LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



D0QDSt.4mDfl 







/.^'•^o'^ *<^^'-^'-y'^ '^^'•^••^.o' V'- 






.♦^•V. 



















v< 



^^ n^ • • • » '^ 










.<• 



~^ 



r ^0* '^-^ -^^ 






*" «i 


















THE GREAT PEACE 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

HKW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



THE GREAT PEACE 



H; H. POWERS 

Author of* 'The Things Men Fight For," "America 

Among the Nations," "America 

and Britain," etc. 



I15eto gotfe 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1918 

AU rights reserved 



^ 



^5 



COPTBIGHT, 1918 

By H. H. powers 



Set up and electrotyped. Published, December, 1918 



DEC 18 1918 



(S)CI.A5()6934 



PREFACE 

When I was asked last August to prepare a book on the 
terms of peace, I consented to have it ready by March, 1919. 
My publishers thought that it should be ready by February 
first if it was to anticipate the march of events. The writing 
was completed in October, but even so, events have gotten 
ahead. It is some consolation to know that the whole world 
shares in this miscalculation. Neither the peoples nor their 
governments, the knowing ones who had all the inside in- 
formation, were prepared for this headlong precipitancy. A 
letter from one of the staff of the Department of State at 
Washington expresses the surprise, not to say the consterna- 
tion, of the government at this sudden development for which 
we were so eager and yet so utterly unprepared. It was in 
anticipation of this unpreparedness that the book was written, 
and yet I too am caught among the unprepared. 

Naturally I have considered carefully whether any change 
should be made in the text as the proofs pass through my 
hands, but save for a few footnotes and minor changes, I have 
left it as it was written. The difficulty in the phraseology, — 
all of it appropriate to the situation of last September, — is 
pervasive. Adaptation to the situation of today would mean 
re-writing. But it is only the phraseology that the armistice 
has rendered out of date. The problems remain, — not one 
of them settled despite confident and contradictory news- 
paper assertion. Even the signing of the treaty of peace, an 
event for which we must perhaps long wait in patience, will 
bring to most of them no immediate solution. If the great 
truth be borne in mind that we are dealing with the slow 
forces of race evolution rather than with political fiats of in- 



vi PREFACE 

stant effectiveness, we shall be little disturbed by these sudden 
eddies in the slow current of events. Momentous as these 
November days have been, they do not seem to me to have 
greatly altered the problem. As I read in these days of 
victory what I wrote in the days of struggle, it is only words 
that I would change. 

N^o doubt the reader will be impatient, — as I was, — to 
get over the generalities of Part I and get to the concrete 
problems of Part II. We have been surfeited with generali- 
ties and abstract propositions. We are eager to know where 
the new frontiers are to be drawn and how much Germany 
is going to pay to Belgium, and what is going to become of 
the Kaiser. But I have found, as I believe the reader will 
find, that there is no getting away from these general prin- 
ciples. We must either master them or they will master us. 
If we do not hold them as reasoned propositions, we hold 
them as prepossessions and unconscious assumptions. Thus, 
there is a universal assumption that people of one speech 
ought to live under one government, and from that we hastily 
conclude that there should be an independent Poland. We 
do not stop to consider that by the same token we ought to 
be British, Alsace should be German, and Switzerland should 
be divided among Germany, Italy, and France. Again we 
assert the right of all peoples to decide their own allegiance. 
That would have justified the Southern Confederacy and 
would insure the crumbling of half Europe into helpless frag- 
ments. Or again we assert the claim of the past and plead 
for the restoration of historic arrangements. That would 
make Xew England British and Florida Spanish while re- 
uniting the Poles and freeing the Bohemians. In popular 
discussion these and other principles are confidently assumed 
as political axioms, — not conjointly of course, for this would 
neutralize them, but singly and for the most part arbitrarily, 
the particular assumption being requisitioned which proves 



PREFACE vii 

momentarily convenient. The writer like the reader is sub 
ject to this lawless tyranny of arbitrary assumption unless 
he sternly guards himself against it. It is for this reason 
that I have ventured to consider with some care the scope 
and the limitations of these principles which are so confidently 
and so carelessly assumed in current discussion. I hope the 
reader will have the patience to do the same. 

Those who have done me the honor to read my earlier 
books on these subjects will see in the present book a larger 
recognition of the psychological factor and something less of 
insistence upon physical environment and cosmic forces than 
in the earlier works. They will perhaps assume that I have 
changed my views as to the relative importance of these 
factors. I should not feel humiliated to plead guilty to the 
honorable indictment. Strange indeed must be the individual 
or the nation that has passed through these four years with- 
out seeing things in somewhat different proportion. The 
very hope of the world lies in such changes as the result of its 
travail. 

But the change is after all more in my theme than in my 
attitude. Hitherto I have dealt with permanent relations 
and with influences extending over centuries. Seen thus in 
longer perspective, history seems primarily the product of 
the cosmic forces. The fume and fret of men seems but 
froth on the surface. Altogether different is the problem 
here considered, the problem of effecting a working arrange- 
ment for the years immediately before us. In this problem 
of the hour and of the near tomorrow, human forces are 
everything. The hate of Bulgar and Greek, the prejudice 
of Moslem and Orthodox and Catholic among the Jugo-Slavs, 
the resentment against German barbarities, — what are moun- 
tains and seas against these fierce energies of the human soul ? 
To treat these as at once almighty and ephemeral, this is the 
difficult art of the statesman. 



viii PREFACE 

I make no apology for my rather pitiless insistence upon 
the difficulties of the problem and the necessarily imperfect, 
even provisional, character of the adjustments which peace 
will effect. The air is full of that irrepressible optimism 
which is at once the hope and the despair of humanity. If I 
have trudged along on the ground while others have aero- 
planed in the clouds, unmindful of the obstacles that beset 
the pathway of plodding men, I have none the less trudged 
cheerfully, confident that the obstacles are being overcome 
and that we shall sometime attain our goal. 

H. H. POWEES. 

Kewton, Mass., 

ISTovember 19, 1918. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAOE 

Author's Preface v 

I Introduction 1 



PAKT I. NATIONALITY 

II Nationalism 15 

III Nationality and Eace 31 

IV Nationality and Territory 43 

V Nationality and Natural Resource ... 55 

"VI Nationality and Trusteeship 67 

VII Nationality and Accountability .... 87 

VIII Nationality and Internationalism . . . 103 

IX Diplomacy and Treaties 127 

PAET II. THE NATIONS 

X Germany 143 

XI Belgium 161 

XII France 175 

XIII Italy 191 

XIV Austria 207 

XV Turkey 242 

XVI Constantinople and the Balkans . . . .270 

XVII Russia and Poland 284 

XVIII The Remoter Powers 297 

XIX Britain 307 

XX America 322 



LIST OF MAPS 

PAGE 

Map of Belgium 163 

Map of Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine Province . . . 181 

Map of Italy 195 

Map of Austria-Hungary 209 

Map of Hungary 213 

Map of Czecho- Slovakia 217 

Map of Eumania 221 

Map of Jugo-Slavia 229 

Map of The Turkish Empire 253 

Map of Constantinople and the Dardanelles .... 271 

Map of Poland 291 

Map of South Africa 311 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

The Great War is passing and the Great Peace approaches. 
The conflict, prolonged and widened beyond our utmost fears, 
is entering upon its fifth year as these lines are written. 
The end is not yet, but the indications are getting clearer 
that the end is approaching and that the end is to be as we 
wish. Beyond doubt an extremely stubborn conflict is still 
before us, with losses that will stagger humanity and with 
possible vicissitudes of fortune which may at times obscure 
the issue, but a calm survey of the situation from a point 
withdrawn from the smoke of battle permits but one conclu- 
sion. The initial advantage of German preparedness has 
disappeared, and the superior resources of the Allies in men 
and materials are unmistakably apparent. The crude and 
hesitant allied strategy of the early months of the war has 
been succeeded by clear vision and fixed purpose. The al- 
most insuperable difficulties in the way of unified command 
have been overcome. Leadership, if not of N'apoleonic 
genius, yet forged in the heat of the great conflict and of 
demonstrated competency, has been assured. Above all the 
incoherence of thought and confusion of purpose, always the 
supreme danger in democratic governments, have been elimi- 
nated. The onslaught of the highly organized Central Pow- 
ers, which so nearly overwhelmed us at the outset, has trans- 
formed our unbridled, wanton energy into disciplined power. 
The more the struggle is prolonged, the more complete that 
transformation will be and the more assured our triumph. 
Such is the outlook at this hour. It may deceive us, for 
nothing is sure before the event, but if the outcome is not 

1 



2 THE GKEAT PEACE 

assured, the obligation of preparedness for the next step is 
clear. It may be presumptuous to assume victory at this 
stage of the conflict, but it is simple prudence to prepare be- 
times for an event which we have willed with all the power 
of our being and which seems increasingly assured. 

And for this event we are not prepared. As far as Berlin 
our pathway lies straight before us, — diflficult beyond com- 
pare, but unmistakable. But from there it is lost in a maze 
of infinite intricacy. If Germany were beaten tomorrow, 
we should be in sore perplexity to know what to do next. 
Preparation for war has left us no time to prepare for 
peace, — nay, more, it has been a bar to any such preparation. 
One of the difficult lessons we have had to learn is that we 
must cease discussing the issues of the war until victory was 
assured. The paramount need was for agreement. To dis- 
agree while we were fighting Germany meant ruin. Hence 
Germany's oft repeated seductive invitation : " Come, now, 
let us reason together." Germany knew that if she could 
start a discussion of peace terms, she could start a dis- 
agreement with all its disastrous consequences. Fortu- 
nately we knew it too, and have had the self-control to 
adjourn till the hour of victory those questions upon which 
agreement will be sure to be difficult and attended with many 
heart burnings. We were agreed with certainty upon only 
one thing, the necessity of defeating Germany. For this 
every nation, every class, every school of opinion, had its 
own reasons. Latin and Saxon, capital and labor, imperialist 
and anti-imperialist, all were in sharpest disagreement on 
some of the issues involved. Fortunately they were agreed 
that the defeat of Germany was more than the issues upon 
which they disagreed. The Latin wished to defeat her be- 
cause she held provinces rightfully his ; the Briton because she 
menaced his necessary sea communications. The laborite rec- 
ognized Germany as unfriendly to the political ascendancy of 



INTRODUCTIOK 3 

labor, while the manufacturer feared the ruthless aggression 
of German " big business." The imperialist saw in imperi- 
alist Germany a redoubtable competitor ; the anti-imperialist 
saw in her the chief protagonist of a hated principle. It 
was thumbs down all round, but for the most varied and even 
opposite reasons. The one condition of successful coopera- 
tion under such circumstances is that individual aims shall 
be subordinated. This has been perhaps our hardest lesson 
as allies, but we have learned it. A few remain who will not 
be silenced, who are so intent upon their particular purpose 
that they are willing to risk defeat rather than that victory 
should fail to realize their hopes. Thus a recent champion 
of ultra democratic reforms declares that if these reforms are 
not realized in the forthcoming peace, the war will have been 
fought in vain. Our allies " must not be permitted to deter- 
mine our purposes " in the war, but we must constrain them 
to make these purposes their own, knowing that this will be 
" for their ultimate good." To this end he urges that Presi- 
dent Wilson should force their hand by the threat of with- 
drawing from the alliance. Our aid being indispensable, 
our terms would necessarily be accepted. This enthusiast 
does not raise the question of what would happen if Britain 
should threaten to withdraw unless we acquiesced in a pro- 
gram of annexation. He sees no disturbing analogy between 
his proposal and the action of Bulgaria who demanded her 
price and sold out to the highest bidder, or that of Italy who 
conditioned her support upon the doubtful acquisition of ter- 
ritories across the Adriatic. To sanction these purposes is 
farthest from his thoughts, for they are purposes which he 
does not approve. But "our" (?) purposes are different, 
and since they have as yet not commended themselves to our 
allies, and these allies show no inclination voluntarily to adopt 
them, it is obvious strategy to bargain with those who oppose 
these purposes when they are in a tight place. 



4 THE GREAT PEACE 

It needs no very profound insight to see that this is intro- 
ducing the principle of belligerency into the Allied camp. 
Strategy is a principle of war, and its use against allies means 
war against allies. If every people, class, or party should 
choose this time to push its advantage under penalty of re- 
fusing to cooperate, it is obvious that cooperation would at 
once cease. For while the radical declares that if peace does 
not assure radical democracy, the war will have been fought 
in vain, a conservative is simultaneously declaring that if 
ultra democracy prevails, " then we have lost the war." To 
the insinuating demand that we should state our case against 
Germany, there has been one consistent answer. We have no 
single case against Germany. We have individual cases 
against her, but as yet no common case. Each belligerent 
has purposes peculiar to itself, purposes in which its allies 
have little interest, purposes which are even mutually antago- 
nistic. Italy wants the Trentino and Trieste, but has no 
direct interest in the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. France 
wants Alsace-Lorraine, but is little interested in, — perhaps 
is secretly jealous of, — Britain's control of the sea. And so 
on indefinitely. The discussion of these aims may produce, — 
almost certainly will produce, — antagonisms and estrange- 
ments, not only between allies, but also between classes and 
special interests within each individual country. 'No suc- 
cessful war of modern times has failed to have its aftermath 
of disappointment and recrimination. England's clemency to 
the Boers alienated large sections of British political opinion. 
The Treaty of Frankfort left divided counsels in Germany, 
and the Treaty of Portsmouth well nigh produced a revolution 
in Japan. This war will be no exception to the rule. It will 
rather be an exceptional case in point. Hence the just char- 
acterization of all Germany's peace offensives as traps. If 
these inherent conflicts of interest and opinion could be lifted 



INTKODUCTION 6 

up into consciousness while Germany is still redoubtable, a 
judicious concession to war-weary Italy or some other ap- 
proachable unit might disclose another Caporetto and breach 
the line. Failing this, it would at least lessen the cohesion 
and weaken the morale upon which victory depends. It is all 
but certain that if the belligerents were to agree to an armis- 
tice and meet in council, conditions would develop, as the ^ 
result of their discussions, which would make the resumption 
of hostilities impossible, no matter how unsatisfactory the 
results obtained. 

All such proposals have fallen flat, save in the deplorable 
case of Russia, whose fate has not been without its lessons for 
the Allies. These proposals have found their supporters, but 
they have everywhere been a dwindling minority. ISTot with- 
out difficulty has a people habituated to free speech and politi- 
cal discussion, seen the reasonableness of refusing to reason. 
Yet in nothing have tbey so justified the claim of democracy 
to be the arbiter of these difficult questions. It is democracy's 
supreme achievement to have perceived that the will to victory 
must exclude all else until victory makes it possible to dis- 
agree and not perish. For disagree we shall and must. 

It is thus that preparation for war has postponed prepara- 
tion for peace, by excluding from negotiation, from public 
discussion, even from individual thought, the grave questions 
incident to peace. With all the pronouncements that have 
appeared, there is as yet scarce a beginning of formulated 
terms. These pronouncements have been, for the most part, 
literary or rhetorical generalizations valuable for rallying 
purposes but not of a nature to enter into a treaty of peace. 
To destroy militarism, to make the world safe for democracy, 
to secure the right of self-determination for all peoples, these 
are legitimate formulas for ideals, but it is clear that if these 
ends are to be furthered by treaty, these propositions must 



6 THE GREAT PEACE 

be translated into concrete terms, territorial, economic, and 
commercial. This is the task of peace making, the task which 
we have adjourned. 

Yet in another sense the adjournment has furthered the 
formulation of peace terms in a way which no discussion or 
negotiation could have done. The concrete task has waited, 
but the psychology of the peoples who are to perform the task, 
has undergone constant and far-reaching change. We have 
ceased to be citizens of a country or a state and have all un- 
consciously become citizens of the world. Undreamed pos- 
sibilities of cooperation among nations have been realized as 
incidents to the great struggle. Equally, the marauder has 
disclosed a power and a will to injure which nothing but the 
experience could have made credible. In particular, our own 
nation has forever discarded the myth of isolation. It long 
ago ceased to be a fact, but the tradition lingered, and along 
with it, not a little of the ignorance, the arrogance, and the 
indifference of which it was the fertile source. If there are 
those who still think we might have avoided this war, they 
must at least recognize that we have not avoided it, and being 
what we are, we should not be likely to avoid it under like 
circumstances again. If the physical conditions permit iso- 
lation, the psychic conditions do not. Whatever reluctance 
we may have felt to accept this conclusion, the constant neces- 
sities of international concert and the fellowship of prolonged 
suffering and achievement have tended rapidly to dissipate it. 
We are reconciled to being a part of the world, an indis- 
pensable pre-requisite of intelligent participation in the great 
world task. If, therefore, we still know little of the compli- 
cated problems with which the peace conference must deal, we 
have been getting ready to know. We have been developing 
the " international mind." 

This was peculiarly necessary for the Allies who repre- 
sent, — partly by chance, to be sure, but not the less really, — 



INTRODUCTIO]^ 7 

the cause of democracy. Democracy, despite its ancient line- 
age, is a comparatively modern thing. Its ancient applica- 
tions were to imits so small as to have no modern significance, 
and its modern applications have been partial at best. 
Broadly speaking, its success has been in inverse ratio to the 
size of its domain. The town meeting has been a success ; the 
state has been less successful. In the broadest field of inter- 
national relations democracy has yet to demonstrate its ca- 
pacity. The great democracy of Britain has had a wonderful 
diplomacy, but not a very democratic one. Nowhere does 
democracy defer so willingly to expert wisdom as in the 
matter of foreign relations. Our own experience is also un- 
convincing. Our diplomacy has been neither wholly demo- 
cratic nor wholly successful, and withal its tasks have been 
much simpler than those of other nations, largely because we 
have deliberately minimized our relations with other states. 

But throughout the domain of democracy there is a clear 
announcement that democracy is to assume the responsibili- 
ties of diplomacy. There is to be no more secret diplomacy. 
International relations like domestic relations are to be deter- 
mined by the popular will. Doubtless the change will be 
less sweeping than these demands would suggest, but there 
can be little doubt that there will be a change and that it will 
be in the direction indicated. The people may not know how 
to rule, but they are plainly determined to try. The forth- 
coming settlement is sure to feel a democratic pressure never 
known before. That settlement will not only involve concrete 
problems affecting every nation on the planet, but it will prob- 
ably establish new principles and lay the foundations of a 
most radical reconstruction of the world order. It is not 
simple tasks but supreme incentives that call democracy into 
action. Such an incentive the present conflict has furnished. 
The settlement will be a people's peace as has been no other. 
No matter who the people's representative may be, he will 



8 THE GREAT PEACE 

listen to the people's voice for tlie constant renewal of his 
mandate. Not once but a thousand times in the course of 
the long negotiations, will be heard the words : '" Our people 
demand this." " Our people will not accept that." If used 
at times as a screen for personal insistence, it will owe its 
serviceableness in this connection to its substantial truth. 
The people will dictate, vaguely, fitfully, ambiguously, but 
not the less imperiously. We have invoked democracy, and 
democracy has come at our bidding, unskilled and unknowing, 
but not the less unafraid. 

Not to the diplomats, whose skill I respect but do not 
emulate, but to the people, their masters, these pages are dedi- 
cated. What shall be the terms of the people's peace, the 
Great Peace ? What are the principles of that better state- 
craft which has been slowly and half unconsciously taking 
shape in the minds of those who through the will to victory 
have slowly won the right to will the world's peace ? And 
what do these principles require in the way of concrete ad- 
justments and arrangements among the mountains and the 
rivers and the seas where men have chanced to be born and 
have snugly nested themselves in the traditions, the preju- 
dices, the loves and the hates of a hundred generations i 

On one point let there be no misunderstanding. Not until 
victory crowns our arms do these questions become the order 
of the day. With the enemy in arms there can be no parley, 
none even among ourselves until we can be sure of our own 
uncompromising and inflexible purpose. Our enemy will not 
spare, and we must not spare. The most criminal of all wars 
is the one begim for a righteous purpose and stopped short of 
a possible triumph. Such a war exacts its toll of misery and 
devastation, yet relinquishes the prize which alone can justify 
the sacrifice. War is the negation of reason, the confession 
that moral forces have failed to safeguard essential human 
interests. A beaten enemy or one who knows that to go far- 



INTRODUCTION 9 

ther is to fare worse, will grasp at the ruse of negotiation. 
The nation that is fooled thereby has not learned the lesson 
of war. Negotiation to the uttermost before war begins ; war 
to the uttermost when negotiation has failed. There is no 
half way ground in the law of war. This is not spite. These 
lines are written in no vindictive or implacable spirit. It is 
the plainest statement of inexorable law that they who draw 
the sword must accept its arbitrament. These pages are not 
written for the enemy, but for his conquerors against the day 
of victory. If they are written somewhat in advance of that 
day, it is in the firm conviction that the will to victory is 
assured. If victory is still to tarry long in its coming, it is 
not too early to prepare for its arrival. When it comes there 
can be no waiting. The misery of the world will brook no 
long and hesitant negotiations. 

It is hardly necessary to add that the writer is not attempt- 
ing to draft a treaty of peace. Such an instrument, of neces- 
sity a task for experts, is but an incident in the larger problem 
of settlement and reconstruction which will require many 
minds and many agencies for its accomplishment. Our at- 
tempt will be simply to answer the question : What should 
the Allies demand? This question takes no account of the 
detailed problem of ways and means, nor yet of the probable 
ability of the Allies to impose their will. The question is 
perhaps best discussed as an academic question. It is well 
to be clear as to what we seek, whether or not the fate of arms 
puts the prize within our reach. Not by way of prophecy, 
however legitimate, but by way of working hypothesis, we 
assume the defeat of Germany as the basis of our inquiry. 
If Germany threw up her hands and cried " Kamerad," what 
would we do with her ? What with her wretched partners ? 
What of the powers now our allies, and of the great world in 
general and possible better guaranties for its peace and order ? 
We will be as concrete and practical as possible in our an- 



10 THE GREAT PEACE 

swers. It avails little to saj that frontiers should follow 
ethnic lines. Where are those lines, and what sort of a Eu- 
rope would we have if we followed them? A little map 
drawing will throw much light upon a dilBcult principle 
which, in the untested abstract, seems so attractively simple. 
Similarly, such principles as self-determination and independ- 
ence. Who or what is the " self " involved and what is the 
scope of the desired " determination." Accepting without 
question the principle of making the world safe for democ- 
racy, what measures is it desirable or practicable for the 
nations in council to adopt looking to that end ? In a word, 
the purpose will be to concrete the problem, not to technical- 
ize it. 

It is hardly necessary to add that inquiries of this kind are 
peculiarly necessary for the American people. We no doubt 
have a very considerable aptitude for practical affairs, but in 
the present struggle we are, by our very location, ignorant of 
the practical issues involved, ^ot one in a thousand of us 
knows that the fate of the world may be determined by the 
possession of a great iron mine in Lorraine, or a pass across 
the Taurus Mountains, or a harbor in the Adriatic. We are 
tolerably good judges of iron mines and passes and harbors 
when once we discover their existence, but we do not live in 
Europe, and have not thought it worth our while as a nation 
to take note of its outworn equipment. So our unencum- 
bered minds find in this field, thus artificially denuded of all 
its concrete realities, a rare opportunity for that aerial po- 
litical philosophy which we as a people affect. It is appall- 
ing with what confidence we generalize from our own highly 
exceptional experience regarding situations in Europe which 
we totally misconceive. We invoke democracy as the cure 
for all the ills which the Central Powers are inflicting upon 
the world, quite overlooking the fact that both the German 
Eeichstag and the Austrian Eeichsrat are almost ideally 



mTRODUCTION" 11 

democratic bodies. A man can vote for deputy in either 
Austria or Germany who could not vote for Congressman in 
Massachusetts. These bodies have no real power, we are 
told. True, because they do not take it. They have all the 
power that the British House of Commons ever had to curb 
autocracy, if they and the people back of them had the will 
to do so. But these peoples do not wish to curb autocracy 
which they believe necessary to give them the unity which 
popular government would destroy. The most superficial 
knowledge of these countries, and especially of Austria, re- 
veals conditions with which our democracy has never shown 
itself able to cope. A knowledge of these facts of physical 
environment and political condition should be valuable, if for 
nothing else, to moderate the excessive confidence of our po- 
litical generalizations. 

Finally, let it be insisted with all possible emphasis, that 
the terms of peace to be agreed upon should be based upon the 
fullest recognition of the special problems and wishes of the 
associated nations. There is a disposition in some quarters 
to recall the fact that we entered the war as a free lance, not 
bound by any pledge to make peace in common with those who 
had so long borne the burden before us. This fancied liberty 
gives us a freedom of action, so we are told, which enables us 
to dictate terms. Conceivably, to those who see no obligation 
that is not " so nominated in the bond." But no possible 
course of action could be more unworthy or unreasonable. 
The nearness of the Allies to the scene of conflict and their 
immediate dependence upon the result gives them a right to 
speak which we can scarcely claim. Were our detachment 
entirely a matter of disinterestedness instead of being chiefly 
a matter of ignorance, our ambition to act as arbiter might 
have some justification. As it is, any such pretension on our 
part is quite unwarranted and its enforcement by coercion, 
direct or indirect, altogether intolerable. We are not more 



12 THE GEEAT PEACE 

disinterested than the Allies. We are simply more ignorant 
of our interests. Above all we are ignorant of their interests. 
It is therefore earnestly to be hoped that our study of the 
problem of peace will be conducted throughout in a spirit of 
profoundest deference for the views and the wishes of those 
who are associated with us in the struggle and who are so 
immediately and vitally dependent upon the outcome. 

It is needless to say that the technical task of treaty draft- 
ing, frontier delimitation, and financial adjustment which 
must complete the agreement reached, is a task for experts 
and one quite beyond the scope of the present work. 



PAET 1 
NATIONALITY 



CHAPTER II 

NATIONALISM 

As we approach the problem of peace, the first question is, 
who is at war ? This question may seem superfluous in view 
of common knowledge on the subject, but a moment's reflec- 
tion will convince us that here at the outset of our inquiry 
there exists a serious confusion of thought. The surface 
fact that we are at war with Germany is held by many to 
conceal a deeper fact of very different purport. On the one 
hand we are assured that our quarrel is not with the German 
people but with the German government, the latter being con- 
ceived primarily as a principle of rule represented by a lim- 
ited clique of persons who are at present its exponents. 
Making due allowance for the diplomacy associated with this 
assertion and recognizing its apparent conflict with the logic 
of events, it can not be doubted that this doctrine has a 
strong hold upon the popular mind. The fact that the powers 
allied against Germany have been from the first predomi- 
nantly democratic and that the fortunes of war have elimi- 
nated the most conspicuous exception, — autocratic, German- 
modeled Japan being easily overlooked, — has tended to con- 
firm this impression that this is a war, not between nations as 
such, but between principles of political and social organiza- 
tion. That it is so in fact admits of no reasonable doubt. 
Popular government is a reality in the western peoples and 
is not yet realized in the Central Powers. If the western 
nations win, their ideas will win with them, while a German 
victory would undoubtedly give a long lease of life and a pos- 
sible extension of domain to autocracy. ISTo doubt autocracy 
and democracy stand to win or lose with their present cham- 

15 



16 THE GREAT PEACE 

pions, at least for long years to come. But whether these 
nations have gone to war primarily as champions of democ- 
racy or autocracy is not so clear. Had this been the issue in 
1914, Japan and Russia would certainly have taken the other 
side. On the outskirts of the two great camps are others 
whose status is not clear. As regards democracy, there is at 
present little to choose between China and Turkey, between 
Bulgaria and Serbia, yet they are in opposite camps. It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that other considerations have 
influenced these nations, — all of them considerably, some of 
them overwhelmingly. Democracy and autocracy will share 
the fate of other characteristics, language, religion, etc. A 
German victory would enormously extend the domain of the 
German language, as an allied victory will extend or confirm 
that of English and French. Yet no one claims that this is 
a war of languages. Incidentally it is so, for the victor's 
language will triumph with him, nor would it be safe to 
assume that peoples are unconscious of this fact or uninflu- 
enced by it. Consciously, and still more unconsciously, they 
are committed in heart to their own familiar speech and will 
sacrifice much for its sake. But this is but one of many 
things to which they are committed and for which they will 
suffer and die. 

Quite comparable to the view that this is a war between 
principles, is the widely held theory that it is a war of classes, 
a capitalists' war, as popular phrase puts it. The argument 
is that wars are brought on by financial interests in the hope 
of gain. This gain may be in the shape of direct profits from 
industries created or stimulated by the war, or the more subtle 
gain of tactical advantage in the class struggle always in prog- 
ress. The argument is often forced and obviously convinces 
less by its cogency than by its congeniality. That there are 
facts which lend themselves to this interpretation is clear. 
War contracts of immense extent are let on easy terms and 



NATIONALISM 17 

result in enormous profits. Currency inflation, always a con- 
comitant of war, even when best financed, sends up prices, 
scales down debts and creates fictitious values. Every war 
has left its legacy of great fortunes, often persisting through 
many generations. Sentiment, too, throws its weight into the 
scale. Labor is adjured in the name of patriotism not to 
press its advantage, and its response may at times enable capi- 
tal to improve its tactical position. 

It would be strange if these possibilities did not appeal to 
certain individuals. That " high finance " or '' big busi- 
ness " should avail itself in a measure of the opportunities 
thus offered is to be expected. That it has at times done so 
on a considerable scale and with far-reaching results is prob- 
able. The action of the National Liberal party, — the party 
of " big business " — in Germany in the present war appar- 
ently furnishes an example. Nor is the influence exerted by 
so mighty an organization as Krupps on minor nations 
through well conducted propaganda a negligible factor in 
determining their decisions for war or peace. 

But when all is said, the facts are hopelessly against this 
theory as an explanation of war. War is destruction, and 
wealth prospers onlv bv production. The disturbance of 
values brings wealth to a few but takes wealth from many. 
The fortunes that war creates are as nothing to the fortunes 
which it destroys. If individuals in hope of gain are moved 
to favor war, even to promote it bv organized effort, im- 
mensely greater numbers are moved by identical interests to 
preserve peace, and there is no reason to suppose them less 
alert or capable than their opponents. Similarly, if war 
gives the employer an advantage over patriotic labor, it gives 
labor a far greater advantage over capital when industry, 
feverishly stimulated and penalized for failure, can suffer no 
interruption. If the rise of wages does not always outstrip 
the rise in prices, the thoughtful laborer will realize that he 



18 THE GEEAT PEACE 

scores an enormous gain if he maintains his standard of living 
at a time when society as a whole is put on short rations. 
War comes to no class as a boon, but upon none does its hand 
rest more lightly than upon labor. 

All of these considerations are greatly enhanced as war 
passes from the local to the general. It is possible to imag- 
ine big business in America or England deriving advantage 
from a war in the Balkans in which we were non-participants 
and our profits as purveyors were undiminished by war taxes. 
Even so, a close analysis would disclose offsets for these advan- 
tages, though hardly sufficient to neutralize their temptations. 
But when the conflagration becomes general, these advantages 
disappear. The farmer whose crop is good in a season of 
partial crop failure, may prosper and even come to associate 
prosperity with crop failure. But let the blight extend to 
his own crop and the truer relation reveals itself. Even with- 
out this immediate loss, it must slowly become clear that pros- 
perity is sadly limited under conditions of widespread indi- 
gence. 

Ko, the " interests " find their opportunity in a condition 
of general prosperity and maximum production of wealth. 
Nothing is more certain than that the great capital interests 
in modern states are overwhelmingly committed to peace. 
The destroyer of wealth is their enemy, no matter where he 
operates, for he destroys the medium in which they operate, 
the sole possible source of their gains. So clear is this fact 
that sanguine experts before our present war were found to 
declare that organized industry and finance had made war 
impossible. The holders of the purse strings held the dogs 
of war in leash. This was an exaggeration of the power of 
organized finance, as others then contended and as the result 
has shown, but there was never a question then, — there can 
be no question now, — as to where the interests of capital and 



^NATIONALISM 19 

finance really lie and on which side their representatives are 
to be found. 

But while this is not fundamentally a class war, it is so to 
a degree incidentally. No one of the present belligerents 
entered this war to emancipate labor or to subject it to the 
tyranny of capital. Yet it will not escape any fair-minded 
observer that the status of labor is far different on the one side 
from what it is on the other. Despite their enormous accu- 
mulations of capital, no countries have so restricted the power 
of capital by legislative and social action as have Britain and 
the United States. In none is the influence of labor so pow- 
erful. Not only in the great Anglo-Saxon centers but still 
more in the self-governing dominions of Australia and New 
Zealand, labor sits in the seat of the mighty as nowhere else 
in the world. Neither the equity nor the adequacy of these 
conditions is here in question. We are concerned only to note 
the fact that the Anglo-Saxon countries stand as the supreme 
representatives of the principle of labor emancipation. Noth- 
ing approximating these conditions can be found in Germany 
and Austria. On the other hand, in Germany especially, 
organizations of capital, instead of being checked by anti- 
trust laws as with us, have been favored, even forced, in the 
interest of national efficiency. Again we will waive the ques- 
tion of desirability or undesirability of these policies. It is 
sufficient to note the facts. 

Once more, it behooves us to recognize that this antithesis 
does not hold throughout. Industrial conditions in China, 
Japan, Serbia, or Greece, bear little resemblance to those 
above described. Least of all did Russia, at the time of her 
entering the conflict, rank with the emancipated powers, nor 
has her orgy of liberty contributed certainly to the emancipa- 
tion of labor, however effectually it has destroyed capitalist 
tyranny. It is perfectly certain that the line-up was not on 



20 THE GKEAT PEACE 

this issue, yet it is equally certain that the line chances to be 
drawn between the forces of industrial freedom and reaction. 
A German victory will mean the perpetuation of the all- 
powerful Cartels of German industrial organization and the 
extension of their sway over new territories together with the 
subjection of labor. A victory for the Allies must as cer- 
tainly extend their industrial system with its attendant eman- 
cipation of labor. 

Other popular theories of war might be considered, but 
always with the same result. The contestants in the great 
struggle are not fighting in the first instance for an abstract 
principle or for a virtue, or for a private or class interest, 
but for a great concrete human thing which embodies 
these principles and interests only incidentally and im- 
perfectly, and that along with many others. For this is a 
war between nations. And we find our place in the 
ranks, not because we approve the principles or interests 
there represented, but for the very much humbler reason that 
we were born there and have, for the most part, no option but 
to stay. This does not mean that we do not care for these 
principles, virtues, or interests, but that we recognize the 
impracticability of working for them otherwise than as em- 
bodied in the nation. We try to make our nation represent 
the principles and the special interests that we believe in, al- 
ways with but partial success, but w^e accept the result and 
make the best of it. For after all the nation is the only place 
where these things have any real existence. The only virtue 
there is in the world is the virtue that is in virtuous men, and 
they are only partially virtuous at best. So with nations. 
None of them have ideal class relations or perfect democracy, 
but they have the only democracy and the only class relations 
that there are in the world. Outside of them there is only 
imagination, a valuable thing, but not at all to be mistaken 
for the reality. It is only out of the democracy of the pres- 



]SrATIOJTALISM 21 

ent and the imperfect class relations of the present that the 
better democracy and the more perfect class relation can grow. 
Thus the nation is the repository of all that the race has 
achieved in the way of democracy and all related interests, a 
very imperfect repository, no doubt, but the only one. The 
treasure is in earthen vessels, but there are no other vessels, 
and without them there would be no treasure. 

It is therefore the deepest of all social instincts, an instinct 
more imperious than that of our own self-protection, which 
impels us to defend the nation. Within the home circle we 
may criticise, attack, and modify to any extent, but we must 
not sacrifice the nation or carry our criticism to the point of 
weakening it in the great competition of the nations. When 
the existence of the nation is ever so remotely at stake, criti- 
cism and party struggle must cease. Thus the two great 
parties in the British government are usually in sharpest 
antagonism, but when a foreign crisis menaces the British na- 
tion, it is the unfailing practice that the leader of the oppo- 
sition in Parliament rises at the first opportunity and pledges 
the support of his party to the government. There must be 
no opposition within, no criticism, no discussion of principles, 
while there is danger from without. These lines are written 
not by way of advocacy, but simply in explanation of the 
fundamental political principle of our age. Men have every- 
where judged that the nations are essential as repositories of 
the great social forces and that they must be defended from 
all attacks, violent or insidious. There are a few who seem 
to think this policy a mistake. They see in the nation not so 
much a repository of social forces as an interference with 
their larger play. They would quite disparage nationalism 
or abolish it altogether. Perhaps the future may have such 
things in store, but certainly not the present. To eliminate 
the nation in the interest of humanity would be like tearing 
down our house that we might see the sky. 



22 THE GKEAT PEACE 

It is hardly necessary to add that in this cult of the nation 
we have usually very little choice as to which nation we shall 
support. The nations are not all alike, and it is often pos- 
sible for the intelligent citizen to see that some other meets 
his ideas of justice and political wisdom far better than his 
own. But he can not usually change his allegiance on that 
account, nor would it be well if he could. The free lance may 
espouse the cause of a nation with which he is in sympathy, 
as Lord Byron espoused the cause of Greek independence, but 
few are so situated that they can play this part, and it is a 
very ineffectual part. Changes of allegiance are diflScult and 
are seldom made for political reasons. The allegiance of 
adoption is always an imperfect allegiance. But quite aside 
from this question of feasibility is the deeper question of 
right. The crude and imperfect nation may have quite as 
good reason to exist as the more advanced nation. It is all 
the nation that somebody has. It may hold little as yet in 
the way of finished achievements, but it holds unknown pos- 
sibilities, possibilities that no other nation may be able to 
hold, and that are somebody's all. Hence the instinct of 
national support is unquestioning. Stand for principle, vir- 
tue, party, class, within the nation, but never as between na- 
tions. Stand for your nation. Such is the instinct and law 
of being in the twentieth century. Perhaps no people has 
ever shown more devotion to abstract principles or contended 
more earnestly for them than the French, and never were 
they more engrossed in their several advocacies than in 1914. 
But ask a French soldier what he is fighting for, and what 
will he reply ? For liberty, equality, fraternity ? for democ- 
racy? for socialism? Not one of these. The answer will 
not vary among a thousand. " Pour la France." 

Perhaps the most disturbing thought about this blind in- 
stinct of nationalism is that it so often tenaciously maintains 
barriers and divisions that are clearly superfluous. It has 



NATIONALISM 23 

the vices as well as the virtues of conservatism. We could 
all mention manifestations of nationalism today that are an 
unqualified nuisance, though there might be disagreement as 
to the examples chosen. Indeed there are no more serious 
obstacles in the way of the settlement that we seek than cer- 
tain perfectly gratuitous and obstructive assertions of nation- 
alism. Virtues like individuals have the defects of their 
qualities. It is friction that makes it so hard to move the 
railway train, but it is friction that makes it possible to move 
it at all, for without friction the wheels would not grip the 
rails. Nationalism must therefore be dealt with in its dual 
capacity of conserving and obstructing force. Few will ques- 
tion the wisdom of the French soldier who fights for France, 
but we did question, — and as the world judges, justly — the 
wisdom of those who fought to make a separate nation out of 
our southern states. There are other cases. The mere shout 
of nationalism for any chance unit without consideration of 
size, location, or suitability, is not a claim to our endorsement. 
For in one important particular nations are not like men. 
They are after all only devices for human convenience, with- 
out assignable limit as to size or character. Hence it is that 
they are able to devour and absorb one another, either wholly 
or in part, becoming thereby proportionally larger. Men 
have fixed frontiers, and though they may greatly interfere 
with one another's privilege and convenience, this frontier 
of personal identity is never passed. Not so with nations. 
They may not only annex one another's territories, but may 
quite assimilate one another's people, displacing the senti- 
ments and habits which constituted their former nationality 
by others suitable to the new allegiance. This latter process, 
to be sure, is often slow and difficult, and seemingly becomes 
more difficult as the national organization becomes more elab- 
orate. But if we take a long glance backward over history 
we shall not onlv discover cases in which it has been com- 



24 THE GREAT PEACE 

pletely successful, but we shall perceive that this process of 
merger and assimilation, often violent and painful, has been 
the regular method of national growth in its earlier stages. 
Indeed, it is not clear how else great nations could have 
come into being in a world which was all parceled out among 
little ones. It is pretty clear that nations ultimately reach a 
stage of development where such merger and assimilation is 
no longer possible, — indeed it seems to be one of the mistakes 
of our great adversary not to have fully appreciated this fact, 
but up to a certain point, while nations are still plastic, such 
mergers, even though temporarily unwelcome, are a normal 
method of uniting men. The principle of self-determina- 
tion, — a principle vital to nations as to individuals, — pre- 
supposes in each case a certain maturity. Applied rashly it 
means disintegration. 

Since nations are but conveniences and, as it were, way- 
stations on the road toward unity, why, it may be asked, 
should we not at once effect the inevitable union, thus ending 
once for all, these conflicts which threaten to engulf human- 
ity ? Easier said than done. !N"ations serve the purpose of 
social convenience, but it is not therefore to be assumed that 
they are mechanical contrivances which can be used or junked 
at pleasure. The nation is not contrived; it grows. Its 
essence is not an agreement but a sentiment, or rather, a com- 
plex maze of sentiments, associations and attachments, the 
product of incredibly slow growth. Have we any idea of the 
painful experiences through which man has come to his pres- 
ent estate ? Slowly, with countless misgivings and misadven- 
tures, he has stumbled out of the isolation of his early cave, 
living down old suspicions, laying the ghosts of strange ter- 
rors, accustoming himself to new restrictions, and learning 
new arts, new wants, and new loves. For millenniums each 
he has conned the lesson of the family, the clan, the tribe, the 
petty state, the nation, learning their passwords, their sym- 



NATIONALISM 25 

bols, and their mystic rites, ever revolting and as often 
scourged back to his arduous task. With every widening of 
his frontier he has faced new terrors and met new foes, ever 
constrained to enter upon new pathways where his progress 
has been marked by his blood. Ever and anon the frontier 
has claimed him as its victim, yielding him a sullen obedience 
only at the price of the amenities and the attachments which 
were the glory of the narrower circle, and making him the 
outlaw of progress. The structure of civilization is cemented 
with the blood of humanity, and not with that of the soldier 
alone. 

And now comes our heedless enthusiast and asks : " To 
what purpose all this clamor of the nations ? Why love the 
one more than the other? How are you better off to live 
under this government than under that ? " Eorsooth ! How 
am I better off to live in my own skin ? 

It is the A B C of our inquiry to recognize the fundamental 
character of nationality. It is beside the mark to descant 
upon the weakness of nationality and the advantages of inter- 
nationalism. We have the one and we have not the other. 
That the larger circle, the wider horizon, to the limit of a 
unified humanity, is preferable to our present national units 
we may readily admit. The unification of humanity is the 
obvious goal of human progress, the unavoidable hypothesis 
of all constructive thought. But the question is not as to the 
merits of human unity. The question is how to get it. 
We shall not get it by the disparagement of nationality or 
by the reversal of the process by w^hich organization has thus 
far been attained. Nations have their unlovely traits. 
They are selfish, suspicious, and prone to resort to force in 
the assertion of their claims. Scrupulosity, candor, and 
deference have not been the rule in international relations. 
That is unbeautiful, seemingly bad, though an exact appraisal 
of results is difficult. But nations have their beautiful side. 



26 THE GKEAT PEACE 

Sheltered behind their barriers of prejudice and suspicion are 
discipline and forbearance, cooperation, protection, and love. 
There the ritual of life works its marvel of harmony in feel- 
ing, thought, and action. These things are good, just the 
kind of things that the great human nation of the future will 
require in larger measure. To decry nationality, to belittle 
its services, to emphasize its limitations and picture it as the 
antithesis of human unity instead of its partial realization, 
this is not to advance the cause of unity but to retard it. 
Nationality is human unity half grown. If we ever get full 
unity, it will be by the further development of nationality. 
Even now that further development is visibly taking place 
before our eyes. It is seemingly to be the crovsming glory 
of our own race to develop the super-nation, the unforced 
merger of independent nations committed to pacific coopera- 
tion in the field of the largest human interests. 

It is not irrelevant to note in this connection that the critics 
of nationality, though ever reprehending its divisive influence, 
seem to have little real sympathy with unity as hitherto real- 
ized in human experience. The emphasis is always upon 
liberty, with a visible sense of the irksomeness of cogent or- 
ganization. Their ideal seems rather to be that of an easy- 
going fellowship in which friction is reduced by reducing the 
points of contact, an organization that is less exacting, more 
Bohemian in spirit, and free from the irksome constraints of 
the more strenuous nationalism. It is significant that inter- 
nationalism, rather than supernationalism or pan-nationalism, 
is the term chosen to express this ideal. The assumption is 
that present nations are to persist, but wnth their teeth 
drawn, this concession to the rejected principle of nationality 
being made as a matter of expediency. But nationality as 
thus tolerated, is to lose its old time significance as the unifier 
of humanity. 

Concurrently with this emasculation of nationality, the 



NATIOI^ALISM 27 

utmost emphasis is laid upon local independence or self-deter- 
mination. It is easy to see what all this comes to. Divisive 
tendencies now held in check by the demands of nationalism 
would be released and half completed assimilations inter- 
rupted. The painfully widening mental horizon would again 
narrow. Localism, provincialism, with an imsubstantial fic- 
tion of human unity, these are the inevitable, — perhaps the 
desired, — result. The internationalist is conspicuously the 
advocate of local and internal reforms. Fortunately for our 
instruction, this philosophy is being applied by Hussia, with 
what results, those most concerned may soon be expected to 
judge. 

These conclusions will evoke protest. The internationalist 
disclaims any intention of disparaging nationality. A promi- 
nent socialist has recently declared : " Internationalism is 
not anti-nationalism. Internationalism presupposes nation- 
alism. It is the inter-relation of nations. The maintenance 
of national integrity and independence is one essential con- 
dition of internationalism." No doubt these declarations are 
sincere and represent the attitude of internationalists as a 
class. They have no intention of destroying nationalism. 
But we are less concerned with intentions than with tend- 
encies. The internationalist recognizes in nationalism an 
" essential condition of internationalism," but does he recog- 
nize the essential conditions of nationalism ? International- 
ism may not purpose the destruction of nationalism, but the 
disparagement of nationalism has always been its concomi- 
tant, its pervasive spirit. The animating spirit of interna- 
tionalism has ever been, — not national solidarity, but class 
solidarity, — and it is national solidarity which is the " essen- 
tial condition " of nationalism. 

It is to be noted finally that nationalism is the striking 
characteristic of recent political development. This means 
that the present age is preeminently the age of nations and 



28 THE GKEAT PEACE 

that sentiment and doctrine have followed in the wake of fact. 
The definiteness and coherence acquired by the modern na- 
tions in the last two or three centuries and above all the 
immense increase in the daily services rendered by the nation 
in our time, all this has developed a corresponding group 
consciousness out of all proportion to anything known in 
earlier times. When the individual knew the nation only as 
the tax gatherer or through the summons to the corvee or the 
army, his enthusiasm for the nation was not very ardent. In- 
deed, had the call to service not come through his local liege 
lord to whom he sustained a closer and more human relation, 
it is doubtful whether the state could have commanded his 
allegiance. But when he meets the state daily in the post- 
man, when the railway, the highway, and all the complex ma- 
chinery of modern national life reveal the state as the great 
doer of needful things, the national consciousness becomes an 
abiding, all-overshadowing fact. Hence the tendency, — 
seemingly somewhat counter to the spirit of the age, — toward 
separation under the lead of nationalism. The languid na- 
tionalism of an earlier day permitted the pseudo-union of 
Xorway and Sweden, presaged a like union of Spain and 
Portugal, and permitted the drastic germanizing policy of 
Maria Theresa and her son with but feeble opposition. The 
nationalism of today, tenfold intensified by the larger service- 
ableness of the state and reinforced by the literary revival 
which has restored the consciousness of past achievement, has 
made short work of these unions based on indifference. Nor- 
way and Sweden have separated, Portugal repudiates the 
idea of merger with vehemence, and the strangely consorted 
nationalities of the dual empire are obsessed with a spirit of 
virulent nationalism. Beyond question this is but a cross 
current. The dominant tendency of the age is toward the 
formation of larger nations, a tendency which necessarily 
implies merger and the disappearance of nationalism in some 



NATIONALISM 29 

of its narrower and more obstructive manifestations. But 
this tendency toward merger is offset by the tendency toward 
the intensification of nationality. The units to be merged 
become more resistant, less assimilable. If the American 
colonies had not united when they did, they could not now be 
made into a nation. 

It is with this paramount fact of nationality, a fact legiti- 
mate in its essence, however extravagant and troublesome in 
its occasional manifestations, that we have to deal. The task 
of the peace conference is essentially a task in nation making. 
Prepossessions against this fundamental fact of nationalism 
will make that task impossible. Equally, such prepossessions 
will make it impossible for us to anticipate and contribute to 
that task. 

It is a corollary of nationalism that nations have rights 
which are exclusive as regards one another. If nations have 
a right to exist, they have a right to rule within their own 
domain. That is the meaning of nationality, the meaning of 
democracy, the basic principle of our western civilization. 
Never is that principle likely to be so sorely tested as in the 
moment of its triumph. What a temptation to our emanci- 
pated labor to compel the emancipation of labor in the Cen- 
tral Powers ! What more generous than to reach a helping 
hand to an oppressed fellow worker! What more prudent 
than thus to eliminate the danger of his underpaid competi- 
tion ! How eagerly certain elements in Germany itself would 
welcome such intervention ! The clamor of appeal is already 
raised. Similarly the cause of temperance, of suffrage, of 
democracy, see here their opportunity to follow in the wake 
of the ponderous war tank into fastnesses otherwise so difiicult 
of assault. It is no disparagement of any of these interests 
to sternly resist their plea. Triumphs thus won would be 
specious, premature, and in the long run, disastrous. " Lib- 
erty is not a gift; liberty is an achievement." For liberty 



30 THE GREAT PEACE 

conferred but unachieved is not liberty but only indulgent 
autocracy. 

In particular should democracy be on its guard lest, in a 
moment when its triumph necessitates the wholesale recon- 
struction of alien systems, it forget its own nature in its eager- 
ness to prevail. Make the world safe for democracy, — yes, 
by all means, at any sacrifice of blood and treasure. But the 
safety of democracy is infinitely more dependent upon for- 
bearance than upon aggression. The people that wills, even 
passively, to have an autocratic government, is more nearly 
exercising a democratic prerogative than the people who 
would force a democratic government upon them. The ut- 
most that can be justified, — and this only with the extremest 
circumspection, — is to demand for subject or component peo- 
ples the right of self-expression. Even so we rob them of 
the stimulating privilege of self-achievement. If it be 
argued that the very existence of an autocratic Germany with 
its militarist traditions and purposes, threatens the liberties 
of neighboring peoples, the reply must be that Germany will 
be autocratic until she elects to be otherwise. Have we not 
learned the futility of baptizing the unregenerate ? To com- 
pel Germany to desist from her attack on our liberties, — that 
is our plain duty. To compel her to adopt free institutions is 
to misjudge both our rights and our powers. Germany thus 
veneered would not be less hostile, nor should we profit by 
a deceptive reliance upon her democratic mask. It would 
be a grave abuse of the happiest of rallying cries if we should 
try to make the world safe for democracy by forcing an un- 
sought freedom upon an unprepared people. 



CHAPTER III 

NATIONALITY AND RACE 

Since nationality holds tlius the supreme place in the 
human scheme of things, the problem of peace becomes a 
problem in constructive nationality. The war has put exist- 
ing nations to a terrible test, and in addition to the damage it 
has wrought, it has disclosed every sort of defect and patho- 
logical condition. There seems to be no likelihood that this 
peace conference, like that of a hundred years ago, will try 
to restore the status quo ante. A radical reconstruction seems 
inevitable. It therefore becomes highly important to under- 
stand the essential conditions of national life. 

In seeking the basis of nationality the first thought is that 
it rests on the foundation of race. Words used in this con- 
nection seem everywhere to imply such a dependence. But if 
by race is meant blood relationship, no existing nation can 
lay much claim to race unity. If we carry our inquiry back 
to the earliest social group, the primitive family, we shall 
find nothing that can be called race purity. The mixing 
process is already at work. Marriage, especially in the days 
of wife purchase, is the reverse of exclusive, and slavery is 
even more indulgent. Even the Hebrews had their Gibeon- 
ites. 

But such race purity as the family represents quickly van- 
ishes in the turmoil of early nation building. Migration, 
conquest, and wholesale deportation with the ruthless disre- 
gard of all prejudices and race barriers, mingles the most 
alien elements. With the advent of more settled conditions, 
these violent agencies are less active, but their place is taken 

31 



32 THE GREAT PEACE 

by individual migration, that silent infiltration of alien ele- 
ments which permeates the entire population, and that the 
more as civilization advances and the facilities for movement 
increase. What we see going on in America is what goes on 
everywhere and always in the growing parts of the world. 
The notion of a pure bred race is a fiction. 

It is perhaps worth noting that within wide limits this 
mingling of the races encounters no protest of reason or in- 
stinct. The union of Caucasian and Mongolian, of black and 
white, is repugnant to civilized instincts, but aside from 
purely prudential considerations as affecting problems of 
language, religion, life habit or social status, unions between 
our closely related western races occasion no repugnance. It 
seems to be, as indeed it is, the natural thing. Blood rela- 
tionship is a negligible factor in our problem. 

But though the fact of kinship is negligible, the name is 
still a name to conjure with. The consciousness of race, — 
the latter vaguely conceived as connoting kinship, — is one of 
the most stubborn with which we have to deal. Though a 
people may be mingled of every race and may know them- 
selves to be so, yet there is no cry to which they will rally as 
they will to that of kinship. The most mongrel of nations 
will sacrifice its most substantial interests and risk its very 
existence in the service of its assumed kin. This is the 
animus of pan-slavism, irridentism, and the like. The ap- 
peal, to be sure, has often had its ulterior motive. The Pan- 
slavist Pussian, so much in evidence in earlier discussions, 
was much more concerned about the Dardanelles than about 
his Polish or Balkan relatives, while the Pan-German, with 
characteristic effrontery, uses the race catchword in behalf 
of the annexation of territories never inhabited by the Ger- 
man people. But these very abuses are suggestive of the 
strength of race sentiment. The German expansionist would 
not call his program Pan-German if there were not something 



NATIONALITY AND EACE 33 

in that covert suggestion of race unity, even in the most inap- 
propriate connections. How much more when, as in the case 
of Italy, the assumption has an outward semblance of justi- 
fication ? If blood unity is gone forever, the consciousness of 
it is not, and no factor in our problem requires to be handled 
with more deference and tact. 

The truth is that while kinship is a fiction, race is a fact. 
We are united by blood only in the most casual way, but we 
are united by other bonds which are far more tangible and 
significant, and which are almost as closely associated with 
birth as kinship itself. We may be born of the bondwoman 
in the house, but we are none the less born in the house. 
The brotherhood that really counts in the world as such 
doesn't come from being born of the same parents, but from 
growing up in the same family. Members of the same race 
are therefore those that have grown up in the same race fam- 
ily, that have joined in the same concert exercises and have 
learned the same ritual of life. Included in this ritual are 
all the most fruitful activities of our lives. Our much 
vaunted individuality is and must be only a trifling interest 
in an essentially ritualized existence. More than this be- 
comes social weakness ; much more becomes insanity. Every 
people is constantly busy in developing its ritual, in reducing 
all the activities of life to uniformity, and correlating them 
with one another, all in the interest of efficiency and economy. 
The way chosen is often arbitrary. It matters little what 
tune we sing, but we must sing together. Correlation is the 
very essence of society. 

The supreme example of this correlation is language. To 
be able easily and with precision to communicate our ideas 
and feelings to those with whom we must cooperate is an ob- 
vious necessity, yet one hardly appreciated till once we are 
deprived of it. A few hours' isolation among a people whose 
language he did not speak has more than once made the 



34 THE GKEAT PEACE 

writer appreciate the embarrassments of the builders of the 
Tower of Babel. As language develops, it becomes the intel- 
lectual counterpart of our entire life, establishing relations of 
incredible finesse, and in turn, stimulating and enticing life 
into activities of unlimited subtlety and complexity. Inas- 
much as language is the counterpart of all else and the con- 
dition of all else, it is often assimied to be the effective basis 
of race. 

But there is much else than language. Indeed pretty much 
all else that there is falls under this same great law of cor- 
relation. The food that we eat is determined originally by 
the spontaneous resources of our habitat, but this option of 
nature rapidly disappears. Time was when Peru grew pota- 
toes and our own country maize, but now both are grown over 
the world. We are learning to make nature very subservient. 
If the choice of our food was once with her, it is now with us. 
If France, Germany, and America, drink three different 
kinds of coffee, it is not because they produce different kinds, 
for none of them produce any, and all of them get the ingredi- 
ents on essentially the same terms. The choice of articles of 
food and still more of the methods of preparation and service, 
are not nature's choices but social choices. This is still more 
true as regards costume, household organization, business and 
social procedure. Every department of life, every possible 
human interest, comes under the sway of this same great law 
of correlation and concert. The result is an all-embracing 
social ritual, a ritual with antiphonal and responses, a ritual 
with parts for the few and parts for the many and parts for 
all, but a ritual without which we are nothing. The indi- 
vidual voice, to be sure, is heard, but to no purpose unless it 
in turn becomes ritual. Failing that, it is only discord. 

All this is truism, but truism too often forgotten at the 
moment when recognition is vital. More truisms must be 
noted if we are to proceed with hope of profit. 



NATIONALITY AND RACE 35 

The obvious function of all this correlation is convenience, 
— convenience of so cogent a character as to be virtual neces- 
sity. Suppose we decide to eat different food from that 
usually eaten about us, food quite as vs^holesome and equally 
congenial to climate and soil, but not the social choice. Sup- 
pose even less, that we merely decide to have it prepared or 
served by other than the usual method. The result is at 
the least, a vast inconvenience and an expenditure of time and 
effort out of all proportion to the advantage gained, which 
last is almost invariably nil. The writer has had rather un- 
usual opportunity to notice the application of this principle 
to his fellow countrymen in travel, — laborious and time con- 
suming effort repeated day after day and meal after meal, 
to effect trivial changes in the ritual of foreign cookery or 
service, when a tithe the effort devoted to self adaptation 
would have removed the annoying friction by conformity of 
the traveler to the ritual of the land of which he is the guest. 
Equally and more true is this principle in other parts of 
social procedure. Imagine, if it be possible, that no social 
standards afford guidance in the matter of dress, — that each 
must devise and in some way secure the necessary costume. 
Conceive the labor involved in devising, in securing the neces- 
sary materials, in making or guiding the making, to say noth- 
ing of the weird and soul estranging result. Intelligent 
women are sometimes criticised for subserviency to " sense- 
less " fashion. The sufficient answer is that they can not 
afford the time and effort to do anything else. The purpose 
of social ritual is to lighten the burden of life, to bring pro- 
ducer, purveyor, and user into frictionless correlation, and 
to make the myriad perplexities of social choice forgettable 
things. 

But social ritual, though originating in convenience, is not 
therefore a mere utilitarian calculus of advantage. It 
quickly develops a coimterpart of unreasoning, passionate 



36 THE GEEAT PEACE 

attachment which finds its only equal in maternal affection. 
Customs the most arbitrary and the most irksome in the learn- 
ing, ultimately intrench themselves behind this barrier of 
feeling and resist all encroachment. We may recognize that 
our way is no better than another, that in a given situation 
it is a handicap and that we can come to the mountain far 
easier than the mountain can come to us, — the suggestion of 
change is none the less intensely repugnant to us. More often 
we quite lose the power to recognize the true relation, and our 
ritual becomes to us the very constitution of nature. The 
Englishman who thought the French word for bread, pain, 
very peculiar '' because it is bread, you know," is a classic 
illustration. When the ritual of social procedure is thus 
completely assimilated to the fundamentals of nature and the 
normal attachments have been developed, innovation becomes 
sacrilege. 

This, then, is our definition of race, a body of men united 
by a social ritual. Born into this ritual, no matter from what 
stock, they grow up in almost abject dependence upon it. The 
adaptation once effected, any second adaptation becomes im- 
mensely difficult and is perhaps never complete. The mere 
learning of a foreign language is but the most trifling begin- 
ning. Said an American who lived for years in Germany 
and had brought back with him a beautiful German wife: 
" I thought I had become German in sympathy and in habit, 
but if I had known how many trifling differences of instinc- 
tive judgment and procedure existed between us, recurring 
day by day and creating friction in the most unexpected rela- 
tions, 1 would never have married her." 

The essence of the social ritual is thus twofold. Objec- 
tively it is convenience. Subjectively it is congeniality. 

We now have to notice certain facts in this connection 
which are vital to our problem. The first is the arbitrary 
character of this ritual. All important as it is, the impor- 



^NATIONALITY AND RACE 37 

tance is in the ritualization, not in the thing ritualized. 
When an army receives the order, " march/' it might conceiv- 
ably start with either foot, but it is imperative that all start 
with the same foot. Judged by inherent fitness, many social 
forms are absurd. What more arbitrary than that an obso- 
lete riding coat with skirts split to go over the horse's back 
and cut away in front to accommodate the rider's bended 
legs, should have become the exacting model for full 
dress of men who never mount a horse. It is the pitfall 
of the inexperienced to judge these social prescriptions 
by intrinsic fitness. But intrinsic fitness is as nothing to 
social uniformity, especially in connections where forms are 
primarily of symbolical value. Any one could devise a coat 
more suitable, but probably no society in the world could 
secure its adoption and emotional consecration, as inscrutable 
influences have secured it for the coat in question. As society 
progresses, this arbitrariness of social choice tends to increase. 
As our mastery over nature increases, the range of theoretic 
choice widens. But the range of actual choice does not widen 
in proportion. Social considerations of propriety take the 
place of nature's vanishing barriers and again, straight is the 
gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life. For the 
multiplication of options means confusion, and ritual and 
convention are the only escape from chaos. Not that the new 
options bring no advantage, but they are available only with 
social sanction. They must be ritualized to be really avail- 
able and legitimate. 

It is therefore illegitimate to assume that race character, 
resting as it does essentially upon arbitrary choices, is inher- 
ently sacred. Some other word for bread would do quite as 
well if once adopted. Language, custom, even religion and 
government, are largely arbitrary as regards their inherent 
character. Their only advantage, — a very great one, to be 
sure, — is that they have acquired social and emotional sane- 



38 THE GEEAT PEACE 

tion. There is much talk today of reuniting religious denom- 
inations which are no longer separated by differences in the 
" essentials." In fact they are separated by something far 
more essential than articles of creed, — by unconsciously 
developed rituals of form and expression in a multitude of 
insignificant things which are an obstacle to that congeniality 
which is the condition of helpful association. This is no 
disparagement of the project of union, a policy often dictated 
by the weightiest considerations of economy and efficiency. 
It is merely a suggestion of where the true obstacle to union 
is to be found. The tenacity of social ritual and the difficulty 
of changing it can scarcely be exaggerated, but broadly speak- 
ing, other forms would do as well. The practical man will 
urge changes only with extreme circumspection, but he is not 
dealing with the sacro-sanct. 

One final and all important consideration remains. What 
determines that a given people shall develop a ritual ? There 
are numberless observations to be made in this connection, 
but only one that is of vital importance. One fact over- 
shadows and embraces all others. They develop a ritual be- 
cause they live together. They can not develop it unless they 
live together ; they must develop it if they do. This means 
that race is a product of CLSsociation, a result of living to- 
gether. 

But this important truth is always at variance with the 
facts of the moment. There are at all times people living in 
a unit territory who are not of one race, and people of one 
race who are not living in one territory. Thus, it would 
seem that the Transylvanians and the Hungarians or the 
Poles and the Germans, separated by no natural barriers, 
ought to be united in race, but they are sharply opposed. 
Conversely, the ancient Pha?nicians and Greeks and the mod- 
ern Anglo-Saxons are conspicuous examples of race unity, 
though occupying widely scattered territories. The obvious 



NATIONALITY AND KACE 39 

explanation is that these races have changed their habitat. 
They lived together long enough to develop their language and 
race character, and then migrated to another territory where 
the diverse race characters have as yet resisted the unifying 
influence of habitat. Sometimes, however, a more subtle 
change has taken place in the territory itself, barriers have 
been virtually eliminated and habitats once distinct thus 
merged into a unit. This little noticed tendency is peculiarly 
characteristic of recent years. Time was when very moder- 
ate barriers kept peoples pretty effectually apart. The Ap- 
ennines almost prevented communication between Venice and 
Florence, giving to the two peoples a markedly different char- 
acter through the distinctive period of their history. Today 
the barrier is scarcely noticeable, and Italy is a unit habitat. 
The very considerable diversity which had grown up between 
the different parts of Italy has perceptibly diminished since 
railways and other modern facilities have lowered the divid- 
ing barriers, the process of unification being aided, of course, 
by the substantial unity bequeathed to all by Eome. In the 
great plains of eastern Europe, mere extent and sparseness of 
population long prevented unification. With extreme sim- 
plicity of life and the feeblest incentive for intercourse and 
exchange, mere expanse and other trivial obstacles sufficed to 
keep peoples apart and slowly to diversify them. Witness the 
separatism of the Ukraine unmotived by barriers of mountain 
and sea. Against such separatism the quickened life of the 
present with its freer communication and its more varied re- 
gional demands operates as a powerful unifying influence. 
The result, however, is to imify the habitat much more than 
the people. Hence the irritating incongruity between race 
and habitat, the seeming refutation of the truth that the one 
is the product of the other. The tendency is in consequence 
to attribute to race an absolute character and to accord to it 
a deference to which it is not entitled. Race character is 



40 THE GREAT PEACE 

derivative in origin and arbitrary in essence. The forces 
making for unification are undoubtedly gaining at the ex- 
pense of the divisive forces. While recognizing the tenacity 
with which races hold to their language and customs, political 
prevision can not wholly ignore the fact that they are a 
waning power. When a conflict presents itself between race 
integrity and the most obvious requirements of territorial con- 
venience, the former may not unreasonably be asked to make 
concessions. Eace interests are not always paramount. 

It will be noted that this conclusion is somewhat in con- 
trast with that reached in tlje preceding chapter regarding 
nationality. ^Nationality must not be confounded with race. 
Eace is merely one of the bases of nationality, ordinarily the 
most important one, but never the only one, and in exceptional 
cases quite subordinate to other factors. It is a great ad- 
vantage to a nation to be based on race unity, but it is not a 
necessity. Switzerland is a nation, and withal a very suc- 
cessful one, but the Swiss are not of one race. Physical 
conditions of habitat are here so much more important than 
race unity that they not only effect the union of diverse races, 
but that without appreciable tendency toward assimilation. 
Great Britain, again, is a nation, but the diverse races united 
under its sway, English, Scotch, Welsh, and Cornish, being 
less separated by physical barriers, are visibly undergoing 
assimilation. The Cornish have lost their separate language, 
the Scotch nearly so, and the Welsh in part, and complete 
assimilation seems plainly foreshadowed, but as yet British 
unity is a unity of nationality with but an incomplete unity 
of race. 

More striking and difficult examples are found in the great 
imperial combinations of Britain and of Eome. Eoman 
unity made no pretense to being a unity of race. Indeed, 
for a long time nothing more was attempted than the barest 
recognition of Eome's paramount authority. Eome had long 



NATIONALITY AND RACE 41 

been mistress of the world before she even attempted unity of 
administration. With the ultimate unification of adminis- 
tration, however, there inevitably came a steadily increasing 
measure of cultural and even of racial unity. Eoman archi- 
tecture, with wide variation of forms, but always Roman, be- 
came universal. Even the Roman language displaced the 
less developed of the subject tongues, thus completing the 
unity of what we now instinctively call the " Latin races," a 
unity developed from the most pronounced diversity within 
historic times. More significant still is the consciousness of 
unity which persisted in Roman Europe for many centuries 
after the decay of the Roman power, a feeling that the world 
unity which that power represented must somewhere still 
exist, however much in abeyance. This was neither a unity 
of race, for none such existed, nor a unity of state, for politi- 
cal authority had long since passed away, but a unity essen- 
tially national, although on so vast a scale that usage hesi- 
tates to apply the term. The more recent and less developed 
case of the British Empire presents similar phenomena. 

We waste our time here in attempts at exact classification. 
The cases are few and so highly individual that classification 
helps us little. But it is clear that the group solidarity which 
has received such accentuation in our day, is something else 
than race unity. Race consciousness should unite the Dutch 
and Flemish, the Germans and Austrians, the Americans and 
Canadians, and divide the Swiss. If given full sway, it 
would recast very extensively the political map of the world. 
But race is a waning rather than a growing power. The 
awkward recrudescence of race separatism in our day at- 
tests rather than disproves the assertion. It is the protest 
of an alarmed race consciousness which foresees its doom. 

Nationality is again to be distinguished from mere po- 
litical authority resting upon no foundation but physical 
coercion. The authority of the Austrian monarchy has not 



42 THE GREAT PEACE 

succeeded in uniting the diverse elements of that perplexing 
population into a nation, though they unquestionably con- 
stitute a state. It is difficult to speak of the United King- 
dom of Great Britain and Ireland as a nation, though it is 
undoubtedly a state. But while the state is not the nation, 
it tends to become one. German Alsace became completely 
merged in the French nation (though not in the French race). 
Cornwall, Wales, and Scotland have become merged in the 
British nation, and are apparently in process of a further 
merger into the British race. There is a clear dependence 
of state upon nation, and of nation upon race, but each de- 
pends upon other things as well. Moreover the dependence 
works the other way. The state requires national feeling as 
the condition of its stability, but let the state be once estab- 
lished and judiciously maintained, and national feeling will 
result. Prussia was built upon the resentful incorporation 
of Frankfort and Hanover, but both are now safely Prussian. 
Bavaria and Saxony were hardly more favorable to the Em- 
pire, but their loyalty in 1914 was unquestioned, xs'or can 
the general desirability of these mergers be questioned, what- 
ever their present embarrassments. 

To summarize, race unity based on language and custom, 
has lost ground in our day, and nationality, a unity based on 
other considerations, chiefly economic, territorial, and poli- 
tical, has acquired the ascendancy. Nationalism stands, on 
the whole, for the larger, though not for the complete union 
of mankind. 



CHAPTEE IV 

NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY 

We have seen that nationality is the key to our problem 
and that nationality is closely connected with race. Indeed 
some would have it that the two should be identical, that a 
race should always be a nation and a nation always a race. 
The trouble, it is contended, lies just here, that nations have 
been formed which are not based on unity of race and so 
are inharmonious, one race tyrannizing over the other as the 
Austrians do over the Bohemians, the Magj-ars over the 
Croats, and the like. Let each of these races be a 
nation by itself and all will be well. This is an 
enticing theory in the abstract, but when we begin to apply 
it, we at once discover that something besides race is neces- 
sary to make a satisfactory nation. It is absolutely neces- 
sary that the race that is to form a nation should be satisfac- 
torily situated. For instance, if a race is divided and scat- 
tered, some here and some there, with alien populations in 
between, it is usually recognized as impracticable to form 
them into a single ethnic nation. Either they must form a 
number of smaller nations alike in race but unable to unite 
because they lack the necessary territorial unity, or they must 
be formed into a single nation with incorporation of the alien 
elements. In either case race unity is plainly not enough. 
Territorial unity is also necessary to the forming of a satis- 
factory nation. Even the sea, — which is quite as much a 
bond as a barrier, — usually makes national union difficult. 
It has made it impossible for the Anglo-Saxon race to form 
a single nation, despite its pronounced unity and its control 

of sea communications. 

43 



44 THE GREAT PEACE 

But the territorial requirement is for something more than 
unity. There are certain elemental conveniences which are 
quite as necessary as unity itself to successful national life. 
To start nations without these is to run so large a risk of 
failure that no prudent people will attempt it. Eirst among 
these requirements is defense. A nation's territory and the 
wealth which it accmnulates upon it in the shape of houses, 
roads, factories and the like, constitute its capital. The na- 
tion that can not put its possessions under lock and key, as 
it were, simply invites aggression. Undoubtedly we may 
hope for greater respect for national rights and something 
of collective enforcement of them as time goes on, but recent 
events have not tended to reassure us as regards the present. 
Nor can we hope that the time will ever come when the nation 
like the householder will not need to take reasonable precau- 
tions. In any case it is a present necessity of nations to pro- 
tect themselves, and therefore a prime requisite that the 
national domain should be reasonably capable of defense. 
In particular it becomes important that nations should be 
delimited on reasonably equitable terms. A national bound- 
ary may be an arbitrary line throuoli a plain, — not an ideal 
frontier, surely, nor easily capable of defense, but still an 
equitable one, as the two neighbors face each other on essen- 
tially equal terms. But when a natural barrier exists be- 
tween two peoples with fastnesses of immense strength, and 
the line is so drawn as to give these all to one party, making 
his domain impregnable and leaving that of the neighbor 
completely indefensible, the inequity is such as virtually to 
destroy the latter's independence and create a relation of 
vassalage. Very few are aware of the number of strategic 
frontiers which are now of that character and the part they 
have played in the present conflict. Thus, Italy has lived 
all her national life under the sword of Damocles, her fron- 
tier towards Austria running, not along the mountain crests, 



NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY 45 

but far down the Italian slope. This has made Austria per- 
fectly safe, while Italy was always exposed to Austrian ag- 
gression. A nation so situated could not disagree with so 
dangerous a neighbor. It was this helplessness which drove 
Italy into the Triple Alliance, a most unnatural combination, 
and this again that induced her to join the Allies, hoping 
thus to remove the hated menace and secure an equitable and 
defensible frontier. It so happens that the territory needed 
to rectify this frontier is all Italian so that racial and terri- 
torial considerations unite in demanding the change, but it is 
easy to understand that if the population were alien, — as in 
certain like situations it is, — the strategic consideration 
might be of so great importance as to overbear the claims of 
race. It would in any case be a factor that could not be 
ignored. 

But territorial demands do not stop here. War, though 
a possibility which a prudent people can never leave out of 
account, is after all the exception. Provision for peace is 
even more necessary. There are territorial requirements 
of peace as well as of war, and these have rapidly become 
more exacting with the development of civilization. Here, 
perhaps, more than anywhere else, popular notions are in- 
adequate, particularly in countries whose perceptions have 
not been sharpened by need. A country so completely 
equipped as is our own, with all the facilities for modern 
civilized existence, easily overlooks its debt to an exception- 
ally favorable situation. That which it owes to accident or 
good fortune, it easily assumes to be the common lot of na- 
tions. It is safe to say that there is not a single nation in 
existence that does not lack some important element of our 
wonderful endowment. If we had more experience of their 
needs, we should have more s^nnpathy with their strivings. 

It is important to note in this connection that the develop- 
ment of civilization in the last two or three centuries has 



46 THE GKEAT PEACE 

materially modified what we may call the minimum terri- 
torial requirements of nationality. The exceedingly simple 
life of an earlier age was essentially local and self-sufficing. 
Every community, almost every household, raised its own 
food, built its own dwellings, made its own tools, and wove 
its own garments. Things brought from distant localities, 
— mostly articles of personal adornment and luxuries of 
limited use, — demanded little in the way of transportation 
facilities. The pack horse and mountain trail were suf- 
ficient. Access to foreign lands was a convenience, but not 
a necessity, the more so as life, thus compelled to be local 
and self-sufficient, developed local possibilities that are now 
undreamed of. For a woman of the Middle Ages to be de- 
nied the privileges of the cloth mart was small privation. 
She might still be decently, perhaps sumptuously clad. For 
the woman of today the cloth mart is absolutely necessary. 

This all-roundness of community life had its political con- 
sequences. It made little nations possible and that in com- 
paratively indifferent situations. Bohemia might be not 
only happy and prosperous but highly civilized without hav- 
ing harbors or extensive commercial facilities. Even in the 
interior of Russia such independent political units could and 
did flourish. 

But something has changed all that. Perhaps the steam 
engine was chiefly responsible. But whatever it was, the 
result was that industry of every kind became specialized, 
communities ceased to be self-sufficing and became dependent 
upon one another, sending great distances and in many di- 
rections, not for a few things of exceptional use, but for every- 
thing. Probably the modern American brings his food an 
average of a hundred miles and other things much farther. 
Hardly a home is so humble that its equipment does not lay 
under tribute every grand division of the globe. 

It is a peculiarity of the new industrial order that it was 



NATIONALITY AND TEERITOKY 47 

compelled from its very nature to be virulently competitive. 
The new way of making goods, by great mechanisms driven 
by nature energies, was cheaper, vastly cheaper, than the old 
way, but on one condition, namely, that they should be made 
in very great quantities. But if made in great quantities, 
there would obviously be more than single communities or 
small districts could use. It vras therefore necessary to get 
the largest possible markets. Hence the belligerent imperial- 
ism of the new industry. It could not remain contentedly 
at home and allow other countries to go on in their old way. 
It simply had to have world markets or it could not work at 
all. It broke into these old countries with their hand artisan- 
ship and local self-sufficiency, as a desolating revolutionary 
force. Some of them like China tried to stem the tide but 
to no avail. Had the new system been capable of local appli- 
cation, the innovators might possibly have been more con- 
siderate. As it was, they developed, as men always do, 
a philosophy of society consonant with their needs and sword 
in hand demanded its recognition. The intrinsic legitimacy 
of honest trade had became an axiom of western thought and 
was maintained by force of arms. 

The all important characteristic of this new order was the 
increase of transportation. For every one of us, every day, 
four tons of goods are moved a mile by the railroads alone. 
Other agencies probably move as much more. Transporta- 
tion has probably increased a hundred-fold as compared with 
the days of Elizabeth. Such an increase has been made 
possible only by a complete change in transportation methods. 
The development of transportation facilities has become a 
prime concern with modern nations. They are in that re- 
spect somewhat like private concerns. When one firm em- 
ploys auto trucks, its competitor can not get along with pack 
mules or carts. The securing of favorable sites for rail- 
roads (one accession to the territory of the United States 



48 THE GREAT PEACE 

was made exclusively for that purpose), for industrial plants, 
and above all for the great harbors which modern shipping 
requires, is of capital importance and is indeed a chief pre- 
occupation of modern statecraft. 

It will readily be understood how completely such a revolu- 
tion invalidates the territorial standards of earlier national 
life. It is important to notice this because nationality is be- 
ing continually advocated on the strength of former national 
possession and achievement. Bohemia, Poland, Serbia, and 
other nations of the past are applicants for readmission to 
the family of nations on old territorial lines. The argu- 
ment is simple and at first sight plausible. " We once were 
independent, prosperous, and civilized. Why can we not, 
with the same territories, be so again ? " The answer should 
be easy in the light of the foregoing. " Prosperity and 
civilization now rest on a different basis from what they did 
in your day." The modern nation can no more get along 
with the old outfit than the modern housewife can get along 
with the spinning wheel and the distaff. This is not to 
prejudice the case of these or other candidates for nation- 
hood, but they must meet the new requirements if they are 
to win the privilege anew. No greater folly could be com- 
mitted than to set up new nations without the basic requisites 
of present-day national life. 

The consciousness that new things can not be as the old is 
curiously betrayed in certain of the extreme nationalist pro- 
posals recently offered for our consideration. Thus an ardent 
protagonist of Bohemian independence urges the reconstruc- 
tion of Bohemia as an independent nation, but can not for- 
get the fact that Bohemian territory has no access to the sea. 
This, he sees, will never do. He therefore proposes that 
Bohemia be accorded a narrow strip of territory which should 
serve as a runway to the sea. This pipestem appendage 
would, of course, be alien in population and would work havoc 



NATIONALITY AND TERKITOEY 49 

with other nationalities quite as much entitled to unity and 
perhaps to independence as Bohemia herself. It would be 
a standing provocation to hostilities and yet entirely indefen- 
sible, a positive marvel of misadjustment. But what would 
you? An independent Bohemia must have access to the 
sea. Assuredly, but the historic Bohemia in whose name 
the new Bohemia is invoked, had no harbors and needed 
none. Thus she has bequeathed no raw material out of 
which the necessities of a modern Bohemia can be constructed. 
Similar difficulties present themselves in connection with the 
reconstitution of Poland, and perhaps in other cases as well. 

The meaning of it all is clear. The past has bequeathed 
to us a lot of little nations with their little patrimonies, once 
ample for nationhood. They ask to be continued under new 
conditions which permit none* but nations more ample and 
more liberally endowed. Professing themselves willing to 
be little, they demand, — the conditions demand, — an equip- 
ment which is possible only for the big. We will not attempt, 
for the moment, to reconcile this conflict of interests. We 
are concerned to note, first, that such a conflict exists, that 
race unity is at war with the requirements of modern equip- 
ment, and second, that race unity is an old fact, the product 
of existence under conditions that have now passed away, 
and the other is a new fact, the requirements which new con- 
ditions have inexorably forced upon the modern world. It 
requires little insight to predict the ultimate outcome of such 
a struggle. The Bohemians will have a seaport, whether or 
no, and they will pay for it by such concessions from race 
unity as are necessary. 

With all possible insistence let it be repeated that these 
words are written in no unsympathetic spirit. It is not the 
intention to disparage these products of the patient dis- 
cipline of past ages. The legacy of race ideals, race sympa- 
thies, and race inspiration which the past has left us must 



50 THE GREAT PEACE 

be accounted among our most precious possessions. To treat 
them lightly as things to be brushed aside at convenience, to 
note only the barriers which they interpose in the way of 
progress, this is the opposite of wisdom and of statesman- 
ship. But there is not one of these precious inheritances 
that has not itself been purchased at the expense of lesser but 
like sentiments which have died that it might live. With 
what agonies of heartache the Scottish clans yielded to the 
strong hand that welded them into the weapon of Eobert the 
Bruce! How many memories of Bannockbum have had to 
be forgotten or remembered with kindlier thoughts ere 
the kilties could find their glory in Waterloo and the Marne ! 
That the one must increase and the other decrease is the lesson 
of all history. The process will not be hastened by con- 
tumely and reproach. The existing horizon is the possible 
horizon for the moment, and the enthusiasms of today are the 
only possible parents of the larger enthusiasms of tomorrow. 
We must reckon, — not grudgingly but s^Tnpathetically, — 
with the products of historic nationality. But we must not 
sacrifice to them, — we are powerless to sacrifice to them, — 
the vital requirements of modern life. These new require- 
ments, these larger physical conditions, have the same power 
to create their spiritual counterpart of sentiment and con- 
geniality, their new race unity, that foimer conditions have 
had. Prudence requires respect for the nationality of the 
past, but progress requires respect for the nationality of 
the future. 

It will long ago have occurred to the impatient reader that 
an easy way of removing this conflict is to be found in co- 
operation. An independent Bohemia must indeed have ac- 
cess to the sea, but why a monopolized Bohemian access ? 
Why can not some neighboring seaboard nation permit the 
use of its facilities by arrangement ? It can. This is not 
a matter of speculation but of fact. Such arrangements 



NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY 51 

exist. Germany ships via Antwerp, Switzerland via Genoa, 
and the like. But while experience attests the possibility 
of such arrangements, it also witnesses beyond question that 
they are never satisfactory. They are impeded, partial, and 
precarious. They are better than nothing, better, it may 
be, than any available alternative, but they remain irksome 
at the best. It may seem very unreasonable of Germany to 
want Antwerp for her very own, but what would we say to 
an alien-owned New York which we were permitted to use 
by arrangement? It is safe to say that such a New York 
would never have attained a quarter of its present size and 
that the diverted traffic would have followed more expensive 
routes to less convenient harbors. 

Here, quite naturally, the internationalist sees in his pro- 
posal a cure for the evils of jarring national interests. Let 
the precarious arrangements referred to be guaranteed by 
the associated nations and the uncertainty is removed. Yes, 
if something can guarantee the associated nations. The pro- 
posal to neutralize or internationalize important ports or 
traffic ways which are necessarily used by different nations, 
is an elaboration of the same principle. Such an arrange- 
ment, it is urged, would make it possible to have an inde- 
pendent Bohemia, and in short, any number of little nations 
without territorial distortions. 

It may seem ungracious to suggest that this is one of the 
very objections to internationalism. It summons men to the 
larger brotherhood by promising them a larger freedom to 
indulge their narrower prejudices. The world feels uncom- 
fortable just now because of an unusual amount of readjust- 
ment which it is called upon to make. The little unities 
that stand for nothing but the past, that correspond to noth- 
ing in the life conditions of the present, are feeling the piti- 
less pressure of these new conditions. We are constrained 
to enter into larger relationships, to adjust ourselves to larger 



52 THE GKEAT PEACE 

groups and get acquainted with strange people. It is all so 
uncongenial, so irksome. We are homesick for the little home 
circle out of which we have been driven into this great cheer- 
less, uncongenial world. 

And just as we are feeling the irksomeness of this larger 
relationship, and uneasiness is passing into resentment and 
revolt, along comes the internationalist and launches his 
anathema against this thing that irks us. He tells us that 
polyglot empires and unions not based on congeniality ought 
not to be. How welcome such doctrine! In exchange for 
this odious reality which chafes us, he summons us to a su- 
preme unity, to the world fellowship, a fellowship that seems 
to demand no concrete sacrifices, to entail no immediate and 
irksome relations. And withal and above all it permits and 
even enjoins the return to the earlier congenial relation with 
its local exclusiveness and prejudices. The appeal is en- 
ticing. 

It may be conceded that this response to the appeal of in- 
ternationalism is quite illogical. If internationalism ever 
becomes a fact among men, it will be no painless union. It 
will require such a shedding of prejudices and such a read- 
justment of mental habit as no nationalism ever yet imposed, 
and the serious internationalist doubtless realizes this and is 
willing to pay the price. IsTor need we question for a moment 
the sincerity of its prophets or the elevation of their motives. 
But all unconsciously the gospel of internationalism owes 
its glamour in large part to its indulgent attitude toward 
provincialism. Its immediate tendency is disintegrating, 
whatever its promise. So pronounced is this relation that dis- 
integration is usually the first plank in the internationalist 
platform, the one upon which present effort is chiefly con- 
centrated. Russia is not altogether a fair example, but her 
case is none the less relevant. She has proclaimed the larger 
human unity and denounced the irksome unity of the nation 



NATIONALITY AND TERKITOEY 53 

under the name of self-determination. The resulting disin- 
tegration is apparent, but hardly the resulting unity. 

Conceding all that may be claimed for internationalism 
as the goal of human endeavor, it is impossible to avoid the 
query whether the disintegration of the present larger aggre- 
gates is the way to get it. These have been painfully formed 
by the slow removal of obstructive sentiments, the formation 
of larger cohesions, and the successive widening of men's 
horizons. The little has grov^Ti into the large. May not 
the large grow into the universal ? 

In summary, nationality is based upon race and upon 
physical' conditions. But race is itself the product of earlier 
and long standing physical conditions. Conflicts between 
the two are due to changes in physical conditions, changes 
due in part to migration, but in greater part to the develop- 
ment of larger relations of co-operation and interdependence. 
In its present high stage of development race sentiment is ex- 
ceedingly tenacious and imperious, often arrogating to itself 
an absolute and permanent character and yielding reluctantly 
to changed physical conditions. Changes in physical condi- 
tion have of late been rapid and far-reaching, the newer de- 
mands for successful national life requiring larger areas and 
better facilities than were formerly necessary. Present race 
feeling, therefore, does not fit present national requirements, 
which latter are too recent to have developed the larger race 
sentiments except imperfectly in certain favored localities like 
Great Britain. It is a transition age, an age of narrow senti- 
ments and broad requirements. Working arrangements must 
be based on compromise. Yet it is well to remember that race 
sentiment is itself a product of physical conditions and that 
new^ conditions inevitably produce new sentiments. Historic 
nationalism is a stubborn but a waning force; specialized 
industrial civilization a permanent and growing power. This 
must increase and that must decrease. The working adjust- 



54 THE GEEAT PEACE 

ments which we are called upon to effect will call for very 
large concessions to these great spiritual inheritances from 
the past, but these concessions should be made in full recog- 
nition of this fundamental fact. The Great Peace must be 
based on a larger justice, a deeper sympathy, and a fuller 
deference than we have hitherto known, but it would indeed 
be pitiful if that deference and sympathy were construed in 
the interest of provincialism and the perpetuation of petty 
prejudice among men. Not so would it become the Great 
Peace. 



CHAPTER V 

NATIONALITY AND NATURAL RESOURCE 

At the basis of national life there is always an economic 
problem. An essential condition of the nation as of the 
family is an assured livelihood. Briefly and by exception, 
a nation may live upon its endowment as a family may live 
by consuming its patrimony, but such an existence is preca- 
rious and demoralizing. Nations can not long escape the 
wholesome necessity of providing for their own necessities. 
Exemption from this requirement, even for a brief period, 
results in a degeneration of tissue which is speedily followed 
by national decay. Spain and Portugal are classic examples 
of nations ruined by being privileged for a time to live on 
the fruits of other men's labors. 

It is therefore pertinent to inquire at the founding of the 
nation as at the founding of the new household, — is economic 
support assured? If not, then nationality will be handi- 
capped and stunted. Such a result has its dangers, not only 
for the nation in question, but for the general community 
of nations. The indigent nation is apt to be the tool of the 
unscrupulous, like the indigent individual. Relations of ex- 
treme dependence involve responsibilities which may well 
be the subject of the closest public scrutiny. 

Eirst in importance in the inventory of a nation's economic 
resources must be reckoned its soil. This, with its correlate 
of climate, is the natural source of its food, clothing, and 
much of its shelter and permanent equipment. It is true 
that all these things may be, and commonly are, secured in 
part from outside the national limits, but to the extent that 

55 



56 THE GEEAT PEACE 

this is necessary, the nation becomes obviously dependent 
in its most fundamental interests. In war, importation is 
difficult if not impossible, and dependence upon it quickly be- 
comes onerous. But not alone in war is the relation irk- 
some. The purveyor is always in some sense a master, and 
national independence, under such conditions of dependence, 
is to a degree a contradiction in terms. 

The present war has served to emphasize what all the 
world knew but had not previously appreciated. That some- 
thing like universal famine was a possibility as a result of 
interruption of world commerce, had hardly occurred to us. 
Yet we have seen the food producing countries themselves 
put on short rations, while millions of bushels of the coveted 
wheat spoiled for lack of transport. Equally, we have seen 
local production stimulated beyond precedent or supposed 
possibility by distress. It may be doubted whether nations 
will ev'er again accept complacently the extreme dependence 
which has characterized England and Belgium in recent 
years. Possibly the accumulation of a surplus may help to 
insure against possible lean years ; but for the most part, these 
nations must resort to the unwelcome expedient of costly 
artificial stimulation, if their limited agriculture is to meet 
the increasing demand. 

Be this as it may, in our task of nation building, we can 
hardly overlook the importance of these fundamental re- 
quisites of successful nationality. Europe has not always re- 
membered this need in her nation making. When Greece in 
1830 was constituted an independent nation, by the European 
powers, the very able prince who was called to guide the 
destinies of the little state, declined the invitation on the 
ground that Thessaly, the natural granary of Greece, was 
not included. But the powers were timid and were guided 
as usual by a great variety of considerations which made it 
seemingly impracticable to provide adequately for the wants 



NATIONALITY AND NATUKAL EESOUKCE 57 

of the fledgling nation. Their decision held, and an impru- 
dent and incompetent prince rashly assumed the responsibili- 
ties which the other had declined. The result was complete 
failure. The powers were obliged to do their work over 
again, to include the necessary grainland, and to secure a 
more competent leader. 

Capacity to produce food staples is of prime importance, 
but by no means the only desideratum. Ability to provide 
a " balanced ration " is most desirable. Agricultural variety 
with its larger guaranty against the vicissitudes of nature, 
stock and their products, fruit and the numberless delicacies 
of the civilized table, these all count. Nor does the require- 
ment stop with food. The impending shortage of wool and 
the disappointing cotton crop of the present year are re- 
minders of our dependence for other essentials upon the soil. 
A narrow and highly specialized productivity, even though 
ample in amount, again necessitates exchange and involves 
dependence, and this again incites to effort to better the na- 
tion's economic position, it may be by those violent efforts 
which it is our problem to prevent. 

The needs above noted are fundamental to all nations and 
to all civilizations. The Indian who disputed the possession 
of hunting grounds with a rival tribe was actuated by the 
same motives that today impel Germany to annex the grain 
fields of Courland. But there has slowly developed in the 
western nations a need which in its magnitude has not char- 
acterized earlier civilizations and is not now felt by certain 
great peoples. The distinctive characteristic of our western 
civilization is its dependence upon minerals. In this it dif- 
fers from the great civilizations of the east. Their equip- 
ment is essentially of vegetable origin. Nothing so impresses 
the traveler in China as the number of things made of bam- 
boo which with us are made of metal. If to vegetable prod- 
ucts we add earthenware of one sort or another, the product 



58 THE GREAT PEACE 

of minerals whose supply is universal and unlimited, we have 
the essential basis of these great civilizations. 

In contrast, our civilization has learned to avail itself, — 
and that at a rapidly increasing rate, — of minerals and more 
particularly of metals the annual production of which already 
mounts into the hundreds of millions of tons. Scarcely a 
year passes that does not witness the transfer of some im- 
portant article from the vegetable to the mineral category, 
apparently never to return. The recent general adoption 
of metal bedsteads and the introduction of metal office fix- 
tures now in progress, are cases in point. 

The advantage of this metal civilization is obvious. Noth- 
ing else could make possible the mighty enginery of modern 
industry or war. We perhaps do not often enough reflect that 
it has the great defect of ultimate exhaustion. Great as is 
the wealth of certain metals like iron still reposing in the 
bowels of the earth, the supply is not unlimited, and local 
scarcity is already acutely felt. Furthermore, continued 
exploitation must be under less favorable conditions, with 
the possibility that we may experience economic exhaustion 
even if physical exhaustion is still remote. The time may 
yet come when men will hunt iron as men hunted it in the 
Middle Ages, reserving the costly stuff for necessary imple- 
ments and invoking for vulgar uses again the unfailing timber 
or bamboo. 

Be the future what it will, wealth of iron and coal is to- 
day the much sought dower of favored nations. A reasonable 
supply of both is, if not indispensable, at least of such ex- 
treme importance to modern nations that they will go to al- 
most any lengths to secure them. Doubtless a people may 
live happily without these resources, but they cannot form 
a nation of great wealth and power without them. The na- 
tions that have developed great population, great wealth, and 
great political power, have all been industrial nations, at 



NATIONALITY AKD NATURAL RESOURCE 69 

least in modem times. Agriculture creates no such accumu- 
lations of capital, no such enginery of power, no such huge 
masses of population, as does industry, which, in the western 
nations, is directly or indirectly based on the exploitation of 
mineral resources. Doubtless such a development brings 
its grave problems and perplexities. The philosopher might 
perhaps counsel a people to resist these dangerous advantages, 
but peoples in their onward groping find little opportunity 
to heed philosophic counsel. In our war with man or nature, 
the all-compelling demand is power. That, the exploitation 
of metal industries assures beyond the wildest imaginings 
of a soil tilling people. 

Again this war has emphasized the great lesson. The na- 
tions that are winning are those that can forge the heavier 
sword. Here, everywhere, the cry is for more, and ever more, 
millions of tons of coal and steel. It takes steel to make 
cannon, and steel to make shells, and steel to make ships. 
And the while we are straining every nerve to provide these 
things, we are reminded on every side of the myriad demands 
of peace which passed unnoticed until denied. Contrast 
the pitiful weakness of Italy that, without coal or iron of 
her own, waits a suppliant for the supplies that are needed 
to stem the tide of invasion. There is warrant for the belief 
that with coal and iron mines of her own, Italy, even the 
weaker Italy of today, might have been knocking at the gates 
of Vienna. But Italy with coal and iron of her own. would 
not have been the Italy of today. An immensely larger 
population, a vastly larger accumulation of capital and in- 
dustrial appliances capable of conversion to war's emergency 
uses would have changed the problem in toto. Is it any 
wonder that the nations want coal and iron ? 

It will of course be urged that economic provision is not 
necessarily dependent on political control. This is true, as 
present conditions prove. Italy and other nations have se- 



60 THE GEEAT PEACE 

cured their coal and iron, like many other commodities, by 
importation, and must apparently continue to do so. It is 
not to be supposed, however, that such provision is satisfac- 
tory, even if assured. Districts having coal and iron, com- 
modities that are difficult of transport, have an immense ad- 
vantage in the development of the basic industries over dis- 
tricts not thus provided. The mere mining of coal and ore 
employs a large population, and this necessarily belongs to 
the district in question. When it is remembered that it takes 
four tons of coal and several tons of ore and stone to make a 
single ton of steel, it will readily be seen that the basic in- 
dustries tend strongly to gravitate likewise to the locality 
where nature has located their heavy materials. Thus a 
farther increment of industrial population tends to develop 
in such centers. 

To those to whom nationality is nothing but an inconse- 
quential prejudice, it may seem of no moment whether such 
a population own the allegiance of a particular nation or not. 
But men do not so judge. These men pay taxes and their 
wealth, — often very large, — is an asset of the state. They 
are available to recruit the armies of their state. They are 
in all respects of the stuff that states are made of. If the 
members of a nation are of importance, by the same token, 
these possible additions are important. 

But we may perhaps add another reason for desiring the 
incorporation of such districts into the territory of the na- 
tion. It is important, not only to get population, but to as- 
similate it to the race which is nationally paramount. The 
assimilation of agricultural populations is very slow. In- 
frequent contact with assimilative elements, and perhaps a 
mental habit less susceptible to these influences, makes such 
a population tenacious of alien speech or ways. But such 
industrial centers as above described, especially if developed 
by the alien annexing power, draw their population from 



NATIONALITY AND NATTTEAL RESOURCE 61 

other sources and predominantly from the dominant nation- 
ality, if it is suitable. It is comparatively easy to implant 
the new language and race sentiments in such a mobile popula- 
tion during the period of its fluidity. Such additions, there- 
fore, not only strengthen the nation, but strengthen 
the race, results obviously to be desired if race and 
nationality are conceived to be important. Whatever 
the reasons, — and it is safe to say that aggressive 
nationalism is but secondarily concerned with the reasons, 
— there is nothing that the nations want more than deposits 
of coal and iron. Campaigns are conducted and treaties 
framed with very large regard for these prime essentials 
of national life. Some of the most sensitive frontier prob- 
lems in Europe turn on these stores of mineral wealth. On 
debatable ground, with a population already hybrid, they 
are the most tempting of all opportunities to shift by slight 
changes of boundary or effort, the whole political and racial 
equilibrium of the family of nations. The enormous in- 
dustrial development of central Europe in the last fifty years 
has inured to the benefit of Germany because she acquired 
the mineral basis of that development from Erance in 1871. 
By that transaction Germany acquired more than the fields 
of Alsace-Lorraine, more than their iron and coal, more than 
their two million people. Quite beyond the limits of these 
provinces, in the region of the belching furnaces and the busy 
workshops, some millions of men today speak German and 
loyally support the German cause who would never have ex- 
isted had the trains carried their coal and their ore the other 
way and fed them to the furnaces of Erance, to call into 
being there the other millions that have not been. For the 
mines bring forth men, and men after the nation's kind. 
Small difference in the end, will some one be found to sug- 
gest ? Perhaps so to those who view the whole with an out- 
sider's indifference, but to France with her thinning line of 



62 THE GREAT PEACE 

defenders, and to Germany with her plans of world dominion, 
these millions one way or the other may be the difference 
between success and failure. 

It is hardly necessary to add that other minerals enter 
largely into the list of national requisites, especially copper 
for which, in its rapidly widening uses, there is no kno\vn 
substitute. Manganese, tungsten, and other metals, some of 
them but yesterday unkno^vn, have speedily become indispen- 
sable as ingredients in that ever changing marvel of products 
which still goes by the old name of steel. Other minerals 
of chemical importance extend the list. Many of these, 
though of highest importance, are used in small quantities 
and derived from limited and local sources, where they are 
easily controlled by individuals, with possible exclusive ad- 
vantage to single powers. In this field of obscure but vital 
interests, unpracticed statesmanship and diplomatic tradi- 
tion are easily misled and popular judgment is hopelessly in- 
competent. It is neverthless in the realm of these subtle 
forces that the destiny of nations may henceforth be decided. 

Xo attempt is here made to enumerate the necessary in- 
dustrial requirements of the nation. A complete inventory 
is the work of the industrial expert, a functionary too little 
employed in most national counsels. Kor has it been the at- 
tempt to show that nations ought to insist upon these re- 
sources as conditions of their existence. The purpose has 
been rather to indicate that nations do seek these things, and 
that their presence or absence reacts strongly upon the wealth, 
population, and power of the states in question. And since 
wealth, population, and power have much to do with the sur- 
vival of nations, the builders of nations must have large re- 
gard for these things. 

So far we have dealt exclusively with natural resources. 
There are, however, other and derivative factors which de- 
termine the economic life of a nation quite as much, perhaps, 



NATIONALITY AND NATUKAL RESOURCE 63 

as these gifts of nature. Tlie possession of mines determines 
whether a nation shall have a mining industry or not. But 
it does not determine quite absolutely whether the nation 
shall have a smelting industry or not. If the materials are 
all there, the tendency is strong to develop such an industry, 
but still these materials may be shipped elsewhere and the 
smelting done by another nation, as in fact happens. Con- 
versely, as this case indicates, it is possible for a nation with- 
out such resources to develop the industry appropriate to 
them. The derivative industry is not quite controlled by the 
primary industry. 

As we go farther from the primary industry toward in- 
dustries more and more elaborative, the dependence becomes 
ever less. Watch springs need not be made near coal and 
iron mines. They may be made anywhere where other con- 
ditions are favorable. Thus a very large option is opened 
in the broad field of industry. Not that the choice ever 
becomes a matter of indifference. There are always potent 
if not compelling economic reasons. It pays to make watch 
springs in some places and not in others, but no longer be- 
cause of the location of the mines. And since large scale 
industry and the grouping of kindred industries is always 
advantageous, it follows that there is everywhere a tendency 
toward specialization and far reaching dependence. This 
specialization is at bottom quite as natural as that which 
rests on the presence or absence of natural resources, but it 
is far more flexible. Left to themselves, industries will mass 
themselves as stated, but it is quite possible for nations to 
prevent this massing and to develop, by judicious stimulation, 
industries of a varied character. Economically this does not 
pay. Nations do not get rich by bribing themselves to main- 
tain unprofitable industries. No matter how many complexi- 
ties and side issues are brought into the argument, nothing 
can change this fundamental economic relation. Nor do 



64 THE GKEAT PEACE 

high wages and full dinner pails result from this mainte- 
nance of non-paying industries, unless temporarily, by avert- 
ing the collapse of an artificial order which the system itself 
has created. 

But while such a policy does not make us rich it may make 
us independent. The reasons that impel nations to seek 
varied natural resources may justly impel them to develop 
varied national industries. Complete national self-suffi- 
ciency, either in resources or in developed industries, is a 
chimera, but relative self-sufficiency is an attainable and a 
desirable goal. 

But it will be objected that this is a national rather than 
an international problem. It has already been urged in an 
earlier chapter that the peace conference can not better show 
its wisdom than by resolutely refraining from interference 
in matters of purely national concern. It is much to be 
wished that the rule might be observed in this connection. 
Unfortunately it is all but certain that certain powers with 
which we have to deal will recognize no such limitation. The 
German industrial development, so much admired and in 
some ways so admirable, has been as ruthless and as aggres- 
sive as German militarism itself. For the widespread Ger- 
man practice of selling goods below cost in invaded markets 
and making up the loss in protected home markets, there is 
probably no remedy, especially as against a nation that has 
no respect for its promises. But certain industries so fos- 
tered are of a character which perhaps entitles them to inter- 
national consideration. A German manufacturer of dye- 
stuffs is said to have declared, anent a proposal to develop 
that industry in Italy, that he would do business there with- 
out profit for ten years, — would if necessary sacrifice the 
profits of ten years past, — to defeat that project. This seems 
harmless until we learn that the reason for this German 
specialty is that the dyestuff industry can be converted with- 



l^ATIONALITY A:N'D I^ATURAL RESOURCE 65 

out change of materials or appliances, into the manufacture 
of high explosives. Such specialization has a significance 
in connection with the problem of national defense that makes 
it a legitimate interest to alliances formed for that purpose. 
Whether effective measures can be devised is not so clear. 

More imperative and more practicable, however, is it to 
see that nations disorganized by the war do not resume their 
national life under conditions that destroy their economic 
freedom. If we may not dictate the economic policy of other 
nations, by the same token we must see that others do not do 
so. We may be perfectly certain that every effort will be 
made by certain powers to prevent the development of econo- 
mic independence, with its concomitants of wealth and power, 
by certain other nations whose subserviency and helplessness 
are desired. The attempt will be to accomplish by an in- 
dustrial offensive that which the military offensive has failed 
to achieve. Prudence forbids us to interpose a veto, but it 
requires us to insure the square deal. 

No rule can be laid down as to the economic requisites of 
national existence, but it is clear that such requisites exist 
and that they are among the weightiest considerations in the 
nation builders' problem. Ample and varied resources are 
a condition of national strength and independence. Such 
provision our own country enjoys in a high degree. Prob- 
ably no other nation is so nearly self-sufficing as the United 
States, nor is it probable that its like is possible without ex- 
tensive mergers of states now separate. 

For nations not blessed with this all-round provision, the 
possession in abundance of some material or product which 
is vitally necessary to other nations, is the nearest equivalent. 
Germany's potash makes her a strong bargainer for our cot- 
ton. If little Greece had been known to have iron in her 
mountains, she might have gotten on without Thessaly. 
Those who have iron can always buy wheat. 



66 THE GEEAT PEACE 

But they cannot buy the capital which their industry is 
not of a nature to create, or the thousands of their o^vn kind 
which their industry is not competent to support. Above 
all they can not buy the varied human types that the raising of 
the wheat and the forging of the iron produce. Their build- 
ing must be done with less differentiated human material. 
The result must be a simpler organism and one perhaps less 
fitted to survive under modern conditions. 

In conclusion, a single fact calls for emphasis. Economic 
resource, like territorial convenience or defensibility, is an 
independent requisite of national existence. The economic 
demands of today are totally unlike those of earlier times and 
stand in no necessary relation to historic sentiments or his- 
toric frontiers. Where race sentiment or historic boundaries 
conflict with economic requirements, concession is inevitable. 
In particular must purely local sentiment be subordinated 
to the interests of the larger populations affected. How in- 
adequate the proposal that the disposition of Alsace-Lorraine 
should be determined by a plebiscite! The industrial, po- 
litical, and cultural future of two great nations is dependent 
upon the decision in a way of which the humble Alsatian 
peasant is utterly unconscious. There could be no greater 
travesty of justice than to settle these far-reaching questions 
of human destiny by reference to the transient sentiment of 
a single generation of distracted border peasantry. To in- 
voke the principle of self-determination in connections where 
its exercise would give to the unknowing few the power to de- 
termine the fate and even the existence of millions who have 
no voice in the settlement, can have no other result than to 
bring discredit upon a vital principle. 



CHAPTER VI 

NATIONALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 

The present peoples of the world are clearly very unequal 
in their capacity for the duties of nationality. These in- 
equalities, again, are of the most varied character. There are 
differences of location, of climate, of education, and of his- 
torical inheritance. The English have been peculiarly fav- 
ored by their location, enjoying at once exceptional oppor- 
tunity for contact with the world and at the same time a rare 
immunity from attack. They have consequently developed 
a remarkable aptitude for affairs and for political and social 
organization. The Erench have profited greatly from their 
Roman inheritance which laid the foundation of their ex- 
traordinary political unity. The Germans, enjoying neither 
of these advantages, have been but recently and imperfectly 
unified and have been unable to develop the capacity for self 
government which the inherent capabilities of the people 
should lead us to expect. Here location and inheritance ac- 
count for differences of the most far reaching character, but 
differences which seemingly do not inhere in race character. 
The Germans are socially akin to the English and were joint 
originators of their political institutions. Very large Teu- 
tonic elements have continually recruited the Anglo-Saxon 
stock, and at an earlier date, the Erench stock as well, with 
no sign of inferiority or misadaptation after a generation 
or two of assimilation. Differences are here purely a mat- 
ter of situation and circumstance, though not necessarily 
slight or transient on that account. In more extreme cases, 
like that of the Russians and the Poles, where access to the 

world is still more limited and natural defenses almost wholly 

67 



68 THE GKEAT PEACE 

lacking, political development has been effectively checked, 
though again, we have no reason to doubt the capacity of the 
race. 

But there are other cases where the difference is more 
fundamental and significant. Where climatic conditions are 
essentially a bar to energy, a type of character develops which 
is undoubtedly less capable of political development. 
Whether the inhabitants of the tropics, when transferred to 
temperate climates, are capable of developing the qualities of 
the northern races is a disputed question, but one of little 
moment. There is little opportunity for such transfer, and 
whatever the result to those thus circumstanced, those that are 
left behind remain unmodified and determine the character 
of the race. It is this character that concerns us. What 
are the possibilities of political development in the less fav- 
ored climates, more particularly in the broad zone between 
thirty degrees north and south of the Equator, the tropics 
as defined by the ethnologist ? 

The writer has elsewhere ^ given at length his reasons for 
believing that the political inferiority of the tropics is in- 
herent and permanent. It was in the tropics that civiliza- 
tion first developed, but that civilization was based on slavery, 
sure sign of the irksomeness of exertion. Even this slave 
organization seems to have been effected by members of more 
energetic races. With the passing of slavery and the intro- 
duction of a more efiicient principle of organization, civiliza- 
tion transferred its headquarters to the energy zone and the 
tropics ceased to progress, even retrograded, separated from 
the developing northern peoples by an ever widening gulf, 
until the northerner himself chose to bridge it. It has been 
justly said that no tropical people has ever yet developed a 
civilization that would pass muster according to the most 
tolerant of modern standards. Such governments have ex- 

1 " America Among the Nations," Chapter XII. 



IsTATIONALITY AKD TRUSTEESHIP 69 

isted within the tropics, and in particular exist there today, 
but they are established and maintained by peoples from the 
temperate zones. Such participation in these governments 
as the native peoples have acquired, has been under the tute- 
lage of the suzerain peoples. The actual choice of human 
agents, — always the test of self government, — has never 
rested with the native. Possibly this too will come, but 
even so it will not prove or constitute equality. It will mean 
at most that they are capable of development, — not that they 
are capable of se?/-development. 

The question of ultimate capacity, however, concerns us 
very little. It is at best a question whether these peoples 
will never develop political capacity, or will develop it very, 
very slowly. Any suggestion that tropical races as a whole 
are the equals of the northern peoples in political capacity 
is a palpable absurdity. Making allowance for certain fa- 
vored localities in the tropics where elevation or dryness 
counteract in a measure the enervating effects of climate, 
the general condition of the tropics speaks for itself. They 
are not young peoples, novices at their task. The tropical 
peoples are among the oldest on the globe. They are not 
few or scattered. The tropics in Africa, India and South 
America bulk large among the world's inhabited areas, and 
India alone has a population nearly equal to that of all Eu- 
rope, with natural defenses unrivaled in the world. They are 
not lacking in resources, for nowhere has nature been more 
lavish. Yet India passed, almost without a struggle, under 
the control of a power one tenth her size and ten thousand 
miles away. Tropical Africa was partitioned with scarce 
a protest, and tropical America appropriated as though it 
were an empty land. We can explain these facts only on 
the assumption of the inferior political capacity of tropical 
peoples. 

It is sometimes urged that this is not inferiority but only 



70 THE GKEAT PEACE 

adaptation to tropical conditions. True, but not an adapta- 
tion to world conditions, and it is with world conditions that 
modern civilization and modern political conditions have to 
deal. All the tendencies of modern life, — the harnessing 
of nature forces, quantity production, world markets, uni- 
versal transportation and communication, — tend to make 
all parts of the world dependent upon one another. The 
tropical peoples may themselves be quite satisfied to be in- 
dolent, unorganized, and inefficient, but the organized and 
energetic northern people need the products of the tropics 
in a measure which only organization and industry can sup- 
ply. Diseases due to carelessness and sloth may be a small 
matter to the native,^ but when foreign ships carry the infec- 
tion to distant ports, it requires intervention. Finally, and 
most of all, tropical peoples require protection from the 
cupidity and ruthless energy of the powerful peoples who 
are tempted or compelled to seek their products. Thus, the 
discovery of rich tin deposits in the Malay Peninsula at a 
time when other known deposits of this indispensable metal 
were beginning to be exhausted, put a pressure upon these 
feebly organized folk which they were entirely unable to 
bear. Imagine the conditions that would have followed such 
a discovery if no strong government had intervened to pro- 
tect native interests. A few vigorous and unscrupulous ad- 
venturers such as are found among all strong peoples, — men 
like Cortez or Pizarro or Drake, or Hawkins, — would seize 
the territory, coerce the natives into working the mines, sub- 
ject them to unspeakable cruelties, and virtually exterminate 
the race in the pursuit of private gain, as was done in the 
West Indies. It is useless to say, — wrong to say, — that the 

1 The inhabitants of Guayaquil are said to have protested against the 
eradication of yellow fever on the ground that they, being semi-immune, 
survived its attacks, while the more susceptible foreigner succumbed. 
It constituted thus a natural protection against dreaded commercial 
competition. 



l^ATIOI^ALITY AND TKUSTEESHIP 71 

foreigner should keep out. He "will not and he should not 
keep out. It would be a breach of trust toward civilization 
to leave unutilized a necessary instrument of progress be- 
cause an inefficient people have accidentally located on the 
spot. Anyway it will not be done. There is no power in 
the world that can keep out the lawless adventurer under 
such circumstances. The prize is too great, the place too re- 
mote, and foreign prohibition too ineffectual. 

The tin mines of Malaysia offer an easy illustration of 
the problem of tropical exploitation, but it is only one case 
among many. All natural products of the tropics, products 
demanded by western civilization with ever increasing im- 
portunity, present similar temptations and dangers. The 
frightful cruelties of rubber gathering in the Putumayo il- 
lustrate the danger of letting the strong race go as exploiter 
without carrying his own strong restraints and protections 
with him. Similar conditions obtained in the Congo while 
under the control of an irresponsible commercial combination, 
conditions which even the assumption of responsibility by 
Belgium did not at once remove. 

When the demand for tropical products exceeds nature's 
spontaneous supply, new reasons for tutelage present them- 
selves. The Malay can collect wild rubber, but when it be- 
comes necessary to establish a rubber plantation, neither co- 
ercion nor inducements will make him equal to the task. 
Larger power of organization, more sustained purpose, and 
fuller knowledge than tropical man possesses are required 
for the purpose. Yet the purpose is perfectly legitimate. 
It is as reasonable that the soil of the tropics should be tilled 
as that the tin should be mined in the service of civilization. 
Yet this mobilization of world resources which is at once 
the necessity and the glory of our civilization, requires the 
organizing abilities and the effective restraints which only 
the most advanced nations can furnish. The strong races 



72 THE GREAT PEACE 

must help the weak and yet must protect them from the im- 
pact of their own strength. 

The tropics perhaps furnish the clearest case of obvious 
dependence, but not bv any means the only one. Peoples of 
undoubted capacity may be quite as dependent by reason of 
limited area and peculiar situation. Denmark is an example. 
oSTo expansion of Danish territory is practicable, and con- 
sequently, no considerable expansion of the race. Denmark 
is surrounded by powerful nations who would find her ter- 
ritories a most convenient addition to their domain. Ob- 
viously the integrity of Denmark must depend on something 
else than her o^wti strength. Lack of coal, of access to the 
sea, or of other vital needs of national life create further 
conditions of helplessness, a helplessness very different from 
that of the tropical peoples, but not the less real. What 
they can not do for themselves, stronger nations must do for 
them. 

Hence the relation which we may call trusteeship, a re- 
lation not to be confounded with mere control. There has 
been plenty of control in the world, but little trusteeship. 
The higher relation has slowly developed from the lower. 
The early conquerors were merely marauders. They took 
everything they could turn to account and destroyed the rest. 
It was an advance when the great Pharaoh of the eighteenth 
dynasty hit upon the idea of making annual raids, plunder- 
ing with moderation, and leaving enough food and seed so 
there might be something for him next year. Then came 
the system of tribute in which the helpless bought immunity 
from the annual raid by an advance payment. It is the 
principle accepted by early empire builders and dominant 
still in the days of more enlightened Rome, that helpless, ap- 
propriated peoples are the property of their suzerain, to be 
farmed for his benefit like a private estate, and with such 
regard for native interests as a prudent farmer shows to- 



]SrATIOI^ALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 73 

ward his horses or cattle, the source of his profits. Even 
Cicero pleads for good government in the provinces, not at 
all in the interest of the provincials, but on the ground that 
it will increase the revenue that can be derived from them. 
In justice to Eome it must be recognized that she became 
better than her theories and that much of the spirit of trus- 
teeship animated her best officials. But their higher temper 
never had the support of a recognized social principle. 

In the awful collapse of civilization which followed the 
decay of Eome, the fugitive principle was quite lost sight of. 
With the rise of modem nations and the world discoveries 
which established dependencies of unprecedented extent, the 
unschooled nations began again at the first lessons. The 
plundering of Peru and the depopulation of the West Indian 
Islands were eighteenth dynasty performances or worse. 
Drake and Hawkins hardly represented a higher principle. 
The policy of the British East India Company in the early 
period of its unexpected imperial responsibilities, reflect but 
little of the later British temper. The attempt to tax the 
American Colonies, though moderate in amount and reason- 
able in its alleged purpose, was suggestive of the earlier idea 
of o^vnership. And so still is the terminology handed down 
from an earlier time and an earlier set of political ideas. We 
still hear of '' British Possessions," and the realities of the 
modern relation are still concealed under the symbols of 
ownership. 

Slowly the principle of trusteeship has emerged from the 
brutal relation of force. The incontinent marauder slowly 
learns prudence and gives his victims the benefit of a closed 
season, as did the great Pharaoh. Then he protects, multi- 
plies, and organizes them, the better to harness them for his 
purpose. Such was the policy of Eome in the great days, a 
wise and humane exploiter, but still not a trustee. But at 
last, in accordance with a principle of universal application, 



74 THE GREAT PEACE 

he becomes interested in the objects of his care. Like the 
horse fancier, whose passion for horses leads him to spend his 
money freely upon them, so the care-taker of the peoples be- 
comes engrossed in his task, proud of his constructive achieve- 
ment, eager to give rather than to get, and the ulterior pur- 
pose of his effort at the beginning is slowly subordinated and 
then forgotten. He is no longer an owner, an exploiter, but 
a trustee. The relation here indicated is not at all one of 
self-denying devotion or religious self-abnegation. It is one 
that results naturally from honest and competent devotion to 
a constructive task. We learn to enjoy the task. Once we 
have learned the delight of building, we would rather build 
than occupy. The typical trust administrator is a practical, 
business man, largely competent, and capable of a large satis- 
faction in his own competency. No self-denying altruism 
need siTpplement, — still less can it ever replace, — his sturdy 
respect for professional honor, his repugnance for the cheap 
betrayal of the implicit trust placed in him, and his satisfac- 
tion at seeing his city of brick become a city of marble. The 
man who has once known these recompenses cares little for 
any other. Especially if he continues a long line of those 
who have so wrought and so judged, any other judgment or 
attitude becomes impossible. 

The same holds of nations, possibly in an even greater 
degree. They are slower to move, slower to become imbued 
with a principle, but correspondingly slow to abandon it, 
especially if it is backed by a long tradition. It is cheap 
tirade to denounce the great order-creating powers as land 
grabbers, bandits, and brigands. There have been nations 
that were selfish and short-sighted, without inspired vision or 
constructive wisdom. And there have been others that have 
built greatly and enduringly, asking little by way of recom- 
pense save the privilege of building, because their pleasure 
was in that. The world has nothing more valuable to show 



NATIO]^ALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 75 

as the result of its age-long travail than such men and such 
nations as these. 

It is needless to say that the spirit of trusteeship has heen 
very differently developed in modern nations. It is not al- 
ways possible to account for these differences which seem to 
stand in no uniform relation to experience or national tem- 
perament. The beginners seem to have fared worst. Spain 
and Portugal had the unfortunate privilege of plundering the 
treasure houses of the newly discovered world. Possibly 
other peoples would have plundered as ruthlessly at that time 
and would have paid as heavy a penalty. That penalty came 
in the form of a demoralizing tradition of unearned wealth 
which no later experience or enlightenment could overcome. 
Contrary to popular opinion, Spain's colonial legislation was 
for the most part well conceived and unselfish. But nothing 
could secure its administration in that spirit. The habit of 
*' milking " the colonies dominated the official and the national 
consciousness. This administrative plunder did not find its 
worst effect in the constant drain upon colonial resources, but 
in the destruction of the constructive tradition. The habit of 
thinking of the colonies in terms of revenue made it impos- 
sible to think of them in terms of constructive opportunity. 
It isn't the collector of rents in slum tenements who dreams 
dreams of architectural reconstruction. This depressing 
temper was not that of individuals ; it was the temper of the 
nation. With imperial decline and the growing need of earn- 
ing her own living, the reluctant nation responded with 
increasing shift and evasion. It was the loss of her last 
colony that started Spain on the wholesome path of self- 
support. To her had been committed one of the world's 
greatest trusts, but she had never learned the secret of trustee- 
ship. 

Spain is a conspicuous example of failure in the trusteeship 
of dependent peoples, but she is neither the only failure nor 



76 THE GREAT PEACE 

the worst one. The failure of Portugal has been more abject 
and pitiful. Her mighty power in the East has dwindled to 
the merest speck, a fossil reminder of things extinct, while 
her African colonies, the only considerable remains of her vast 
empire, are the blackest spots on the dark continent. Even 
more than Spain, too, she has suffered the demoralizing home 
reaction of unearned existence. Her chief monument is 
African slavery, her invention. The world owes to her in- 
famous trusteeship the most insoluble of all social and race 
problems. 

But distinctly worse than either is the case of Turkey. 
She hardly surpasses them in cruelty or destructiveness, but 
against her trusteeship lies this damning indictment, that it 
has been the subjection of the higher to the lower. The Turk- 
ish Empire has included the most civilized peoples of the 
ancient world and of all the later times down to the Renais- 
sance. It has scarcely included at any time a people, — 
Arab, Jew, Greek, Armenian, or other, — which was not supe- 
rior to the Turk himself. Upon these subject races the Turk 
has never conferred any gift of organization. He has never 
even learned their own higher secret. He has simply al- 
lowed their organization to continue, using at times the con- 
quered as agents of administration, and through them farming 
his estate for his own benefit. Thus the Rumanian princi- 
palities were always ruled by Christians. Before the con- 
quest Christians ruled them in the interest of Christians; 
afterward, Christians ruled them in the interest of Turks. 
The governorship was sold in Constantinople to the highest 
bidder, and the purchaser, always a Greek, recouped himself 
from the revenues that should have gone to the development 
of the provinces. Meanwhile the Turk sat at home, good- 
natured, tolerant, unimaginative, amid the decaying splen- 
dors of an empire that he did not create and could not pre- 
serve. It is not an uncommon thing that a crude people has 



NATION^ALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 77 

conquered a more highly developed one, but it would be dif- 
ficult to find a ease in which the conqueror has learned so 
little from the conquered. If there is any power among 
men to rectify the demonstrated misfits of history, the Turk 
may well be asked to give an account of his stewardship. 

If we turn from these deplorable examples in almost any 
direction, the contrast is striking. In trusteeship of the high- 
handed imperial sort, the Russian has given us much to 
admire. Doubtless Russian provincial development has been 
for the sake of the empire rather than for the sake of the 
provinces, but there has at least been provincial development, 
and that of a sort that would have done honor to Trajan. To 
one who compares the squalid quarters of old Tiflis with the 
magnificently appointed city which Russia has built beside 
it, or who looks out upon the superb avenues and quays of 
Dalny which displace the Chinese fisher huts of a few years 
before, it is plain that with all her faults, Russia was no 
mere parasite, no wearer of the cast-ofiF purple of older em- 
pires. Nor was her constructive power confined to the build- 
ing of cities. Under a dynasty which despite its recent fiasco 
has been characterized for a century and a half by a remark- 
able degree of ability and public spirit, Russia was one of the 
great constructive powers in the world. It was her misfor- 
tune that the democratic preoccupations of the western pow- 
ers should make us primarily conscious of Russia's unlearned 
lessons, her rudimentary development of popular government 
and safeguards for individual right. We neither realized the 
impossibility of achieving these things first, nor yet the fact 
that they were being rapidly achieved. The Duma and the 
Zemstvos, despite their limited prerogatives, were rapidly 
building popular government on the soundest of foundations 
when the avalanche of fanaticism and treason swept their 
work away. The writer holds no brief for Russia. Her 
efforts will be needed at home for a long time to come. Even 



78 THE GREAT PEACE 

were she with us still in her coherent power, her trusteeship 
for the wards of the nations was more to be dreaded than 
sought. But now that she has left the stage we may freely 
recognize her as one of the great players. 

A mixed record, but on the whole an honorable one is that 
of France. The problem presented by North America, a 
problem of colonization more than of trusteeship of the native 
races, was little suited to the France of the ancien regime. 
Religious bigotry hindered settlement, and state aid proved a 
demoralizing inducement. International conflicts prevented 
any rational policy toward the natives, even had the insight 
of the time made such a policy possible. It is rare that a 
historic decision has been better justified than was that on the 
Heights of Abraham in 1759. 

But the free France of a later day has had a very different 
history. No wars with European rivals have been fought 
within the limits of her great modern dependencies. No at- 
tempt has been made to displace their native populations. 
From the first the policy has been one of development, and 
so far from exploiting these possessions for tribute, they have 
uniformly entailed a charge upon the home government for 
their maintenance and development. It is just here that 
France has been oftenest criticised. She has not been preda- 
tory or parasitic, — despite a certain tendency to officialism 
on the part of French residents, — but she has not always 
seemed to be practical. Perhaps the difficulty lies with the 
home people. They are less disposed to grasp colonial oppor- 
tunities for business and less inclined to let foreigners do so. 
Hence the development of the dependencies is slower and the 
day of self-support is postponed. 

Possibly it should be added that French devotion to the 
principles of free government has at times hindered her work. 
In her effort to do for her dependents she has gone so far as 



NATIONALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 79 

to incorporate Algeria into the body of France, giving it rep- 
resentation in the French Parliament and at one time extend- 
ing the entire body of French law to this province. The 
result only demonstrated the futility of arrangements not 
based on nature. Algeria is not France, and her representa- 
tives show a dangerous provincialism and detachment from 
general interests. Above all, Mohammedans are not French- 
men, and the well meant privileges of French law were for 
them a hardship and an irritation. 

But despite these excesses of zeal and other limitations of a 
less excusable kind, French rule has shown in a high degree 
the spirit of trusteeship, and an increasing mastery of its 
problems. It is a matter of regret, to those who chiefly de- 
sire the expansion of the French race, that the Frenchman is 
so little disposed to emigrate and challenge the native posses- 
sion of Algeria and Tunis, but as the trustee of dependent 
peoples France is certainly not to be criticised for showing 
so little disposition to displace them. That she is creating 
in these lands the material conditions of civilization in a 
degree that they have never known, and that she is sincerely 
devoted to their development rather than to a policy of 
exhausting exploitation is hardly to be questioned. France 
is one of the great trustees. 

The case of Britain is too well known and recognized as 
a model to require lengthy discussion. The most striking 
fact is the immensity of her trust. About one-fourth of the 
population as of the area of the globe is in her keeping, and 
of these more than three-fourths are essentially wards. In- 
deed if we take account of the scanty population of the self- 
governing dominions, a population quite unable to protect 
itself unaided against possible aggressors, then all outside the 
United Kingdom, or more than nine-tenths of the vast aggre- 
gate, must be classed as dependent. Trusteeship, however, 



80 THE GREAT PEACE 

as regards the self-governing dominions can be nothing more 
than protection from foreign aggression. Bejond this they 
are self-sufficing. 

Toward the dependent peoples the policy of Britain, though 
persistently misrepresented, is not open to doubt. Its first 
requisite is order, as is that of every true government. But 
this assured, all effort is bent toward the care and develop- 
ment of the people held in trust. Burke's declaration that 
England was not powerful enough to oppress the humblest 
dweller on the banks of the Ganges and protect the proudest 
lord on the banks of the Thames, may fairly be taken as the 
guiding principle of British trusteeship, a principle whose 
strength lies not so much in its acceptance by the British 
people as in the slowly developed tradition of the British 
administrator. This tradition which is not the creation of 
any single individual or the result of any legislative act, has 
slowly come to envelop the whole service like an atmosphere. 
It is not the sentimental devotion of the altruist, but the self- 
respect of a superior race. From his first day in the service 
the future administrator breathes this atmosphere of matter- 
of-course recognition of native rights and suzerain obliga- 
tions. The petty tricks, the lies, the nameless exasperations 
of his wards must not exhaust his patience. That would be 
to show weakness. His word must be inviolable, the more so 
because theirs is not. To take advantage of them is con- 
temptible, unsportsmanlike, l^ot saintliness but sportsman- 
ship is the key to this finest service ever rendered by race to 
race. 

But the great thing about British trusteeship is not merely 
its justice, competency, and professional honor. It is rather 
to be found in its democracy. To the limit of the possible 
it is Britain's policy to place responsibility in native hands. 
This policy, so well exemplified and advocated by Lord 
Cromer in his administration of Egypt, means in the first 



NATIONALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 81 

place the use of native agents so far as possible in adminis- 
trative service, a general practice in all trusteeships, for only 
the most bungling incompetent seeks posts for " deserving " 
partisans in such a service. But British policy goes farther, 
— and in this finds its distinctive characteristic, — placing 
the actual direction of affairs little by little in native hands. 
In this Britain never dogmatizes about the inalienable right 
of men to govern themselves. She feels her way. She is 
chiefly concerned with their ability to govern themselves, and 
justly concludes that, failing the ability, the right has no 
present application. Withal, she has shown herself inclined 
to give them the benefit of the doubt. In recent years espe- 
cially, she has taken long chances in her extension of the 
principle of native control. Unlike France, she cares not a 
whit for logical consistency. Her procedure is empirical. 
But she is sincerely devoted to the principle that men should 
be permitted the use of their powers and encouraged to develop 
them. The discontent among her educated colonials is an 
indication of success in the attainment of both these aims. 

The striking outward fact is the material success of British 
trusteeship. Her colonies prosper, prosper beyond the imagi- 
nation of those unfamiliar with them. Not one of them 
pays a penny of tribute or contributes perforce even to impe- 
rial defense. Yet not one of them entails a charge upon the 
imperial budget. Their increase in wealth has been enor- 
mous, an increase which has accrued primarily, — especially 
in Egypt, — to the poorest classes of the population. And 
the English have prospered, — justly prospered, — in trade 
with the people that England has made rich. That wealth 
and intelligence have not brought submissiveness and content 
is quite in accordance with their nature. It is a unique 
record. Britain is the great trustee. 

Our own experiments in this unwonted relationship call 
for brief notice. Our experience has been but recent and 



82 THE GKEAT PEACE 

has been complicated from the first by prepossessions and 
divided counsels. We had no thought of assuming trust 
obligations. We had little sympathy with them or apprecia- 
tion of their necessity. In particular we felt that they were 
inconsistent with our own political institutions. In conse- 
quence our policy has been characterized by not a little of 
half-heartedness and vacillation, the more so as our first great 
acquisition, — that of the Philippines, — was of a peculiarly 
unpremeditated and unnecessary character. Our hesitancy 
has naturally reacted powerfully upon the Eilipino mind, 
arousing aspirations of the vaguest and most troublesome 
character. Said an American who had listened to a Fili- 
pino's glowing words on independence : " What could you 
do, if you were independent, that you cannot do now ? " "I 
could build my house there in the middle of the street, if I 
wanted to." " But suppose your neighbor objected and in- 
terfered." " I would get him." " But suppose he got you." 
A shrug of the shoulders was the only answer. 

Yet despite these handicaps, American administration in 
the Philippines is an undeniable success. Material prosper- 
ity, enormous improvement in physical and sanitary condi- 
tions, well nigh universal education, and the establishment of 
order and safety such as the islands have never known, are its 
indisputable results. Objections on the ground of imperial- 
ism and the strategy of national defense simply lose all hold 
upon the mind, when once we are in the actual presence of 
this great undertaking. We are doing the white man's work 
and doing it worthily. We have learned much from Britain, 
but possibly have a thing or two that we might teach her. In 
the extension of self-government to the people, we have vied 
with Britain in the audacity of our faith. 

One fact is worthy of especial notice. In the mountainous 
interior of the islands have dwelt from time immemorial the 
head hunters whose strange rites are so inimicable to civiliza- 



NATIOJ^ALITY AND TEUSTEESHIP 83 

tion. They are also found in Formosa, Borneo, and other 
localities where they are the wards of the Japanese and the 
Dutch, expert trustees in their way. Both these powers have 
been compelled to adopt a policy of extermination toward 
these untamable savages. The Japanese have surrounded 
their habitat with a barrier of barbed wire which is advanced 
from time to time as parts of the area are cleared, and in this 
narrowing circle the savages are trapped and destroyed. In 
the Philippines, Americans have risked their lives to learn 
the secret of these strange peoples and to reconcile them to 
civilized ways, an effort that has been crowned with success. 
They are today among the most promising of our Filipino 
wards. 

But American trusteeship has not stopped with the Philip- 
pines. The building of the Panama Canal, and the slowly 
dawning consciousness of its vital place in our developing 
commerce and our national defense, have awakened us to the 
necessity of order and business-like administration in the 
Caribbean region. Faced with the possibility of foreign 
complications of the most dangerous character, we have shed 
our prepossessions and accepted our inevitable task. We 
stand guard over Cuba, protecting her alike from foreign 
aggressors and from herself. We have annexed Porto Rico 
and the Virgin Isles. We have a protectorate over Hayti and 
Panama. We are unofficially in control of the Dominican 
Eepublic. Our marines occupy the Nicaraguan capital. 
The Canal Zone is ours by a perpetually renewable lease. 
Not one of these trusts was sought ; not one of them could be 
avoided; and the end is not yet. The inexorable logic of 
events has brushed aside our theories and our prepossessions. 
Not with exultation but with a grave sense of responsibility 
we may accept our place among the world's trustees. 

The coming settlement is primarily a problem of trustee- 
ship. What is to become of the German colonies, the Portu- 



84 THE GKEAT PEACE 

guese colonies, the Turkish subject territories ? Who are to 
be sponsors for Belgium, for Denmark, for Switzerland, for 
Holland, for the Balkan and near-Balkan states ? Who will 
maintain the free passage of the Bosphorus and the Darda- 
nelles? The answer will depend largely on our conception 
of the relation involved. 

On the one hand is heard the claim of ownership. Give 
us back "■ our colonies," our share of the plums. Colonies 
are property to be farmed like an estate. Their people are 
our servants to be used subject only to such limitations as self- 
interest and public conscience with its feeble instruments for 
the prevention of cruelty may dictate. This was the answer 
of Spain to all charges of cruelty and incompetency in Cuba. 
" Cuba is ours." It was the plea of ownership, pure and 
simple. To this claim we instinctively opposed the principle 
of trusteeship. The opposition was not one of argument or 
theory. It was the instinct of a free people. Spain's his- 
toric title was unquestioned. The great trust was indubitably 
hers. But she had been guilty of breach of trust, and through 
incompetency and maladministration her title was forfeit. 
There was no other possible attitude for a free nation com- 
mitted to the cause of human freedom. There is no other 
possible attitude today. 

But if trusteeship, then who is to be the trustee ? Again 
the internationalist is heard. Eor the common interest there 
should be a common trust. An international trusteeship is 
proposed for the administration of the Dardanelles, the great 
canals, the little nations, the tropical colonies and the like. 
The proposal is logically plausible. But the opinion may 
safely be hazarded that the trusteeship which is to give the 
world a stable peace will depend much less on logic than on 
competency. Beyond a doubt the spirit of trusteeship must 
be maintained. Territories and interests which are incapa- 
ble of self-administration, must be administered in the inter- 



]SrATIONALITY AISTD TRUSTEESHIP 85 

est of their own people and the community of nations. But 
whether such administration can better be secured by an un- 
tried international agency than by experts in the work who, 
all uncoerced, have developed compelling traditions of soimd 
trusteeship, may well be doubted. Possibly an administra- 
tion could be devised for Egypt which would better satisfy 
the equities of international theory than that now established 
there, but hardly one that would better conserve the inter- 
ests of the Egyptians, or the legitimate interests of other 
powers. The case is not unrepresentative. The possibilities 
of internationalism will be considered in another chapter. 
Meanwhile it behooves us to note to how great an extent the 
greater nations of the world have acquired not only inter- 
national functions but the international spirit. A recent 
writer has aptly described the British Empire as " a great 
and sacred international trust with responsibilities of vital 
importance for all mankind." These words are no figure of 
speech. The British Empire is not an empire but a group 
of free nations holding numerous wards in trust. That trust 
is administered with strictest impartiality not only as re- 
gards the associated nations, but as regards nations in general. 
The prudent will think twice before they relinquish such 
tried instruments as this for untried theoretical creations. 

But whatever the ultimate choice, the great national trusts 
must long continue. We may propose internationalization 
of the Dardanelles and the like, but no man in his senses ex- 
pects Britain to surrender India or France Madagascar. 
Whether these trusts are to be permanent or are ultimately 
to give way to international agencies, the chief wards of hu- 
manity are still to be long in their keeping. There can be 
no more urgent duty in this terrible hour than to emphasize 
their character as trusts. Discriminating tariffs, adminis- 
trative partiality, parasitism, and ofiicial intimidation such 
as have marred and still mar certain otherwise fair records, 



86 THE GKEAT PEACE 

are one and all incompatible with the spirit of the trust. 
Such excellent administrators as Holland and France may 
hesitate to grant to all nations the advantages which they enjoy 
in the farming of their rich, tropical possessions, but any 
other policy is sure to jeopardize both their title and the 
peace of the world. No more vital interest is involved in 
the forthcoming settlement than to establish on the firmest 
foundations the principle of trusteeship, the principle that the 
control of helpless peoples is to be in their interest and in 
the common interest of all nations. The trustee must find 
his reward in the mere privilege of doing, not in any monop- 
oly of trade or exploitation. We may with perfect legiti- 
macy consider the removal of Germany from her trusteeship. 
Whether we can justly or safely exclude her from traffic with 
these colonies or with any colonies is a very different question. 
To so exclude her would be to deny her a place in the family 
of the nations. 



CHAPTER VII 

NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

Wak is in part an effort to hold nations accountable for 
their acts, an effort usually culminating in the imposition of a 
penalty by the victor. We have here to consider the efficacy 
and practicability of certain conventional penalties as a means 
of holding offending nations to account. In particular the 
popular penalty of indemnity calls for careful consideration. 

There is nothing that a belligerent does to an enemy in 
war that he may not do to the same enemy after surrender 
if he chooses. The collapse of all resistance leaves the victor 
sole arbiter. In earlier v^arfare the worst horrors were often 
reserved for the hour of victory. The story of Samuel who 
cursed Saul and deposed him from the kingship because he 
had spared the king of the Amalekites and the best of the 
flocks condemned by the implacable Samuel is familiar. 
From that time down to Tilly's capture of Magdeburg in 
the Thirty Years' War, the harsh old rule has been of inter- 
mittent if not regular application. Even among the most 
civilized ancient races the selling of prisoners of war into 
slavery and the beheading of enemy generals on the battlefield 
was the high watermark of leniency. Confiscation of estates 
and looting of personal property was a matter of course. 

Self-interest mitigated the rule in case of conquest. What 
was the use of conquered provinces if nobody remained to 
till them for the benefit of the conquerors ? The notion that 
these lands were necessary for the expansion of the conquer- 
or's people did not at first suggest itself. Race lines were 
trivial in a day when language was rudimentary and slavery 
obliterated all distinctions. With primitive sense of thrift, 

87 



88 THE GKEAT PEACE 

therefore, a conquered population might be conserved, the 
while personal effects as before were ruthlessly confiscated. 
This was the easier because of the fact that such effects were 
almost exclusively articles of personal gratification rather 
than productive capital. When the Egyptian Pharaoh 
proudly records the thousands of pounds of gold that he 
carried off as the result of a marauding campaign, we must 
beware of attaching to the transaction a modern significance. 
Ko doubt the feelings of the conquered suffered severely from 
the loss of their earrings and bracelets, and the vanity of 
the conqueror was correspondingly flattered, but the economic 
functions of society were little disturbed. Gold was not a 
circulating medium or a measure of values, and the transfer 
of gold from one locality or owner to another was a matter 
of no serious consequence. 

To a very large degree these conditions continued down to 
comparatively modern times. The precious metals, to be 
sure, became money in Greek and Roman days, and the indus- 
trial fabric became somewhat sensitive to disturbances from 
this source. But even in the great days industry remained 
simple, credit relations were few, productive instruments were 
but tools of small value, and accumulations of industrial 
capital were comparatively small. During the Middle Ages 
again the world lapsed into a far more primitive condition, 
and simplicity again brought the immunity which is charac- 
teristic of all simple organisms. 

But with the development of power industry came the enor- 
mous accumulations of industrial capital and with them the 
all-embracing credit relations and the sensitiveness to mone- 
tary values which are the characteristic of our time. It is 
not necessary or fitting that we here go into detail. It is 
sufficient to remind ourselves of the perfectly recognized fact 
that the industrial fabric of the world is now a unit, that its 
parts are all interdependent, and that an extreme sensitive- 



NATI0:N^ALITY and accountability 89 

ness pervades the whole. Violent transfers of the precious 
metals or of industrial capital are attended with disastrous 
results which are apt to outweigh their benefits. Without 
attempting to go into this subject fully, we may give a few 
illustrations. 

Let us take the subject of indemnity in its crudest form as 
popularly conceived, the payment of a large sum of gold by a 
country whose currency is gold or on a gold basis. It is a 
well known fact that prices are determined by the ratio be- 
tween the amount of money in circulation and the amount of 
business done. Suppose we could violently take from Ger- 
many a billion dollars and add it, — as we should do in this 
money age, — to our circulation. There would be a general 
rise in prices everywhere, that is, a cheapening of money. 
All creditors, including holders of insurance policies, owners 
of liberty bonds, receivers of fixed salaries, and the like, 
would lose in proportion to the cheapening of money. Other 
classes would reap correspondingly unexpected profits. 
Hardship and extravagance inevitably follow such changes. 
But this is only the beginning. Every country depends some- 
what, — usually a great deal, — on foreign commerce. When 
prices rise, manufacturers are compelled to charge more for 
their goods. If, for instance, they wished to sell goods in 
South America, their prices would be very high. Mean- 
while Germany, having reduced her money supply by a bil- 
lion dollars, would have experienced a general fall in prices, 
and her manufacturers would be able to offer their wares in 
South America at a very low price. The first result of our 
seizure of Germany's gold would be to shut ourselves com- 
pletely out of the South American market. 

But the matter would not stop here. There are always 
some industries in which there is close competition even for 
our home market. Let us take the cotton industry as an illus- 
tration. We have a tariff on imported cotton goods to pro- 



90 THE GEEAT PEACE 

tect our home producers. Even so there are usually some 
kinds of cotton goods which can be bought so cheaply abroad 
that even after payment of the duty they will undersell Amer- 
ican goods. Now let us suppose that prices rise violently in 
America and fall correspondingly in Germany. That, of 
course, would include the price of manufactured cottons along 
with the rest. Immediately the German manufacturer could 
undersell the American manufacturer and we should all soon 
be wearing goods " made in Germany." Sentiment, of course, 
might prevent this for a time and to some extent, but no boy- 
cott based on sentiment ever long restrains economic forces. 
The second result of our billion dollar indemnity would there- 
fore be to close our own factories, turn our people out of 
employment, and boom the industries of Germany. So cer- 
tain are these results that it is now recognized as economi- 
cally impossible to transfer large quantities of the money 
metals, — that which is the nation's normal quota, — from one 
nation to another. So extreme is this sensitiveness that even 
peace transactions on a large scale have to be managed with 
the greatest care. When the United States acquired the 
Panama Canal from Prance for the sum of forty millions, 
special experts were called in to devise means of transferring 
this sum, — now so seemingly insignificant, — without creat- 
ing serious disturbances of the kind above mentioned. 

It is characteristic of the ruthlessness of German militarism 
that they planned on huge indemnities in case of victory. 
At the close of the war of 1870-71 Germany exacted from 
France an indemnity of a billion dollars, — a huge sum for 
tiose days, — and took it in gold. She is said to have locked 
up this sum as a war chest in preparation for " the next war " 
for which she is always preparing. This prevented the flood- 
ing of her own currency and the consequent rise in prices, 
but it did not prevent the reverse effect in France. The 
result, though mitigated, was distinctly unfavorable to Ger- 



NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 91 

man industry which did not begin to forge ahead until the 
effect of this was lived down. Conversely, France surprised 
the world by the rapidity of her economic recovery. Ger- 
many is now repeating this blunder. In her peace with Rus- 
sia she has exacted an enormous indemnity which is now 
being paid by installments and in gold. Her economists have 
not failed to warn her of the danger of this course, but the 
nation has not yet mastered its crude passion of cupidity. 
Among the numerous extravagant peace demands heard in 
Germany during the last four years, none is heard so often 
as the demand for indemnities. 

But there are subtler ways of securing indemnities than 
this. One is to take over productive property in some form. 
Thus the railways of Germany, now state owned, might con- 
ceivably be made over to foreign governments to be run for 
their benefit or sold to foreign or German syndicates. This 
would in itself be an immense indemnity. The surrender of 
German ships is also proposed, a proposal which has the more 
pertinence because of the destruction of Allied shipping by 
submarine warfare. Still another proposal, — this time from 
German sources, — is that colonies be transferred as an in- 
demnity. Finally, a transfer of national credits or obliga- 
tions is proposed. Thus, Germany, when considering an in- 
demnity from France, proposed that Russia's huge debt to 
France should be paid to Germany. Again a would-be Ger- 
man conciliator proposed that Belgium be indemnified for her 
losses by England against the surrender to the latter of the 
German colonies. A proposal closely akin to the above is that 
the indemnity exacted should be paid in installments as is 
now being done by Russia. This was urged by German chau- 
vinists at a time when Germany, still suffering from the 
effects of the French indemnity, was urged to again despoil 
the too rapidly recovering France. Such an indemnity, 
though expressed in terms of money, would not be really paid 



92 THE GREAT PEACE 

in money, but by transfers of goods in the ordinary course of 
international trade. 

These proposals all have the merit that they do not dis- 
order the delicate credit system of the world in the way above 
described. Each has its individual merits and objections 
which deserve brief notice before we turn to the general prin- 
ciple underlying them all. 

The railroads are the largest industrial asset of the German 
states. They have the merit of tangibility. But if oper- 
ated in the interest of foreign states or their citizens, they 
would inevitably become the target for unfriendly legislation 
and regulation at which the Germans are past masters, and 
for which there is no limit and no remedy. It may be naively 
objected that Germany would be bound by treaty pledges on 
these points. Doubtless, but conceding that these difficulties 
could all be anticipated, — an extreme concession, — what is 
to compel Germany to respect these pledges ? Foreign owned 
railroads would be a most irritating constant reminder of Ger- 
many's humiliation. Cheating the railroad would become a 
point of honor, and German law, administered by utterly 
unfriendly officials, would give no redress. If the foreign 
powers protested, Germany would in effect reply: "What 
are you going to do about it ? Will you make another world 
war to redress your grievances ? " The net result would be 
that Germany would submit to any hardship to ruin these 
hated foreign properties. Bankruptcy would follow, and 
with little or no payment the properties would pass into Ger- 
man hands again. Hence, the only thing would be to dis- 
pose of them at once to German owners. This would mean 
merely an ordinary indemnity with the railroads as a cum- 
brous intermediate term for determining the amount. 

The transfer of ships is not open to these objections, and 
is of all these proposals the most appropriate. It presents 
only such objections as hold against all indemnities, objections 



NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 93 

which we reserve for later consideration. Even more innocu- 
ous, unless in this most general wav, is the proposed transfer 
of international obligations. The principal question is as to 
the value of the obligations available for transfer. If Ger- 
many were victor, France might be compelled to surrender 
her claims against Eussia as formerly proposed, but their 
value is now doubtful. Our own country would be the chief 
loser. We now hold obligations against governments for the 
most part solvent, amounting to over seven billions of dollars. 
To transfer these obligations to Germany would not only 
largely offset her own vast debt, but what is even more im- 
portant, it would give her absolute financial control of some 
or all of these countries during the long period of indebted- 
ness. Such a country as Italy, for instance, would become 
absolutely a tributary state, unable to make a single impor- 
tant decision without Germany's consent. The establishment 
of this relation of financial control over countries not avail- 
able for annexation, was indeed a prominent feature of Ger- 
many's plan of world conquest which contemplated indem- 
nities from France which, as one noted writer urged, " can 
scarcely be made too heavy." 

But with the Allies as victors, what can be gotten in thia 
way ? Immense sums are due from Russia to Germany, but 
one purpose of the Allies is to liberate Eussia from this Ger- 
man tyranny. We can not collect further installments from 
Russia. We must if possible compel Germany to return what 
she has taken. We shall be fortunate if our financial rela- 
tions with Russia do not involve much heavier burdens. 

Turkey, Bulgaria, and presumably Austria owe vast sums 
to Germany. But we have seemingly decided to dismember 
at least two of these countries. The value of their obligations 
under these circumstances is problematical. If the Turks 
lose Constantinople, Armenia, Palestine, Syria, Arabia, and 
Mesopotamia, two thirds of which is an accomplished fact 



94 THE GREAT PEACE 

and the rest an almost inevitable sequence of victory, how 
will they pay the huge war debt they have contracted ? Bul- 
garia, too, is likely to issue from the war with diminished 
wealth and credit if not with diminished territories. The 
case of Austria is more obscure but not more hopeful. 

It will be plain from the foregoing that such transfers 
promise small relief for the war burdened Allies. Neverthe- 
less this is the one form of indemnity which it is most im- 
perative to exact. These obligations carry with them of ne- 
cessity a large measure of political dependence, and the Allies 
will leave their work half done if they leave the component 
parts of the menacing Mittel Europa in financial bondage to 
Germany. Turkish bonds may be below par, but they at 
least command Turkish allegiance and that must not be to 
Germany. Such a transfer would come much more under the 
head of guaranty than of indemnity, but it is not the less 
important for that reason. 

The possibility that Germany may hold pre-war obligations 
against foreign states such as Brazil which may have good 
value is worth considering, but these obligations are doubt- 
less in private hands and are hardly to be distinguished from 
the manifold assets of that character which make so large a 
part of a nation's financial capital. There is little to be 
gained by singling out these securities in indemnity calcula- 
tions. 

There remains to be considered the proposed transfer of 
colonies. Aside from the fact that these colonies are already 
in Allied possession and their assimilation into their several 
colonial administrations already far advanced, it can not be 
too emphatically asserted that colonies can not be considered 
as indemnity. Nations want them, as men want wives, but 
they should not be gotten by purchase in the one case or the 
other. To count colonies as financial assets inevitably im- 
plies the idea of exploitation for profit. This is the bane of 



NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 95 

all colonial relations, the vicious principle that wrecked the 
colonial empires of Spain and Portugal and made their names 
a byword and a hissing. It is a vicious theory which only 
the Anglo-Saxon seems completely to have outgrown. He 
makes money, to be sure, from colonial trade, but only as he 
makes money from trade with Germany, or as a German 
makes money by trade with these same Anglo-Saxon colonies. 
The sole meaning of possession in such cases should be, — and 
very nearly is, — the artificial maintenance of conditions of 
world commerce which more developed peoples can maintain 
for themselves. No nation that assumes the burden of main- 
taining these conditions with fair equity toward the civilized 
world should be asked to pay for the privilege. The sale of 
colonies is on a par with the Turkish system of selling gov- 
ernorships. It is significant that Germany should think such 
a sale quite a business proposition. It gives us the measure 
of German trusteeship. 

The difiiculty of finding available assets for the collection of 
indemnities is plainly considerable. Nevertheless it may 
safely be assumed that the collection of an indemnity in the 
form of capital, if discreetly managed and especially if dis- 
tributed over a long period, is not economically impossible. 
Germany has vast powers of recuperation and if skillfully 
farmed for indemnity purposes, would prove productive. 

There remain, therefore, the general questions, what do 
we wish to accomplish by means of indemnity and how far 
are our ends attainable ? 

The first idea is that of punishment, to hurt Germany be- 
cause she has hurt us. This again may be simply from anger, 
a desire to inflict injury without much thought of conse- 
quences, or it may be a more reasoned attempt to make Ger- 
many think twice before she tries it again. The first we will 
not discuss, though sentiments of resentment will perhaps 
bulk large at times during the long struggle. It is much to 



96 THE GKEAT PEACE 

be hoped, however, that we shall keep a cool head and see 
where we are going. If so, our desire to make Germany 
smart as a deterrent to future aggression will probably re- 
solve itself into the more tangible and reasonable demand of 
recompense for injuries suffered. We will not for the mo- 
ment dwell on the fact that the injury is incalculable and 
utterly beyond Germany's power to recompense. It may well 
be that certain particular injuries will be deemed to have 
prior claim and that they will not be open to this objection. 
Wherever the line is drawn, we may concede the possibility 
of formulating a practicable demand and of enforcing it at 
the peace settlement. 

There is still another criterion for the determination of 
an indemnity, namely, the weakening of the rival. This has 
been the avowed purpose of Germany both in the historic case 
of 18Y1 and in the proposals made later with regard to in- 
demnities to be exacted from Britain, France, and America. 
This is of course an entirely different thing from the recom- 
pensing of injuries, but in practice it works out much the 
same. The losses are always so colossal that no indemnity 
can cover them, and whether the indemnity be demanded for 
this purpose or for the weakening of the enemy, it may very 
well be the limit of what the conquered can pay. Our prob- 
lem, therefore, simplifies itself to this. W^hat will be the 
result to us of exacting an indemnity from Germany ? 

First of all, we must continue our military occupation of 
the country until the indemnity is paid. This has been the 
rule in such cases. If the indemnity is collected at once, the 
occupation will be brief, but in that case the amount can not 
be considerable. It can not be too strongly insisted that the 
means for paying a large indemnity do not exist in Ger- 
many at present. Possibly Germany could raise the amount 
by foreign loans as France did in 1871, but the odds are much 
against her, and if she succeeded, it would amount to our 



NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 97 

lending her the money to pay our indemnity with all the risk 
of later repudiation which would be involved in taking her 
promise to start with. In all probability such an indemnity 
would have to be paid in installments, and if we did not con- 
tinue military occupation of the country, the installments 
simply would not be paid. Germany would have no con- 
science about repudiating a debt which she believed unright- 
eous, and she would know perfectly that her enemies would 
not undertake another world war to collect a debt that would 
not cover a tenth their expenses. The cost of such a military 
occupation would in itself be prohibitive, though it would be 
the least of the objections to such a course. It would not be 
peace but war. 

It has been urged that the Allies possess an easy alternative 
to this expensive and dangerous expedient of armed occu- 
pation. They hold and presumably will retain the tropical 
world and many of the raw materials necessary to German 
industry. Any failure on Germany's part, it is argued, can 
be met by a refusal to furnish the raw materials which Ger- 
many needs. But a moment's reflection will make it clear 
that the Allies possess no such power. It is not the nations 
that buy and sell rubber and cotton, but individuals who act 
quite independently and ask only protection in their opera- 
tions. Doubtless the Allied nations will, in their national ca- 
pacity, control the supply of necessary raw materials to pre- 
vent cornering in a scarcity market, but to continue to do so 
would mean the abandonment of the fundamental principle 
of our economy. It is conceivable that that principle may be 
abandoned, but certainly not suddenly, nor in the interest of 
collecting an indemnity. So long as the regime of individ- 
ual liberty continues, Germany will find purveyors for her 
wants. If the Allies should abandon the policy of the open 
door as regards the territories they hold in trust, and should 
forbid the sale of their products to Germany, it would not 



98 THE GREAT PEACE 

only invalidate their title to trusteeship but would raise a 
storm of protest from their own citizens. There may well 
be opportunities for wise, concerted, economic action on the 
part of the Allied governments, but they will hardly find it in 
abrogating their long standing rule of industrial liberty. As 
compared with the havoc which such a step would work, the 
gain of an indemnity, even the largest, would be as dust in 
the balance. Moreover the Allies do not altogether monopo- 
lize these supplies, and any attempt so to do would stimulate 
competitive production elsewhere with disastrous results. 

But we will not allow even this diflBculty to keep us from 
the deeper issue. Possibly ingenuity and statesmanship of 
a high order could overcome these obstacles and could secure 
from Germany the regular payments of a deferred indem- 
nity of large amount. What would be the result? The 
immediate result would of course be to enrich the Allies and 
impoverish Germany. In the same way a gift to charity re- 
lieves suffering. But it is the rarest thing in the world that 
the forces set in motion stop with the first happy result. 
Habits are formed and character adjustments effected which 
are often the opposite of what is intended. As the world 
emerges from the colossal contest, the supreme fact will be 
the impoverishment of the world. Eor this there is but one 
possible cure, the devotion anew of human energy to the con- 
quest of nature, the practice of thrift and self-denial. The 
nation that learns these habits soonest and best, will inherit 
the future. Any trifling handicap in the way of initial allot- 
ment will rapidly disappear in the face of this all potent fac- 
tor. "We are awed by the immensity of the world's momen- 
tary stock of wealth. That is as nothing to the great stream 
which is ever emerging from the void and disappearing in the 
channels of human service. Give to a favored nation any 
advantage you please in the way of initial supply, and if its 
rival has an advantage, say, of ten per cent, in habits of pro- 



NATI0:N^ALITY A^D accountability 99 

ductivity and thrift, it will pass its favored competitor in a 
single generation. Bismarck thought he had disabled France 
for fifty years by his crushing indemnity. Within a decade 
he confessed his miscalculation and showed undisgiiised alarm 
at the recovery of his humbled enemy. Impoverishment only 
stimulated thrift, such thrift as no other nation in Europe 
knows, and reversed the great Chancellor's calculation. 

Despite all her losses, Germany is going to emerge from 
this war tremendously strong for the ensuing industrial 
struggle. Her colossal debt is not a liability against the 
German people, but against Germans in behalf of other Ger- 
mans. Every cent paid by the taxpayer will be wrung from 
him by enforced economy which will become a law of his 
being. But every cent so paid will be paid to a person who 
is for the most part an investor, an accumulator. It would 
be impossible to devise a better method for coercive thrift. It 
will mean enormous privation, the loss for whole generations 
of much that makes life worth living, but it will mean the 
rebuilding of the industrial machine of Germany in the 
shortest possible time. 

If we impose farther burdens we shall possibly postpone 
that recovery (though even that is not sure, as the experience 
of France would seem to show), but we should assure only the 
more certainly the ultimate result. Meanwhile we should 
just as surely experience a disastrous reaction ourselves. 
I^othing so bodes ill to us in our future competition with 
Germany as the certainty that we shall not be willing to pay 
the price for success that she will offer. We shall demand 
shorter hours, lighter tasks, more favorable and expensive con- 
ditions of labor. Above all we. shall demand higher wages 
which means that we shall refuse to set aside as large a part 
of the national income as Germany will do, to restore and 
enlarge the great industrial plant of society. This may be 
the wise decision. Certainly the ampler living is one of the 



100 THE GREAT PEACE 

things, nay, the very thing, for which industry exists. But 
the eternal obstacle to the attainment of these ends is the com- 
petition of lower paid and less exacting labor. It is an eco- 
nomic truism that slave labor makes free labor impossible. 
In precisely the same way the prolonged enslavement of Ger- 
man labor would be an insuperable obstacle to the emancipa- 
tion of our ovm. 

In the face of these considerations, it is scarcely worth our 
while to urge or refute the so-called ethical arguments for 
indemnity. Germany's guilt for the great war is incalcu- 
lable, but it is a guilt for which the feeble means at the dis- 
posal of the victor offer no atonement. Perhaps, too, in our 
moments of calmer thought, we may realize that it is guilt of 
a somewhat different order from that with which our puny tri- 
bunals are accustomed to deal. In the surging torrents of 
race assertion and the conflict of race ideals individuals count 
for so little and their freedom of choice is so narrowed that 
our human codes and tribunals seem to have no competent 
jurisdiction. This is no attempt to minimize the guilt of 
Germany. The writer can not see it otherwise than as a 
monstrous, immeasurable thing. Not because it is so little 
but because it is so great, he feels the hopelessness of any 
attempt to assess a penalty. The great case takes us back 
through a chain of causes which we shall not soon follow to 
the end. We may as well wait for the judgment day. 

Our conclusion is, therefore, that as a general measure of 
reprisal, or restitution, or deterrent, or economic repression, 
indemnities are not available. Above all in a war of such 
magnitude as this, the defeated can not pay and the victors 
can not collect an indemnity at all commensurate with either 
injury or guilt. Could they do so, the indemnity would ulti- 
mately defeat its own end by its reactions upon the habits of 
the peoples involved. Indemnity is no remedy for war. 

But it is possible that in a limited way indemnity may be 



iq-ATIOI^ALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 101 

a remedy for the abuses of war. There is a distinction, pos- 
sibly artificial, but not the less important, between things 
sanctioned and things forbidden in war by the consensus of 
civilized nations. The sinking of the Queen Mary is in a 
different class from the sinking of the Lusitania. The inva- 
sion of France, the recognized rival of Germany, unprovoked 
as it was, is different from the invasion of Belgium, whose 
neutrality Germany had promised to protect. The execution 
of Captain Fryatt was not war, but plain official murder of a 
civilian. These acts, appalling as is their aggregate, are 
after all just the things which our governments and our tri- 
bunals have been established to deal with. Indemnities for 
the victims of the Lnsiianin and for at least certain of the 
injuries suffered by Belgium,^ if kept within limits not too 
disturbing to the economic order, may have a wholesome effect 
in establishing the limits of warfare. Even here, however, 
only the most conspicuous cases can be dealt with. Any at- 
tempt to cover the field of Germany's violations of interna- 
tional law would at once encounter the obstacles already noted. 

The writer ventures, with much hesitation, to raise the ques- 
tion of other possible penalties in certain cases. There were 
things done in Belgium as elsewhere which have no relation 
to war and which no nation condones. Many of these are on 
record and their perpetrators perfectly known. The sugges- 
tion is reasonable and perhaps practicable, that certain of 
these monsters, men often high in authority, should be handed 
over to civil tribunals and punished in accordance with civil 
law. A few public trials and legal executions would have 
results of possibly permanent value. Care should be taken to 
choose such cases as even the German conscience would con- 
demn. Yet here again the suggestion appalls by its vast 
scope. Only the most limited application of the principle of 
peace reprisals can have other than disastrous reactions. 

1 This subject is considered at length in the chapter on Belgium. 



102 THE GKEAT PEACE 

If the peace for which we are striving is to be worthy 
of our struggles, it must be a peace that will bring prosperity 
to the world, and ultimately reconciliation to men. The no- 
tion that the crippling or impoverishment of a competing 
nation can permanently enrich our own is a fallacy con- 
demned by all human experience and unworthy of thoughtful 
men. Let us not be guilty of following Germany in the 
grossest of her blunders. Germany is at present a colossal 
example of misdirected energy, but destruction is not her only 
art. German proficiency is as marked in constructive as in 
destructive lines. The problem of the world is not to destroy 
this energy but to subdue it to its service. Let us not forget, 
in the just indignation of the moment, the immense poten- 
tial serviceableness of this misguided people. The Germans 
are after all a people that the world can not spare. Even 
from the low standpoint of commerce the repression of Ger- 
many would have disastrous consequences. Germany is not 
only England's redoubtable competitor. She is also Eng- 
land's best customer. If, therefore, the suppression of Ger- 
many brought profit to certain industries it would bring ruin 
to other and greater industries. The full benefits of afflu- 
ence are impossible except in an affluent world. It is indica- 
tive of Germany's abuse and degradation of the function of 
war that she should see in it an opportunity for wholesale 
plunder. 

Above all it is fitting that a nation which never exacted an 
indemnity, but which has established the precedent of pay- 
ment for the territories annexed, a nation that entered this 
war in pursuit of no material interests and that rejects with 
scorn the imputation of sordid aims, — it is fitting that such 
a nation should refuse to compound its ideals for money pay- 
ment. And may reparation, where necessary, be so made as 
to carry with it no taint, no clouding of tha ideal which is 
the glory of Belgium and France. 



CHAPTER VIII 

NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 

Internationalism, in its necessity and its crude reality, 
is the outstanding fact in the present world situation. Na- 
tions can do nothing alone, — will never again do anything 
alone. There are no more local problems, no exclusively 
national interests. Alliances are the supreme problem of 
war, as cooperation is the supreme fact in peace. With the 
passing of the old local civilization and of the self-sufficient 
community, independent nationality in any complete sense 
of the word becomes a fiction. International dependence is 
the ever increasing fact as civilization develops. The prob- 
lem of the hour is to match this growing independence with 
both the mood and the mechanism of effective cooperation. 
The dependence is inevitable, and that in itself means weak- 
ness. Effective cooperation is indispensable. Only that 
means power. 

A time like this tends to emphasize and at the same time 
to pervert the problem of internationalism. Our thought 
turns too exclusively to the prevention of war. The problem 
seems to be a judicial one, and the supreme need a tribunal 
for the settlement of disputes. The great international in- 
terests, on the contrary, are peace interests, and the problem 
is administrative far more than judicial. It is a question 
of the official management of certain great business interests 
of the nations much more than a problem of punishing or 
preventing breaches of the peace. 

Among these interests perhaps the most obvious is the use 
of the sea, the inevitable international area and the highway 
of the nations. The problem is to keep it open and safe, 

103 



104 THE GREAT PEACE 

safe from the pirate or individual marauder, and safe from 
the shock of contending nations who pursue their enemies 
upon this world domain. This problem will be discussed 
more fully in the chapter on Britain. For the present it is 
sufficient to note its obviously international character. 

Then there are certain strategic sites of special importance, 
an importance so great as to overshadow the problems of their 
own population. Gibraltar is an extreme example. Its in- 
significant population is little more than an appendage of the 
garrison. Its interests as compared with those of the na- 
tions whose busiest trade route is controlled by the great rock, 
are so insignificant that all question of democratic privilege 
is completely forgotten. The double passageway of the Dar- 
danelles and the Bosphorus presents a like problem, though it 
is less easily detached from adjacent territories and the prob- 
lem of its local population is not so readily subordinated. 
But it is alike in this that the world interest is paramount. 
The people who live there have rights which must be re- 
spected, but they can not be permitted to control the water- 
way, nor yet to block the highway, almost equally important, 
which crosses it from north to south. 

The great canals, Suez, Panama, and Kiel, are quite sim- 
ilar, but with the important difference that they are artificial 
and have been built at enormous expense. Those who have 
made this outlay have acquired a title which can not be 
ignored, yet one which can not be allowed to obscure their 
obviously international function. 

Certain small nations, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Swit- 
zerland, and others, have something of this paramount inter- 
national character. They are nations with a considerable 
population and a historic national consciousness for which we 
instinctively claim the usual privileges of self-determination 
and independent sovereignty. Yet they have something of 
the Gibraltar character in that their occupation or use by a 



KATION^ALITY AND INTEEliATIONALISM 105 

great power would give it an overwhelming advantage over 
its rivals. Such states necessarily lose some of the ordinary 
attributes of sovereignty and become in a sense wards of the 
powers whose fate they can not but determine. They are 
international interests. 

Quite distinct are those peoples who are wards because of 
inability to manage their own affairs in a manner to meet 
modern requirements. There is an irreducible minimum of 
decency, order, and safety which all parts of the world are 
now required to provide. The doctrine of liberty is no 
longer construed as giving to any people the right to breed 
pestilence or rob and kill peaceable persons, or withhold from 
the world the resources which civilization has requisitioned 
for its higher uses. There is still much of all this in the 
world, but it is recognized as an abuse, and it is a legitimate 
international problem to remove it. The peoples that can not 
eliminate pestilence and anarchy and make it safe for men 
to go and come within their borders must be helped to do so 
or made to do so. For such peoples a receivership must be 
established. This does not mean that they have no rights, 
but that they are incompetent to protect their rights, and still 
more, to protect those larger rights to which all local rights 
are necessarily subordinate. All backward peoples are thus 
of necessity the wards of the nations. Under present condi- 
tions the guardian is necessarily a nation, but the interest is 
plainly international. The perception of this fact has led to a 
proposal that international agencies be created for the admin- 
istration of these trusts, more particularly for the adminis- 
tration of the German colonies which this war is seemingly 
going to throw upon the world for disposal. 

Most important of all international interests, however, are 
the great, civilized nations themselves in that range of their 
interests which do not come witliin their recog-nized individ- 
ual jurisdiction. The great civilized powers are after all the 



106 THE GKEAT PEACE 

great disturbers of the peace, the great destroyers of civiliza- 
tion. If the savage becomes a ward by reason of his inability 
to keep the peace and protect life and property, then by the 
same token the great powers call for guardianship. The 
problem is to find a guardian. 

Let us recognize at the outset, if possible, that the impor- 
tant thing is to get the work properly done, rather than to get 
it done in a particular way. There are always those who 
wish procedure to be logical. There are others who demand 
only that it should be effectual. Possibly if we perfectly 
understood all factors in our problem, the logical and the 
effectual would be seen to be very nearly identical, but with 
our half knowledge the seemingly logical often diverges 
widely from the effectual. It is characteristic of the very 
successful Anglo-Saxon that he invariably prefers the effec- 
tual, no matter what its seeming incongruity. It is in this 
Anglo-Saxon spirit that we approach the study of this much 
debated subject. We seek an effectual administration of 
international interests in a manner consonant with their inter- 
national character. The presumption is enormously in favor 
of any existing administration which meets these require- 
ments, as it is in favor of the further use of experienced and 
efficient agencies. It is the logical thing to provide inter- 
national agencies to administer international interests, just 
as it is the logical thing to have the community own its 
bakeries because all citizens eat the bread. But such logic 
often reposes on mere verbal suggestion. The real ques- 
tion is, which way gives us the most and the best bread. 
It is a slow and difficult task to create effectual admin- 
istrative agencies. It means knowledge which transcends 
the individual's power to acquire and guiding traditions 
which transcend his personal sense of obligation. Such 
an administration can only rest back on a coherent and well 
defined entity such as only national bodies have yet been able 



NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 107 

to supply. The creation of such a great spiritual entity is a 
matter of secular slowness. It can be done, it almost cer- 
tainly will be done, but by what methods and whether for 
immediate availability is not so clear. It is rather to be 
anticipated that for a long time to come we shall find the 
great, mature, disciplined nations the most effectual agencies 
for purposes of international administration. The important 
thing in the meantime is to recognize clearly the nature of 
the trust and their accountability to the community of nations. 

With this general observation we may reserve for discus- 
sion in other chapters the various concrete interests which are 
involved in the present war. The freedom of the sea is essen- 
tially the problem of Britain, so long its guardian. The 
problem of Belgium, nation and international bulwark, is 
necessarily the subject of an entire chapter. Constantinople, 
the problem of a thousand years, calls for treatment which 
may require a break with all tradition. The German col- 
onies, again, must be considered, not as cases under a general 
rule, but in relation to adjacent territories and the problem 
of their political development. If full account be taken of 
local peculiarities, these problems raised by the war will be 
found capable of individual solution. 

There remains the great problem of establishing an inter- 
national agency for the one task for which the nations are 
individually incompetent. All the other tasks, the control of 
the sea, the occupation of strategic sites, the protection of 
little nations, the administration of backward territories, 
may be, — and thus far have been, — distributed among the 
great powers, but the control of these powers themselves obvi- 
ously requires a higher authority. That authority can be no 
other than the joint authority of these nations themselves or 
a preponderant portion of them. Proposals to form such a 
joint authority and to equip it with machinery suitable for 
its function have acquired unusual importance from the ap- 



108 THE GREAT PEACE 

parent adhesion of the President of the United States who has 
given prominence to this subject in all his addresses and pro- 
nouncements relative to conditions of peace. Statesmen of 
nearly all the Allied nations and even the chancellors of the 
German Empire have also expressed their approval in more 
or less guarded phrase. The subject therefore rises quite 
above its usual status of theory and speculation, and becomes 
one of the great practical issues of the day. As such it de- 
serves our careful consideration, both in its present form and 
in its origin. 

The earlier proposals were purely permissive and moral. 
Little more was attempted than to have a place and an agency 
always ready to arbitrate the differences of those who were 
unable to reach an agreement unaided. The verdict rendered 
by this tribunal was to have no other sanction than its pre- 
sumptive competency and impartiality and the force of inter- 
national opinion. 'No doubt such an arrangement would meet 
certain requirements. Its defect lay in its basic assumption 
that nations were willing to live and let live and asked only 
for equity under this principle. Now if never before, the 
world should realize how far this is from the facts with which 
we have to deal. 

Slowly it became apparent that an element of force was 
necessary in dealing with a problem whose essence was force. 
Proposals to compel the submission of disputes to arbitration, 
to enforce the acceptance of the award, and the like, were 
made, — always with this result that they raised the ques- 
tion of who or what was to do the compelling. To the popu- 
lar mind this question has never come home with its true 
force. The writer has been interested to note with what ease 
\j proposals of internationalization of every sort find acceptance 
with the public. If the Dardanelles proves a bone of conten- 
tion over which the great powers exhaust their energies, the 
popular remedy is always there. Internationalize the straits 



NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 109 

and make them all stand back. It rarely occurs to any one to 
ask, who is to make them stand back. Even after Germany 
has snapped the bonds of international law like tow burned in 
the fire, the assumption is still unthinkingly made that she 
would stand in awe of an internationalized Constantinople. 
There is an easy and very creditable explanation for this per- 
sistent illusion. We live under conditions of social order so 
secure that obedience to the judgments of tribunals is a matter 
of course. We never think of trying conclusions with the 
policeman's club or the armed power of the state. Eor us the 
pronouncement of recognized authority is final. We nat- 
urally assume that the pronouncement of recognized authority 
will everywhere be final. Yet nothing is more certain than 
that it is the policeman and the armed power of the nation, 
no matter how unnoticed and forgotten, which give to con- 
stituted authority its finality. 

Thi? fact has not escaped the attention of practical men. 
Attention has therefore been devoted of late, and especially 
since the outbreak of the great war, to the question of sanc- 
tion or enforcing power. This can be furnished, of course, 
only by the nations themselves, and must be in essence, how- 
ever disguised, a super-state. Proposals looking to this end 
are best represented by the strongly urged League to Enforce 
Peace which numbers among its promoters many distin- 
guished names, and commends itself, as we have seen, to the 
statesmen of most of the nations now at war. 

The League proposes a union of nations pledged to submit 
their differences to a tribunal, if " justiciable," or to a com- 
mission of inquiry if the issues are adjudged vital to the 
existence or honor of the nation. In the latter case, according 
to plans which have been given the widest currency, it is not 
proposed to make the commission's report binding upon the 
parties to the dispute. They are pledged, as members of the 
league, only to await the result of the inquiry. They are 



110 THE GREAT PEACE 

then free to go to war if they elect to do so. It is judged 
that this very moderate demand will commend the plan to 
those nations whose power and pride make them hesitate to 
commit their existence and honor to the keeping of other 
nations. Finally and chiefly, the members of the league are 
to use their power, military and economic, to compel obedi- 
ence and the observance of pledges to the league. It is plausi- 
bly urged that a power so overwhelming would effectually awe 
any rebellious power. 

It is plain that such a league would involve a great en- 
croachment upon the traditional authority of the nations. 
It is not simply the right to make war which is withdrawn 
or curtailed but the right to adjudicate or investigate all 
those questions which give rise to war. In current plans, 
this encroachment upon national prerogative is held within 
the most moderate limits, but this moderation is confessedly 
prudential and temporary. The concession of the right to 
go to war after investigation is a reluctant one, not to say 
a specious one, for the intention is plainly to make war vir- 
tually impossible by the investigation. More would be de- 
manded if more were judged possible, but in this transition 
state it is thought best to leave the nations at least the outer 
semblance of national prerogative. But the avowed purpose 
of the proposed leairne is to prevent war, and this can be 
accomplished only by developing an extensive and powerful 
supernational authority. The assumption usually is that 
with the establishment of such an authority, national differ- 
ences would tend to disappear and that the supernational 
authority would have little to do. Such an assumption seems 
unwarranted. If the nations become submissive and indif- 
ferent to national asfcrandizement, it can onlv be because 
they have ceased to be the doers of the real things, as in the 
case of the States of the American Union. But the lessen- 
ing interest in the states has not meant a lessening activity 



NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 111 

on the part of the Federal government. It is because the 
Federal government has absorbed the substance of state au- 
thority that we no longer care much about their individual 
interests or aggrandizement. When we recall that all 
equilibriums among nations, localities, families, and the like 
are continually being upset by new discoveries and inventions, 
above all by the unequal power of growth which so mysteri- 
ously manifests itself in peoples, we may assume with cer- 
tainty that the supernational authority thus established would 
either break down or be progressively extended and strength- 
ened. If the nations continue to be the real power, the old 
ambitions, jealousies, and conflicts of interest will continue. 
If international authority holds these turbulent elements in 
permanent equilibrium, it can only be by increasingly ab- 
sorbing such of their functions as have international re- 
actions. This would mean the gradual establishment of a 
vast administrative mechanism with numerous functions and 
an extensive personnel, in short, the formation of a true super- 
state. 

Such a super-state once formed and experienced in its ad- 
ministrative functions, would almost inevitably take over 
in turn those international trusts which for the present are 
administered by the nations. The policing of the seas would 
ultimately be done by ships flying the flag of the league and 
owning only its authority. Gibraltar and the Dardanelles 
could hardly fail to accept like administration. Belgium 
and Denmark and the great canals would continue under in- 
ternational guaranties of a sort very different from those they 
have hitherto known. Above all, the tropics and all the lands 
of the backward peoples would be the charge of the super- 
state. Or, not to make too violent an assumption, if these 
various trusts were still administered by individual nations, 
it would be by delegated authority and under the sanctions 
of the super-state. 



112 THE GEE AT PEACE 

The writer, for one, is not deterred by this prospect. Let 
us hedge and hesitate as we will, the conclusion is unescap- 
able that the world is moving toward Cosmos rather than to- 
ward Chaos. If it is not, it is not worth bothering about or 
staying in. Nor can the writer conceive of this Cosmos as 
essentially other than a state with its organs for repressing 
disorder and organizing for effective cooperation the multi- 
farious energies of nature and man. This organization does 
not take place spontaneously nor without coercion of reluc- 
tant and suppression of malignant forces. The world unity 
must be essentially a state. ISTor can the argument that in- 
ternational authority is inconsistent with national sovereignty 
be recognized as having any weight. Absolute sovereignty 
/ is and always has been a fiction. 'No state has more authority 
/ than it has power, and no state has unlimited power. The 
very existence of other states limits the power of the state, 
and there is no reason why that power should not be further 
limited in the interest of the ends for which states exist. 

But all this is ultimate and immeasurably remote. Be- 
tween us and the attainment of ideal internationalism 
stretches a long, long road of difficult progress, and it is 
near its hither end that lies the problem with which we have 
to deal. For the coming settlement will be after all only 
a transition adjustment, one destined to give place, — peace- 
ably, let us hope, — to another and to many another before 
the end of the road is reached. And the way is not plain nor 
is the distance measured, however clear the goal. Turning, 
therefore, from ultimate or ideal internationalism to in- 
ternationalism as a practical problem of the immediate pres- 
ent, let us consider how far it is available as a solution of 
present difficulties. 

It is a precaution never to be omitted in such cases to in- 
quire what light, if any, history has to throw upon our prob- 
lem. Very few people seem to be aware to how large an 



ITATIONALITY AND INTEENATIONALISM 113 

extent the experiment of international control has already 
been tried. Despite the complicating circumstances that 
are always present, certain of these cases are exactly in point 
and their outcome is the most reliable guide we can have. 

A significant case is that of Denmark. Controlling by 
her situation the entrance- to the Baltic, she is yet too weak 
to protect herself against her powerful neighbors. In the 
interest of the European balance of power, the great powers 
of that day, England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Eussia, 
pledged themselves in 1853 to respect the integrity of Den- 
mark and to join forces against any one of their number 
who should violate it. But in 1864 Prussia and Austria, 
having quite changed their views as to their needs, attacked 
Denmark and despoiled her of Schleswig-Holstein. France 
found herself too busy and too little interested to interfere. 
England threatened to the last, but ultimately backed down, 
and Russia, most concerned of them all, was powerless to pre- 
vent the spoliation. 

It will of course be urged that this was not a fair test, that 
not all powers were represented, and that only a single object 
was included. It will be clear on reflection, however, that 
these were elements of strength rather than of weakness in 
the scheme. If all the nations had been included, would 
Argentina or Guatemala or Turkey or the United States have 
been likely to oppose Germany and Austria if a country so 
nearly interested as France refused to interfere? And if 
they could not stand together on this vital question which 
they had distinctly foreseen, is it likely that they would have 
risked a war with such powers on other and more unexpected 
issues? The case was a very favorable one and illustrates 
another factor with which we have always to deal, namely, 
national growth. Prussia had prospered and the vision of 
sea power had come to her. The difficult Danish straits gave 
but unsatisfactory access to her long Baltic sea coast and in 



114 THE GKEAT PEACE 

war time were impassable. Her navy which must protect 
her toward the east and toward the west, must be able to pass 
the Danish peninsula at will, or but half of it wouH be avail- 
able against either foe. In short the idea of the Kiel Canal 
had come to her, and the Danish neck must be acquired. 
Pretexts, the most barefaced imaginable, were found, the 
situation of the hostile powers shrewdly estimated, Austria 
won by false inducements, and the deed accomplished. 

Belgium offers another case, almost identical with the 
foregoing, save that there were fewer guarantors and no 
acquiescence in the spoliation. But again the agreement was 
violated because conditions had changed and one of the guar- 
antors deemed it advantageous to violate its pledge. 

Whether we invoke internationalism as the custodian of 
some special and local interest or as the general arbiter of 
all international disputes, we encounter the same difficulties 
which wrecked these experiments. The larger applica- 
tions of the principle do not essentially change the problem. 
The argument of preponderant force takes no account of the 
ease with which great combinations are formed in our day. 
It is impressive to say that in a league of twenty nations, the 
nineteen could always bring the one disturber to book. What 
guaranty have we that it would be nineteen against one? 
So it was argued about Denmark, that four could always 
control the one. But it proved to be three against two, and 
that at a moment when one of the three was embarrassed and 
another weakly led. In a combination of twenty nations this 
situation might easily repeat itself. Nothing is more de- 
ceptive than general talk about '' nations " with counting 
on the finger tips. As a matter of fact the nations are very 
unequal in size and are so situated that they fall into natural 
groups which have no choice but to act as units. If an in- 
t ternational agreement were reached neutralizing the Dar- 
danelles and signed by all the present powers of Europe, and 



S' 



NATIOi^ALITY AISTD INTERNATIONALISM 115 

Germany should violate the agreement and attempt to seize 
the straits herself, the other powers could not line up against 
her. Holland, Belgium, and Denmark would be compelled 
to remain neutral or join with her, as she might choose, under 
pain of annihilation. The same might be true of Norway 
and Sweden, to say nothing of the Balkan states. Opposi- 
tion could come only from a few great powers. But it is al- 
most certain that Germany would choose a time for such an 
adventure when one or more of these powers would be em- 
barrassed, and that inducements would bring one or more 
of them to her side. There has been hardly a decade in the 
last hundred years when a statesman of the sagacity of Bis- 
marck could not have found conditions favorable to such an 
enterprise. And the Dardanelles once seized and Constanti- 
nople occupied by Germany and her allies, they might very 
possibly hold it against all comers and through it attain their 
end of world domination. 

Even greater than the danger of direct violence would be 
the danger of intrigue, the manipulation or corruption of 
international agents, the scheming to control their appoint- 
ment, and the accusation, true or false, but deadly in either 
case, of partiality. And if the administrator were not partial 
when partiality was sought, the accusation of partiality would 
be the certain device for removing the unpliable official. It 
is a situation in which Potiphar's wife could play her role to 
perfection. Nor would these dangers menace international- 
ism less in its role of world arbiter than in its function as 
local administrator. The losing nations would be dissatis- 
fied nations, and their dissatisfaction, whatever its cause, 
would be laid to the charge of the league, engendering schism 
and faction within the group of the nations. 

And there would always be losing and dissatisfied nations. 
The great and eternal disturber of equilibrium among na- 
tions is growth, unequal growth, which makes the equities of 



116 THE GEEAT PEACE 

today seem the inequities of tomorrow. The losing will 
falsely explain their loss. The growing will protest against 
their straitened allotment of opportunity. They will not 
willingly give of their growth and their strength to swell 
the ranks of other peoples and assure the triumph of other 
cultures than those they love. We may decry these impulses 
but we can not escape them. These forces that menace the 
nations are the forces that built the nations and the forces 
that must maintain them. The fundamental weakness of 
all schemes to stabilize international relations is that they 
assume rigidity and finality where the norm is flux and 
growth. They are like attempts to survey town lots on a 
glacier or to prescribe once for all the size of a boy's shoes. 

Viewed in what is perhaps its most significant aspect, the 
present conflict is a struggle between these two principles of 
rigidity and plasticity. The western nations, mature in 
their development, have attained to relative permanence of 
frontier and the idea of finality has become fundamental in 
their thought. The nations of Central Europe and still 
more of Eastern Europe have established their boundaries 
more recently and with less conformity to nature, conveni- 
ence, and race. To a large extent these boundaries are ob- 
viously artificial and perhaps provisional. It is impossible 
for these nations to attribute thus instinctively to their ar- 
rangements this character of finality. It seems to them a 
monstrous thing to conceive of the present European hodge- 
podge with which they are but too familiar, as a finality, a 
thing to be petrified and held fast forever. With this con- 
sciousness of plasticity comes inevitably the dream of con- 
solidation, of leadership, of world dominion. This is with 
them, not an argument or a conviction, but an instinct. In 
this struggle, therefore, two great race instincts are in con- 
flict, and each race tries to interpret the other in terms of its 



NATI0:N^ALITY and internationalism 117 

own instinct. Each utterly fails to take account of the in- 
stincts which it attempts to harmonize. 

This conflict of instincts is pathetically and amusingly il- 
lustrated by the reception of the peace league proposal in 
Germany. This reception has taken two opposite but per- 
fectly consistent forms. On the one hand the proposal has 
been scornfully rejected as a scheme to put Germany at the 
mercy of a combination dominated by her present enemies. 
The assumption was that the league would be under Anglo- 
Saxon leadership and that it would mean Anglo-Saxon world 
empire. On the other hand, the German chancellor early 
in the war announced that Germany not only approved such 
a league but that she would he willing to assume the leader- 
ship of it. This proposal has recently been repeated with 
the suggestion that Germany should take the initiative in 
preparing plans for such a league and the farther naive sug- 
gestion that the natural capital for such a league would be 
Berlin. We laugh at such proposals, but they are perfectly 
serious, and the German can not understand why we laugh. 
It will be noted that whether he accepts or rejects the pro- 
posal, the one thing he sees in it is the possibility of a dom- 
inating leadership ending in world empire for a single race. 
This is fundamental to all his thinking, an axiom of his 
political philosophy. A league of nations, to his mind, could 
not be other than an instrument for world domination by a 
single race. He would accept it with perfect sincerity and 
set to work all his powers of organization and intrigue to 
secure that domination for his own race. It is not incon- 
ceivable that he should succeed. 

There are other minor difficulties in the way of the pro- 
gram of inclusive internationalism as it was originally pro- 
posed, difficulties in themselves sufficient to insure its failure 
under present conditions. One is the group dependence of 



118 THE GREAT PEACE 

nations which deprives them of the liberty of action which 
the plan of the league presupposes. How can we ask Hol- 
land to promise in certain eventualities to attack Germany 
or even to withhold supplies when we know that she will 
he annihilated if she does so ? The same of Denmark, of 
Rumania, of Bulgaria. What possible freedom of choice 
have Portugal and Finland and the Poland that is to be ? 
They have no option but neutrality or cooperation with the 
nation that can destroy them. The world is made up, not 
of many independent nations, large and small, but of a few 
great groups, vague in outline but predetermined in their 
essence, which necessarily act as units. 

Again, it is provided that in those matters concerning 
which nations refuse to surrender the right of war, they shall 
hold that right in abeyance. They may not fight until after 
their quarrel has been investigated, but then they may. But 
then they can not, or if they do, they must do so under vitally 
changed conditions. How can we expect Japan to give 
Russia a year's notice of her intention to defend a cause which 
she dares not arbitrate, when we know that her only hope lies 
in promptness and surprise ? Such a proposal simply dis- 
arms the quick nations in favor of the slow, the little nations 
in favor of the big. Whether this would be in favor of ul- 
timate equity is doubtful, but the nations unfavorably af- 
fected will hardly consent thus to give away their case. 

Most of all are to be feared in such a league the possibilities 
of racial propaganda, the inevitable formation of parties, 
the coalition of nations having common interests or instincts, 
the deepening schism between groups, as the forces of growth, 
energy, or accident slowly tipped the scale toward the one or 
the other, the reappearance within the league of the hostilities 
which it was meant to suppress. How certain the charge 
that the winning group was the favored group ! How in- 
evitable the suspicion of partiality, a suspicion as fatal as 



NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 119 

the fact! How irresistible the temptation of the losers to 
secede, to redress the balance with the sword! When Flor- 
ence, hampered in her growing industry by the feuds of her 
country barons, suppressed them and destroyed their castle 
tollgates, she thought to insure peace by forcing them to live 
within her walls where she could watch and control them. 
The result was that they brought their feuds with them and 
rallied the Florentines to the one or the other side. Flor- 
ence was rent with strife for a hundred years until in despair 
she banished them in a body to fight it out away from her 
presence and carry their mischief where they would. Until 
men are peaceable, such a league to enforce peace will be a 
trap and a pretext for war. 

But under peace conditions, it may be urged, men will be 
peaceable. Germany would not care to seize the Dardanelles 
if she were certain of being free to use it. She would not 
seek colonies with all their burdens of administration if she 
were certain to have the freedom of their markets and her 
fair share of their raw materials. Assure her this by in- 
ternationalization and she will be content. So in her dis- 
tress she would fain assure us. Would that it were so. But 
if this war has taught us anything, it is that Germany wants, 
— not the freedom of this our world, — but its lordship. We 
utterly mistake the temper of nationalism in these its more 
virulent forms if we do not perceive that it desires to pre- 
vail, to dominate and subordinate other nations and other 
civilizations. Germany does not believe in a fellowship of 
equal nations. She believes in a triumphant Germanism. 
Freedom of the seas, freedom to use the Dardanelles, free- 
dom to trade with the tropics, all these she has had and these 
nowise meet her demands. She seeks the control of the 
world's vantage points and the world's resources, that she may 
make them serve the ends of Germanism. There is nothing 
unique about this except the virulence and ruthlessness which 



120 THE GREAT PEACE 

it acquires from German character, but it is in square contra- 
diction with the purpose of the proposed league, and if Ger- 
many joins such a league it will be to use it for her purpose. 

The objections to the proposed league have been urged at 
some length because of the great and influential support 
which the project has received and because of the writer's 
conviction that it involves very great peril. In particular 
we should be on our guard against the thoughtless argument 
that " it will do no harm to try it." It may do infinite harm 
to try it. The natural and necessary concomitant of any such 
scheme is disarmament, partial or complete. There is no 
known way of effectually enforcing such a measure. If 
actual armament is reduced, there are still ways of accumu- 
lating military advantage by the cornering of necessary ma- 
terials, the equipment of mimition plants, the specialization 
of national industries in directions favorable to military pre- 
paredness, the manipulation of national education and the 
like. The nation that wishes to evade the purpose of the 
peace league can do so. Germany, by a misdirected military 
move has roused the peaceably disposed nations and armed 
them against her. She can not hope to prevail against a 
world in arms. Her next move must of necessity be to again 
disarm the world. Eor that purpose a peace league with its 
program of universal disarmament is admirably suited. 

Once more we grasp at straws. Will not the war change 
the German temper ? Yes and no. It is reasonable to hope 
that Germany will ultimately learn the lesson of these ex- 
periences. The German people can not suffer as they have 
suffered without at last reflecting to some purpose on the 
blindness of conceit, the abysmal ignorance, the world alienat- 
ing arrogance, and the maddening brutalities that have neu- 
tralized all their science, their industry, and their organiza- 
tion and dragged them down to defeat. These things will 
sometime be written so that Germans will read them and will 



NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 121 

understand. No people can be wholly immune to the cor- 
rective influences of experience. But this change will not 
come soon. One of the most extraordinary phenomena of his- 
tory is the persistence of Prussian character. Such as they 
have been in this war, they have been ever since they were 
known in history. Yet they have again and again passed 
through these chastening experiences. While conceding 
therefore, that the Germans will be influenced by this ex- 
perience, we must not expect that the change will be so im- 
mediate or so far reaching as to constitute in itself a safe- 
guard for the peace of the world. 

Yet it may easily seem to be so. Over and above all the 
bitterness and resentment which will follow defeat, will ap- 
pear a war-weariness approaching utter exhaustion. This 
weariness will conceal from us, perhaps even from the Ger- 
man himself, his deeper and more permanent sentiments. 
He may easily seem broken, humble, perhaps contrite. Even 
without the dissembling of which he is a master, he may 
easily disarm those who are incapable, — as they always have 
been incapable, — of understanding his intractable nature. 
Under such circumstances the enthusiast with whom the wish 
is so easily the father of the thought, may think the candi- 
date ripe for baptism into the circle of the changed in heart. 
Alas for the peace of the circle when old passions return 
with the new currents of life.-*^ 

But the foregoing objections which the writer has felt 
compelled to urge with so much earnestness, hold only against 
plans of immediate, universal internationalism. Interna- 
tionalism is immediately practicable and necessary, but it 
is practicable only among a limited number of nations. Uni- 
versal internationalism will sometime be practicable, but not 

1 The same point of view is expressed by Mr. Roosevelt in his vigor- 
ous assertion that to include Germany and Turkey in a league to enforce 
peace would be like attempting to eliminate burglary by including all 
the burglars in the police force. 



122 THE GREAT PEACE 

now. Successful internationalism must rest on a spiritual 
basis of common aims, common instincts, and common sym- 
pathies. No nation is ready for internationalism until it 
has outgrown even the wish to dominate other nations that 
have learned how to provide the common decencies of na- 
tionhood. The nation that even feels the inclination to im- 
pose its will upon the civilized Belgians, is not ready for 
internationalism. It must come to feel an instinctive aver- 
sion for that sort of thing. Above all, it is necessary that 
this sentiment should exist toward the members of the group 
itself. The true league of nations finds its analogue rather in 
good society than in the mechanically organized state. As 
we exclude the ill bred person from the society of the well 
bred, setting thus the highest possible price upon good breed- 
ing, so the ill bred nation that has not learned the decencies 
of live-and-let-live, can not be more effectually corrected than 
by exclusion from the society of those who have learned the 
lesson of civilization. 

The league we seek is in existence, guaranteeing to an ex- 
tent that few appreciate, the peace of the world. Its nu- 
cleus is the great fellowship of independent British nations 
(misnamed the British Empire) in whose circle our own 
country has long unconsciously held its place on almost ex- 
actly the same terms as the rest. These nations with their 
wards control one third the surface of the earth and one third 
of its population. Within this vast area there is peace. Xo 
one makes or dreams of making war upon another. All are 
moved by a common impulse. — so much more effectual than 
a common agreement, — to enforce peace upon other less pa- 
cific peoples. This league was not made ; it grew, as all liv- 
ing things do. It needs but the privilege of larger growth. 

The present war with its fellowship in arms has been an 
immense stimulus to this vital league. It has lifted it from 
the unconscious into the conscious realm" and defined and 



NATIONALITY AND INTEENATIONALISM 123 

intensified its purpose. Does any one imagine that if the 
existence of Anglo-Saxon civilization were again imperiled, 
our country would wait two years and a half before it lifted 
a finger in protest or preparation ? The spiritual reunion of 
the Anglo-Saxon peoples, the only reunion that they desire 
or need, is Germany's unintentional contribution to world 
unity thus far. 

But there is other growth and more significant. France, 
with her wards, twenty times the homeland in area and vitally 
related to territories in Anglo-Saxon trust, has been added 
to the league of the changed in heart. It is not implied that 
France has ceased to be imperialistic. No nation has. The 
desire for colonies, the desire to control the untamed peoples 
and subdue the uncouth to the uses of ordered life is the corol- 
lary of virility and manhood. But France no longer desires 
to rule Italy or Spain as Napoleon made her do. She has en- 
tered the circle of the well bred. The same for Belgium with 
her vast trust of the Congo. Do we realize what a guaranty 
of peace is contained in these handclasps across the Channel ? 
If we assume that by the exercise of vigilance, forbearance, 
and tact, our ov^ti country can answer for the peace of that 
Latin America for which it unwittingly made itself sponsor 
nearly a century ago, then two thirds of the world's surface 
and two thirds of its people are already within the fold. 

It is by no means certain that this is the limit of our ef- 
fective achievement. The bulk of the remaining world is 
the Mongolian East. Of this, China is at present inert. 
The controlling element is Japan, her control having been 
assured during the present war, both by her aggressive policy 
toward China and by her astute diplomacy regarding our- 
selves. By the one she obtained a virtual suzerainty over 
China and by the other she obtained our recognition of it.^ 

1 The " notes " exchanged between Viscount Ishii and Secretary Lan- 
sing amount to a treaty recognition of Japan's " paramount interests " 
in the East. 



124 THE GEEAT PEACE 

What will be Japan's part in the struggle between Cosmos 
and Chaos? It would be idle to assume that she is bound 
to her present allies by any such bonds of sympathy as those 
that unite the Anglo-Saxon peoples or even the British and 
Erencli. There is no kinship of race or culture. Nor has 
the Orient had reason to look upon the western nations as 
natural protectors of the weak. But considerations of ad- 
vantage of which the Japanese have shown themselves singu- 
larly appreciative, constitute a very effectual pledge of co- 
operation with the group above indicated. All discussion 
of the ease with which Japan could seize the Philippines or 
the possibility of the capture of Hawaii or of a successful 
descent upon the California coast are beside the mark. Japan 
is a naval power and must remain so. She will not and can 
not risk collision with the power that controls the sea. That 
power is and must continue to be the league above mentioned. 
During three and a half years of the great struggle Japan 
watched to see which way the scale would incline. When 
the decision became plain, Viscount Ishii voiced the sincere 
and inevitable decision of the Japanese people when he said : 
" Japan has decided to cast in her lot with the English 
speaking peoples of the world." This decision rests on the 
larger opportunism rather than on affection, but it is not 
therefore untrustworthy. It is certainly preferable to the 
sullen acquiescence of a beaten and revengeful Germany. 

Our league as thus enlarged is so nearly all embracing 
that it has but to take note of its power and extent to assure 
peace in the world. It must expect to maintain that peace 
with a very large element of mobilized force as long as there 
are peoples in the world that are willing to use their force, 
not to maintain order, but secure domination. That price 
must cheerfully be paid for the boon which it can assure and 
which as yet can not be assured without it. But if the price 
be paid and the boon assured, the outsiders will not long re- 



NATIONALITY AND INTEKNATIONALISM 125 

main unreconciled. Let it be established beyond reasonable 
doubt that the Anglo-Saxon solidarity has come to stay and 
that cooperation with France and Japan is a settled fact in 
international relations, and the present century will witness 
such a transformation of German policy and of German 
sentiment as no coercion or artificial fellowship could ever 
effect. 

Such a conclusion will be unwelcome to those who hope, 
as the sanguine have always hoped, that this struggle would 
be the last. The air is full of cries that if this war be not 
the end of war, if it end not in the full recognition of inter- 
nationalism, then we shall have fought in vain and our peace 
will be but a truce. But victories are never final in this 
struggle between right and might, and if all is vain that is 
not final, how vain our human struggle has been. 

It is a relief to note that the manifest impossibility of in- 
ternational confidence between the chief contestants in the 
present struggle has made itself felt even in the circle of the 
sanguine. The American society of the League to Enforce 
Peace whose earlier plans we have had under consideration, 
now announces a revised plan, with much of complicated 
definition and machinery, which makes provision for cer- 
tain of the special cases which we have considered. Mem- 
bership is to be restricted and based on fitness as determined 
by a vote of the existing membership. It may also be com- 
plete or partial, the members being pledged in the one case 
to use both military and economic pressure to enforce the 
mandates of the league, and in the other case economic pres- 
sure alone. This is evidently a recognition of the delicate 
position in which certain of the smaller or more exposed na- 
tions find themselves. Simultaneously there comes from Eng- 
lish sources a cautious and limited proposal of a " League 
of Free Nations " whose constituency could not be other than 
that already noted. The questions of procedure and ma- 



126 THE GREAT PEACE 

chinery which so greatly interest the advocates of these pro- 
posals, need not here detain us. What concerns us is to note 
that the limitations thus admitted imply the complete aban- 
donment of the original principle. The plan, if adopted in 
this form, would mean essentially the perpetuation of the 
present Allied group, with the addition of certain machinery 
whose usefulness has yet to be tested. The prospect is less 
dazzling but far more hopeful. For in fact such a plan as 
this corresponds to the great reality. 

Internationalism is a thing, not of the flesh, but of the 
spirit. It is a growth, not a contrivance. What we need is 
to recognize it, not invoke it. The league that we have 
dreamed of is here, less symmetrical and mechanical than 
that of which we had dreamed, but infinitely more vital and 
effective. Its widening circle passes from the English to 
the British, from the British to the Anglo-Saxon, from the 
Anglo-Saxon to the democratic. It has but one more step, 
— from the democratic to the human. That is a long step, 
but a step to be hastened rather than forced, and not to be 
hastened by force. 



Note. It is interesting to note that our present administration that 
has insisted not only upon a league of nations, but upon disarmament 
as its corollary, now urges a tremendous increase of our navy, an in- 
crease apparently intended to make it the largest in the world. This 
may seem inconsistent with the idea of international guaranty. On the 
contrary it marks the first sane appreciation of what such a guaranty 
implies. It is a popular fallacy that internationalism would make na- 
tional defense unnecessary, the assumption being that social action in 
like manner relieves the individual of the necessity of protecting him- 
self. But does it? Let anyone who so imagines, visit a bank vault and 
observe the intricate and ponderous mechanism installed to protect the 
bank's funds. Could the bank count on police protection if it left the 
front door unlocked and the money heaped upon the counter? When 
that becomes possible, it will be legitimate to cite the analogy of social 
protection of the individual as an argument for internationalism and 
disarmament. Even the most successful internationalism could only 
protect those nations that do their utmost to protect themselves. 



CHAPTER IX 

DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 

It is the bad luck of the dike keeper that when the flood 
breaks through he is always busy working at the breach. 
The suspicion is inevitable that he did not do all that might 
have been done to stop the breach, that he was negligent or 
incompetent, — possibly even that he opened the breach him- 
self. So with breaks in the dikes between nations. The 
menace has been there for months or years. By a vigilance 
and a resourcefulness almost superhuman, the diplomats in 
charge, — possibly on both sides, — have been endeavoring 
to prevent the break. At the moment when the break comes 
they are at their busiest, contriving check and brace and 
counterweight, but all in vain. Their work goes down to 
ruin and almost invariably drags them dovm with it. Then 
the comfortable burghers whom nothing but disaster arouses 
to consciousness, overwhelm in their turn the wretched 
keeper and all his work. Why all this intricacy and con- 
trivance, these subterranean works carried out without our 
knowledge? Why were we not called to the dike? We 
could have averted the disaster. 

The metaphor is doubtless imperfect as all metaphors are. 

The storms that beat upon the dikes of the nations are largely 

human storms, with a measure of consciousness and volition 

which it is not meant to deny. But when all allowance is 

made for this element of knowledge and choice, these storms 

so far transcend common knowledge and individual volition 

that they closely resemble the great nature forces of wave 

and flood that breach our dikes against the sea. Nor does 

the analogy end here. There can be no reasonable doubt 

127 



128 THE GREAT PEACE 

that diplomats have been as a class devoted, patriotic, and 
skillful, honest keepers of the dikes. There is scarcely a 
recorded case of betraval of trust, rarely even one of negli- 
gence. Incompetence has been frequent enough, but not more 
frequent than in other responsible positions, not so frequent 
even as we think, for failure is always construed as incom- 
petence by a public never cognizant of the deeper facts in 
the case. 

Yet now that the dikes have broken, the demand is again 
heard for drastic remedies. We challenge, not the individual 
diplomat nor yet the individual negotiation, but the whole 
principle and practice of diplomacy. There must be an end 
of secret diplomacy, an end of secret treaties. Even more 
drastically it is demanded that the very privilege of treaty 
and of negotiation itself be withdrawn as between individual 
nations, all relations being subject to supernational regu- 
lation. These demands, like certain others noted in the pre- 
ceding chapter, derive an added interest from the endorse- 
ment of the President of the United States who has not hesi- 
tated to give to these principles a foremost place among the 
conditions of peace. They therefore call for our careful 
consideration. 

The proposed curtailment of diplomatic and treaty privi- 
lege as between individual nations is in a class by itself. It 
is in fact a feature of the plan for a league of nations al- 
ready discussed. If this plan is to be adopted in its com- 
prehensive and unqualified form, a certain limitation of in- 
dependent diplomatic relations is inevitable. Little leagues 
and private understanding might easily render nugatory 
the provisions of the larger agreement. The privilege of such 
private understandings is therefore quite logically withheld. 

Quite logically, but not so certainly effectually. This is 
one of a multitude of popular remedies which look to ends 
without sufficient regard to means. What means has the 



DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 129 

family of nations at its disposal for preventing such private 
understandings? It is specitically in connection with the 
plan for a complete league of nations that this restriction is 
proposed. Such a league would include Germany, Austria, 
and Turkey. It is needless to say that for a very long time 
to come sentiments of bitterness toward the western powers 
and of common interest as among themselves are likely to 
characterize these peoples. Suppose Germany and Austria 
see an opportunity to advance their own interests by a policy 
of solidarity. What is going to hinder them? Even the 
most flagrant violation of the league provision would be dif- 
ficult to detect and still more difficult to punish, but the 
really dangerous cases would not be the flagrant ones. The 
trouble is, there is the usual insensible gradation from the 
admissible to the inadmissible, and that in two ways. 

In the first place, no one can contemplate an absolute pro- 
hibition of agreements between nations. Such a prohibi- 
tion would have no counterpart or analogy in either indi- 
vidual or federal relations. The states of the American 
Union are not prohibited from making agreements with one 
another, and such agreements are frequent. Their rights 
in this connection are of course limited and can not legally 
be used against the defined federal interest, but it is plain 
that they could be and would be so used if any group of 
states were unfriendly to the union. The one flagrant case 
of such use is familiar, but the really significant cases are of 
constant occurrence, cases of sectional solidarity unfavorable 
to federal interests which nothing but the overwhelming pre- 
ponderance of federal loyalty holds within the limits of safety. 
Reduce the privilege of local international agreement to a 
minimum, and it will still be possible to find in it a medium 
for the expression of disloyal sympathies and local cohesions 
having all the dangers of present alliances. 

The second difficulty is that international cooperation and 



130 THE GKEAT PEACE 

solidarity depends but little on overt official agreements. Let 
the law forbid marriage between undesirable parties, and the 
usual result is that they cohabit without marrying. We 
have dissolved trusts, but seldom prevented the concerted 
action at which we aimed. So we may prohibit treaties and 
alliances within the league of nations, but we can not pre- 
vent concerted action or gentlemen's agreements where senti- 
ment and interest favor such action. The chief result of any 
such prohibition would be to substitute the informal for the 
formal, the clandestine for the open. A closer view of actual 
conditions in our day will disclose the fact that even now, 
without the desired prohibition, treaties and alliances play 
a minor part in the concerted action of nations. Most of 
the actual correlation is informal and unofficial. It is the 
ententes (the understandings) that hold and the alliances 
that break down in the present war. 

We thus see two serious obstacles in the way of eliminating 
the clique in the community of nations, first, the impossibility 
of detecting and punishing the agreements in question, and 
second the possibility of maintaining the clique without such 
agreements, by means of perfectly informal and intangible 
understandings. It is not meant to imply that legal action 
can do nothing to limit practices of this kind, but that the 
clique spirit is peculiarly difficult to control, quite as diffi- 
cult in the community of nations as in the community of men. 
1^0 repressive action of this sort will contribute much to the 
solution of our problem. 

The abolition of secret diplomacy is the reform most 
prominently urged in this connection. This demand comes 
from the most varied quarters. The representatives of that 
school of democracy who essentially reject the principle of 
representation in democratic government and who would re- 
fer all issues directly to popular vote, quite consistently ap- 
ply the same principle to the regulation of foreign relations. 



DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 131 

The demand for open diplomacy is essentially a demand for 
referendum diplomacy. It is chiefly from these more radical 
elements that come the caustic references to " traditional and 
musty diplomacy " and the often expressed fear lest the 
forthcoming settlement should be another diplomats' peace, 
another plot around the table, a new deal at the old game. 
There is in such criticisms a certain assumption that diplo- 
matic negotiations are essentially machinations, deals made 
by persons who are irresponsible and unrepresentative, and 
on a low moral plane. The moral straightforwardness of 
the people is thus invoked to save the world from diplomatic 
chicane. 

But the criticism of traditional diplomacy comes from other 
quarters which represent very different political assumptions. 
Thus, ex-President Eliot of Harvard University has ex- 
pressed regret at the secret conduct of the negotiations of 
1914 by Sir Edward Grey, while paying a high tribute to his 
ability and disinterestedness. He objects, not to the deci- 
sions or the outcome of the negotiations, but to the principle 
on which they were conducted. In view of the very consid- 
erable openness which has always characterized Sir Edward 
Grey's diplomacy, and his insistence upon the publication of 
treaties, such an objection is a serious one. 

There can be no doubt that a considerable ground exists 
for these criticisms. The history of diplomacy offers num- 
erous examples of chicanery which were made possible only 
by secrecy. The well known case in which Bismarck en- 
tered into a secret agreement with Russia in a sense dia- 
metrically opposed to the known agreement with Austria is 
a characteristic case. In this case Austria was depending 
on her understanding with Germany, all unconscious that 
she was being betrayed by her ally. If the agreement with 
Russia had been open and known, the agreement with Austria 
would have lapsed automatically. Such cases of extreme dis- 



132 THE GEEAT PEACE 

ingenuousness are uncommon, but secret agreements against 
some third power that was an object of legitimate fear or 
illegitimate aggression, have been exceedingly frequent. 
There can be no question that secrecy has enabled nations to 
combine against other nations, for purposes either of war 
or peace, as they otherwise could not have done. At a time 
when we are seeking to prevent hostilities, the prohibition of 
secrecy is a form of disarmament. 

Another and quite different objection which is urged with 
a certain justice is that secrecy lessens the accountability of 
the diplomat and enables him to adopt a policy not sanc- 
tioned by the people. It is undemocratic. As regards 
formal ratification, this is undoubtedly true. The people 
can not be directly consulted as to agreements reached and 
may even continue for years unconscious of the obligations 
which have been entered into on their behalf. This is ab- 
horrent to the theory of direct democracy, that is, democracy 
in which the people do not delegate their powers but decide 
questions directly by popular vote. It is this school of de- 
mocracy which most loudly voices its protest. 

But if we concede the necessity of delegating the people's 
powers, — a necessity nowhere so obvious as in the field of 
foreign relations which lies farthest from the familiar facts 
of daily life, — the objection loses much of its force. The 
transactions of diplomacy may be secret, but its policy is un- 
mistakably determined by popular will, so far as that will 
finds expression in government, and the people are by no 
means without the power of holding the diplomat to account. 
The mandate of the people to its agent would then be some- 
thing like this : " We do not know what steps are necessary 
to accomplish our ends, but we wish cooperation with this 
power, protection against that power, etc." Such a mandate 
is not more diflScult to enforce or more liable to abuse than 
any other, save in so far as international interests are farther 



DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 133 

beyond the people's ken than matters of domestic concern. 
For this difficulty no form of procedure offers an adequate 
remedy. 

It may as well be stated at the outset that the writer has 
but limited faith in plebiscite democracy. There is a place 
for the plebiscite, and the possibility of a referendum as an 
emergency measure, to break a deadlock or to punish mal- 
feasance may be freely granted. But the wholesale adoption 
of plebiscite methods means the rejection of the expert in 
the whole business of government. For centuries the ex- 
pert has been the ever increasing dependence of modem so- 
ciety. The field of knowledge so immeasurably transcends 
the capacity of the individual mind, that the individual can 
appropriate its advantages only through the intermediary 
of specialists of many kinds. Government is no exception. 
If self-government is held to mean popular mastery of the 
expert problems of which modern government consists, then 
self-government is an iridescent dream. The theory that 
we must have direct personal expression of opinion on prob- 
lems of governmental detail as a means of making the people 
intelligent is an absurd misconception. We do not study 
medicine in order that we may intelligently employ a phy- 
sician, still less in order that we may dispense with his serv- 
ices. Our intelligence, — the only intelligence that is fea- 
sible or relevant, — consists in the ability shrewdly to esti- 
mate the results of his ministrations. 

!N"owhere is the difference between this intelligence which 
shrewdly estimates results and the specialized intelligence 
of the expert more marked or more important than in govern- 
ment. The enactment of wise corrective legislation is as 
delicate a task as a piece of corrective surgery. It is for the 
people to note their malaise, to choose their surgeon, and to 
order the operation. For all of that they may be competent. 
It is not for them to perform the operation. The referen- 



134 THE GKEAT PEACE 

dum movement, whatever local correction of abuses it may 
have effected, has everywhere developed its inevitable weak- 
nesses. It has gathered its whole force, not from the superior- 
ity of popular decisions, but from the incompetency of former 
intermediaries. The only advantage of the intermediary 
is the advantage of expert knowledge. Our intermediaries 
have not been specialized experts. The fact that they knew 
no more than we did, has not unnaturally suggested the pos- 
sibility of dispensing with their services. Some of the 
democracies that are being born in these days of travail bid 
fair to revolutionize both the theory and practice of self-gov- 
ernment as we know it. The evolution now observable in 
certain states toward a parliament whose lower house repre- 
sents individuals and the upper house the specialized organs, 
industrial, commercial, and cultural, which make the modern 
state, is distinctly a truer application of the representative 
principle and a higher type of democracy. Society is not 
made of individuals alone, but of individuals and specialized 
organs of which the non-participant individual knows almost 
nothing. To represent the former only is not democracy 
as regards our great, modern, specialized societies, whatever 
it may have been in the days of simpler things. It is this 
radically unrepresentative character of our representative in- 
stitutions which has discredited them and made them the 
prey of the lobby, that illegitimate and extra-constitutional 
third house through which alone the organs of society find 
expression. This explains the revolt against representative 
government, but it does not justify it. This is the age of 
the specialist, and despite all its dangers, the specialist must 
be our hope and must have our confidence. 

This may seem something of a digression, but it is in fact 
an indispensable preliminary to our main conclusion. No 
plea for referendum diplomacy is to be admitted under the 
disguise of open negotiation. We need the expert in every 



DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 135 

department of government, and nowhere so much as in the 
management of foreign relations, the matters which lie 
farthest from our ordinary knowledge. Especially do these 
considerations need to be brought home to the American peo- 
ple. It is from them that this demand for plebiscite diplo- 
macy chiefly comes. It is not our superior democracy but 
our superior ignorance, that motives this demand. It is 
hardly an exaggeration to say that we, as a people, do not 
even know the existence of those great material interests the 
careful adjustment of which is vital to the problem of peace. 
Hence we soar in the untrammeled ether of pure generaliza- 
tion and caustically refer to those who sit around the table and 
make " new deals at the old game." The peoples of Europe 
that live in physical contact with those material factors that 
make or mar their destiny, have this immense advantage over 
us that they know their incompetency. The basic assumption 
of our further discussion must be the frank acceptance of the 
expert in this, the most specialized of all functions of gov- 
ernment. The recent assertion of an American scholar that 
there were not more than four Americans living who had the 
knowledge and skill necessary to represent America at the 
peace table may be an exaggeration, but it emphasizes an 
important truth. 

Accepting, therefore, the expert, what are the conditions 
under which he can work successfully to accomplish the just 
ends of negotiation? There can not be a moment's hesita- 
tion in answering this question. The preliminary stages of 
negotiation must have the benefit of privacy. There are 
delicate stages in almost every diplomatic transaction, sharp 
disagreements and unreasonable arguments which if published 
would rouse resentments and jealousies that would make 
further negotiation impossible. The notion that the people 
are calm, and judicial, and peace loving, and that it is diplo- 
matic scheming which engenders strife is utterly erroneous. 



136 THE GREAT PEACE 

It is a part of the art of the diplomat to keep his temper, to 
marshal many and unfamiliar forces, to win by nice align- 
ment and organization, as the great general wins by strategy. 
Of all this recondite science the people know nothing. But 
they seek their objectives none the less relentlessly, and when 
balked, tend necessarily to grasp at the weapon of violence 
which passion is prompt to put in their hands. It is some- 
times assumed that the expert moves of diplomacy have 
something sinister about them, which tends ever to embroil 
peoples in war. The fact is that diplomacy is averse to war 
in its inmost nature. When diplomacy proves unequal to 
the task and war comes in to cut the Gordian knot, it is a con- 
fession that diplomacy has failed. The diplomat himself is 
almost invariably sacrificed and finds in the rupture the end 
of a hard earned career. 

It is true that diplomacy sometimes deliberately precipi- 
tates war, but only when war is judged to be inevitable and 
the choice of time and circumstance seems of advantage. 
For every war thus precipitated there are a dozen that diplo- 
macy labors hard to avert and which could not be averted 
without its aid. Merely as an abstract proposition, the peo- 
ple do not want war, but their passions and jealousies render 
them exceedingly prone to violence. It is these passions 
and jealousies which are the great problem of diplomacy and 
the sufficient occasion for diplomatic secrecy. 

This secrecy can be and often has been abused. The con- 
fidence reposed in the expert may always be abused. But in 
the last resort we remain judges of the expert's work. Even 
when no suflficient measures are adopted for the public discus- 
sion and ratification of treaties, — measures certainly not 
lacking in our own country, — successful diplomacy must and 
does keep in touch with the will of the people. The concep- 
tion of the diplomat as one whose machinations flout the 
popular will is ludicrously false. He is normally in an at- 



DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 137 

titude of studied subserviency, even while reserving at times 
the right to " appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober." 

Our conclusion is that secret diplomacy, in the sense of 
confidential negotiations, is not an abuse but a necessity, a 
permanent condition of the successful performance of the 
diplomat's necessary functions. For such abuses as occa- 
sionally occur the remedy is to be found in the choice of bet- 
ter diplomats and the development of a higher standard of 
professional honor. There is no short cut or royal road.^ 

Passing from negotiations to agreements, there can be no 
question as to the desirability of publicity as a general prin- 
ciple. This is not a new conclusion. It has been the steadily 
increasing practice of the more enlightened nations in recent 
years. That remarkable document, the memorandum of 
Prince Lichnowski, late German ambassador to England, at- 
tests the stand of Britain on this point in an unusual manner. 
The much desired treaty concerning the Bagdad railway 
which Germany at last succeeded in obtaining, was held up 
for many months and finally lost because Britain insisted 
upon its publication when signed, a step to which Germany 
refused to consent. In our own case the publication of 
treaties is practically inevitable owing to the requirement 
of ratification by the Senate, a procedure which insures 
publicity, intentional or otherwise. There can be little doubt 
that this practice will become more general. 

But it must not be overlooked that there are certain treaties 
of a perfectly legitimate character which would be vitiated 
by publicity. Such are treaties of military alliance which 
contain specifications as to military procedure in the event 

1 It is interesting to note that when Mr. Wilson's unqualified endorse- 
ment of open diplomacy seemed about to become embodied in a binding 
enactment, he hastened to explain that he approved of publicity only 
for the treaties as finally negotiated, secrecy being indispensable for 
the negotiations themselves. He has, in practice, quite frankly availed 
himself of at least this much of the privilege of secrecy. 



138 THE GREAT PEACE 

of war. A mere pledge of alliance may be published, — in- 
deed its publication may be just the means of accomplishing 
its purpose. But treaties specifying the extent and manner 
of military cooperation and the objectives aimed at have 
the same occasion for secrecy as a general's plan of campaign. 
Such treaties have been frequent and necessary in Europe. 
If we have not resorted to them, it is because our isolation 
has hitherto made military alliances unnecessary. The re- 
sult is that in one more important particular we are dis- 
qualified for judging Europe. Meanwhile our isolation 
seems gone forever and it may well be our procedure rather 
than that of Europe that will require revision. 

Once more we shall be adjured to form a league of nations 
and abolish forever the danger of war and the odious safe- 
guards which it seems to necessitate. So be it, — if so it may 
be. In the preceding chapter we have given reasons for 
moderating our expectations as to the immediate immunities 
to be hoped from such a league, — more exactly, perhaps, as 
to the possibility of forming such a league to include the na- 
tions with which we are now at war. And until they are in- 
cluded, be it noted, the league must be in a measure a league 
of offense and defense having something of the character 
above noted. Not till the leagiTC becomes both inclusive and 
stable beyond the possibility of collapse or even serious dis- 
turbance can the conditions of ideal publicity in treaty agree- 
ments be attained. Such a condition is to be sought by every 
means in our power, but not assumed as a fact while it is as 
yet but an aspiration. 

Meanwhile it is reassuring to note that the element of 
secrecy in treaties is much less than is supposed. Secret 
treaties are after all not very secret. Details are withheld, 
but the general tenor of such agreements is always discovered 
and usually frankly avowed. The Bolshevik publication of 
the secret treaties of the Allies brought no surprising revela- 



DIPLOMACY A^D TREATIES 139 

tions. If the reasoning of the foregoing pages is correct, it 
is only this general purport of treaty agreements of which 
the public can take profitable account. As regards this gen- 
eral purport, the diplomat is now held to a very real account 
by peoples capable of so doing, and it is doubtful whether 
publicity in matters of detail would make public control more 
effectual. The treaties of the last hundred years have pretty 
effectually reflected the will of the peoples who permitted 
themselves to be bound by them. 

It is hardly necessary to allude again in this connection 
to the unenforceability of a provision against secret treaties. 
Let us forbid all we like, and yet if Germany and Austria 
make such a treaty, what are we going to do about it ? We 
might never find it out. If we did, we could only declare 
it invalid, and if they still chose to be bound by it, what 
then ? Would we use war or boycott to force them to desist ? 

Openness and straightforwardness are qualities greatly to 
be desired in all human relations, great and small, but they 
are the spontaneous product of confidence and goodwill, not 
matters of contract and treaty stipulation. Publicity in pub- 
lic affairs, never useful in matters of technical detail, is to 
be desired and expected as rapidly as the conditions of fel- 
lowship are realized. To most if not all of the nations the 
great war has brought as its chief compensation an enlarged 
sense of fellowship and a greater appreciation of the interests 
and needs of other peoples. May frankness and candour ap- 
pear as a pervasive spirit rather than as a futile stipulation 
in the Great Peace. 



PAET n 
THE NATIONS 



CHAPTER X 

GERMANY 

In- peace as in war, Germany is everything. No doubt 
her allies have been very important factors in prolonging the 
war, contributing both by their military power and still 
more by their strategic position to the diflBculties of the 
Allies. Correspondingly they will present their full share of 
difficulty to the peace conference. But in the one case as 
in the other Germany is the key to the situation. As it is 
useless to defeat her allies unless we can defeat her, so it 
is useless to settle their problems until we have settled hers. 
Every question, territorial, racial, commercial, connected 
with the various countries now at war, turns sooner or 
later on the supreme question, what about Germany? We 
must try at the outset, therefore, to get a clear idea of 
what we wish to accomplish with regard to our arch antago- 
nist. As regards the war we have answered the question 
with fortunate positiveness. " Unconditional surrender " 
is the plain demand of the American people. " War to the 
end, to the very end of the end," is the stem declaration 
with which the powerful Clemenceau voices the undoubted 
determination of all the Allies. If there have been mo- 
ments when this determination seemed to be called in ques- 
tion, they have but given opportunity for its reaffirmation 
by statesmen and peoples. We are determined to see it 
through, to make the power that sought the decision of force, 
accept the decision of force, " force without stint or limit." 
But what then ? For as regards our present inquiry, this 
" end of the end " is but a beginning, and our war formula 

carries us no farther. It is true that we hear suggestions 

143 



144 THE GKEAT PEACE 

about wiping Germany off the map, and Germany is doing 
much, and ever more and more, to reconcile us to some such 
procedure. But what does this wiping off the map mean? 
Does it mean the annihilation of the German race, or their 
expulsion from their land, or even the carving up of their 
country and its distribution among neighboring nations ? 
It is plain that we have neither the temper nor the oppor- 
tunity for any of these things. Nobody wants German 
exiles or German territory. All such proposals are there- 
fore mere expressions of war passion which contribute noth- 
ing to the solution of our problem. Whatever our senti- 
ment toward Germany, we can not get away from the fact 
that there is to be a Germany after the war, a Germany 
that we must live with and that can make us an infinity of 
trouble, no matter how badly she is beaten now. The problem 
of adjustment will be almost inconceivably difficult at best. 
It will help us little to get Germany where we can dictate 
terms to her if we do not know what terms we wish to dic- 
tate. What then should be the position of the German peo- 
ple in the future community of nations ? 

The writer, for one, is utterly opposed to any policy of 
soft heartedness or leniency toward the German nation. 
The world can not for a moment tolerate its pretensions or 
its temper, and any harshness that may be required to com- 
pel their abandonment is a harshness which we must be 
prepared to exercise. Despite our wartime fulminations, 
it is a matter for grave concern whether at the critical mo- 
ment we can be hard enough for the hard task. The Allied 
nations are not brutal, not even under German provocation. 
If they prove equal to the difficult task before them, it will 
be because that task presents itself as reasonable and neces- 
sary to their minds. What must that task be ? 

There are two ways of answering this question. The 
first we may call retrospective. It recalls Germany's deeds 



GERMAItTT 145 

in recent years and attempts to estimate her moral guilt 
with, a view to retributive action. The account is appalling 
and any attempt to calculate her debt overwhelms the mind 
and swamps all kindlier feelings in a tempest of moral indig- 
nation. It is hardly to be doubted that the sober verdict of 
history and ultimately of the German people itself, will be 
that this war, in its unprovoked aggression and its unpar- 
alleled brutality, is the most criminal in history. With these 
facts in mind it is easy to conclude that no penalty is too 
severe for Germany's guilt, and no status too low for her in 
the future family of nations. But unfortunately such a con- 
clusion brings us to no practical solution of our problem. 
Eetributive justice calls for a payment that would condemn 
the German people to perpetual bondage, a relation impossible 
for us, even if thinkable for them. The debt as thus assessed 
leaves her hopelessly bankrupt. As in the case of other bank- 
rupts, some fraction of the debt must be accepted in lieu 
of full payment. What shall that fraction be ? 

There is but one practicable way of settling bankrupt 
accounts, the way adopted by all rational societies. That 
is to let the past be past, to cancel the hopeless debt, and 
let the bankrupt whom we can not get rid of, start again 
in life under such restrictions as may be required for the 
safety of his fellows. In a word, protection of the com- 
munity of nations rather than retribution must be the guid- 
ing principle in our settlement. We are fighting to make 
the world a decent place to live in, and it is much to be de- 
sired that we direct our efforts solely to that end. 

Why are we in this war ? ]N'ot because Germany sank the 
Lusitania, or butchered babies, or attacked neutral com- 
merce, or otherwise violated international law. '^oi that 
there is the least doubt about her having done these things, 
or about our judgment of them. But whatever justification 
these facts give to the war, they are not the issue, — the 



146 THE GREAT PEACE 

great issue, — in the struggle. That issue is between two 
principles of organization, the principles of freedom and 
coercion. Both sides look forward to a united humanity. 
The one side believes that that union must be effected under 
the leadership, the direction, and the authority of a single 
superior people, a people that has more energy', more mental 
power, and more organizing ability than any other and that 
is therefore privileged, — nay, divinely commanded, — to im- 
pose its will and its wisdom upon the world's less favored 
peoples. 

It is perfectly consonant with this doctrine that this people 
recognizes the superior right, the divine authority, of a 
single individual or a limited class among themselves, but 
that of itself does not concern us who are outsiders to this 
relation. We have paid altogether too much attention to 
this figure in shining armor who rather symbolizes than em- 
bodies the principle at issue. It will be the gravest of mis- 
takes if we challenge the right of the German people to 
have such leadership and such organization as they choose, 
or question the actuality of their choice, even though we be- 
lieve their choice has a certain bearing upon our problem. 
The result of such a choice can hardly be other than to 
rally German patriotism to the support of the system thus 
attacked, and to fix upon the free institutions whose tri- 
umph we desire, the stigma of foreign intervention. Nor can 
we regard lightly the possibility that the destruction of so- 
cial institutions by outside agencies before the people has 
become matured to the change carries with it the menace 
of bloody revolution and social disintegration. The ex- 
ample of Russia is before us, and the responsibility for 
German plotting in this desolating terror is not the least of 
the counts in Germany's terrible indictment. Our pres- 
sure would doubtless be less clandestine, but if really exer- 
cised against the defacto institutions of a neighbor state, we 



GEEMANY 147 

can hardly fail to incur like odium and with greater jus- 
tice, for it would be for us a violation of our most cher- 
ished principle. 

No, ours is no feud with domestic autocracy. It is a 
larger issue. It is what we may call the race autocracy of 
the German people, their belief in the superiority of a 
single race, and in the right of that race by reason of its 
superiority, not merely to lead, but to dominate all other 
races. When the leaders of German industry, the great 
men who do things in Germany, some time ago memorialized 
their government regarding the necessary objectives of the 
war, they specified numerous territories which must be 
annexed, — Poland, Courland, Belgium, a part of France, 
etc., — and then added that these territories must never, on 
any account, be allowed a voice in determining the destiny 
of the German Empire. In other words Germany must 
subject to her authority large populations of advanced civi- 
lization, but must not allow them, either now or at any 
future time, to share the privileges that belonged exclusively 
to the superior German people. 

It matters very little how much Germany intended to 
take as the result of the present war. It has suited her 
purpose, at various stages of the conflict, to disclaim in larger 
or lesser measure, the vast objectives attributed to her by 
her critics and by her authoritative spokesmen. This is 
small matter. In these great schemes of world conquest, as 
in the offensive of a single campaign, the prudent commander 
sternly limits the objectives which are then and there to be 
attained. Germany did not mean to conquer the world now. 
She could not have organized such enormous gains without 
a vast development of resources and personnel. It is even 
possible as the Eaiser has stoutly affirmed, that he had never 
planned world dominion. Sufficient unto the day is the evil 
thereof. General Foch is 'probably not yet planning his 



148 THE GREAT PEACE 

entry into Berlin.^ But it is perfectly plain that if Germany 
had realized her limited objectives in the present war, she 
would not have stopped permanently with them, but new 
designs would have followed to be attained at her convenience. 
All discussion of the extent of her proposed present aggres- 
sion is beside the mark. The question is as to the principle 
on which she was proceeding. And when we learn that she 
was already parceling out Australia among her supporters, 
we may assume that even her immediate objectives were not 
over modest. 

It is but fair to recognize that there is an enormous 
amount of historic precedent for Germany's plan. Most 
of the organization of mankind has hitherto been of this 
kind. She can cite the awe inspiring example of Rome 
in her favor. Nor can it be doubted that there is some 
ground for her assumption of superiority. Without con- 
ceding for a moment her claim to a unique position among 
the races of the world, we must recognize her wonderful 
power of organization, her integrity of administration, her 
energy in the development of natural resources, her genius 
for applied science, all as entitling her to a very high place 
among civilized peoples. She is no doubt in a position to 
confer very great blessings, as regards these important mat- 
ters, upon some of the less developed peoples to the east and 
south over which she has sought to extend her authority. All 
this and more we may admit, but the one great issue re- 
mains. She believes in the right of a superior race to dom- 
inate the rest of the world by force and to make other peoples 
its servants in perpetuity.^ 

1 Written about October first. 

2 The writer has quoted elsewhere the allusion by Professor Rudolph 
Huch to the British and French as races which are '* incapable of attain 
ing a high humanity, incapable of influencing the world. Such nations 
are destined to hew wood and draw water for the dominant nations. 
If they can not fill this inferior office they must perish." "America 
Among the Nations," p. 357. 



GEKMANY 149 

And what do we, the Allies, stand for ? Or, to make our 
inquiry a little more concrete, since the Anglo-Saxons are 
the most numerous and prominent of Germany's antagonists, 
and since both writer and readers of these pages are Anglo- 
Saxons, let us ask what the Anglo-Saxons stand for. We 
have little reason to fear that our French or other Allies will 
seriously dissent from our conclusion. 

The slogan, as we know, is liberty. It is liberty bonds 
that we are buying and liberty bread that we are eating. 
The French motto consecrated by the Eevolution and now in- 
scribed on every public building in France, is Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity. This may seem more comprehensive, 
but it is in fact only a more elaborate statement of the great 
Anglo-Saxon principle which in practice works out into the 
same trinity. Not that the Anglo-Saxon believes at all in 
the mere removal of restraint. He has found by sad ex- 
perience that this does not result in liberty but in disorder 
and in all manner of interference with the legitimate func- 
tions of life. If there is anything that the Anglo-Saxon 
hates, it is disorder, and he knows that order does not result 
spontaneously from the removal of restraints, but from a 
carefully adjusted balance between restraint and privilege. 
The Anglo-Saxons are a strong governing race. They have 
never hesitated to lay a heavy hand on disturbers of the peace, 
whether individuals or nations. 

Nor do the Anglo-Saxons cherish the foolish notion that 
the races of men are equal. They have lived too much in 
contact with all sorts and conditions of men not to know 
that races like individuals, whatever they were meant to be 
or may sometime become, are at present in their capacity 
for government or anything else, very far from equal. And 
they believe quite as much as the Germans in their own su- 
periority as a race. It would be the sheerest affectation not 
to do so. They have measured themselves with every race 



150 THE GEEAT PEACE 

in the world in almost every capacity, and without settling 
the question of absolute rank, they have the evidence of 
their senses that many of the races of men are immensely 
their inferiors. There is no mawkish self disparagement in 
their bearing toward these peoples. Such of them as are 
unable to maintain the decencies of national life, they do 
not hesitate to constrain, as need may require, in the inter- 
est of that order which they believe to be necessary to the 
peace of the world, even compelling them in appropriate 
connections to recognize the superiority which is the war- 
rant of their authority. The Indian sentinel that stands 
guard at so many of Britain's doorways, must present arms 
whenever the white man passes. That is not a gratuitous 
obeisance, but the very means best suited to the accomplish- 
ment of the white man's necessary task. All of this is but a 
way of saying that the Anglo-Saxons are a practical people. 
They do not believe in liberty or anything else beyond the 
point where experience proves it to be serviceable to human 
interests. 

But in this very practical way and within these proven 
limits the Anglo-Saxons do believe in liberty and equality 
as the Germans do not. Though both would assert their be- 
lief in liberty within practical limits, their judgment of what 
those practical limits are is so different that it works out in 
a diametrically opposed political policy and an opposite view 
of how the unity of mankind is to be brought about. 

This belief in liberty and equality appears in two ways. 
Eirst, the Anglo-Saxons recognize the civilized nations as 
equals. This does not mean that they think Italians, Span- 
iards, French, and English are equal in all respects, but they 
are alike in this that they have all learned to maintain or- 
der and live decently with other nations. That is the test 
of competent nationhood. Possibly some one of these peo- 
ples is more competent to manage national interests than 



GERMANY 151 

the others, but that does not seem to the Anglo-Saxon a 
reason why that people should seize their territories and as- 
sume the management of their affairs.^ Such a notion has 
become distasteful to them, just as it becomes distasteful to 
well bred men, even if hungry, to grab food from one an- 
other's plates or raid one another's larders. It is the live- 
and-let-live temper, the sportsmanship and good breeding 
of the civilized nations. 

But there is a second development of this temper, this 
instinct of liberty and equality which is more remarkable. 
Britain has gotten together an extraordinary and heterogene- 
ous aggregate of peoples all of whom have at one time 
recognized her authority. Some were originally colonies 
peopled by emigrants from her own. race. Others were 
colonies acquired by conquest from other strong races which 
became involved in conflict with Britain. Still others were 
backward peoples that were unable of themselves to provide 
the peace and order required for nationhood and so passed 
into trusteeship. This great aggregate was formed in defer- 
ence to no special theory and was at first subjected to author- 
ity of quite the traditional kind. 

But as the strenuous period of consolidation passed, the 
Anglo-Saxon instinct showed itself. Little by little Britain 
has relaxed her hold upon the more capable parts of this 
vast domain, trusting only to the spirit of friendliness and 
fair play to maintain the necessary accord. Canada, Aus- 
tralia, and New Zealand, being obviously competent to man- 

iln the early days of the war when Germany was carrying on a 
propaganda in neutral countries, her emissary to Sweden, in a public 
address in Stockholm, developed the familiar German thesis that the 
superior organizing ability of the German people gave them a right to 
organize the world. An auditor interrupted him with the question 
whether that gave Germany the right to organize Sweden. With per- 
fect candour and characteristic German tact, he is said to have replied 
that he thought it did. Can we imagine an Anglo-Saxon saying, or 
even thinking, such a thing? 



152 THE GREAT PEACE 

age their own affairs and maintain peace and order within 
their borders, and under the bonds of good breeding to live 
at peace with one another, it became repugnant to Anglo- 
Saxon instincts to exercise authority over them. With the 
Boers whose unwilling pledge to keep the peace was less 
reassuring, the case was not so clear, but the aversion of the 
Anglo-Saxons to holding competent peoples in tutelage made 
the subjection of South Africa impossible. India and Egypt 
are not able as yet to guarantee the essentials of peace and 
order, but they are being hurried on toward self management. 
Hence comes the paradox of British development, that while 
Britain has been consolidating a quarter of the world under 
her control, she has at the same time been relaxing her con- 
trol and leaving these peoples free again, so that now they 
take their place, to the full measure of their capacity, along- 
side of France, Italy, and the rest, nations that have never 
known Britain's control, as free peoples, managing their 
own affairs and at liberty to do anything they choose except 
injure one another. 

This is race democracy, the recognition of liberty and 
equality as the working basis of nations in their relations to 
one another and the ultimate principle of human unity. It 
is a thing that can not exist until nations learn good breed- 
ing, that is, until they learn to dislike lording it over other 
nations that are able to manage their own affairs and keep 
the public peace. 

The Germans have noticed this relaxing of British con- 
trol and have quite misunderstood it. They can not under- 
stand how a strong race should willingly relinquish control 
over other races. They have often extolled the excellence of 
British colonial administration, but have noted this relaxa- 
tion of authority as a weakness. This and the consequent 
slight development of British military power, are the grounds 
for the oft repeated charge that the British are a decadent 



GERMAI^Y 153 

race. This aversion to the exercise of authority has seemed 
to them nothing less than a degeneration of their moral 
fiber. Heinrich von Treitschke, the most representative of 
German writers on these subjects, declared that the British 
Empire was a sham which would fall to pieces at a touch, 
all because it lacked that overlordship which seems to the 
German the only possible way of uniting men. 

The other nations now associated with Britain have less 
extensive but similar records. Our own history is a con- 
spicuous example of the Anglo-Saxon principle. Our sev- 
eral states, though more dependent upon the Federal Gov- 
ernment since the great nation-wide interests of railroads 
and the like have developed such proportions, are none the 
less free, and there is little disposition to curtail their free- 
dom. We put an end to Spanish rule in Cuba, but we 
refused to establish our own in its stead, as the Germans 
were sure we would do. In our trusteeship of the Philip- 
pines we have rivaled Britain's liberality to the Boers and 
with even less guaranty. The record of France is hardly 
less liberal, though perhaps less judicious and successful in 
certain cases. 

It may be noted in passing that the nations that have at- 
tained to this race democracy have, with practical unanimity, 
adopted the democratic principle in the management of their 
home affairs. They do not recognize any authority as di- 
vinely established over them, but establish their own author- 
ity and the rules for its exercise. This, of course, is quite 
natural, for the spirit that recognizes liberty and equality 
among competent nations, would naturally recognize liberty 
and equality among the men of their own nation. But we 
must not confound the one democracy with the other. Above 
all we must not assume that the mere adoption of demo- 
cratic forms of government by the German people, especially 
if done under pressure or in times of great national distress. 



154 THE GREAT PEACE 

would insure the spirit of live-and-let-live in the larger rela- 
tion between the nations.^ The matter goes very much 
deeper. We are dealing with the character of a race, or 
more exactly, with a certain stage in the development of a 
race that has not yet become sensitive to the higher forces 
that regulate the relations between men and nations. 

One more fact must be noted before we are ready to 
draw our conclusion. Eace autocracy and race democracy 
can not permanently get along in the world together. It 
is hard for those who are democratically minded to realize 
this. Why, it may be asked, should we not keep our way 
and let Germany keep hers until she is tired of it ? Why 
must we fight her because she lacks good breeding? The 
answer is that she insists upon fighting us, and that quite 
consistently. She believes that the superior race, — which 
is of course her own, — not only may but must establish 
its authority over all the rest. As it is her duty to confer 
this higher organization upon a stubborn and misguided 
world, she can not consistently rest from her labors until 
her task is accomplished. There is no live-and-let-live in 
the creed of autocracy. 

This, then, is that hated thing that we must put out of 
the world, race autocracy, the arrogant assertion of race 
superiority and the assumption that race superiority carries 
with it the right and the duty to subjugate and control 
all other races. This is what we have called militarism, a 
name which suggests rather one of its outer manifestations 
than its inner spirit. That spirit has been just as manifest 
in German industrial aggression as in recent military cam- 
paigns. It is this that we have declared niust be destroyed. 

1 This seems to be exactly what is now happening. The morning 
paper announces: "The Germans are hastening their constitutional 
and electoral reforms in the hope of presenting a government with 
which the United States and the Allies will deal in restoring permanent 
peace." Such a structure would be built upon sand. 



GERMANY 155 

It is an exceedingly diflBcult thing to accomplish, for this 
militarism or race autocracy is not so much a thing as the 
absence of a thing, the absence of good breeding, of the sen- 
sitiveness to others' feelings and the s\Tnpathy for others' 
ideals which makes us averse to coercing those who have 
learned the art of decent living. We must trust to the slow 
influences of peace to develop this restraining instinct. 
Meanwhile we must repress this pious hoodliunism as best 
we may, and in our settlement take stem measures to " stop 
this swashbuckling through the streets of Europe," as Lloyd 
George has so admirably called it. We must not hesitate at 
any measure necessary to that end. 

Just what practical measures does this require of us? 
This above all else. German auihority over every race or 
people other than their own, must cease} If the Germans 
wish to be governed in the German way, we shall make a great 
mistake to interfere, but knowing as we do that Germany 
believes in dominating other peoples, and that without limit, 
with no intention ever to make them free or self sufficient, it 
is the plainest of duties to ourselves, to the principle that we 
stand for, and to the peoples that are helplessly concerned, 
to see that our settlement does not sanction at any point or in 
any degree the triumph of this German principle. 

Do we realize what this means ? It means that when we 
release Germany from the grip of our armies, there must be 
no German dependencies, no alien provinces, no overshadow- 
ing alliances, no strangling agreements. Germany must be 
nothing but Germany, and that limited to those peoples that 
unmistakably choose to cast in their lot with her. For the 

1 Recent reports of German barbarities in the administration of the 
African colonies, — barbarities for which even the present war had not 
prepared us, — have added emphasis to this conclusion, if emphasis 
were needed. It can not be too strongly insisted, however, that this is 
not the issue. If Germany's treatment of her wards had been free from 
cruelty, it would still be open to the graver condemnation here noted 
of condemning them to perpetual servitude. 



156 THE GREAT PEACE 

trusteeship of backward peoples, the guidance of weaker 
allies, and the exploitation of others' territories her avowed 
principle of political organization as yet disqualifies her. 

There is another aspect of the case which is more imme- 
diately our o\vn. Germany is situated between the two 
greatest peoples in the world. On the one side is the Slav 
with territories forty times the size of Germany, and on 
the other side the Anglo-Saxon with territories seventy times 
that of Germany. Wedged in between these two mighty 
races, Germany fears extinction, politically from the one, 
culturally from the other. Hence the frantic effort to be- 
come also a great empire by the annexation of territories at 
hand and overseas, the seizure of capital, the acquisition of 
natural resources, and the conquest of world markets and 
commercial privileges. Aside, therefore, from her divinely 
appointed mission of world organizer, Germany has a very 
concrete and local reason for counterbalancing her huge riv- 
als by a prompt and strenuous expansion. Whatever the 
legitimacy of such an expansion in the abstract, a study of 
the concrete situation shows it to be impossible. There are 
no more colonies to annex and no suitable neighbor lands to 
assimilate. The only alternative, and one which Germany 
clearly sees and frankly accepts, is to destroy the British 
Empire to get materials to build her own. Germany doubt- 
less argues that turn about is fair play in the highly gratify- 
ing occupation of empire building, but the British Empire 
and the Anglo-Saxon race w^hose future is thus menaced, can 
hardly so regard it. More cogently, the world whose peo- 
ples are concerned primarily for the maintenance of peace 
and the privilege of undisturbed development, may take ex- 
ception to this theory of rotation. For Germany makes no 
charge that these trusts are mismanaged. Her plea is solely 
that of privileged exploitation. 

Both the empires that Germany menaces and the world at 



GERMAISTY 157 

large whose interests quite transcend her claim to rotation of 
privilege, must unite in telling Germany that her dream of 
empire is gone forever. Present trusts are too firmly estab- 
lished, present overseas colonies too far developed, and pres- 
ent order too nearly assured to permit of violent readjust- 
ment in her supposed interest. This is no wrong or in- 
justice. Not every people can have imperial opportunity. 
It is the exceptional privilege of the few whom coincidence 
and the world's need requisition for the work. Austria has 
no dependencies and expects none. Japan must shape her 
plans with reference to other forms of national achievement. 
Germany came too late and went at it wrong. She must 
frankly recognize and we must recognize that her opportunity 
has passed by. Our settlement must be based above all on 
the recognition of this principle that there can he no im- 
perial future for Germany. That is the stake for which she 
threw the dice in this war, and she has thrown and lost. 
Any lingering notion that some measure of imperial privi- 
lege, some portion of imperial domain, are hers by right 
on the score of nationhood, a right to be conceded now or 
on the occasion of some future rehabilitation, is fatal to the 
cause for which we have fought. 

But if Germany may not wear the purple, she must still 
be clothed and fed. We may as well recognize that it is a 
sheer impossibility for the civilized world to keep the Ger- 
man people permanently in repressive custody. We have 
the strength to do it, but we have not the stomach to do it. 
It is repugnant to the whole principle on which our lives 
are ordered, to the whole philosophy on which our claim is 
based. Germany must have opportunity, if not the oppor- 
tunity that she seeks. The change of temper in the German 
people on which the permanent solution of the problem must 
depend, will not be brought about solely by repressive meas- 
ures. No doubt a crushing defeat will have a powerful 



158 THE GREAT PEACE 

effect in diminishing their arrogance and dampening their 
world conquering ardor, but if we leave them nothing worth 
doing except world conquest, that ardor will revive. Let us 
stop and ask ourselves, what do we wish Germany to do? 
Would we not have her devote herself to honest industry, 
to the development of her natural resources and to the gen- 
tle arts of civilization? If so, then we must see to it that 
she has every opportunity, every inducement, to expend her 
great energies along these lines. !No churlish policy of hit- 
ting Germany wherever she shows herself will accomplish our 
purpose. If we want her to be decent, we must give her 
the privilege of being so. 

It must be recognized, however, that Germany has her- 
self made this liberal policy exceedingly difficult. Quite 
aside from the passions engendered by the war and the con- 
sciousness of the monstrous wrongs that Germany has com- 
mitted against civilization, her industrial and commercial 
policy for many years preceding the war has had a predatory 
character and an imperialist purpose which have stamped it 
with illegitimacy. If we must suppress German imperial- 
ism and encourage German industrialism, then we must be 
quite sure that German industrialism is not German im- 
perialism in disguise, as it has been in the past. We can 
not open the world's markets to German industry and Ger- 
man commerce if they continue to take orders from the Gen- 
eral Staff. 

It is difficult to see what guaranties the Allies can ask or 
Germany can give as security against this danger. It is 
probable that for a time precautions must be taken of an 
onerous character, especially as regards the apportioning of 
certain raw materials which are to be much in demand fol- 
lowing the war. Difficult as these adjustments must be, 
they are not beyond the wisdom of modern statesmanship if 
the principle governing the settlement is kept clearly in mind. 



GERMANY 159 

"We want Germany to be transformed from a bullying mili- 
tary power into a constructive industrial nation. We must 
not block the road to that transformation. Any notion that 
the world can prosper by the suppression of Germany's indus- 
trial competition and by the manacling of Germany's great 
power of world service is a profound mistake. Our busi- 
ness men know, if the rest of us do not, that the German 
market is one that they can not afford to lose. It is the glory 
of the Anglo-Saxon to have learned, as he has pushed his 
trade among the remotest peoples, that these peoples can be 
profitable to him only as he makes them rich. That is the 
lesson of British trade in India and in Eg}^pt. Can we 
have the steadiness of vision to perceive, in these passionate 
times, that the principle is of universal application ? 

Undoubtedly the suggestion that Germany desist from her 
dreams of empire and become an honest industrial nation 
like " the nation of shopkeepers " that she has so often 
mocked, will be rejected with scorn by certain elements which 
have been dominant in German higher circles in recent years. 
There is none the less reason to believe that Germany may 
reconcile herself to the now imwelcome alternative. The 
case of Holland is closely analogous, though on a smaller 
scale. Holland once was among the foremost of the great 
imperial powers. She lost her primacy in conflict with a 
rival that was at that time far less considerate than those with 
which Germany now has to deal. It is doubtful, however, 
if Holland now regrets her loss of empire and its burden- 
some responsibilities. Doubtless she feels keenly her help- 
lessness in the presence of the great swashbuckler, but she 
probably does not envy him his role. It is not beyond hope 
that Germany should some day come to think and to feel 
in the same way. When that time comes she will find her- 
self quite automatically one of the group of free, world serv- 
ing nations, sharing to the full the privileges which they 



160 THE GREAT PEACE 

are at present forced to deny her. For in the end, it is the 
free, world serving nations who will guard the backward 
peoples and fill the empty places and share the earth's in- 
crease. Whoever performs these tasks of empire will per- 
form them at the bidding of the free nations and to them 
will render account. 

In the following chapters we shall have occasion to take 
up the case of the several territories, adjacent and overseas, 
and the problems of international interests and relations 
which call for special consideration under the principles 
herein set forth. 



CHAPTER XI 

BELGIUM 

Among the victims of German aggression, Belgium unques- 
tionably claims first attention. Uer complete innocence of 
any part in provoking the war, her helplessness, her claim 
to German protection by virtue of treaty guaranty, her heroic 
resistance, and finally, her fearful sufferings, have made her 
the sacrificial offering for the world and won for her the 
world's compassion. It is hardly necessary to recall the 
treaty agreement of 1838 by which Prussia, France, and 
Britain pledged themselves to guarantee the independence 
of the little nation, pledging her, meanwhile, to form no 
alliances and to refrain from other usual precautions against 
aggression. Nor need we recall the momentary candour 
with which the German Chancellor recognized the wrong 
of the invasion and pledged reparation, or the later disgrace- 
ful attempt to prove the helpless little state the aggressor. 
The main issue as regards Belgium has fortunately never been 
doubtful. Whatever else may have been in doubt, the res- 
toration of Belgium is a point regarding which the Allies 
have never faltered. 

For this restoration there are two reasons. The first and 
sufficient reason is the mere fact that Belgium existed and 
was minded to continue as she was. Failing some flagrant 
wrong against the peace of Europe, of which she has never 
been guilty, it is fundamental to the principle of liberty and 
equality which is the common faith of the Allies, that that 
existence should continue. It is easy to see that Germany 
wanted Belgium and that in a thoroughly peaceable Europe, 
the closest possible relation between the two countries is to 

161 



162 THE GKEAT PEACE 

be expected and desired. But in view of the conclusion al- 
ready reached that no extension of German territories is ad- 
missible under present conditions, the re-establishment of 
Belgian nationality follows as a matter of course. 

But this argument is quite overshadowed in the present 
instance by the fact that Belgium is strategic ground, the 
one natural gateway between France and Germany as be- 
tween Germany and Britain. Through this gateway have 
poured the conquering or marauding hosts that from time im- 
memorial have passed eastward or westward in the struggle 
between the two great peoples that are separated by the 
Bhine. Here too have landed the British armies like that 
which conquered Napoleon at Waterloo, and from here as 
from no other point an invasion of England might be un- 
dertaken with hope of success. The strategic character of 
Belgium was never so well illustrated as in the present war. 
Everyone knows how the unexpected resistance of Belgium 
held up the German advance for days and thus gave to Erance 
the time to mobilize the troops that stopped the German ad- 
vance at the Mame. Suppose Germany had held Belgium 
and that her advance on that fateful first of August had 
started from the western Belgian frontier ? It is as certain 
as things human can be that the Germans would have occu- 
pied Paris and Calais and that the whole result of the war 
would have been different. So far as we can now foresee, 
that must always be true. The possession of Belgium by 
Germany would put both France and England in her power. 

Conversely, though to a far less degree, the possession of 
Belgium by England or France would give them a strong 
position as regards Germany. It would advance their front 
line and bring them that much nearer to the heart of Ger- 
many, wherever that may be. But the advantage would be 
inherently defensive rather than offensive. The Belgo-Ger- 
man frontier is short and correspondingly easy for Germany 




BELGIUM 

«C/U.E OF MU.ES 



oufh 

N O Ji T H 



^^' 



^^ 



a 



GToningen 



ft D 



,M 



^ 



T 

,Zwclle , 



Amsterdam^ 

The Hague> 



KOTKrdam 



^- 



<V 



SEA 



^ 



Ss^.r^-''x/^^ 









> Bouloene 




^ ^ I . *^/'Dusseldori1 

3 Antwerp /^^■>.<^k'{ ^> 



<^ -^ feBrusscl 

i Mons 

w 



russels > ci 1/ 

/ 1-4 

^ Liege J i|A 

Naranr Jj, ^ 



lAix--la Cllapellei 




BELGIUM 165 

to defend. Moreover there lies close behind it the immense 
natural barrier of the Ehine which can be strengthened in- 
definitely. The chief industrial centers of Germany, to 
say nothing of her remotely located capital, all lie to the 
east of this barrier. Germany's affectation of terror lest her 
enemies should get possession of Belgimn need not be taken 
very seriously. She did, indeed, greatly fear such a move on 
their part, but only because it would checkmate her in her 
long cherished plans of aggression. 

The reasons, therefore, which led the three nations, in a 
loyal endeavor to preserve the balance of power, to neutral- 
ize Belgium and to pledge their support of her neutrality, 
were very serious reasons and have lost none of their validity. 
Belgium is a natural neutral ground, important to all and 
a matter of life and death to England and France. Her 
maintenance as a neutral nation is indispensable so long as 
these three nations remain enemies, really or potentially, and 
this they plainly must remain so long as Germany believes 
herself divinely commissioned to control the destinies of 
civilized men. 

But what is involved in the restoration of Belgium ? First 
of all the restoration of Belgian territory to the sovereignty 
of its own people. As regards internal affairs this covers 
the requirements, for the Belgian people are amply capable 
of providing for the needs of civilized government. But as 
regards their place in the family of nations, Belgium will be 
as helpless as before. Her people are too few and her fron- 
tiers too open to enable her to defend herself against her 
powerful neighbors who can never be indifferent to her politi- 
cal status. Will the restoration of Belgium automatically 
restore the guaranties which have hitherto determined her 
status ? Obviously not. For three powers, emerging from a 
prolonged and bitter war as conquerors and conquered, to 
assume a joint trusteeship would certainly be a dubious pro- 



166 THE GREAT PEACE 

ceeding, but when the very cause of conflict was the viola- 
tion of this same trusteeship, to resume it would be absolutely 
farcical. An orphan ward, in the care of three trustees, is 
kidnapped by one of them, her person outraged and her 
property squandered. When apprehended the miscreant 
gives as his excuse that he but anticipated what he believed 
to be the intended action of his co-trustees. He is com- 
pelled to give up his victim and to make such restitution as 
is possible. So far, so good. But how about the guardian- 
ship ? Shall the kidnapper retain his position ? 

The mere mention of restorin the joint guaranty of Bel- 
gium reveals the incongruity, th\ impossibility of such a 
proceeding. There is reason to believe that the original 
tripartite agreement was made in good faith. Prussia had 
at that time and for many years after, no imperialist aims 
which menaced the independence of Belgium. If threat- 
ened at all in the earlier years, it was by the jingoistic policy 
of France under the second Empire. But following the Ger- 
man victory of '70-'71 and more particularly following the 
accession of William II, the temper and policy of Germany 
gradually underwent a radical change. The policy of a 
balauce of power gave way to that of German supremacy 
which has been characterized in the preceding chapter. With 
this new policy Germany inevitably became disloyal to the 
spirit of her earlier guaranty, and its violation was only a 
question of opportunity. That violation did not begin with 
the crossing of the frontier on August first. Long before 
that Germany had built her network of double tracked 
strategic railways up to the Belgian frontier with their huge 
terminals that no possible peace requirements could justify, 
thus completely altering the physical situation. Meanwhile 
she had long made it plain to France that the building of 
strong defenses on the Franco-Belgian frontier would be re- 



BELGIUM 167 

garded as a hostile act. It is plain that she had long marked 
Belgium for her own. 

With this plainly declared change of policy on Germany's 
part, the compulsory renewal of her guaranty could not be 
sincere, and an effort to secure it would be but an incite- 
ment to hypocrisy. If the world entrusts the vital interests 
involved in Belgian neutrality ever so little to German 
guaranty, it will do so to its grave peril. 

What then ? There is but one practical alternative. Ger- 
many's railways have destroyed the neutrality of Belgium 
and made it a spearhead on the German shaft pointed al- 
ways toward the west. We can not destroy these railways. 
The destruction of railways is a familiar incident of war, 
but an impossible condition of peace. Any such crippling 
of Germany in her legitimate peace interests would be justly 
criticised as vandalistic and would rankle long in the hearts 
of the German people. The German breach of neutrality is 
permanent. The menace must be met in kind. Belgium is 
to be reconstituted by the Allies. She must remain their 
ally. They must be her permanent guaranty against Ger- 
many, the only power from which she fears or has occa- 
sion to fear aggression. And since in any future war she 
is certain again to be the first to feel the blow, she must be 
prepared to parry it. The narrow frontier between Belgium 
and Germany must be the first line defense of Western 
Europe against the German. Moreover Belgium must be 
prepared to man these defenses. Whether the armament of 
the future be much or little, Belgium must henceforth bear 
her share. She must never again be disarmed and exposed 
with naked breast to the enemy under the fiction of neu- 
trality. It is a great change from a shielded neutral to a 
frontier guard, but one imperiously dictated by the logic of 
events. More exactly it is not a new situation, but a new 



168 THE GREAT PEACE 

recognition of a situation long existing and revealed by the 
tragedy of the invasion. There is no occasion, as there cer- 
tainly is no disposition, on the part of England and France 
to interfere in the domestic affairs of the well managed little 
kingdom, but in their one great international concern the 
three powers are necessarily a unit, and to affect independence 
or separate action would be merely disingenuous. Whether 
the short frontier in question is the strategic one, the one 
most capable of defense, is a question for experts to deter- 
mine. If it is not it should be made so. No marked dif- 
ference of race hinders the rectification. If Germany should 
protest and seek the reason for the possible encroachment, she 
should not have far to go to find it.^ 

It will doubtless be urged here that Belgium should have 
the benefit of international guaranty. Beyond a doubt, 
but once more we must remind ourselves of what is meant 
by guaranty. It is merely a pledge of all the nations in- 
volved to use their force as needed to secure the end guar- 
anteed. International guaranties are too often conceived as 
substitutes for force. On the contrary they are always force, 
actual or potential. And international force like national 
force, has need of strong positions and efficient instruments. 
If Germany sees that the frontier is open and that by a quick 
move she can seize a dominating position, the mere pro- 
nouncement of any number of nations will not deter her. By 
all means let the nations of the civilized world guarantee 
Belgian neutrality, but it will be a guarded frontier that 
will enforce their guaranty. 

But the worst of our problem is yet to come. The Allied 
demand for " restoration, restitution, and guaranty " has be- 
come associated in the public mind especially with Belgium. 
We have considered briefly the question of restoration and 

1 For the possibility of extending Belgian territory on the east eee 
note at the end of Chapter XII. 



BELGIUM 169 

guaranties. It remains for us to consider the question of 
restitution. 

The material losses sustained by Belgium in the destruc- 
tion of property, the interruption of industry, and war con- 
tributions are probably the heaviest in proportion to her re- 
sources, of any of the belligerents. Even such occupied 
countries as Serbia have suffered less in material wealth 
since they possessed little except their soil. Belgium on the 
contrary, being primarily an industrial state and the most 
densely peopled in Europe, had accumulated vast wealth and 
that in a form peculiarly subject to injury. Being almost 
wholly in enemy possession and stiff necked in her opposition 
to his purposes, she has felt the full force of his fury. By 
common consent all the Allies, even those that, like France, 
have suffered immense injury, concede that Belgium has a 
preferred claim. Before examining the question how far 
Germany may be expected to discharge this obligation it may 
be well to call attention to one aspect of restitution that has 
been too little discussed, namely restitution in kind. 

The immense destruction which the war has wrought has 
created a dearth in many lines, notably in many kinds of 
mechanical and industrial appliances, which will be felt long 
after the war is over. Thus, the writer inquired recently the 
price of an automobile. The dealer mentioned a certain 
sum, — the price fixed by the manufacturer, — but could not 
fill an order. Pointing to a car that was passing he re- 
m,arked : " If I had that car I could sell it for twenty per 
cent, more than that. The price of the new car is fixed at 
the factory, but on a used car I can set my own price, and 
the demand is so great that I can get more than the price 
of new." Obviously under such circumstances the owner of 
a car would not feel indemnified for its loss by getting back 
its cost. He wants his car because he needs it and can not 
replace it. Ships furnish a well known example. Holland 



170 THE GREAT PEACE 

has refused to put ber ships at the disposal of the Allies, even 
if fullj insured. She does not want the insurance. She 
wants the ships ready to earn the enormous profits which will 
come with peace. If the ships are lost, it will be years be- 
fore she can replace them. 

This is the situation of Belgium as regards much of the loot 
that has been carried off by the invaders. Aside from works 
of art and like objects which have been removed with Ger- 
man thoroughness, a process in which certain persons of 
exalted rank have distinguished themselves, and the return of 
which should be enforced with pitiless rigor, Belgium has 
been subject to another form of pillage for which there is 
hardly a precedent. As has already been said, Belgium is 
primarily an industrial state, and as such, one of Germany's 
great competitors. When first occupied by Germany, there 
was an obvious attempt to preserve the industrial plant, 
and every inducement was offered to employers to resume 
operations and continue to give the population employment. 
Belgium was at that time regarded as a German province 
and was protected in its industrial interests like any other 
section of the Empire. But when later it became apparent 
that Belgium could not be retained, the policy of the invader 
changed. A systematic removal of all valuable machinery, 
raw materials, and industrial movables of every sort was 
imdertaken and Belgium was stripped bare. Doubtless the 
intention is to destroy buildings and other immovables if 
the evacuation actually takes place, the complete destruction 
of Antwerp and Brussels being contemplated, it is said, in 
that event. The object is, of course, to destroy Belgian com- 
petition after the war. If Belgium will not work for Ger- 
many, she shall not be allowed to work against her. 

We are too apt to confine our thought to the money loss 
involved in such a program. The time loss is here even 
more important. We are so accustomed to having access to 



BELGIUM 171 

a plethoric market where you can buy anything and in 
any quantity if you have money enough, that a compounding 
of injuries in terms of money is too readily accepted as 
satisfactory. But after the war no such market will exist 
for years to come. There will be no end of things, and 
among them chiefly these great requisites of industrial recon- 
struction, which will not be purchasable for love or money. 
Germany is perfectly aware of this and is taking every pre- 
caution that her factories shall be equipped and stocked ready 
to start the moment peace is declared, while her victorious 
rivals are confronted with the painful task of rebuilding. 
Even if Belgium received an adequate money indemnity, 
she would have to stand as a petitioner, — in part at least be- 
fore German purveyors, — and wait their pleasure for the 
necessary equipment. 

The remedy in this case is obviously restitution in kind. 
Not necessarily the identical machines, for their present 
availability is doubtful, but equivalent articles from Ger- 
man factories or German stocks sufficient to reinstate Belgian 
industry in the shortest possible time. Both in purchasable 
equipment and in raw materials, Belgium should be supplied 
before Germany receives her allotment. Failing these pre- 
cautions, Germany whose factories are essentially intact, will 
make a rush for world markets from which Belgium will 
long remain excluded, and into which she will later have to 
force her way against an intrenched and determined enemy. 

No doubt Germany will protest against this on all manner 
of grounds, equity, humanity, and the like. Consistency is 
not a German characteristic. But however inconsistent, such 
pleas are likely to have their weight with the Allies, With 
an unsubdued Germany we can deal sternly, but with a 
beaten Germany there is danger that we shall be soft hearted. 
It will perhaps be well for us at that time to recall that Ger- 
many has pursued this policy of weakening her enemies in- 



172 THE GREAT PEACE 

dustrially with a view to their ultimate subjection, all with 
a thoroughness that we hardly yet appreciate. Thus in the 
famous Hindenburg retreat in the spring of 1917, not only 
were buildings, railways, roads, and bridges utterly destroyed, 
but fruit trees were sawed down or girdled and even the 
soil, in some cases, treated with chemicals so as to destroy 
its fertility. This was not spite but war, war projected far 
beyond the present struggle into the days of peace, to prevent 
the little savings of the French peasant, destroy the produc- 
tivity of the soil, and lessen to as great an extent as possible, 
the number of Frenchmen who should be born into the world. 
The forces thus launched will, to a large extent, continue 
after peace, — a war after the war. If it was our right and 
our duty to combat German aggression in its military form, 
it is equally our right and our duty to combat it in this half 
military form whose consequences are equally to be feared. 
The writer makes no plea for mere destructive retaliation. 
It is to be hoped that no German factory will be destroyed 
except as an incident to legitimate military operations. But 
it is equally to be hoped that Germany will not be allowed to 
profit by this deliberate spoliation of an industrial rival. 

But no restitution in kind that is within Germany's power 
can liquidate her debt to Belgium. For every article recov- 
erable a score have been destroyed, not to speak of the markets 
lost, the years of labor wasted, the lives sacrificed, the famil- 
ies disrupted, the shame endured, injuries for which money 
indemnification is a mockery. Even the direct property 
losses which can be measurably expressed in terms of money, 
attain a figure which, without our recent experiences, would 
have seemed fabulous. The loss to industry during the 
first year of the war, in buildings destroyed and machinery 
destroyed or removed, is estimated at a billion dollars, while 
agriculture lost in buildings, implements, and crops, seven 
hundred and eighty millions more. Meanwhile war con- 



BELGIUM 173 

tributions, systematically exacted throughout the period of 
occupation, from cities, provinces, individuals, corporations, 
from anything, in short, from which money might be ex- 
torted, attain a staggering total for v^hich as yet no reliable 
estimates are available. Meanwhile Belgium has borrowed 
from the United States alone in the short space of eighteen 
months, the sum of one hundred and fifty seven million 
dollars to feed her starving people, while similar obligations 
have been incurred toward other governments, — all this in 
addition to some three hundred millions spent for like pur- 
pose in charity. The direct property loss alone amounts to 
several billions. 

This, of course is but the beginning of injuries suffered. 
German authorities state that in a single year there were a 
hundred thousand convictions in Belgium by military 
tribunal. We may safely assume that most of these were 
incident to the invasion and that they constituted in the 
aggregate merely a colossal injury to the Belgian people. 
The nameless injuries unoflBcially inflicted and above all the 
ruin of Belgian industry with its resulting demoralization 
of the people swell the account beyond the limits of the im- 
agination. 

Any proposal that Germany should fully indemnify Bel- 
gium for these losses breaks down from sheer, demonstrable 
impossibility. To exact the full toll would be to sell her 
land under the hammer and her people into bondage. There 
is a limit to what Germany can do, and a much narrower 
limit to what it is expedient to compel her to do. We must 
beware of settling such a question in a spasm of moral in- 
dignation. Not only would such a payment ruin Germany 
utterly, but it would ruin Belgium. We have considered 
elsewhere the difficulties in the way of such adjustments. 

But impossible as it is thus to square the account, this is a 
connection in which the conscience of the world simply will 



174 THE GREAT PEACE 

not be placated without a measure of reparation. Not only 
have the Allies been a unit in demanding it from the first, 
but German voices have been heard from time to time de- 
manding reparation to Belgium in the interest of the na- 
tional honor. Doubtless such voices are rare, but the fact 
that they are heard at all from a people which could com- 
placently hear from its prophet of world dominion the in- 
junction to " leave to the conquered nothing but their eyes 
to weep with " is an indication of the enormity of Germany's 
crime in the eyes of all men. 

Aside, therefore, from the restitution in kind which has 
been urged, a reasonable, — that is to say, a practicable, — 
indemnity may be — must be, — exacted. It would be well 
that this should cover certain specific losses the nature of 
which leaves least reason to fear a demoralizing reaction 
upon the people. Such would be the payment of loans made 
by the Allies which must otherwise become a burden upon 
the Belgian taxpayer, the return of war contributions which 
have been largely taken from the active industrial capital 
of the country and again are largely represented at pres- 
ent by loans for which tax payers are responsible, and the 
restoration of buildings required for industrial purposes. 
From Germany, too, might be secured the equipment or the 
funds, one or both, for fortifying the eastern frontier against 
her future aggression. Possibly the object lesson would 
have its value. How much this indemnity can or should 
be made, having regard always to the danger of general de- 
moralization, it is impossible for the writer to form any idea. 
There are other claimants to be heard, — none quite so de- 
serving as Belgium, but still entitled to a hearing before 
Belgiimi is fully recompensed. When the utmost has been 
exacted that it is safe or even possible to demand, Belgium 
will still be compelled to begin life anew under conditions 
closely approximating to economic ruin, 



CHAPTER XII 

FRANCE 

The reasons which induced France to enter the war, or 
more exactly, the reasons which induced Germany to at- 
tack her, were many and varied. To the popular mind the 
issue was, for France, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and 
for Germany its defense and retention. There can be no 
question that this is a completely erroneous conception of 
the situation. France had long since decided never to go 
to war to recover Alsace-Lorraine and Germany knew that 
the issue was dead unless she revived it. On the other hand, 
France had prospered greatly in the field of colonial enter- 
prise, and in company with Britain, by the simple fact of 
anticipating Germany's tardy ambition, effectually blocked 
the way to the realization of Germany's vast designs. More- 
over France had accumulated, — thanks in part to Germany's 
earlier indemnity exactions, — a huge capital, the power of 
which Germany had more than once been taught to fear. 
Germany, balked in her expansionist designs by French oc- 
cupancy and by French finance, boldly determined to ap- 
propriate both her colonies and her capital. The funda- 
mental fact which we must not lose sight of is that it was 
Germany that had the grievance and Germany that was the 
aggressor. For France more than for any other of the great 
powers, this is a war of defense. We need not rest this 
conclusion on French assertions or on any estimate of French 
character. It inhered in the situation. The claim of Ger- 
many that Britain and France were the aggressors is pal- 
pably absurd. They were the possessors and Germany the 
dispossessed. They were creditor nations and Germany a 

175 



176 THE GREAT PEACE 

debtor nation. A successful war would have given them 
little thr.t they did not already possess, unless it be immun- 
ity from the menace of German attack, while a successful 
war for Germany would have won her an imperial domain 
and an enormous loot. The nations that have much to lose 
and little to gain by war, have given hostages to keep the 
peace. Those who are familiar with recent European his- 
tory will not forget that the French general election, held 
but a few weeks before the outbreak of the present war, 
returned a distinctly pacifist majority to Parliament and 
virtually assured a policy of semi-disarmament, the peril of 
which was averted only by the heroic extra-constitutional in- 
sistence of President Poincare. The forcible recovery of 
Alsace-Lorraine was certainly farthest from the thought of 
this prosperous and pacific people. 

But the war came and not only revived the old passion 
but furnished new and compelling reasons for the recovery 
of the lost provinces. If France could live at peace with 
Germany, she could spare them, though not without loss. 
If she must fight Germany, they were indispensable. What 
then is the problem of Alsace-Lorraine ? 

The population comes first to mind. To the novice, in- 
deed, it is the only consideration. What is their race, their 
nationality, their affiliation, their history? The answer to 
these questions will illustrate the diflSculty of these easily 
proposed ethnic solutions. 

In race, these provinces have the normal border character 
of a no-man's land. The predominant racial stock is neither 
French nor German, but belongs to an earlier race. This, 
however, counts for little, as we have seen. In language there 
is much mixture. Alsace is and always has been predomi- 
nantly German in speech, though French is spoken in certain 
frontier districts. But this German is a most extraordinary 
dialect, entirely unintelligible to one who understands only 



FEANCE 177 

high German. In Lorraine a little less than half the terri- 
tory is French. Taking the two provinces together, a little 
less than one-tenth of the population are accounted as French 
speaking and the area in which French predominates is not 
much greater. 

But these figures are most deceptive. In the first place 
Germany easily manipulates these figures by recording as 
German all who speak German, regardless of whether they 
speak French also, a procedure of immense importance in a 
border province where a knowledge of both languages is com- 
mon. When we remember that throughout the period of 
German occupation, the German language has been employed 
in the schools to the exclusion of French, and that by the 
above procedure Germany has succeeded in reducing her 
Polish population to negligible proportions,^ we may assume 
that these statistics hardly correspond to fact, or if they 
do, the fact loses its usual racial significance. It is doubt- 
less true, however, that the population is predominantly Ger- 
man, and in Alsace almost wholly so, the more so as France 
during her control of these territories, made no effort to 
force the French language upon them. 

But whatever the proportion, the dividing line loses most 
of its significance from the fact that it is not a line at all. 
Throughout practically the entire area the two languages 
are intermingled, especially in Lorraine. There is very lit- 
tle advantage in assigning an area of mixed speech to one 
side or the other. 

A farther fact which greatly modifies the significance of 
these data is the enormous displacement of population which 
followed German occupation and which would undoubtedly 
attend another transfer. When Germany took possession 
she substituted for the tolerant policy of France, a program 
of strenuous Germanization. This and other features of 

1 Her stock assertion now is that " there is no German Poland." 



178 THE GREAT PEACE 

German rule were displeasing to the population, Germanic 
though it was, and all who could feasibly leave the country, 
did so. The nearby French city of Nancy promptly received 
an addition of a third to its population. It was one of the 
suggestive results of the war that the German dialect of 
Alsace dominated whole quarters of this French city be- 
cause the Alsatians objected to being Germanized. Alto- 
gether it is claimed that a full quarter of the population 
left the provinces, despite the great industrial development 
which offered them such inducements to remain. Their 
places were of course taken by German immigrants. During 
the present war, as the possibility of reference of the ques- 
tion to popular vote has forced itself upon German atten- 
tion, this displacement of population is said to have been 
systematically continued, unsympathetic proprietors being 
expropriated and their holdings disposed of to loyal Ger- 
mans. Germany probably has little reason to fear the re- 
sults of a plebiscite. All this raises the question, however, as 
to the validity of such a plebiscite, even if the principle were 
conceded. If we are to consult the wishes of the Alsatians, 
it is pertinent to inquire, who are the Alsatians ? Have the 
exiles no rights? Have the immigrants full rights, espe- 
cially those so lately rushed in to stuff the ballot box ? It is 
impossible to give a sweeping answer either way. The ex- 
iles are hopelessly lost; the immigrants for the most part 
there to stay. There is nothing to do but accept the situa- 
tion. Yet Germany would ask nothing better in the case of 
Belgium or the Baltic Provinces than to refer their case to 
a vote if she is given the privilege of preliminary seizure and 
forty years of forcible preparation.^ 

1 It is well to recall that the dominant Pan-German party demand not 
only the annexation of Belgium, but the expropriation and German 
ownership of its essential industries. The very monstrousness of Ger- 
man demands serves in no small degree to camouflage them from their 
victims. The decent world has simply lost the power to believe things 



FKANCE 179 

To the claim that Alsace-Lorraine is historically a part 
of France, Germany replies that it is also historically a part 
of Germany, and that that connection is older and of longer 
standing. This is true, especially as regards Alsace, which 
belonged to Germany from 925 to 1681, or between seven and 
eight centuries, while the connection with France was only 
from 1681 to 1871 or less than two hundred years. But the 
German is careful not to recall what we are all too prone to 
forget, namely, that there was no Germany at that time. 
There was a German people existing in the shape of numer- 
ous petty states of which Alsace was one, but there was no 
German nation and consequently no conscious German na- 
tionality. Alsace during these early centuries developed 
a nationality of her own, but no other. Not till she became 
a part of France in 1681 did she have any chance to develop 
the sentiment of allegiance to a great modern nation. She 
came to France, therefore, racially but not politically, Ger- 
man. It is a surprising attestation of the liberality of 
French character, that though her government was at that 
time wholly autocratic, the policy adopted toward the new 
province was one of extreme tolerance and moderation. It 
was completely successful, with the curious result that Alsace 
became as loyal as any French province, while retaining its 
essentially German character, thus hopelessly complicating 
the ethnic-political problem. We have seen that race at the 
best is not a sufficient determinant of nationality. In such 

that Germany coolly professes. Yet Germany has been doing these 
things for decades. One reason why " there is no German Poland " is 
that Germany has long been expropriating the intractable Poles Many 
years ago when the writer was a student in the University of Berlin, a 
distinguished professor created a sensation there bj' denouncing this 
policy of forcible displacement as too drastic. He urged that Germany 
had only to leave the Pole without education, save of a rudimentary 
character, and the better-educated German would soon displace him by 
natural means. This amazinja: proposition in governmental circles 
was regarded as almost treasonably lenient, and the professor was for 
a time in marked disfavor. 



180 THE GKEAT PEACE 

a confused and contradictory form as this it becomes well- 
nigh negligible. 

Turning to the physical or strategic problem, the data are 
still conflicting. Lorraine is physically a part of France, 
though the dividing line is not sharp. There is no serrated 
ridge or commanding stream plainly destined by nature as a 
boundary, — unless we regard the Rhine as such, which has 
its difficulties. The whole district is rather the barrier, 
which of course makes it debatable ground. Turning far- 
ther south, there are two natural and rather pronounced par- 
allel barriers, the Rhine and the Vosges M,ountains with a 
broad valley between them. This valley is Alsace and the 
mountains or the river became the international boundary 
according as the one people or the other proved the stronger. 
On the whole the mountains have had the advantage, as ia 
indicated by the fact that during the period of linguistic de- 
termination, German was established in the valley. But 
during the period of political determination, France had 
the advantage, and established, as we have seen, her na- 
tionality in the valley. It is still something of a draw 
game, but with this reflection that the whole territory is a 
region of tremendous strength, giving its possessor a power 
of offense or defense which the other can not match. Those 
concerned for the world's peace may well be interested in 
the character and designs of the holder. 

We come finally to the most important consideration of all, 
the natural resources of the district. These consist chiefly 
of that great determinant of national destiny, iron, together 
with a large deposit of potash of which Germany has otherwise 
a practical monopoly. We here approach what is beyond 
question the most important problem of the entire peace set- 
tlement. It is a sad fact that the supreme factor in the deter- 
mination of national destinies is one of which the American 
people in its discussion of this question, has seemed as yet 



,— C- ...■■JIT. - ■ 

Longitude Suti* 

netherLand^K'^ 

ANfWERP/^ 




NbRTH ^RABANT ' 



-;y'''-'-''-imburg/ 



? Y^ 
■■•/ , 

L I E/ G E 



.-^r5' 



^'''lUXEMBIIRG ( 









E 
apelle 

O 

< 



>.LuKemburg/ /Treves A^f /^ . C 

O 



<:^^ 



'^aiserslautern I j 

^P PALATIN|ATr 

(To Bavaria.) f 
irbruckeii 



Heidelberg < 




-ALSACE-LORRAINE 



AND THE ^-\ ^Mfi^ 

RHINE PROVINCE /*" X. 

, SCALE OF MILES fRANCHE 

10 20 30 40 60 „'^*!52'*0 

„ . . . COMTE 

'''"*' {^^ •''■<"• Jv/.v.vJ «* 

Depolitt wfy>7A DepctiU ti'"--' ^■■' 

5' wMs.cw.co.m. 6° 



FRANCE 183 

almost wholly unconscious. It is a familiar truth that in war 
the victory always inclines to the side that has the most men 
and the amplest equipment. Leadership of course counts for 
much and may, in a given war, decide the issue. But leader- 
ship is a short-lived thing. If a Xapoleon gives the victory to 
France, it is only for a short time. Napoleon passes, and a 
Moltke appears on the other side and turns the scale. The 
personal factor is but a ripple on the surface. It is the great 
undercurrent of men and resources that determines the 
result. 

But even here we have not reached the final term. We 
have seen that resources develop population. In 1750 it was 
generally assumed that England had reached her limit of 
population at the long stationary figure of eight millions. 
Then came the discovery of coal and the development of her 
great industries, and her population rose to thirty-eight mil- 
lions. Jt was coal and iron that made the extra thirty mil- 
lions. ) 

Exactly the same thing is happening in Germany today. 
Her population has gained about thirty millions in forty 
years, and it is iron and coal that have produced the extra 
thirty millions. Meanwhile France has not increased, and 
it is at bottom primarily for this reason, that she lacks the 
iron and coal. It is iron and coal that produce the men and 
it is iron and coal that arm and equip the men. Hence we 
come to the farther truth, — the almost appalling truth. It, 



is natural resources that determine the strength and the 
ultimate destiny of nations. 

The question naturally arises, whether there is any limit 
to this principle. If a country like Germany or France were 
one vast coal and iron mine with absolutely limitless sup- 
plies, would it have limitless power? "Would it not have, 
after all, other limitations of space or food which would 
affect the result? Yes, undoubtedly, if it remained in its 



184 THE GREAT PEACE 

original boundaries. But that is exactly what it would not 
do. Such a country would develop and equip a very large 
population, all that it could raise or buy food for, and with 
this population it would conquer additional territories in 
which it could raise more food and develop more population, 
and so on to the end. If its supplies of iron and coal were 
far superior to those of other powers and if they were not 
early taken, before the nation had time to grow to them, there 
could be but one result. That nation would dominate the 
rest. 

This is almost the exact situation in Europe today. It is 
of course impossible to tell with exactness how much of these 
minerals lies buried in the earth, but estimates have been 
made in Europe with great care, especially in the matter of 
coal. According to these estimates Belgium has a coal re- 
serve of 11 billion tons, France 17 billion tons, England 189 
billion tons, Russia 233 billion tons, and Germany 409 bil- 
lion tons. A billion is a very large number and even the 
smallest of these reserves may give us a reassuring sense of 
sufficiency. But in a matter in which annual consumption 
rises into the hundreds of millions and in an age when a 
single steamship bums a thousand tons a day, these figures 
become distinctly finite. The important thing to note is that 
Germany has today substantially half the coal reserves of 
Europe, while France has next to none. These two countries 
are nearly equal in size, but one has about twenty-five times 
as much coal as the other. That difference is already ex- 
pressing itseK in the normal way. The two countries had 
fifty years ago about the same population. Today Germany 
has thirty millions more than France because they entered 
the industrial era, the one with coal and the other without. 
That difference in coal supply has only begun to express 
itself in population. France can not hope to redress the 
balance unless she can get larger supplies of coal. In that 



FRANCE 185 

industrial development which is preeminently the measure 
of modem national power, France is a case of arrested de- 
velopment.^ 

In the matter of iron the balance is less unequal and Ger- 
many is certainly in a less fortunate position. By far the 
largest of her ore beds is in the extreme west, a huge deposit 
lying right astride the present Franco-German frontier. 
This ore bed was carefully examined by German experts at 
the time the frontier was drawn, but with imperfect results. 
They reported that only the eastern portion of the field was 
valuable and so the western part was graciously left to 
France. Improved methods, however, quickly invalidated 
their decision and left Germany to mourn the loss of a splen- 
did prize which had been within her grasp. It is significant 
that one of the first objectives of the German army was this 
iron mine, the seizure of which robbed France at the very 
outset of practically all her material for war and compelled 
her to depend on imports from America. The seizure of her 
slight remaining coal fields completed her helplessness. It 
is for that reason that the French people were doomed to pass 
the past winter in unwai^med houses. 

Viewed in the light of these facts, the disposal of Alsace- 
Lorraine acquires an entirely new significance. Germany 
will cling with the utmost desperation, to this great ore bed, 
not only to the eastern portion which has been the source of 
three quarters of her supply in the last few decades, but 
to the French portion as well which it was her first care to 
acquire and which has been exploited with feverish activity 
throughout the war. It is this iron mine of Briey that the 

1 " Let us not deceive ourselves. It is not common language, litera- 
ture, or traditions alone, nor yet clearly defined or strategic frontiers, 
that will in the future give stability to the boundary lines of Europe, 
hut rather such distribution of its supplies of coal and iron as will 
prevent any one of the great nations of Europe from becoming strong 
enough to dominate or absorb all the others." Macfarlane, " The Eco- 
nomic Basis of an Enduring Peace." 



186 THE GREAT PEACE 

Germans have m mind when they talk about a " slight rectifi- 
cation of the western frontier." To possess this ore bed 
would not only disarm France completely and make her de- 
pendent upon distant allies, but it would limit her popula- 
tion, prevent her industrial development, and in the long 
run make her a ward of Germany. Germany will not 
relinquish without the most desperate of struggles what is 
virtually a guaranty of her eventual domination. She now 
has the coal ; with a " slightly rectified " Alsace-Lorraine, 
she would have the coal and iron both necessary for the task. 
ISTot willingly will Germany let such a prize slip from her 
grasp. There is reason to fear as Maximillian Harden has 
declared, that " if necessity compels us to sign such a peace 
(surrendering Alsace-Lorraine), seventy million Germans 
will tear it vip." And for all these reasons the French peo- 
ple, to whom the experiences of the war have brought home 
these truths with new force, will cling with the tenacity of 
despair to this condition of their safety and their independent 
existence. 

It is one of the curious caprices of nature that these vital 
conditions of power and growth to modem nations should 
be located in spots that were predestined to be the frontiers 
between great peoples. If the German coal and iron de- 
posits were in Hanover and the French in Touraine with 
only innocent farming land between the two nations, the 
problem would be immensely simplified. As it is, forty per 
cent, of Germany's coal reserves are in Silesia, an eastern and 
essentially Polish province which would be lost to Germany 
if the more radical plans for the reconstitution of Poland 
should be carried out, — which helps to explain Germany's 
insistence that there is no German Poland. The rest of her 
coal is on the western frontier, most of it west of the Rhine. 
All that France possesses lies in the same uncertain region. 
The iron is held in even more dangerous equipoise. Nature 



FEANCE 187 

could hardly have better contrived to keep these races at 
odds, or shall we say, — to force their ultimate union ? 

Returning now to Alsace-Lorraine, we have to note the 
important fact that their restitution to France would give 
her the iron, but it would give her no coal. Only one of the 
great western coal fields, that of Saarbrueck, extends slightly 
into the territory of Lorraine. All the rest that lies to the 
west of the Ehine is located in the Ehine Province, as the 
territory is called which lies between Lorraine, Luxembourg, 
and Belgium on the one hand and the Ehine on the other. 
The restoration of these provinces would therefore have this 
extraordinary and highly unsatisfactory result, that it would 
give about all the iron of central Europe to France and all 
the coal to Germany, a most doubtful guaranty of peace. It 
would be like making peace between two blood feudists by 
giving to each hostages out of the family of the other. 

The fate of Alsace-Lorraine is as nearly determined as 
anything can be by the present war. Elsewhere everything 
is still in a state of nebulous generality, but here the frontiers 
of our purpose are definite and concrete. France is to have 
Alsace-Lorraine. It would indeed be a neglect of the most 
elemental precautions if the decision had been otherwise. 
But in the light of the facts here set forth, it may well be 
asked whether this promises peace or a renewal of the con- 
flict. Against that frontier, — which is henceforth our 
frontier, — the Teutonic storm will beat with redoubled fury. 
Germany will not purr peacefully with such an appeal to her 
predatory instincts constantly before her eyes. She will not 
be deterred by any international warnings to " keep off the 
grass." It will be force, not mere international agreement, 
that maintains that frontier, force not potential merely, but 
in large part actual, equipped and ready for its strenuous 
task. All the awful mandates of the powers will avail noth- 
ing if Germany finds the frontier unguarded and rushes the 



188 THE GREAT PEACE 

iron and coal mines and a few strategic points from the too 
trustful powers. 

Why has the world decided on just this territory of Alsace- 
Lorraine ? Is it so clear that this is the measure of nature's 
equity, the sufficient guaranty of the world's peace ? Noth- 
ing of these. Alsace-Lorraine is to be returned because 
Alsace-Lorraine was taken away. The Europe of yesterday 
was a hodge-podge of accident, but in this world of new 
forces and changed conditions, it is still yesterday that gives 
the law to today. ^ With all our talk of destroying Prussian 
militarism, we can not bring ourselves to disarm the mon- 
ster, because, forsooth, the arms were his of old. The writer 
has small hope that his suggestion will commend itself to a 
world obsessed with the idea that the surface facts of local 
prejudice and habit are the legitimate determinants of na- 
tionality. Yet human progress has been a continual struggle 
against these surface accidents, a continual yielding on their 
part to the inexorable forces of environment. But however 
hopeless the suggestion, there is but one suggestion possible 
as the result of this reasoning. The Rhine Province and the 
Palatinate should go with Alsace-Lorraine. That territory 
cuts a huge notch out of the natural unity of the west Rhine 
territory, with no other result than to take from the western 
peoples practically all their coal and make their frontier in- 
defensible. Its cession to Erance would restore the boundary 
of Caesar, the boundary of nature. It would still leave Ger- 
many twice as much coal as it would give to Belgium and 
France. It would be, under modern conditions, a bourdary 
virtually immune from aggression as between peoples measur- 
ably equal in equipment for defense. Finally, it would give 
to France the possibility of that industrial development that is 
now so unrighteously denied her, a development without 

1 " Das ewig Gestrige das immer war und immer wiederkehrt, 
Und heute gilt weil's gestern hat gegolten." 

— ScHiixEB, " Wallenstein." 



FKANCE 189 

which she has no future and German domination of the con- 
tinent with all its illimitable possibilities becomes assured. 
It is the irreducible minimum of concession if we are to have 
peace on this border which is the Armageddon of the nations. 

It will of course be objected that this leaves Germany 
insufficiently supplied with iron. There is truth in this. 
Importations from Sweden and from the recently discovered 
deposits of Lapland, a pretty safe supply even in war, 
and possibly from imperfectly explored southern sources, 
must less conveniently eke out her supply from other home 
sources. Possibly we might reconcile ourselves just now to 
seeing a nation that is equally predatory with steel billets 
and steel cannon, a little straitened for the present in her 
supply. But after all this question is irrelevant. There 
is no iron in the Khine Province. If Germany is to get 
her iron in the west, she must have Alsace-Lorraine and 
perhaps some "rectifications." That we do not propose to 
give her. But the Rhine Province has coal, our coal, and it 
is on our side the river. 

But here comes the stubborn fact. It was not so from 
the olden time. These people are Germans. Yes, and so 
are the Alsatians. France won them by fairness and toler- 
ance. She can win the others by the same. Doubtless a 
transfer would mean an exodus of the irreconcilable among 
this German population. But it is an open question whether 
there would not be as many who would welcome the transfer. 
The people of the Rhine Province do not love the Prussian. 
In any case, the people that has solemnly proposed that all 
non-Germanic population in America and Australia should 
be transported to Africa can hardly complain of a transfer 
that exiles and oppresses no one, even if it should result in 
something of voluntary exodus to congenial lands across the 

river. 

France, like Belgium, has a vast claim against Germany 



190 THE GREAT PEACE 

on the score of property destroyed and injuries of every sort 
inflicted. As already indicated, however, these claims rest 
on a technically difterent basis. France is a great power, a 
long standing and recognized rival of Germany, and not 
under German guaranty. It is not claimed that this differ- 
ence is more than technical. France was peaceable and her 
warfare against Germany was of that legitimate sort which 
can not be held to justify military reprisals. Still, techni- 
cal though it be, the difference is such as to give Belgium 
a prior claim. If it be practicable to indemnify both with- 
out injurious reactions upon themselves and upon the world, 
by all means let it be done, but on this point the writer 
has already expressed his doubts. 

The great question of colonial possessions, a question in 
which France is deeply interested, may be reserved for sep- 
arate consideration. 

Note. A glance at the map on page 181 will disclose the fact that 
the Rhine Province lies in part between Belgium and the Rhine The 
annexation of this part to France would be highly unnatural. It would 
therefore be the natural thing to make Belgium rather than France the 
beneficiary in this region. Tliis would have the farther advantage that 
adjacent Belgium is Flemish, that is, low German, in speech, essentially 
the same as the Rhine Province. The writer has made no effort to decide 
this question of local convenience. The Allies in this region are 
considered as a unit and the transfer here proposed is urged on behalf 
of the group rather than of any particular member. An extension of 
Belgium and possibly a modification of the Dutch frontier might well be 
necessary in case of this transfer. 



CHAPTEK XIII 

ITALY 

The entry of Italy into the war was in a sense unlike that 
of the other Allies. It had no immediate connection with 
the crisis which seemed to determine the action of the others. 
Indeed, Italy had seemed to share the apprehensions of 
Austria at the rising power of Serbia. This previous atti- 
tude together with her alliance with the Central Powers 
and her long hesitation before taking the decisive step, made 
her action seem peculiarly deliberate and calculating. Prob- 
ably the difference was mostly seeming, for the action of 
those powers that made most of the Serbian and Belgian 
episodes was really determined by very serious considerations 
of self-preservation. It was no burst of moral indignation 
at violated pledges or impudent demands that swept Prance 
and Britain off their feet, though that indignation was tre- 
mendous and sincere. This wave of emotion greatly aided 
those governments in quickly marshalling their people to pro- 
tect their vital interests, but it was those interests which the 
statesmen of those powers believed to be jeopardized, that 
were the real ground of their action. The emotional out- 
burst in those countries served, therefore, to somewhat screen 
the deeper movement of the nation. 

In Italy this screen was lacking. The psychological mo- 
ment for moral protest had passed when Italy, after pro- 
longed parley with both camps, finally took the decisive 
step. It is true that ardent protagonists of the Italian cause 
have attempted to claim for Italy a share in this moral 
spontaneity so honored in popular judgment. We are told 
that the Italian people forced a cautious and reluctant gov- 

191 



192 THE GREAT PEACE 

eminent to enter the war in vindication of its honor and 
on behalf of the sacred rights of humanity. There was un- 
doubtedly pressure from a certain section of the Italian pub- 
lic, and no doubt these sentiments were urged and sincerely 
entertained, but they have impressed the world less than 
similar sentiments in other countries. This seemingly calcu- 
lated pursuit of self interest is noted, not by way of criticism 
of the Italian people, with whom the writer claims a personal 
relation of friendship of more than thirty years standing, 
but rather in their defense. Their case is quite as strong 
as that of the others, but it does not look so and has in fact 
made less appeal. 

Italy entered the war chiefly for two reasons, antagonism 
to Austria, — one of the deepest antagonisms in Europe, — 
and desire to better her very unsatisfactory strategic position. 
The first reason, antagonism, was the popular motive because 
it rested on facts that were within popular memory. It 
had, of course, its generous counterpart or aspect in irredent- 
ism, the desire to redeem their kinsmen from the hated 
Austrian rule. The second or strategic argument was the 
one that actuated the Italian statesmen and military leaders. 
It was abundantly justified by the situation. To a consider- 
able extent the strategic and ethnic demands coincided. To 
a much greater extent they were made to seem to do so. 

The antagonism to Austria is based on very substantial 
grounds. Her rule over the once highly civilized independ- 
ent states of northern Italy, was both unnatural and unen- 
lightened. The friction engendered by it increased steadily 
to its close in 1866. To this was added another source of 
friction when in 1870 Italy broke with the Vatican, a rup- 
ture seemingly unavoidable if Italy was to be consolidated. 
During this long period of struggle, Austria remained the 
one uncompromisingly Catholic power, upholding not merely 
the Catholic faith, but the Catholic claims to temporal rule. 



ITALY 193 

Indeed, throughout the earlier struggle for independence and 
nationality, Austria appears, not only as claimant for Italian 
territories on her own behalf, but always as the staunch up- 
holder of Papal claims. As the feud between the Quirinal 
and the Vatican has never been settled, so the feud between 
Italy and Austria has necessarily continued. It is difficult 
for one not familiar with internal conditions in the two coun- 
tries to appreciate the inevitableness of all this. Austria 
is a group of alien and even antagonistic nationalities united 
almost solely by fealty to their personal sovereign and their 
loyalty to the Catholic faith. For these states, if their union 
is to be preserved, the Catholic faith is an indispensable 
political factor. In Italy, on the other hand, we are dealing 
with a single race whose natural political union was long 
blocked by the Catholic church as ruler of the centrally sit- 
uated Papal States. For Italy, therefore, it was absolutely 
essential that the Catholic church should disappear as a 
political factor. These two nations were therefore squarely 
opposed in a matter that was vital to each. The result was 
antagonism, deep and long standing, which has become an 
instinct of their people. Nor can we escape the conclusion 
that this antagonism is a living one, not merely a memory. 
The forces that produced it are in part still active and con- 
tributing to its maintenance. Austrian rule over northern 
Italy has greatly diminished, but it has not wholly disap- 
peared, while the fundamental conflict regarding Catholic 
claims, though perhaps less keenly felt than formerly, is 
still present. This antagonism is therefore one of the great 
factors to be reckoned with in the approaching settlement. 
Resting as it does upon Italian unity, Austrian diversity, 
and Catholic claims, it must apparently continue as long as 
these continue. The dissolution of Austria might remove 
it, for it apparently does not hold against the component 
parts of the Austrian state, but only against the government 



194 THE GREAT PEACE 

which represents their union. The renunciation of the claim 
of the church to territorial sovereignty might also remove it, 
would certainly reduce it. The disappearance of Italian 
unity is a contingency which we seemingly need not consider. 
Turning to the problem of Italy's strategic frontier, her 
grievance is plain. The Austro-Italian boundary was deter- 
mined in 1866 under peculiar conditions. France and Italy 
had just fought an indecisive war against Austria. Success- 
ful on land, they had met decisive defeat in the Adriatic, 
and it is doubtful what the result would have been had 
Austria not been overwhelmingly defeated at the same mo- 
ment by Prussia. This defeat of Austria by a power which 
was an}i;hing but an ally of France, alarmed the latter and 
made her come to terms with Austria on her own account 
and with little reference to the interests or wishes of Italy, 
thus relinquishing what seemingly was within their grasp 
as the result of Austria's embarrassment. Most of Austria's 
Italian territories were ceded, — not to Italy, but to France, 
who thereupon exchanged them for Savoy, an Italian ter- 
ritory on her own frontier. This peculiar transaction 
definitely foreseen by France, is perhaps responsible for the 
establishment of a frontier which France would hardly have 
accepted had she been the one to guard it. Its most glaring 
defect was the retention by Austria of the Trentino, a purely 
Italian district of immense strategic strength. The Trentino 
is doubly Italian, for not only do the people speak Italian, 
but the district is on the southern slope of the Tyrolese Alps, 
whose summits are the natural boundary between the Italian 
and German peoples. The retention of the Trentino de- 
prived Italy of her natural defenses against her age long 
rival and enemy, while it gave to the latter the best possible 
opportunity to attack her neighbor for the recovery of the 
territories that she had unwillingly parted with. To these 
natural advantages have been added some of the most power- 



ITALY 197 

ful fortifications in the world, the building of thirty-five 
powerful forts having converted the whole region into one 
vast fortress. 

Even this is not the whole story. The Trentino thrusts it- 
self like a blunt wedge into the great plain of northern Italy. 
It is from the northeastern corner of this plain, far beyond 
the Trentino, that Italy must operate if she is to fight Austria. 
The Trentino in Austrian hands thus becomes a frowning 
bastion threatening the flank of any army that passes and 
the communications of any army that has passed. It would 
be difficult to find a parallel for this extraordinary defense. 
It is plain that Austria established this frontier in expecta- 
tion of trouble and with the intention of holding the whip 
hand. 

A somewhat similar though less striking situation holds 
in the east. Here the Isonzo River is the natural boundary 
though not quite the linguistic boundary between the two 
peoples, the Italian speech extending somewhat beyond it. 
But once again Austria established the border somewhat to 
the west of the river in order that her own front might be 
impregnable and the Italian front exposed. 

We need not waste any anathemas on Austria. All the 
powers involved were manoeuvering for position, and neither 
Cavour nor Napoleon III would have scrupled to take advan- 
tage of such a situation if they had been able to do so. But 
looking at it from the standpoint of European or world 
peace, it is clear that the arrangement is a vicious one. 
No war sentiment should pervert our judgment and induce 
us to reverse the situation giving to Italy the chance to over- 
awe her antagonist. But a boundary based so far as possible 
on natural features and separating the antagonists on fairly 
even terms is desirable in the interest of general peace, 
especially since ethnic boundaries so nearly coincide. The 
cession of the Trentino to Italy and the rectification of the 



198 THE GREAT PEACE 

Isonzo frontier in conformity with natural boundaries and 
so far as may be with race limits, are the most indisputable 
of Italy's claims. It will be noted that precedence is here 
given to natural over ethnic frontiers. This is the sound 
principle in all cases where the two are fairly identical. An 
ethnic frontier is never sharp edged. Language boundaries 
are both vague and shifting, while natural boundaries in 
a region like this are often inexorable. To make the crest 
of a mountain range or the summit of a pass a national boun- 
dary is reasonable, even if a few persons have carried their 
language over the divide. The proper drawing of the polit- 
ical boundary usually effects the rectification of the ethnic 
frontier speedily and without hardship, whereas the ethnic 
factor has no such power over nature. The two rectifications 
noted would each require slight ethnic adjustments. A 
proper mountain frontier in the north would require the in- 
clusion of a portion of the Tyrol with a few German speaking 
inhabitants, while a strategic boundary in the east would 
leave a few Italians under Austrian rule. 

But unfortunately neither Italy's demands nor Italy's prob- 
lems end here. The great Austro-Italian frontier is the 
Adriatic. It may seem extravagant to characterize a body 
of water a hundred miles wide as a boundary, but all the 
problems of a frontier exist here in their most acute form. 
Unfortunately here too we find Austria holding the same whip 
hand over Italy, this time through a caprice of nature. The 
Italian side of the Adriatic is featureless and indefensible, 
a low unbroken coast line without a single harbor suitable 
for modern commerce or for a naval base, except possibly 
at the extreme south where Brindisi has been constrained 
into the service of the Orient mail and Taranto does duty as 
an indifferent naval station. Briefly, Italy, of necessity a 
maritime and naval power, has on her east coast no facilities 
for either commerce or defense. The east coast of the 



ITALY 199 

Adriatic, on the contrary, is a perfect maze of rocky islets, 
deep fjords, and ample harbors, while at the northern end 
lies Trieste, one of the finest harbors in Europe, and at the 
other an embarrassment of riches in the way of natural 
refuges for a navy. Such is Cattaro, a fjord whose narrow 
but perfectly practicable entrance between towering cliffs is 
scarcely visible from the sea, but this once passed, it opens 
into a great inner lake resembling in size, shape, and environ- 
ment the famous Lake of Lucerne. The conquest of Mon- 
tenegro by Austria was effected primarily to give her posses- 
sion of the mountain dominating this naval stronghold. 
Another is Avlona, a deep bay, its entrance protected by an 
island, in the inner recesses of which ships of war could lie in 
perfect security. Still another is the channel of Corfu, a 
body of water between the island and the mainland almost 
entirely surrounded by towering mountains. Here are har- 
bors and islands and naval bases in plenty for both coasts, but 
all piled up on one, a most inequitable caprice of nature. 
Here again, precisely as in the mountains to the north, the 
power holding the east coast is perfectly secure from attack 
and the power holding the west coast absolutely defenseless. 
This disparity of position results in a further disparity, in 
that Austria finds it unnecessary to maintain a great navy 
and is thus free to devote her resources to her army, while 
Italy is compelled to maintain both, and that of course to 
the disadvantage of both. 

Italy covets this coast. It is clearly a strained and un- 
natural territorial program but one to which she is forced 
by the exigencies of her position. These exigencies are her 
real and comprehensible motive, but they are not her chief 
argument, for the simple reason that Austria can advance 
even more compelling ones. To give the eastern coast of the 
Adriatic to Italy would obviously be an advantage to Italy, 
but it would even more obviously be ruin for Austria. It 



200 THE GREAT PEACE 

would take all of her sea coast and leave her an interned 
nation like Serbia. Worst of all, it would not find a natural 
frontier, no matter where the line might be drawn. The 
interned Balkan states would never be reconciled and would 
make endless wars of protest. If Italy held her ground, she 
w^ould find in these protests and the constant menace from the 
rear a continual incentive to extend her borders. We should 
have introduced one more formidable factor into the trouble- 
making Balkan situation. 

Considerations like these would hardly deter Italy, con- 
tinually menaced by her position and confronted with a power 
so hated as is Austria, but Italy is not unconscious that to 
the world and to those allied powers whose cooperation can 
alone realize her ambition, these are very serious objections. 
To her own people, too, as to every other, strategic considera- 
tions make but a feeble appeal. She has therefore turned to 
another argiimeut which everywhere in our day enjoys pos- 
sibly exaggerated popularity and an argument which in this 
case she has certainly abused, — the argument of race. Italia 
irredenta, unredeemed Italy, is the slogan by which Italy 
has roused the enthusiasm of her people and appealed to the 
sympathy of mankind. 

We have seen that as regards the mountain frontier this 
argument coincides fairly if not exactly with the argument 
of natural defense. It there reinforces an argument already 
conclusive. It may also be urged fairly for the city of 
Trieste and part of the Istrian Peninsula at the tip of which 
lies the city of Pola of ancient Roman importance and now 
the chief naval base of Austria, Beyond this, all the way 
down the eastern coast, Italian is more or less in use on 
account of the constant intercourse with Italy, but it is clearly 
an exotic. The traveler along this coast, familiar in a 
degree as he is sure to be with the sound of Italian and 
wholly unacquainted with Serb, is apt to get an exaggerated 



ITALY 201 

impression of the Italian character of the region. Statistics, 
even if imperfect, are a much safer guide. According to the 
census, Dalmatia, the narrow coast state including the islands, 
which is most under debate, contains more than 600,000 
Serbs and but 18,000 Italians. The latter form but three per 
cent, of the population as against ninety-six per cent, of 
Serbs. Italian irredentists will say that the census is unfair, 
all the bi-linguists being counted as Serbs. It is safe to 
assume that Austria has not erred in favor of Italy. Still, 
it would be a very extravagant irredentist who would claim 
ten per cent, of Italians for Dalmatia. If it be argued, 
as it justly may, that under Italian rule in this bi-lingual 
country, assimilation would be rapid, it must not be over- 
looked that this quite gives away the irredentist case. Italy 
can not claim these people as her unredeemed brothers, and 
then shift her ground and say that though they are not 
Italians, she could speedily make them so. The claim of 
race has absolutely no validity as regards Dalmatia, and 
not a wholly satisfactory one as regards Trieste and Istria, 
for even here there are far more Slavs than there are Italians 
in Dalmatia. Yet the secret treaties published by the Bol- 
sheviki show that an agreement existed between Italy and 
her Allies to the effect that she was to receive the Trentino, 
the Isonzo district, Trieste, Dalmatia and Avlona. We have 
briefly to consider the wisdom of this arrangement. As 
regards the Trentino and the Isonzo district, the case is 
and always has been clear. The Allies have always and 
openly stood for this accession, and even Austria offered the 
most of the disputed territory in a vain effort to secure Italian 
neutrality. That is one of the settled things in a program 
of Allied victory. 

The other claims fall into three groups ; — the Italian 
speaking district of Trieste and Istria, the coast strip and 
islands of Dalmatia, and the naval base of Avlona. Of these 



202 THE GKEAT PEACE 

Dalmatia is the weakest. Foreign in population and indis- 
putably foreign in location and strategic and economic de- 
pendence, its transfer to Italy could be contemplated only as 
a part of the program of complete Austrian dismemberment, 
and even so would be hazardous and unnatural in the extreme. 
The defeat of Italy in the north is not too dearly paid if it 
has saved Europe, — as it seems to have done, — from this 
unnatural bargain, a bargain to which the Allies undoubtedly 
gave their consent purely and simply because of their desper- 
ate need and because Italy would not take the risks of war 
for a less price. No friend of Italy can fail to share her 
extreme solicitude for the danger that ever menaces her 
from this sinister coast, but equally, no thoughtful friend 
can fail to recognize the risk attending this too ambitious solu- 
tion of the age long problem. 
-^.The case of Avlona is wholly different. That, as has been 
explained, is purely an isolated naval base, used only by the 
fleet, and approached only from the sea. There is as little 
temptation to expand such a possession as there is to expand 
Gibraltar. The position is of all those available for the pur- 
pose, the one nearest to Italy and the one best adapted to her 
purpose. It completely commands the entrance to the Adri- 
atic, subject only to the check of other like bases, — Cattaro, 
Corfu, or Durazzo, — which may be held by other powers. 
There is but one excuse for Italy's possession of such a post, 
namely her lack of a suitable base on her own coast. That 
excuse is apparently suflficient. It is further to be noted that 
Avlona is not a part of Slavic territory, but of Albania, a 
district almost certainly incapable of nationality, its popula- 
tion being divided in language, religion and sympathies and 
predatory in the extreme. With the inevitable division of 
Albania, Italy may occupy Avlona without injury or risk to 
Serbia. 

There remains the district of Trieste-Istria, more or less. 



ITALY 203 

Here, as we have seen, tlie fact of Italian race, that is, Italian 
speech, — for the basic blood is probably Slavic, — makes its 
strong appeal. The Italian people, little moved by consid- 
erations of national function, see in this fact of language a 
sufficient reason for the union of this district to the Italian 
kingdom. Whether the inhabitants of the district share this 
desire is not easy to determine. There can be no doubt that 
they are strongly attached to their language and desire to 
retain their Italian character, and it is quite possible that 
they see in such a union the natural if not the only means of 
doing so. So much may undoubtedly be conceded for that 
portion of both populations which lives its life compara- 
tively unthinkingly as regards the larger problems of the 
national destiny. 

But it can hardly be doubted that the few who are more 
immediately concerned with these larger interests are aware 
of other factors which seriously complicate the problem. 
Trieste is a splendid harbor, just such a one as Italy would 
wish to possess, but it could not under any possible arrange- 
ment, be made to serve Italian purposes. Even if Italy's 
maximum purpose should be realized and Trieste, Istria, and 
Dalmatia should be annexed, scarcely a square mile of Italian 
territory would be served by Trieste. On the other hand, 
Trieste is the only harbor which serves the great Austrian 
hinterland, and as such, Austria's sole communication with 
the sea. It is true that Dalmatia is Austrian territory and 
that it has numerous minor harbors, but Dalmatia is a de- 
tached coastal strip completely separated from Austria proper. 
Moreover, the mountainous character of this coast gives these 
harbors no satisfactory access to the regions farther inland. 
Dalmatia is essentially a detached interest, enormously val- 
uable to Austria as a defensive outpost, but commercially 
capable only of serving itself. For serious access to the sea 
both Austria and Hungary are limited to a single port. 



204 THE GEEAT PEACE 

Trieste is the terminus of the great railroad line leading to 
Vienna, while Fiume, just across the narrow neck of the 
Istrian Peninsula, serves as the unique outlet for the great 
plain of Hungary. If Trieste were annexed to Italy, there- 
fore, Italy could not use it and Austria would have to use 
it. In its actual function, Trieste will remain Austrian, 
no matter what flag may fly over her harbor. It is most 
unfortunate to have political arrangements thus squarely at 
odds with economic function. It is true that Austrian rule 
over people of Italian speech has produced friction, but that 
is due primarily to a suspicious and repressive policy on the 
part of Austria, motived, no doubt, by fear of this same 
annexationist movement. Indeed this fear and this policy 
have gone far to create the danger which Austrians dread. 
There are Italian writers who claim that irredentism is an 
Austrian invention. The policy of Austria in 1866 was 
conspicuously unfair to Italy, and the consciousness that 
Italians so regarded it, has made Austria fearful of the 
Italian attitude everywhere. A repressive policy on her 
part toward Italian speech and national aspirations generally 
was the natural but unfortunate result. If instead of this, 
Austria had adopted a policy like that of France in Alsace, 
it seems not improbable that the Italians in this small and 
practically detached district would have contentedly accepted 
her rule, as the Alsatians accepted that of France, the reason 
for race separation being much more obvious in the former 
case than in the latter. There is reason to believe that the 
changes which this war will effect in Austria, undoubtedly 
the most considerable which will be anywhere effected, will 
quite change the conditions of Austrian rule. In any case, 
this is one of the clearest cases in which other than race con- 
siderations are the paramount interest. The proposal that 
Trieste be given to Italy to be held as a toll gate on Austria's 
main route to the sea merely because three quarters of her 



ITALY 205 

people speak the Italian language, is not one to be seriously 
entertained. 

Italy, too, has her colonial problems. She is deeply in- 
terested in the possible dismemberment of Turkey and is an 
eager claimant for a share in the spoils. In 1911, as a result 
of her seizure of Tripoli, she found herself in an inconclusive 
war with that power whom she could not force to make a peace 
recognizing her occupation of Tripoli. Debarred by the 
powers from attacking Turkish possessions on the Adriatic 
coast, she finally seized a group of islands, — the so-called 
Dodecanese, — to bring Turkey to terms. Still Turkey re- 
fused, and the occupation was continued until the inevitable 
popular sentiment made withdrawal difficult. The peace 
which ultimately followed provided for a farther, — though 
still provisional, — occupation of the islands, but the ensuing 
Balkan wars prevented Turkey from complying with the con- 
ditions stipulated for their restitution. Thus temporary 
occupancy hardened into permanency, a typical case of the 
way such things go. Now Italy wishes to be confirmed in 
the possession of the islands, a very strategic group, and also 
to be assigned a territory on the mainland adjacent. The 
feasibility of such an assignment naturally depends on the 
settlement of the Turkish problem to be discussed elsewhere. 
It involves the most vital questions of European policy and 
the policing of the world's trade routes in the interest of 
peace. But the question of Italy's interests is a different 
matter. It is impossible for a disinterested outsider to avoid 
misgivings as to the results of such ventures on the part of a 
country inherently poor, — for no country without iron and 
coal can ever be largely populous or rich, — and a country 
already burdened with heavy responsibilities of this kind. 
Italy already has Tripoli and Eritrea. The proper adminis- 
tration of dependencies is not a money making thing. Their 
development implies large investments of capital. Italy had 



206 THE GKEAT PEACE 

little disposable capital before the war, and she will have 
less after it. There is grave danger that her colonies will 
become starveling affairs, or that the necessities of the admin- 
istrator will draw her into a policy of predatory exploitation 
such as has clouded the memory of Spain and blighted the 
lands committed to her keeping. Trusteeship is something 
that Italy can not afford, and predatory exploitation is some- 
thing that the world can not afford. Italy may well be 
cautious. 

These considerations apply with even greater force to the 
project, also endorsed by the Allies in their hour of need, 
that in the event that the German colonies were acquired 
by the Allies, Italy should also receive additional African 
territory. It is to be hoped, in the interest of Italy herself, 
that this promise, like that regarding Trieste and Dalmatia, 
will lapse with changed conditions. The trusteeship of back- 
ward races is a stern necessity, — not a privilege to be grasped 
at. Eagerness to acquire under such circumstances implies a 
false conception of the relation involved. 



CHAPTER XIV 

AUSTRIA 

This term, — here briefly used for the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, — undoubtedly covers the most serious problems of 
the war and of the modern political world. It was in the 
necessities of this strangely assorted group that the war origi- 
nated, and it is here that are to be encountered the most 
stubborn difficulties in the way of settlement. The Austrian 
Empire sets every precept of political experience at defiance. 
It is not based on unity of race, or on the supremacy of a 
dominant race. It was formed by outside pressure, con- 
tinued by fraud, and is maintained by balanced antipathies. 
It has been described as " a political abortion, the petrified 
residuimi of a confusion of Babylonian languages." Yet it 
is one of the most dangerous of all governments to meddle 
with, because the antagonisms which characterize it inhere, 
not in the government, but in the elements of which the 
nation is composed. Few suggestions are more popular for 
the forthcoming political reconstruction of Europe than that 
of abolishing this incongruous combination. It is not al- 
ways remembered that to abolish the combination might not 
remove the incongruity. 

The main features of this combination are familiar. The 

Empire consists of two essentially independent states which 

are united only in their sovereign and in what amounts to a 

defensive league against other powers. They have their 

army and their representatives with foreign powers together, 

but are otherwise as independent as any other nations. Each 

of these partner nations consists of a number of distinct 

races, most of them having historic or racial affinities with 

207 



208 THE GREAT PEACE 

outside peoples. These racial units in some cases lie partly 
in Austria and partly in Hungary. Finally, some of these 
races, notably the Germans and the Magyars, have thro\Mi 
out colonies which lie like scattered islands in the territory 
of the other races. There is of course the usual number 
of foot-loose individuals who have scattered themselves 
throughout the whole empire. 

Of these various races, the Germans, Bohemians, Mora- 
vians, Italians, Galicians, Slovenes and Dalmatians are under 
the sway of Austria. They lie, in the most awkward imag- 
inable arrangement, like a wide open lobster's claw, the big 
and little fingers enclosing the more compact Hungary which 
includes in its turn the Magyars, Slovaks, Rumanians, Slavo- 
nians, and Croats. Attached to both these countries but not 
belonging to either are Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are 
administered by a special bureau under the war department. 
Certain peculiarities of the various units must be noted in 
connection with their aspirations and the proposals made with 
regard to them. For we are confronted with the momentous 
proposal, a proposal already far advanced toward accom- 
plishment, that this historic empire, so long one of the pillars 
of the political structure of Europe and ruled by the oldest 
European dynasty, is to be dissolved. Such a dissolution 
would of course only liberate forces long held in uneasy 
equilibrium, forces which must necessarily react in new and 
unknov^n ways upon the equilibrium of nations and perhaps 
in turn form new combinations. It is of the utmost import- 
ance that we understand the nature of the forces thus liberated 
and that we forecast, so far as possible, their several reactions. 

The two chief elements in the dual empire and the nuclei 
of their respective groups, are the Germans and the Mag^'ars. 
There are about ten millions of each and both are situated 
in the valley of the Danube. The Germans are located in 




AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

(POLITICAL) Durazzo/ 

SC»LE or «.LE^_' 7 V X^^GREECI 

1.5- LoD ganJt Bart from OreeD^^oh2p^ ySalonil^y 



3 Prague 



((Je, 



/Municji 




i al/7 lo. 



^'i- 






Rumanian) o <pa '^A^i 

^ Tatar 

. and . 
^ \gu/0^') SEA 
Sofia 

0-\ 
1^1 r Consta>i\toople 

(Bulgar) 



lj6° LoDsHttde East from GreeDwiob^gQ'' 



>^S 



Salonikiq 



AUSTRIA 211 

a compact mass in the western or upper Danube valley, 
with a comparatively narrow southwestward extension in the 
Alps, — the Tyrol. It is important to note, however, that 
they are solidly united along their whole western and north- 
western front to the Germans of Germany from whom they 
are but accidentally and artificially separated. This terri- 
torial unity with the larger German body is the all important 
fact. The founders of the German Empire did not wish to 
include the Austrians, both because of their ancient pre- 
tensions to leadership which militated against the supremacy 
of Prussia, and because Germany hoped, through their 
ascendency in the Austrian combination, to bring the whole 
motley group under her control, a very shrewd and success- 
ful calculation. But if the dual empire is dismembered and 
the Austrian Germans are thrown on their own resources, they 
could not do otherwise than join their kinsmen. This union 
is everjn'here recognized as inevitable and one to which the 
Allies could not consistently take exception. While consist- 
ency is not quite inevitable in international action there can 
be no doubt that in this case the union would take place 
without protest. This would extend German territory from 
the Baltic to the Adriatic and give to Germany her much 
coveted base on the southern sea, for no thin screen of Italian 
littoral would hold back such a power from so necessary 
and natural a consummation. The possible consequences of 
such an extension of German territory will be reserved for 
later consideration. It is sufiicient now to note the fact. 

It is farther to be noted that the Germans have their islands 
of settlement more widely scattered through the Empire than 
those of any other race, — some of them extending even 
beyond the eastern border to the vicinity of Odessa. The 
significance of these settlements should not be overlooked 
when they become centers, not of Austrian, but of imperial 



212 THE GREAT PEACE 

German influence. Einallj it should be added that the 
German unattached man of business is more ubiquitous and 
correspondingly more influential than any other. 

The Magyars are located compactly almost in the center 
of the empire, though a very large island of Magyar popula- 
tion is situated right in the elbow of Rumania where it is 
entirely surrounded by Rumanians, and other smaller settle- 
ments are scattered throughout Transylvania. Unlike the 
Germans, the Magyars have no racial kin in Europe except 
the Turks from whom they have become widely differentiated 
and who can give them no backing. The proposed dismem- 
berment would leave the Magyars an inland nation of about 
ten million inhabitants. Despite the utmost deference to eth- 
nic considerations, the population would still be sadly mixed. 
Numerous German communities are scattered through 
the territory, while a large Magyar population would be 
excluded from it, a constant incitement to eastward expan- 
sion across a wholly arbitrary frontier and at the expense of 
a woefully mixed population. The only natural frontier 
would be the Carpathians on the north, and even to attain 
this inevitable barrier, it would be necessary to include a 
considerable area of Russian population ^ with consequent 
temptation to Russian irridentism. The Magj'ars could 
hardly feel that the lines had fallen unto them in pleasant 
places. 

To the north of the German Austrians and the Magyars 
are three bodies of Slavs, the Czechs or Bohemians, the 
Moravians, and the Slovaks. The first two are under Aus- 
trian and the third under Hungarian rule. Altogether they 
number slightly more than eight millions. The distinction 
between these groups is historical rather than racial, but not 
the less considerable for purposes of practical cooperation. 
Nevertheless they seem able to act together at least for pur- 

1 The so-called Euthenians, a name adopted by Austria to conceal the 
fact that these people really belonged in the Empire of the Czar. 



'AUSTRIA 215 

poses of opposition, and the recent extraordinary achieve- 
ments of their troops in Russia has given the combination 
an unexpected interest in the eyes of the world. For mili- 
tary purposes they have already been recognized as an inde- 
pendent national unit, a recognition which seems to pre- 
figure their later recognition as a nation. This has long been 
the aspiration of the Bohemians who constitute about one 
half their number. The union of the three elements for 
political purposes seems to be recent, and the program of the 
others, especially of the Slovaks, is probably less matured. 
Of all the subject nationalities of the dual empire none are 
so likely to insist upon independence and none so likely to 
attain it as this group. It is therefore most important to 
consider the difficulties and the possibilities of the proposed 
arrangement. 

First, the territory, no matter how carefully delimited, 
would still have a mixed population. A large part of his- 
toric Bohemia, for instance, the part devastated during the 
Thirty Years' War, was resettled by Germans and is now Ger- 
man in population. It is all but certain, however, that the 
Bohemians would insist upon having this territory on his- 
toric grounds,^ and since the alternative would be to give 
it to Germany, we may assume that the Allies at the present 
juncture would acquiesce in their demand, the more so as the 
whole territory has long been accustomed under Austrian 
rule to a unit administration. This is merely one of the 
numerous limitations which are forced upon the ethnic prin- 
ciple the moment we begin to make a practical application 
of it. Yet it is a very serious limitation, for it insures the 
perpetuation of the race struggle between Czechs and Ger- 
mans, a struggle which has been characterized by a bitterness 

1 As this goes to press it is reported that the Bohemians ( doubtless 
German Bohemians) have asked Germany to take over this German 
territory. Another report says that the new Bohemian government 
offers food to Austria on condition that this territory is guaranteed to 
Boliemia. 



216 THE GKEAT PEACE 

and a purely provocative obstructiveness unparalleled in 
parliamentary annals. The only difference would be that 
the Germans would now be the under dog and the Czechs 
would now avenge themselves for centuries of real or fancied 
oppression. It is easy to understand how the cry of these 
Germans would go across the border, and how willingly, in 
certain eventualities, the big brother would lend a listening 
ear. It is to be noted further that large German settlements 
nearly cut the Slovak territory in two, and other settlements 
are sandwiched in between Bohemia and Moravia. In addi- 
tion there is a large percentage of German population in 
the districts accounted Bohemian and Moravian. The pros- 
pect is not bright for a happy family in the new Czecho- 
slovak state. 

Turning now to the internal character of the country, 
we again face troublesome conditions. Bohemia is largely 
industrial, more than half the industries of the Empire 
being located within this territory. The Slovaks, on the 
other hand, are an agricultural people. There is in every 
country, — as notably in our own, — a tendency to jealousy 
between industrial and agricultural districts. When it is 
remembered that the connection between the Czechs and 
the Slovaks is recent and untried and that most of the 
industries of Bohemia are owned by Germans, it is safe to 
predict that the course of true love will not nm smooth 
between these newlyweds. 

If we turn to the territorial arrangement, it will be at 
once apparent that it is very little suited to purposes of 
defense or administrative convenience. It is long, straggling, 
and irregular. Its frontier, enormous in extent and for 
the most part based on no commanding natural features, 
would be the despair of a strategist. Bohemia and Moravia 
constitute a sort of peninsula thrust into German territory, 
one of the most isolated racial habitats in the world. Once 



AUSTRIA 219 

the Germans are united and in possession of their entire 
racial habitat, this peninsula could be pinched off by an easy 
drive across the narrow neck. International guaranties will 
be invoked to prevent this and to guarantee the integrity 
of the exposed nation. Conceding the efficacy of this guar- 
anty, it may still be doubted whether territorial integrity 
would secure independence. To control a state so situated, 
Germany would not need to occupy the border fortresses. 
Her railroads with their constant economic argument, would 
give her every facility. It is precisely in this way that 
Prussia controls certain minor German states in imperial 
questions, they being unable to vote against her on account 
of their situation and economic dependence. The necessity 
for access to the sea which could only be secured on Ger- 
many's terms, would assure that domination in the present 
case, no matter what the agreements or the guaranties of the 
nations. 

Still to the north and stretching farther east lies Galicia 
or Austrian Poland. Most of the southern boundary is 
marked by the mighty range of the Carpathians, though 
annoyingly enough, this happens not to be the true ethnic 
boundary. The dominant race of eastern Galicia has crossed 
the Carpathians and occupied a considerable territory on 
the southern slope. This territory, under the present 
partnership arrangement, is very properly assigned to Hun- 
gary, while Galicia historically limited by the Carpathians, 
belongs to Austria. There can be no question that, if we are 
to dismember the Empire, the Carpathians must continue 
to be the line of division, the overflow of the northern race be- 
ing left to take the consequences of its venturesome trespass. 

Since Galicia once belonged to Poland, the easy popular 
disposition of it is to restore it to a reconstituted Poland. 
But this is a superficial proposal and one quite inconsistent 
with the ethnic principle. About two thirds of Galicia is 



220 THE GREAT PEACE 

Russian in race and in certain of its historic antecedents. 
If race is to be the criterion, this part of Galicia should be re- 
stored to Russia, a proceeding which may have its embarrass- 
ments at the present juncture. This problem need not detain 
us, however, at present. It is sufficient to recognize that the 
natural disposition of this fragment would be to restore it to 
its northern kinsmen, whoever they may be. That, the 
Galicians may perhaps be left to determine, though this is 
a case where even their choice may not insure harmony. 
Curiously enough, the Galicians are reputed to be compara- 
tively content with their present allegiance. The Austrians, 
themselves in minority in Austria, have needed the support 
of some other race element to insure their control, and it 
has usually been their policy to win the Galicians by special 
concessions. Hence the almost unique phenomenon in this 
part of the world of a comparatively contented people. This 
content is of course only relative. 

To the east of the Magyars lies the much more extended 
domain of the Rumanians. The Rumanian problem is 
ethnically the simplest of all the problems of the Balkans, 
yet even so it presents almost insoluble difficulties. The 
key to its solution is found in the fact that an independent 
Rumanian kingdom already exists. This, however, includes 
less than half the Rumanian area. To the east of independ- 
ent Rumania lies Bessarabia, a well defined area between 
the Pruth and Dniester rivers. This is solidly Rumanian 
in population except in the coastal region where a patchwork 
of German, Bulgarian, Turkish, Russian, and Rumanian 
settlements are an effectual bar to any ethnic claim. The 
claim of Rumania to this coastal strip, however, is as good as 
any other, and since it necessarily goes with the hinterland 
of Bessarabia to which her ethnic claim is indisputable, 
there can be no ground for hesitation. The only excuse for 
Russian occupation has been the great plan of Russian ad- 



AUSTRIA 223 

vance to Constantinople, a plan which if realized along this 
route would wipe out Rumania altogether. It was perhaps 
to Russia's interest to keep Rumania small and weak, but 
such interests will hardly prevail under present conditions. 
The annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania, though effected 
in the first instance by Germany and for her own ends, is 
perhaps the most obvious and feasible act of ethnic justice 
which this region permits. It is a recognition of race unity 
and at the same time it is opposed by no other consideration. 
Rivers are not ideal boundaries, but the Dniester is as good 
as the Pruth. Bessarabia is not vital to Russia in any sense. 
It includes no great city, no necessary seaport, no important 
trade route. Its transfer would break no fond ties, inter- 
rupt no long standing tradition. It is one of the few one- 
sided questions. 

To the west of Rumania and in the angle of its bent contour 
lies Transylvania, now a part of the Magyar kingdom. A 
very large area is here predominantly Rumanian, an area 
nearly as large as that occupied by the Magyars themselves. 
It is upon this that the Rumanians have especially set their 
heart, and this that would undoubtedly fall to their lot in 
the event of the dismemberment of the Dual Empire. The 
addition of this large tract would not only greatly extend the 
Rumanian domain and unite the Rumanian race, but it would 
round out the country very handsomely, giving it a compact 
form, a splendid river waterway, and a very satisfactory sea 
coast. 

But closer examination discloses serious obstacles in the 
way of this attractive plan. The first of these obstacles is 
political. Transylvania is united to Rumania by race, but 
not by political tradition. This is a superficial fact, but one 
often more potent at a given moment than the more per- 
manent facts of nature. It is difficult to know what the 
aspirations of the Transylvanians are, but it is safe to 



224 THE GREAT PEACE 

assume that in case of internal strain, there would be a 
tendency to cleavage along this line. 

This tendency would be accentuated by the physical fea- 
tures which here assume such immense importance as seriously 
to offset if not altogether to outweigh the claims of race. 
Sweeping around the deeply indented curve which marks 
the present western boundary of Rumania runs the great 
chain of the Carpathian Mountains, one of the most consid- 
erable as well as one of the best defined natural boundaries 
in Europe. This divides Transylvania from Rumania 
proper in a way that no political union can ever efface. Not 
that this is a bar to political union, but it is an obstacle, and 
one which, in a complex of conflicting forces, may assume 
large importance. 

On the other hand, Rumania by this extension would 
acquire a perfectly arbitrary western border with no natural 
defenses whatever. So lacking is this ethnic frontier in 
natural feature and so vague in its own nature, — for language 
areas fade into each other unless separated by very pro- 
nounced barriers, — that when the recent Rumanian cam- 
paign was decided upon with the avowed purpose of annexing 
Transylvania, it was announced that the River Theiss was 
the Rumanian objective, this being the first natural feature 
which it was feasible to recognize as a national boundary. 
But such a boundary would give nearly a third of the Magyar 
territory to Rumania and would repeat within her borders 
the race feuds which have made the dismemberment of Austria 
seem necessary. The only difference would be that while the 
Magyars have hitherto oppressed the Rumanians, the Ru- 
manians could now oppress the Mag^^ars. It is of course 
possible that the controlling powers would not sanction these 
extreme ambitions of Rumania and would restrict her to the 
true ethnic limits, but in that case the limitation of a com- 
pletely artificial frontier would be inevitable. 



AUSTEIA 225 

Restricted within these narrower but still unnatural limits, 
the ethnic problem becomes simpler, but it is still embarrass- 
ing. Unlike the hinterland of Bessarabia, Transylvania is 
not solidly Eumanian in population. There are numerous 
islands of Magyar and German dotted all over it. Worst 
of all, there is in the angle of the Carpathians and thus in 
the very center of the Rumanian oval, a very large district 
which is decisively Magyar. The completed Rumania, there- 
fore, is shaped much like a doughnut with the hole full of 
Magyars. It would be difficult to imagine a worse situation. 
The small scattered settlements of Germans or Magyars might 
be gradually assimilated in a country otherwise Rumanian, 
but so large a district as this will almost of necessity persist, 
compelling recognition of its language in schools, courts, and 
administration, and bringing its inevitable feuds. The fact, 
too, that the kingdom of the Magyars on the west is but a 
hundred and fifty miles away, and that traditions of Magyar 
supremacy many centuries old would make the Rumanian 
yoke doubly onerous, would provide almost ideal conditions 
for political restiveness and instability. Only the most 
extraordinary race tolerance, a tolerance to which not one of 
these races has approximated as yet, could prevent the re- 
emergence of all the traditional Balkan troubles. 

The Dobrudja is a coastal strip lying between the lower 
Danube and the sea. Its population is extremely mixed, — 
Russians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Turks, — but with 
Rumanians fairly in the ascendant, especially in the north. 
But even were the Rumanian ascendency less assured, it would 
be preposterous to assign it to any other power. It gives 
Rumania her only sea coast, while it would give to Bulgaria, 
— the other possible claimant, — nothing, except the power 
to injure Rumania. Nothing more absurd has emanated 
from war passions than the suggestion emanating from Ger- 
man sources, that the whole of the Dobrudja be given to Bui- 



226 THE GKEAT PEACE 

garia. But while the allegiance of the Dobrudja is not open 
to question, its southern limit which is necessarily arbitrary, 
is not so easily settled. As the result of Rumania's bloodless 
intervention in the second Balkan war, the boundary was 
moved some distance to the south. The district thus annexed 
has virtually no Rumanian population, while the Bulgarian 
population is considerable. So far as the writer is aware, 
no important strategic advantage was secured. At this dis- 
tance it looks very much like one of those impulsive and 
unthinking assertions of race cupidity which it is the function 
of race breeding to restrain. If Rumania loses this ill gotten 
gain in the redrawing of the map of Europe, she need not 
be an object of commiseration. To the north of Rumania, 
wedged in between her notched northern border and Galicia 
is the little crown land of Bukowina. The southern portion, 
— about enough to fill the notch, — is Rumanian in popula- 
tion, the remainder Russian. A reapportionment would cer- 
tainly give the Rumanian portion to Rumania. It is possible 
that political tradition, natural features, or other considera- 
tion would dictate the transfer entire. It can not be too 
strongly insisted that mere race, — that is, speech, — in this 
Babel of the world, is not a sufficient criterion for our pur- 
pose. These people care often more for their church than 
for their language, and then again, more for their political 
tradition than for either. It is of interest to indicate ethnic 
arguments, but altogether inadmissible to dogmatically assert 
their complete validity. It is equally preposterous to assume 
that the people themselves can solve these world problems by 
an expression of preference based on provincial prejudice 
and local faction. The settlement should be based on the 
fullest deference to their interests and on a very considerable 
deference to their present preferences, but there are times 
when their preferences may well be sacrificed to their in- 
terests, and their interests to the interests of humanity. 



AUSTRIA 227 

It should perhaps be added that the Eumanian habitat ex- 
tends across the Danube into the northeastern comer of 
Serbia, and small Rumanian settlements are also found south 
of the Danube in Bulgarian territory. It would be the height 
of unwisdom to include any of these in a Rumanian king- 
dom. There is even a considerable Rumanian district in 
northern Greece, hundreds of miles from the home of the 
race. These people plainly have no alternative but to accept 
the consequences of their adventurous migration. 

In conclusion, the Rumanian kingdom should undoubtedly 
be extended by the inclusion of Bessarabia. If the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire is to be dissolved, it must plainly be ex- 
tended to include Transylvania also, not, however, as far 
as the river Theiss. Bad as this arbitrary boundary of the 
larger Rumania would be, it would certainly be preferable, 
in a readjustment based ostensibly on race, to an arrange- 
ment which outraged Magyar unity and guaranteed the per- 
petuation of race conflicts. But at the best the greater 
Rumania would be an uneasy state and a sorry compromise. 
It would have nothing of the homogeneity of the mature na- 
tions of western Europe, not even the homogeneity which the 
smaller Rumania possesses, nor would it have a territory in 
which that homogeneity could be easily achieved. 

To the southwest of the countries we have considered and 
with a long frontage on the Adriatic, lies the territory of the 
group of peoples known as Jugo ^ Slavs. This is again a 
territory lying partly within and partly without the Empire. 
Outside are Serbia and Montenegro ; inside are Slavonia and 
Croatia which belong to Hungary, Dalmatia which belongs 
to Austria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina which belong to both. 
Adjoining this territory on the northwest is the small moun- 
tainous country of the Slovenes occupying a very strategic 

1 Jugo is a Slavic word meanins: aoiTthern. It is pronounced Yvgo and 
is aometimea so written for the benefit of those who are accustomed 
only to the English sound of J. 



228 THE GREAT PEACE 

site at the head of the Adriatic, for it is in the country of the 
Slovenes that the important little Italian district of Trieste 
is located. It is also the Slovenes who confront the Italians 
on the Isonzo border. It is very doubtful whether the 
Slovenes will be grouped with the Jugo Slavs in the forth- 
coming settlement, not so much because of their racial dis- 
tinctness, which is considerable, but because of their location 
which will almost necessitate a separate destination. We 
will therefore omit them from the group for the present. 

As thus limited, the territory of the Jugo Slavs presents 
the most compact, unified, and workable unity in all this 
region. It has a remarkably unified population except 
along the edges where, of course, something of the inevitable 
racial mixture is found. It has few of the islands of foreign 
population scattered about, such as are so perplexingly com- 
mon in Magyar and Rumanian territory. It has an exten- 
sive sea coast suitable for both commerce and defense. The 
proposal to combine this territory into a single independent 
kingdom, considerable enough in territory, population, and 
resources to be self-respecting and self-supporting, is an ex- 
ceedingly attractive proposition. 

But again, closer inspection somewhat dampens our en- 
thusiasm. Down in this part of the world race takes on a 
new character. It is no longer primarily a question of lan- 
guage. Religion is the all important consideration. And 
religion is not a matter of spiritual experience nor yet of the- 
ological belief, but of allegiance to an ecclesiastical organiza- 
tion. These organizations are not merely state churches in 
our western sense of the word, but as the result of peculiari- 
ties in the former Turkish administration they acquired and 
in a measure still retain an altogether extraordinary political 
importance. So important is this factor that when Bulgaria 
found herself in competition with Serbia and Greece in the 
attempt to win the Macedonians, she found it impossible to 



AUSTKIA 231 

do 80 while she recognized the same church authority. The 
Macedonians could not understand what it meant to join the 
Bulgarian cause unless there was a Bulgarian church. So 
Bulgaria renounced the authority of the venerable Patriarch 
of Constantinople and appointed an Exarch as the head of her 
own church. It was now possible to win Macedonians to her 
cause because there was something tangible to lay hold of. 
Serbia and Greece were not bold enough to take so daring a 
step, and so they lost out in the propaganda which eventually 
made Macedonia predominantly Bulgarian. One curious 
result, however, was often manifest, where two brothers would 
announce themselves to the census taker, the one as Bulgarian 
and the other as Serbian or Greek, the fact being that one 
had recognized the authority of the Bulgarian Exarch, and 
the other retained the old allegiance. 

We have gone somewhat afield for our illustration, but the 
conditions are essentially those with which we have to deal. 
Eeligion is everywhere in the Balkans, and for that matter, 
throughout the whole Austro-Hungarian domain, the essen- 
tial basis of nationality. The Macedonian peasant hardly 
feels it more than the Austrian or Hungarian nobility. The 
question of Jugo Slav unity therefore resolves itself very 
largely into a question of religious unity. This unity is un- 
fortunately conspicuously lacking. The Croats, Slavonians, 
and Dalmatians are Catholics, the Serbians and Montenegrins 
Orthodox (Greek church), and the Bosnians, strange to relate, 
are largely Mohammedan and reactionary Mohammedans at 
that. It was they who fought the sincere attempts of Turkey 
at political reform in the early part of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. It would be difficult to get more irreconcilable groups. 
Of course our American suggestion is at once that we found 
the new state on a basis of religious tolerance, and such a law 
would undoubtedly be passed. But there is not the least 
likelihood that real tolerance would result. Such laws exist 



232 THE GREAT PEACE 

in both Austria and Hungary, but they are notoriously and 
ostentatiously violated, even officially. Yet the Catholic ele- 
ment which rules in Austro-Hungary is undoubtedly the most 
liberal and tolerant of the three. To propose tolerance to 
these people is like proposing free love to us. It was this 
difference of religion quite as much as anything that made 
Serbia absolutely deaf to all the wooings of Austria. It was 
this that compelled Austria to employ two hundred thou- 
sand men for three years to bring Bosnia under her admin- 
istrative control when it was assigned to her by the powers. 
It was religion which led to the murder of Archduke Ferdi- 
nand by one of his Bosnian subjects. Curiously enough, 
this prospective emperor was strongly Slavophile. He was 
committed to the policy, — detested by Germans and Mag- 
yars alike, — of reconstituting the Empire on the basis of a 
triple partnership instead of a dual partnership as at pres- 
ent, the Slavs being the third partner. Yet it was a Slav 
who shot him. The reason was that with all his liberality 
toward the Slavs, Ferdinand was a staunch Catholic, uncom- 
promisingly committed to the maintenance of the Catholic 
unity of the Empire. His murderer was an Orthodox Slav, 
to whom Slavic influence in the Empire was as nothing to the 
maintenance of the Orthodox church. The Mohammedans 
will hardly prove more concessive. When it is recalled that 
this local tenacity will be backed up by all the millions of their 
fellow believers, the prospects for assimilation or tolerance 
are not flattering. One can imagine how the Eoman Propa- 
ganda Fide would bestir itself if there were any chance of 
the Croats and Dalmatians going over to the Orthodox faith. 
Would the millions of Orthodox Russia do less if they saw 
a like menace to the faith of the Serbians and Montenegrins ? 
It is possible that all these difficulties may be overcome, but 
the problem is not one of language or blood. 

A seemingly trivial incident of this religious difference 



AUSTRIA 233 

has after all serious consequences. The Catholic countries 
use the Eoman alphabet while the Orthodox countries use the 
much superior Cyrillic alphabet which is in use by the Rus- 
sians. While it is a comparatively easy task to learn both 
alphabets, practically very few do so, and religious prejudice 
increases the difficulty. We are therefore confronted with 
the curious fact that peoples that speak the same language 
cannot read each other's books and newspapers. A more per- 
fect device for perpetuating provincialism could scarcely be 
devised.^ 

Leaving the Slovenes for the time being alone, — though 
they cannot possibly remain alone, — let us now take a wider 
look over the group of nations thus reconstituted. We have 
at the north an almost impossible Czecho-Slovakia (we will 
call it Bohemia for short), a small Hungary wholly inland, a 
large but imeasy Rumania, and a well situated but poorly 
united Jugo-Slavia. In addition we have extended Ger- 
many and brought her down to the Adriatic, and have given 
to Poland or Russia, one or both, territories which bring them 
to the Carpathians. What are the prospects for harmony 
within this group ? 

The one power that has most conspicuously gained is Ger- 
many, for the extension of her territory through to the south- 
em sea is of immense significance. But in reality Germany 
would have lost, for she would be getting the small territory 
of German Austria in exchange for the whole Austrian Em- 
pire which she had brought into close alliance and which, by 
the recently concluded agreement between the two emperors 
she had virtually annexed. Doubtless German Austria would 
be more dependable than the larger and less s^Tupathetic 

1 It is but fair to note that these peoples, meeting in representative 
convention in Corfu, have frankly recognized the difficulties here noted 
and have notwithstanding reached the conclusion that a working union 
is possible. This augurs well for the success of the attempt, though it 
can hardly be said to guarantee it. 



234 THE GREAT PEACE 

combination, — though such an addition to the South Ger- 
mans would justly give Prussia some cause for anxiety, — but 
most if not all the new states formed would at present be 
anti-German and would oppose stout resistance to a German 
advance in this direction. This, indeed, is the very pur- 
pose of the proposed dismemberment, the only purpose that 
can justify Allied intervention in the affairs of the Empire. 
Germany will not willingly accept such a situation. Yet it 
is by no means clear that she would lose or that we would gain 
by it. Germany could count on her Austrians absolutely, 
but could we count on these raw new states to resist her 
blandishments and ward off her intrigues ? With the example 
of Bulgaria before us, it is hard to feel confident in their 
unchanging loyalty to this or any other cause. And when 
we recall the German settlements scattered through these 
states all the way from Vienna to Odessa, and the farther fact 
of race dissensions which afford so admirable an opportunity 
for Germany to breach the phalanx, we have still occasion for 
misgivings about the reconstituted Balkans. 

Two of the states thus formed would have no access to 
the sea. This is simply indispensable for a modem nation. 
Hungary could, and probably would, be accommodated 
through the country of the Slovenes, though Croatia would 
have to give up a little of her territory if Hungary is to re- 
tain her present port of Fiume, the only one available for her 
purpose. The bulk of the Slovenes, however, would go to 
Germany as a condition of her having access to the Adriatic, 
an irreducible minimum. If this is not given her, she will 
take it, or will keep the world on the anxious seat by her 
obvious intention to do so. 

But Bohemia could not be accommodated in this essential 
matter by any accession of territory. Her path to the sea 
must always be across German territory, the dismemberment 
of which by a Bohemian strip is too outrageous a violation of 



AUSTEIA 235 

ethnic proprieties to be discussed. For this indispensable 
condition of modern life an independent Bohemia would al- 
ways be dependent upon Germany, the relation which now 
irks her. 

Rumania would be a large and well situated, but physically 
divided, ill-guarded, and heterogeneous state. Of the lesser 
states thus formed, Rumania would be the largest, the best 
equipped, and the most workable. She would have no irk- 
some dependence and no extraordinary needs. Her difficul- 
ties would be internal, but these considerable. 

The same would be true in ever greater degree of Jugo- 
slavia or greater Serbia. Her position would be excellent 
and her access to the sea ample, — much better than that of 
Rumania. Her troubles would come from within. Nature 
speaks strongly for this combination, — more than for that 
of greater Rumania, but man demurs. Not much can be 
done till man consents, but in such a case we need not hesi- 
tate to pay our respects to nature rather than to man. 

A liberated Austria would not make a happy family. In- 
dependent governments do not make independent peoples. 
Bohemia mistakes the nature of the bonds which gall her. 
The antagonisms, the conflicts of interest, and the relations 
of dependence that are so conspicuous within the Austrian 
Empire, would mostly be there if there were no empire, — 
would mostly be there and some beside. There must be some- 
thing to coordinate these jarring elements, at least to the 
point of livableness. To the Hapsburgs falls the unlovely 
task. When the din becomes intolerable and the public ser- 
vice waits, and the Parliament becomes a babel, and the 
Czechs refuse to speak or to hear the German that all know, 
and insist on speaking the Bohemian that nobody else under- 
stands, and chaos ends in deadlock, then Hapsburg speaks, 
the ruler of a thousand years, and people in all the troubled 
realm draw a sigh of relief and say : " Thank God, we have 



236 THE GREAT PEACE 

an Emperor to save us from ourselves." Nowhere is mon- 
archy so unlovely, because nowhere has it so unlovely a task. 
The monarchy may be abolished, but not the task. 

The writer doubts the feasibility of a complete dismember- 
ment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Autonomy based 
on national, that is, approximately racial, units is obviously 
desirable, though even that will prove difficult in almost every 
unit for the various reasons above detailed. But complete 
independence, followed as it inevitably would be, by tariff 
barriers and all manner of commercial and industrial handi- 
cap, with oppressive treatment of minority elements and 
echoes across the border, would cripple the development of all 
these peoples and ruin some of those most eager for the experi- 
ment. The crude and unsatisfactory union of these peoples 
which history has bequeathed to us is better, far better, than 
disunion. Its bonds, which are so largely nature's bonds, 
are less galling than would be those same bonds under mere 
imputed freedom. 

A much more reasonable alternative is federation, but even 
this as Americans conceive it, is of doubtful applicability. 
Such a federation would necessarily imply federal functions, 
federal organs, and federal authority. It is much to be 
feared that the states to be included in such a scheme have not 
yet learned the deference and the concessive spirit necessary 
to the success of federal action. We have seen something of 
obstruction in our own Congress, but it is as nothing to what 
is habitual in the Austrian Parliament. This Parliament 
(Austrian, not Austro-Hungarian) was reconstituted in 1907 
on an absolutely democratic basis, election being by manhood 
suffrage. A man can vote for representative in Austria who 
could not vote in Massachusetts. The membership elected at 
that time was thoroughly representative of those classes and 
interests that are characteristic of our time. There was in- 
exhaustible work for them to do, reforms long agitated and to 



AUSTRIA 237 

which they stood pledged. Yet when, after four years of ses- 
sion, they were prorogued, they had earned no gratitude and 
accomplished nothing. Race antagonisms dominated every- 
thing from the first. The Czechs would vote for nothing that 
the Germans wanted, and the Germans reciprocated. They 
would not even speak the hated language of their opponents. 
Each manoeuvred for the support of other race elements. 
When the present war began, Parliament was dismissed, not 
as a tyrannical muzzling of democracy, as we have too hastily 
assumed, but to suppress the interminable race struggle in the 
interest of public safety. It may be urged, and with much 
justice, that present race relations in Austria are unjust and 
that a juster arrangement would lessen these antipathies. 
Undoubtedly, and too much insistence can not be placed on 
the necessity for these juster arrangements. But it is a far 
cry from present conditions to successful federation. For 
after all no government can work that can not govern, — that 
can not break deadlocks and bring about decisions and secure 
acquiescence and get necessary things done. There are few 
groups of men that have reached the point where federation 
can be sure of accomplishing these necessary ends. Most 
democracies, so-called, have their autocrat in reserve to break 
the deadlock which they can create but can not undo, — an au- 
tocrat known, of course, by less opprobrious names. No place 
could be found among civilized men where federation would 
oftener require such a service than in Austria. Perhaps a 
better could be found than the Hapsburg, but scarcely an- 
other whose decisions would be so restrained and whose 
authority would be so enforced by the tradition of the cen- 
turies. 

And here some one will suggest the Hague tribunal as the 
proper successor of the Hapsburg. It is difficult for the 
writer to suppress, or yet to express, the emotions with which 
he hears such a proposal. It betrays such an utter lack of 



238 THE GKEAT PEACE 

feeling for reality, such an unconsciousness of the forces that 
really sway the minds of men, such a disregard of the need 
of that daily, sympathetic, living touch with the conditions 
to be dealt with, that the very suggestion makes argument 
hopeless. The Hapsburg may be an autocrat, but his au- 
tocracy is beneficence itself compared with the autocracy of 
an alien absentee tribunal. The Hapsburg seems to us 
only an autocrat. He is in fact, — he must be, — and for 
many a long year has been, little else than a conciliator. To 
a knowledge which no be-lawyered tribunal could ever ac- 
quire, a knowledge which is less an acquisition than an inher- 
itance, is joined a reverence and a love on the part of his 
people which no personal faults ever suffice to destroy or to 
make inoperative for the performance of his indispensable 
function. 

The vTriter holds no brief for the Hapsburgs, but he 
has too much respect for the democracy 'i^'hich such pro- 
cedure would violate, too much regard for the Hague Tribunal 
which such functions would imperil, and too much faith in 
liberty to which even Austria is entitled, to see hope in this 
destructive and reactionary proposal. The Hapsburg has a 
task for which he is responsible to his own people. There is 
another task for which he and they are responsible to the 
world, the maintenance of the world's peace and of justice 
toward other nations. For that he and they must be held, — 
are being held — to a stern accountability. Let us not con- 
found the two tasks. We shall not help Bohemia as we shall 
not help Ireland, by recognizing a jurisdiction over their 
case which we can not helpfully exercise. 

This brings us to the great transgression, the world's griev- 
ance against Austria. She made herself a bridge over which 
the great marauder crossed to Armageddon. The offense 
was grievous and grievous must be the expiation. That thing 
must stop forever. Hence all these proposals. If there were 



AUSTRIA 239 

no Austria, there could be no bridge. Nay, more. An inde- 
pendent Bohemia, an independent Rumania, an independent 
Serbia, all of them anti-German, would automatically block 
the way. But would they? Might not a helplessly depen- 
dent Bohemia barter her aid, wittingly or unwittingly, for 
the indispensable that only Germany could furnish ? Is it 
so certain that a Serbia, rent with religious feuds, might not 
offer through faction the door through which so many a con- 
queror has marched to victory ? Is it certain that Rumania 
with her Hohenzollem dynasty and her opportunist policy 
might not play the role of Bulgaria? It is a short-sighted 
statesmanship that sees hope in dissension and helplessness, 
rather than in union and slowly evolved adjustment. Much 
more surely the anti-German forces of the Austrian Empire 
will block German aggression if united than if separated and 
weak. 

What then do we wish as Austria's pledge to keep the 
peace ? First of all, we should demand liberty within the 
Empire. There is no sufficient reason why Austria, — vast 
complex that she is, — should be ruled by a German-Magj'ar 
partnership. Granting that these races are better qualified 
for the task than the others, — as they almost certainly are, — 
their rule is oppressive, repressive, and obsolete. In refusing 
autonomy to the other race elements, they have made that 
autonomy inevitable. That autonomy for the Rumanians 
and the Jugo-Slavs unfortunately can not be effected within 
the Empire. The war has made that impossible. It will 
be difficult in the extreme to effect it outside the Empire, yet 
in the measure of the possible the attempt must be made. 
Rumania must remain independent and must be extended to 
the Dniester. Whether the safe bulwark of the Carpathians 
should be abandoned for an arbitrary line and the Transyl- 
vanians and imprisoned Magyars included in free Rumania 
is not so clear. A satisfactory status for the Transylvanians 



240 THE GREAT PEACE 

within the Empire would seem more practicable. But if 
they are still to be the serfs of the Magj'ars, then their union 
with Eumania is inevitable. 

The Greater Serbia is again difficult but seemingly inev- 
itable. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia are not vital 
to Austria unless as potential factors in national defense. 
They are vital to Serbia, and if a union can be effected with 
full consciousness of the delicacy of the religious problem 
and adequate provision for it, the combination is a natural 
and hopeful one. Since Austria has made their union within 
the Empire impossible, she may justly be asked to consent to 
their union outside it. But this union would not be an inclu- 
sive one. Slavonia and Croatia would still be within the 
Empire and in part at least must there remain. They give 
Hungary her only access to the sea, an access of which it 
would be folly to deprive her if we hope for enduring peace. 
Their religious union with the Empire and their doubtful 
friendship for the Orthodox Serbians would facilitate if it 
did not in itself necessitate this seemingly unnatural arrange- 
ment. 

On the south, too, the union would be incomplete. The 
Montenegrins, always independent and holding a vitally 
strategic position, are said to be irreconcilable, l^o Greater 
Serbia for them, but the unrestricted freedom of their moun- 
tains. Their aloofness is certainly not in the interest of the 
larger human order, but it may prove unalterable.^ 

The preposterous kingdom of Albania, based on no unity 
either of religion or speech or history, and created at the be- 
hest of the Central Powers for no other purpose than to give 
a pretext for intervention, should be abolished. The south- 
ern portion speaks Greek and should be annexed to Greece, as 
in effect it has been. Austria's former objection to this on 

1 Later reports are to the effect that their king consents to enter the 
union. His consent practically insures the consent of his people. 



AUSTEIA 241 

the grouiid that it would give Greece control of the Corfu 
channel and so of the Adriatic, may now be ignored. Italy's 
objection on similar grounds is now offset by her own occupa- 
tion of Avlona. The northern portion can go nowhere else 
than to Greater Serbia. 

Galicia, too, may perhaps reasonably go to her own if there 
is any own for her to go to, — and if she really wishes to go, — 
but there would be little objection to her willing continuance 
in the Empire. For Bohemia and her kindred there can be 
no better wish than partnership in the Empire. Nor need 
the Allies greatly trouble themselves to urge a reformation 
which at best would have come in the not distant future, and 
which the war must hasten unless our indiscretion interferes 
with the course of nature. 

The Ilapsburg autocracy will disappear as soon as Austria 
can dispense with autocracy. Meanwhile the accumulated 
prestige of a thousand years of service is a thing not lightly 
to be squandered. Much to be envied are they who, like the 
English people, know how gradually to emancipate them- 
selves from autocracy, and yet preserve its prestige, its dig- 
nity, and its personal organ for the useful purposes of de- 
mocracy. In Austria that transformation is exceptionally 
difficult, but it is possible and it has long been under way. 



Note, As these pages go to press, the destruction of the Empire 
seems complete. The Czech Republic has acquired sufficient being to 
call a president from America, with what degree of popular warrant 
remains to be seen. Jugo-Slovia, too, has found a spokesman if not a 
popular voice, and begins its national life by showing its teeth to the 
Italians in Fiume, thus necessitating American intervention. German 
Austria looks toward Germany and Hungary is abandoned to solitude 
and uncongenial republican thoughts. There is nothing yet to prove 
that the Empire can be dispensed with, — nothing to prove, for that 
matter, that it has been dispensed with. 



CHAPTER XV 

TURKEY 

The problem of the Turkish Empire has been for a cen- 
tury the clearest and the most obscure in Europe, — the clear- 
est in that there has long ceased to be any doubt as to the 
necessity of some sort of receivership for the helpless realm, 
and the most obscure in that it has seemed impossible to de- 
cide what that receivership should be. Turkey has borne a 
charmed life, protected by her very incompetency from the 
consequences which that incompetency entails. Time and 
again she has seemed about to pay the penalty of her inef- 
ficiency and her crimes, but each time she has escaped with 
trifling penalty, escaped to continue and even to exceed her 
former blunders and misdoings. Will she escape this time ? 
The great settlement hardly involves a more important ques- 
tion. So long as Turkey is allowed to do that which is every- 
where else forbidden and to omit that which is everywhere 
else required, there will be small chance of establishing in 
the world that better order and health for which we are sac- 
rificing so much. Turkey festers in the world's flesh. Is 
the newer surgery able and ready to effect a cure ? 

It is no part of the writer's purpose to inveigh against the 
Turkish people as criminal and depraved. Still less does 
this charge lie against the individual Turk. All evidence 
points to the conclusion that he is a man of many virtues, 
patient, peaceable, hocpitable, industrious, and kind, virtues 
invaluable in individual relations, but quite incapable of 
forming a state. Even in his organic capacity in which he 
is guilty of such incredible crimes as the Macedonian atroci- 
ties and the Armenian massacres, it is rather his helpless 

242 



TTJEKEY 243 

incompetency than his criminal instincts with which we have 
to deal. The Armenian massacres have no such moral sig- 
nificance on the part of the Turk as they would have on the 
part of a competent western nation, — as they do have on the 
part of the nation that incited them. It is easy to extenuate 
the crimes of the Turk. But that does not in the least lessen 
the misery resulting from his deeds or the responsibility of 
the civilized world for their continuance. In a sense it in- 
creases it. If the Turk is irresponsible, the world becomes 
by so much more responsible for allowing him to exercise 
privileges with which he can not be trusted. Refraining, 
therefore, from moral denunciation, we have to note what 
it is in the Turkish Empire that is incompatible with modern 
civilization. 

The Empire is based on religion. That religion asserts not 
only its own superiority but its own exclusive right. The 
unbeliever has no right to live. If allowed to do so, it is by 
the grace of the conqueror and on any terms that may seem 
good to him. Of rights there can be no question to a non- 
Moslem population. This is fundamentally at variance with 
the whole concept of the western world. The fact that the 
Turk has been, from the standpoint of this fundamental prin- 
ciple, an easy master, does not in the least change the prin- 
ciple. He has in fact pretty generally spared the conquered. 
He has first offered them the privilege of embracing Islam, 
in which case they at once become entitled to all the rights and 
privileges of the conquering race. This was a corollary of 
his principle, but it is not the less worthy of note that it made 
the Turk the most liberal of conquerors. As this privilege 
has remained open to the conquered, it has attracted certain 
subject peoples, not always from the highest motives, to the 
standard of Islam. The Albanians and the Bosnians are 
examples. But religions allegiance, nowhere more tenacious 
than in the Turkish east, has generally led to the rejection 



244 THE GKEAT PEACE 

of the conqueror's offer. In that case the conquered was 
allowed to live on condition that he paid an annual poll tax. 
He was not allowed to serve in the army, could have no arms, 
and was deprived of all civil rights. This was slavery in 
principle, though carelessly enforced for the most part. All 
such subjects were deprived of the benefits of Moslem law, 
but were assumed to have a religious law and a religious head 
of their own whom the Turkish government held responsible 
for their behaviour. The person not registered as belonging 
to one of these religions simply had no law, no political or 
civil status whatever, for the idea of a civil state and of 
statute law independent of religion, the Turk simply can not 
conceive. 

This characteristic of Turkish rule is in a double sense 
a bar to progress. In the first place it denies in principle 
the argument of human rights as regards all non-Moslems. 
The plea that they should be elevated and developed falls 
flat in the face of this fundamental assumption. They are 
in essence disloyal. Their very lives are forfeit. What they 
possess is just so much more than they deserve. If they 
want more, let them join the faithful. The door is always 
open. Such reasoning seems very satisfactory to a Moslem. 

In the second place, religious law is wholly unmodifiable 
in theory and largely unmodifiable in fact. Men did not 
make it, and how should men change it ? Such is the argu- 
ment. Slow change is always going on, to be sure, but this 
is smuggled in under the plea of returning to an earlier purity 
from which men have unconsciously dropped away, or it is 
itself challenged as a departure from the true standards. A 
religious state is therefore necessarily a conservative state. 
This is suitable for an early stage of political development 
in which stability rather than progress is the desideratum, 
but it is utterly out of harmony with modern requirements. 

The second great characteristic of Turkish political organ- 



TURKEY 245 

ization is autocracy. This exists in its most unapologized 
form. The sultan is held amenable to the sacred law of the 
Koran, but to no other law whatever. The liberty claimed 
for him is somewhat startling to western ears. Thus, it is 
regarded as wholly inadmissible that he should be bound by 
his own plighted word, for this would destroy his freedom of 
action. Such autocracy is always limited, of course, by many 
prudential considerations, but the theory is none the less po- 
tent and incompatible with modern ideas. 

The Moslem religion is military as is well known. In 
practice Christianity has been hardly less so, but the western 
civilization has unmistakably come to look upon war as an 
abnormal condition, a means of maintaining order. The 
Moslem assigns it a very different function, and his different 
conception beyond a doubt retards the realization of western 
peace ideals. The Turkish Empire was built by military 
organization, the most efficient in the world in its day. For 
three centuries it held the first place, yielding it only when 
the art of war was transformed by an alliance with a science 
and an industry of which the Turk was incapable. With the 
extermination of the terrible Janissaries in 1826 by a Sultan 
who had come to fear their power, Turkey lapsed into rela- 
tive impotence as a military power until revived in modern 
days by German organizing genius. During this period of 
relative impotence Turkey has no doubt lost much of her 
maitial spirit without thereby modifying in the least her 
fundamental militarist principles. 

But it can not be too strongly insisted that abstract prin- 
ciples offer no sufficient basis of judgment in such cases. It 
is the soundest of Anglo-Saxon principles that we are to take 
no account of men's theories, little account even of men's 
words, and that we are to judge men simply by what they 
do or fail to do. It is here that the Turk fails most miserably 
to meet the test. In every part of his vast empire he found an 



246 THE GEEAT PEACE 

advanced civilization. In no part has he preserved that civi- 
lization, much less made advance upon it. The writer has 
traveled some thousands of miles in territories now or recently 
under the rule of the Turk. In every square mile of the 
territory thus visited there prevails a squalor inconceivable 
to a dweller in the western world. Evidences of the earlier 
civilization are pathetically abundant, but everything is ruin- 
ous and decaying. Great regions, some of them among the 
richest in the world, have lapsed into absolute wilderness 
through the neglect of irrigation, a necessity in a very large 
part of the Empire. Roman highways, bridges, and reser- 
voirs are traceable only by scanty remains. Hillsides where 
the cut-stone wine presses attest the former presence of vine- 
yards and intensive culture, are now overgrown with weeds, 
and goats browse where once was careful tillage. If the 
Turk did not do all the destroying, he at least has been un- 
able to rebuild. The reason is perfectly simple. He came 
into this civilized land a conquering barbarian and made the 
land and its civilized peoples his servants. He could not and 
he would not do their work or learn their arts. Yet as slaves 
and servants to a selfish and unenlightened master, they 
could not maintain their arts and their appliances. The 
Turk has been good natured, tolerant, even indulgent, but 
these are not the qualities that develop a civilization. 

The revolution of 1908 attempted to change the funda- 
mental structure of the Empire and eliminate its vices. The 
power of the Sultan was limited by a constitution. Provi- 
sion was made for the development of statute law. Paces 
were made equal before the law and liable alike to military 
service. In short, Turkey was to become a modern state. 
But such things do not go thus easily. The impulse had 
come from without, and the old conditions remained within. 
Above all the new Turkey was officially Mohammedan, and 
Mohammedanism retained necessarily its old connotations. 



TUEKEY 247 

It was with astonishment and intense indignation that Mo- 
hammedans were told in those first days of hectic modernism 
that they must surrender loot taken, in accordance with im- 
memorial custom, from the patient unbelievers. What the 
outcome might have been under ideal conditions we can only 
guess. The conditions were not ideal. The war with Italy, 
the Balkan wars, and now the world war have swept away 
the feeble exotic and established the more normal military 
despotism with which we now have to deal. ]!^ever since the 
days of Othman has the government been more oppressive, its 
procedure more arbitrary, its autocracy more absolute. And 
to all this is now added the most appalling massacre in Turk- 
ish history. 

The Armenian massacre reveals better than anything can 
well do the fundamental weakness of the Turkish government. 
We are shocked by its incredible brutality, but in fact it is 
incompetency rather than brutality which is its chief lesson. 
The Armenians occupied strategic ground. Their country 
is an elevated mountainous region sloping downward from 
the Caucasus to the plain of Asia Minor. Part of the Ar- 
menians had already passed under Eussian rule. A Eussian 
attack from this quarter was inevitable, and the presence of 
a disaffected people in this highland outpost on the route 
which the Eussian must take was a very obvious danger. 
The German-trained dictators of Turkev, aided, no doubt, by 
the General Staff at Berlin, realized the necessity of taking 
precautions. A strong and efficient administrative organiza- 
tion could have taken precautions of a humane character. 
Turkey possessed no such organization. Hence it was 
agreed that the Armenians must be deported, a natural con- 
clusion, however barbarous. But for this deportation Turkey 
was as incompetent as for anything else. She had no rail- 
roads, no commissariat, no shelters along the way. She had 
no place to deport these Armenians where they would not fall 



248 THE GREAT PEACE 

into the hands of the enemy, except the desert region to the 
south and east. Without roads, without shelter, without sup- 
plies, and without time or means or skill to create any of these 
things, she yet had to accomplish the task which was imposed 
upon her by the conditions and by a merciless ally. Is it so 
surprising that she made short work of an impossible task by 
massacre ? 

This is not said to excuse Turkey but rather to condemn 
her. If there were no roads, shelters, or supplies, there 
should have been these things. If there was no administra- 
tion in Armenia that could make deportation unnecessary, 
there should have been such an administration. Nay, more, 
there should have been such a rule that the Armenians, who 
have known no independence for two thousand years and have 
ceased to feel the need of it, would have guarded the fron- 
tier themselves. The condemning fact may not be Turkish 
malevolence, but the condemnation is not therefore the less 
complete. 

If there is any moral animus to the Allied cause, there can 
be but one attitude toward Turkey. The rule of Mohamme- 
dans over non-Mohammedan peoples must cease. That rule 
is vicious in principle, for Mohammedanism is the negation of 
all rights on the part of non-Mohammedans. It is far more 
vicious in fact, for the Turk is mentally and culturally the 
inferior of the peoples he rules. Mohammedan rule in the 
Caliphate of Bagdad or Cordova was better than its creed. 
In Turkey it has no such amelioration. Nor does the mon- 
strous character of Turkish rule end with the subject Chris- 
tian. The Turk is the conqueror not only of Christian races, 
but of earlier and better Mohammedan powers. The Arab 
race, with which Mohammedanism began, has long been sub- 
ject to a race which is a Mohammedan parvenu, a race alien 
in spirit to that with which Mohammedanism began and a 
ruthless marauder upon its domain. By the law of the Koran 



TURKEY 249 

only an Arab and a descendant of Mohammed can hold the 
position of Caliph. The Sultan, who is neither a descendant 
nor an Arab, has long held it by sheer right of conquest. 
The Arab is neither unmindful of these facts nor reconciled 
to them. Absolutely loyal to his religion, he is not loyal to 
his upstart barbarian master. 

All this is familiar and has long made the dissolution of the 
Turkish Empire inevitable. Yet at every crisis when that 
dissolution seemed inevitable, insuperable obstacles have pre- 
sented themselves. These have been, first, the immense im- 
portance of the several territories of the Empire, especially of 
Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and the jealousy of the 
great powers regarding them ; second, the fear of the great 
Mohammedan powers, England and Erance, as to the conse- 
quences to their populations of an attack on the one great 
Mohammedan state ; and, third, the reluctance of the western 
nations to extinguish a fellow nation that did not directly 
threaten their own existence. This last was especially mani- 
fest when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Czar 
of Russia deliberately proposed to England and France that 
the three powers unite to dismember Turkey, " the sick man 
of the East," and appropriate his territories. 'No doubt Eng- 
land and Erance had misgivings as to the possibility of a 
satisfactory division and were actuated in part by prudential 
considerations in that refusal which brought on the Crimean 
War. But it is equally certain that quite aside from these 
considerations, the Czar's proposal would have encountered 
unconquerable repugnance on the part of these peoples. 

It is important to note that all of these obstacles have now 
disappeared. Russia no longer claims the Dardanelles and 
is not likely for many a decade to be in a position to claim it 
effectively. Even if she did, England and Erance, now in 
league and in possession of Egypt, would no longer fear her 
control of the straits. Germany is the new claimant and 



250 THE GEEAT PEACE 

Germany must be denied. But Germany seeks to control by 
controlling Turkey. The maintenance of Turkey is there- 
fore in the interest of Germany's designs, as it was formerly 
in the interest of her present enemies. 

The fear of molesting the political and religious head of 
the Mohammedan world has passed. The Sultan no longer 
occupies that important position. Arabia is again independ- 
ent of Turkey and her king, this time an Arab and a descend- 
ant of the Prophet, now rules as Caliph in the sacred capital 
of Mecca, while his soldiers are fighting the Turk on the 
plains of Moab. The Turk is thus branded as an usurper by 
the authority of the Prophet's legitimate representative.-^ 

Finally, it must be said that our reluctance to extinguish 
the Turkish nation has disappeared. The knowledge of what 
Turkish rule is like, the utter failure of all attempts at re- 
form, both those of internal and those of foreign initiative, 
and the repeated massacres of tens of thousands of peaceable 
subjects for no other reason than suspected dissatisfaction 
with intolerable political and economic conditions, these have 
deepened the conviction that that government has no right to 
exist. Meanwhile the active alliance of Turkey with the arch 
enemy has given the necessary occasion for the long needed 
action. If this war does not end with a radical solution of 
this perennial problem, it will convict the Allies in their turn 
of incompetency and will render futile all other attempts to 
establish permanent peace. 

But our problem, like all such problems, is a concrete one 
and one bristling with practical difficulties. What are the 
component parts of the Turkish Empire with which we have 
to deal, and what is the problem presented by each ? The list 
has noticeably diminished since the Crimean War. The war 

1 The complete failure of Mohammedans the world over to respond to 
the Sultan's summons to a Jihad or holy war when Turkey joined the 
Central Powers in the present conflict is another indication of his loss of 
prestige as Caliph. 



TTJEKEY 251 

of 1877-8 saw the loss of Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, 
and Herzegovina in the Balkans, the fastnesses of upper 
Armenia in the Caucasus, and the Island of Cyprus. Egypt 
and Tunis slipped away soon after. The war with Italy took 
Tripoli, Ehodes and eleven other islands. The Balkan War 
resulted in the loss of Albania, Macedonia, part of Thrace, 
Crete, Samos, Chios, Thasos, and other islands. Turkey in 
Europe is reduced to Constantinople and the few square miles 
necessary for its incomparable defenses, a mere defensive 
outpost to the real Turkey lying beyond the narrow straits. 

It is to this Turkey in Asia, the real Turkey, that we now 
turn. It is here that the task of the present war lies and 
here that the work of dismemberment and rearrangement is 
already far advanced. Looking at the map of Turkey in 
Asia, we notice certain well defined areas which are more 
separable and definitely set off by nature than is usual in such 
cases. At the top and running horizontally on the map is a 
band of territory about a thousand miles long and four hun- 
dred miles wide. Some six hundred miles of this zone on the 
left is unsupported on the south, a huge projection running 
westward from the mainland, commonly known as Asia 
Minor, or in discussions of Turkish affairs, Anatolia. But 
this zone continues with little change right on to the Persian 
border, four hundred miles farther, or perhaps we should say, 
to the Caspian Sea, two hundred miles farther still, though 
this last is not under Turkish but under Eussian and Persian 
rule. This twelve hundred mile zone is unusually well de- 
fined, having the Black Sea and its straits and the Caucasus 
on the north, a sea at either end, and a sea half the way ou 
the south. And as if this last were not enough, there is a 
mighty mountain range running along this southern coast and 
on past the Syrian corner into the mainland itself. But 
shortly after passing this corner the mountains seem to lose 
their bearings. The chain swerves to the northeast and then, 



252 THE GREAT PEACE 

after a while, turns southeast again, thus cutting a broad, 
shallow notch out of the eastern part of our broad zone. And 
since the mountains are thus crowded to the north in this 
region, they pile up and fill the whole narrowed eastern part 
of the zone, which thus becomes a wild, rugged plateau which 
culminates in the great Ararat of Bible story, a mountain 
17,000 feet high. In this eastern mountainous part of the 
zone is situated, — though very vaguely defined and not all 
in Turkish territory, — the sore tried Armenia. 

Turning now to the notch on the southern side of our zone, 
we find two rivers rising at its very point and almost together, 
the Tigris and the Euphrates. The former flows southeast- 
ward following the right hand side of the notch, and heads 
straight for the Persian Gulf, which it reaches in due time 
by a tolerably direct course. The latter flows southwest, fol- 
lowing the left hand side of the notch and makes directly for 
the Mediterranean at the corner above referred to. But 
some time before reaching the coast it seems to encounter im- 
passable barriers. It therefore changes its direction, heading 
also for the Persian Gulf, which it reaches soon after joining 
with the Tigris. The two rivers thus enclose an immense 
tract of comparatively level country, Mesopotamia, — between 
the rivers, — which with adjacent river lands on the east and 
west, stretches from the summit of the notch to the Persian 
Gulf. 

The mountains which run along the southern coast of Asia 
Minor and which seem to become confused as they strike the 
solid mass of the mainland, send a branch due south the whole 
length of the coast. It was these mountains, of course, that 
prevented the Euphrates getting through to the corner of the 
Mediterranean. To the east of these mountains all is barren 
and desert till we get to the territory of the great rivers which 
retreats rapidly to the southeast. But on the western or sea- 
ward slope is a narrow strip of habitable country beautiful 



TTJEKEY 255 

and rich toward the north, then leaner to the south, until it 
vanishes in yellow sand just where the great continent links 
up with Africa. This narrow strip is perhaps the most fa- 
mous in the world, partly because it is the home of the religion 
of the western world, but partly also because it has always 
been the narrow causeway by which alone the great peoples 
of Egypt and Mesopotamia could get access to each other. 
It is thus the bridge between Asia and Africa. Looking 
again at the map, the broad horizontal zone which is the heart 
of Turkey seems to be perched on two legs, the one a very 
slender one and quite perpendicular, the other a very broad 
and long one thrown far to the rear. Between these two is 
thrust the vast bulk of the Arabian desert, one of the most 
impassable barriers in the world. This desert extends far to 
the south in the mighty Arabian Peninsula, an enormous ter- 
ritory green about the edges but desert or semi-desert within. 
These green edges form still another area, or rather, a series 
of areas, which must be considered. Economically they are 
of little importance, though famous as the breeding ground 
of the finest horses and the hardiest of men. This narrow 
border is too long, too narrow, and too broken to form a 
political unity. It has in fact recognized the sway of the 
Turk only fitfully and in part. But it has a political im- 
portance quite without parallel from possessing the holy 
cities of the Mohammedans, Mecca and Medina, situated on 
the western borders of the peninsula. 

The point to be emphasized in connection with these sev- 
eral areas is their almost complete distinctness, the one from 
the other. The great horizontal zone, to be sure, is essen- 
tially a unit in spite of its more mountainous character and 
greater general elevation in the east. There is no sharp 
dividing line physically, ethnically, or historically, and the 
much mooted project of dividing this area has its warrant 
rather in recent political events than in nature or history. 



256 THE GREAT PEACE 

But all other demarcations are sharp. The Mesopotamian 
plain is as definitely distinguished from the Armenian high- 
lands into which its head is thrust as plains usually are from 
the mountains they adjoin. Historically the two regions have 
been largely distinct. The western coast strip communicates 
with the broader land to the north only by a narrow pass 
across the Taurus Mountains, the Cilician Gates, while it is 
separated both from Mesopotamia and the Arabian coastland 
by broad stretches of desert. Habitable Arabia is completely 
isolated and is indeed broken into several portions, all more 
or less distinct physically and politically. 

Ethnically the problem is even more confusing. Arabia, 
Mesopotamia, and the coast strip of Palestine and Syria speak 
Arabic, but in this part of the world language is not the bond 
of race but religion. Arabia and Mesopotamia are Moham- 
medan, but the coast strip is hopelessly divided between Mo- 
hammedans, Christians, and Jews, these last being histori- 
cally rather than numerically predominant in Palestine and 
the Christians, perhaps, in Syria, though in all this coastal 
strip, the meeting place of the world's religions, we find a 
bewildering complexity of sects and hybrid faiths. 

In the great Anatolian-Armenian zone the Turkish lan- 
guage and the Turkish religion predominate in all but a few 
coast cities and isolated country districts. This and this 
only is religiously, linguistically, and in some approximate 
sense ethnically, Turkey. Toward the east, however, the Ar- 
menian element becomes more pronounced, while in the ex- 
treme west the Greek is much in evidence, being occasionally 
in the majority, notably in Smyrna, the metropolis of the 
entire territory. But Greeks and, even more, Armenians are 
scattered through the entire territory. To further complicate 
the situation certain bodies of Greeks speak only Turkish, but 
write it with Greek characters. There are various other 
anomalies. 



TURKEY 257 

We have now to consider the problem of these several units. 

The Hedjaz, the Arabia of the holy places, a region of un- 
certain extent, has become independent under British suzer- 
ainty during the war, a result that no peace conference is 
likely to challenge and that Britain is still less likely to sur- 
render in view of the fact that three quarters of the Moslems 
of the world are under her rule and that the control of the 
holy places by a power working in harmony with her policy is 
essential to the very existence of her empire. Moreover there 
is every reason to believe that British suzerainty is the choice 
of the Arabians. In spite of the much fomented and exag- 
gerated Turkish discontent in Egypt, it has long been a well 
known fact that Moslem interests as such, long convinced of 
the necessity of suzerainty, have sho^vn an unmistakable pref- 
erence for that of Britain. The writer has been personally 
cognizant of two pretty thorough canvasses of Palestine and 
Syria, both by non-British parties, in which these two ques- 
tions were put to all sorts of men : " Do you think there will 
be a change of rule here? If so, what government would 
you prefer ? " The answer to the first question was every- 
where in the affirmative. The Turk was doomed. As to his 
successor all the Moslems and most of the others hoped for 
British rule. British impartiality in the administration of 
justice and in protecting Moslems in the exercise of their re- 
ligion had deeply impressed the Moslem mind. There is 
every reason to believe that these sentiments, so common in 
liberal Mohammedan centers everywhere, are shared by the 
Arabians. If so, British suzerainty in the Hedjaz and the 
holy places may be regarded as firmly established on the prin- 
ciple of self-determination so dear to the western mind. 
Other parts of the Arabian littoral like Oman have long been 
independent under the watchful eye if not the official suzer- 
ainty of Britain. She respects their independence and does 
not interfere with their prejudices or their doings. Mean- 



258 THE GEEAT PEACE 

while she renders them the great service of seeing that ro one 
else shall interfere with them. This is suzerainty reduced to 
its lowest terms, but a suzerainty that is invaluable. In this 
most limited sense Arabia is British, — a necessary condition 
of its being Arabian. 

The case of Mesopotamia is very different. Arabia is free 
to be as exclusive as it chooses, for none but the devotee has 
occasion to set foot on its soil. Mesopotamia is a highway, 
the one practicable short cut between Europe and India. 
From time immemorial it has been a busy trade route be- 
tween the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Nothing 
can long prevent its becoming so again in the infinitely larger 
sense that modern facilities make possible. The Bagdad 
Eailway is one of the world transforming projects comparable 
to the Suez and Panama Canals. It would not only become 
one of the great through traffic routes between the two busiest 
human centers on the globe, but it would develop in Meso- 
potamia itself one of the richest regions in the world, a region 
now utterly dormant, but capable of responding in an almost 
unparalleled degree to the science, industry, and capital of 
the west. What Mesopotamia needs, therefore, is not merely 
the negative guaranties of Arabia, but the most intensive de- 
velopment and scientific administration. There must be im- 
mense investments of capital in railroads and above all in 
scientific irrigation on which the prosperity of the country 
depends, now as in the days of Xebuchadnezzar. There must 
be protection and guaranties that the highway thus opened 
shall not be used for armed forays destructive alike to the 
country itself and to the great countries to which it offers 
access. Finally there must be deference to the religious insti- 
tutions of the country whose people, though not Turkish or 
pro-Turkish, are devoutly Mohammedan. 

There are the most obvious reasons why this task should de- 
volve upon Britain. Her proven deference for native insti- 



TUKKEY 259 

tutions which has become almost an instinct of British char- 
acter, her immense aptitude for development of the kind here 
required ^ and her experience in handling the very similar 
problem of Egypt, all put her at the head of the list of eligible 
candidates. But the overvt'helming consideration is the prox- 
imity of India, which is exposed to attack through Mesopo- 
tamia alone. If we recognize her responsibility for the three 
hundred millions of India, we can not but recognize her right 
to control the only gateway by which their safety is menaced. 
The British Mesopotamia campaign has practically assured 
British occupation of the country. The capture of Bagdad, 
glorious with the memories of the Moslem's saturnian days 
and the great caliphate of Ilaroun-al-Easchid, was the sign 
to the Moslems of the new and not unwelcome order. Thence 
the advance was continued in two directions, one to the north- 
ward toward Armenia, where a junction was contemplated 
with the Russian forces operating from the Caucasus, and 
one to the northwest toward Aleppo, where a junction was 
apparently contemplated with British forces operating north- 
ward from Egypt along the coast strip. With the collapse 
of Russia the former movement lost its chief significance, and 
save for a recent abortive dash for the oil wells of Baku it 
has long been lost to view. The advance toward Aleppo has 
also been long unreported, but in view of the splendid suc- 
cess of the advance from Egypt, there is every reason to expect 
the junction in the near future. Assuming this to be accom- 
plished, it is important to note just what such a completion 
of this plan implies. It is nothing less than the severance 
of the Arab speaking areas from the Turkish zone to the 
north.^ The Arabic domain, the true home of Mohamme- 

1 Her engineers are said to have planned irrigation works for Meso- 
potamia before the outbreak of the war. 

2 It must be remembered that the Arabic and Turkish languages have 
nothing in common save their written characters. They do not even 
belong to the same linguistic family. 



260 THE GREAT PEACE 

danism, the real cherisher of its traditions and the possessor 
of its holy places, is thus lost to the Turk, to whom it has 
never owned willing allegiance. As these lines are written, 
all this is no longer prospect, but essentially accomplished 
fact, a fact which no tribunal can or should reverse. Meso- 
potamia will become another and a greater Egypt under the 
same patiently creative and considerate administration as 
that which, in a single generation lifted Egypt from her low- 
est abasement to a prosperity such as the Pharaohs never 
knew. 

The coast strip on the eastern Mediterranean offers us 
essentially a problem of sentiment. It is mountainous 
throughout, but with the usual broad valleys and fertile slopes 
which this implies. Toward the south it becomes arid and 
merges into desert. The southern half of the strip is Pales- 
tine, whose interest to the western world requires no com- 
ment. It is the only region in the world which is sacred to 
three great religions, Jewish, Christian, and Mohanunedan, 
for it must not be forgotten that the Mohammedan finds a 
place in his system for the worthies of Jew and Christian 
precisely as the Christian does for those of the Jew. The sup- 
posed tomb of Abraham is guarded by the Moslem with a zeal 
almost as fanatical as that which he displays at the tomb of 
Mohammed. But both Moslem and Christian recognize in a 
sense the prior claim of the Jew. For him Palestine is not 
merely a shrine but a fatherland. It is therefore with some- 
thing like general consent that the liberated land becomes 
again the home of a Jewish nation. 

But those who know the modern Jew will not fail to note 
the utterly artificial character of the nation thus established. 
The Jews as a whole have immense wealth and power, but no 
one expects that wealth and power to be transferred to Pales- 
tine. That country, trifling in extent, meager in its agricul- 
tural possibilities, and devoid of minerals, can never have 



TURKEY 261 

army, navy, industries, or extensive population. In itself, 
therefore, it must be utterly helpless, nor can any amount of 
Jewish wealth in foreign lands lend it effective support in an 
emergency. Yet it remains much as of old, immensely stra- 
tegic as an approach to Eg^^pt and as sharing with that coun- 
try the control of the Suez Canal. What, then, are to be its 
political affiliations ? Who is to be its sponsor ? The an- 
swer can hardly be doubtful, in view of the interests above 
suggested. No doubt the new Palestine will be nominally 
independent, and the fact that the modern Jew can provide 
administrative talent of the highest competency should make 
that independence a reality, if, as may be expected, the Jews 
of the world and not those of Palestine alone, are charged 
with the administration of the little state. This too will in- 
sure the broadest tolerance toward the multifarious devotees 
who swarm to this shrine of the nations, for the great Jew 
who rules in Wall Street and in the council halls of modern 
empires is no narrow fanatic. So far all should go well. 
But for protection against great states, a great state is neces- 
sary. That state must be Britain. Britain would tolerate 
no other. The Jew would accept no other. No doubt all 
outward appearance of such protection will be avoided. Ab- 
solute independence will be the fiction, or if avowed protec- 
tion be deemed necessary, then perhaps a form of internation- 
alism, but in that Britain must needs be the animating spirit, 
the really operating agent. 

Let us not imagine for a moment that Britain covets these 
responsibilities. She is already seriously burdened. But 
this is the fatality of empire. To safeguard lands held in 
trust, approaches which control these lands must be con- 
trolled, and then other approaches, and so on indefinitely. 
Britain would welcome partners and sharers in the task, if 
partners of assured trustworthiness could be found. But 
imagine her sentiments if a Jewish Palestine should throw 



262 THE GEEAT PEACE 

itself into the arms of a Germany like the Germany of today. 
Fortunately that is little to be feared. The Anglo-Saxon, 
alone among great peoples, has given the Jew a fair chance, 
and the Jew knows his friends. 

The northern part of the coast strip is Syria, richer and 
more beautiful than Palestine, but lacking its unique historic 
attractions. It is broader and more productive than Pales- 
tine, and in particular it has numerous and excellent harbors, 
especially Beyrout in the south and Alexandretta in the ex- 
treme north at the corner of the sea, an advantage which 
Palestine lacks. The prosperity of Tyre and Sidon in an- 
cient times and the incomparable ruins of Roman Baalbek 
attest the larger possibilities of this region, which is in process 
of occupation by the Allies as this is written. It has long 
been recognized that Syria was to become a French protec- 
torate in the event of the partition of Turkey. This was pre- 
figured by the building of French railways, this being recog- 
nized as a French sphere of influence and investment. It is 
suggested by the French capture of Beyrout in recent days, 
though the conquest of the country is being effected by a Brit- 
ish force. All considerations of propriety and prudence 
speak for it in the present juncture. Not only is France 
the traditional protector of all Christians in the Levant by 
an ancient agreement whose value consists in its long standing 
recognition, — a fact of importance in this strongly Christian 
district, — but the present complete imderstanding between 
France and Britain makes the presence of these two nations 
on this causeway of the nations a double guaranty against its 
use by a marauder. It can not be too strongly insisted that 
no part of this Arab world is able to protect itself, and the 
only alternative to occupation by the powers we now fear, is 
its occupation by powers we can trust. The ever ready sug- 
gestion of internationalization can be in practice nothing but 
this same occupation in disguise. 



TURKEY 263 

Turkey south of the Taurus Mountains, the whole domain 
of the Arab tongue and the Arab culture, is thus disposed of, 
not prospectively but actually. We have but to record, as the 
peace conference will have but to ratify, the inevitable and 
only reasonable decision. There remains for consideration 
the broad zone stretching from the ^gean to the Caspian, 
the true home of the Turkish language and the Turkish cul- 
ture. This has not been occupied by the Allies, nor are their 
intentions clear regarding it. Omitting for the time being 
Constantinople and such territory as may be necessary to 
control the straits, we have first to consider whether this ter- 
ritory can be advantageously divided, and second, what dis- 
position can be made of it, whole or in parts. 

The outrages committed upon the Armenians have not 
unnaturally elicited the sjTupathy of the civilized world and 
led to the conviction that the Armenians must be rescued from 
Turkish rule. Quite naturally we have jumped to the con- 
clusion that the way to do this is to sever Armenia from 
Anatolia and put it under the government of its own people. 
The Allied peoples seem to have settled clo\vn rather content- 
edly to the idea of an independent Armenia. But inquiry 
reveals the amazing fact that there is no such thing as a 
modern Armenia. There is a district in which Armenians 
once predominated and in which existed some two thousand 
years ago a somewhat fluctuating Armenian kingdom. But 
today there is neither kingdom nor predominant Armenian 
population. Eeliable statistics, of course, do not exist, but 
careful estimates have been repeatedly made and there is 
sufficient agreement among independent estimates to give them 
a fair reliability. Taking the best accredited of these esti- 
mates, we reach the amazing conclusion that Armenia as 
usually defined has but fifteen per cent, of Armenians in its 
population, while Turks, that is, Moslems who speak the 
Turkish language, number seventy-four per cent. There are, 



264 THE GREAT PEACE 

therefore, even in Armenia itself, five Turks to one Armenian. 
Nor is there any appreciable part of the country in vt^hich 
these figures are reversed. Only in nine out of the hundred 
and fifty-nine subdistricts into which the country is divided, 
are the Armenians in the majority, and then the majority no- 
where exceeds sixty-five per cent. These nine subdistricts 
are trivial in area and are not all contiguous. All told, the 
Armenians living in Armenia have been estimated at slightly 
less than a million. And all these figures, it must be remem- 
bered, were for the period before the war. According to the 
most conservative estimates of the deportations and massa- 
cres, these numbers and percentages must now be reduced to 
a half or a third. Such a population becomes almost negli- 
gible in deciding the political destiny of a people. Conceding 
that Armenia may be separated from Turkey without com- 
punction, what are we going to do with it ? If we merely 
make it independent and leave it to the management of its 
inhabitants, the Armenians would still be at the mercy of a 
Turkish population five or ten times their number. It is true 
that the outrages from which they have suffered so much have 
not originated with this local Turkish population, and com- 
plete separation from the baneful control of Constantinople 
with its big schemes of world politics and its strategic re- 
quirements would promise decided amelioration of their lot. 
But it would still leave the root evil, the rule of non-Moslems 
by Moslems, with their denial of all rights to the subject 
population. This must cease. If the victorious civilized 
powers do not realize this, then nothing like final results are 
to be expected from their present victory. 

But recognizing this necessity, it may well be asked whether 
anything is to be gained by separating Armenia from Ana- 
tolia. There are Armenians in both and in both they are a 
small minority, totally unable to control or even to furnish 
valuable initiative. They have no such outside backing as 



TURKEY 265 

the Jews. They are a subject people of two thousand years' 
standing, timid and non-political in their instincts. Until 
recent political exigencies made them the target for Turkish 
outrage, they were docile and passively loyal. Aside from 
the feeble and obsolete fact of historic tradition, Armenia does 
not differ appreciably from Anatolia in its Armenian or gov- 
ernmental problem. 

The Greeks form a numerous and influential element on the 
extreme western coast and noticeably in Smyrna, the com- 
mercial metropolis of Anatolia, where they are in the major- 
ity. The existence of an independent Hellenic kingdom west 
of the ^gean naturally suggests annexation of these districts 
to Greece. This has been made the more plausible by the 
recent annexation of Chios and Samos to Greece. These 
large islands lie on the Asiatic side of the ^gean and are 
essentially a part of the mainland from which they are sepa- 
rated by only the narrowest expanse of water. To step from 
these annexations to the mainland is the easiest of steps. 

But nothing could be less suited to annexation than these 
Greek settlements. The Greeks do not form a normal terri- 
torial population performing the various functions of com- 
munity life, but are like the Jews in our American cities, a 
specialized commercial class. To annex Smyrna to Greece 
because of the Greek commercial element there, would be a 
little like annexing l^ew York to the new Palestine because 
of its Jewish merchants and financiers, — an extreme compari- 
son, no doubt, but one not the less illustrative. There is no 
evidence that these Greeks desire such annexation, — indeed 
they almost certainly do not. They have seldom been mo- 
lested by the Turks and have assumed a political status in the 
Empire similar to that held by the Jews in the great western 
nations. Their ambitions are not political. If there is any 
demand for such annexation, it comes from Greece, whose 
people have acquired imperial aspirations. Even this de- 



266 THE GREAT PEACE 

maud is doubtful. Under her present wise leadership, Greece 
is notably sane, and will hesitate to assume the impossible re- 
sponsibilities of isolated littoral possessions in Asia without 
the possibility of an effective hinterland. The suggestion is 
rather the impracticable dream of western enthusiasts. 

The Anatolian-Armenian zone therefore remains a unity, 
or if not a unity, its division contributes little to the solu- 
tion of our problem. That problem is simply the problem 
of Turkish government. The problem is embarrassing. The 
population is overwhelmingly Turkish, and by our much her- 
alded right of self-determination it should govern itself. The 
small minority of alien elements should take their chances or 
seek a better condition elsewhere. But we can not but be 
appalled by the consequences of our own reasoning. Turkish 
misgovernment is so abysmal that only ignorance can make 
it seem tolerable. To one who has seen the squalor of these 
lands that nature has made rich and that earlier civilization 
has made glorious, talk about self-determination becomes sac- 
rilege. Even the reading of such a book as Brailsford's Mace- 
donia, so compelling in its dispassionateness and in the calm 
statement of the facts that the writer knew so well, simply 
leaves no alternative to the conclusion that Turkish rule must 
cease or must be made amenable to the higher requirements 
of that civilization for which we stand. It is not true that 
we believe in the unqualified right of self-determination. 
High above mundane realities and in the pure ether of ab- 
straction in which some spirits so exasperatingly love to soar 
while practical decisions wait, we may formulate our gener- 
alizations about self-determination and government by con- 
sent, but with our feet on the earth and in the midst of 
annoying realities we have never hesitated to apply the needed 
corrective. There is a certain minimum of decency and order 
that the civilized world will not forego. If a people can 
supply that minimum, it is the fixed principle of free peo 



TUEKEY 267 

pies to let them do it. If they can not or do not do it, it is 
equally our principle to help them or make them do it. 
Doubtless we must be patient and give a people time to learn 
the difficult art. We have done so with Turkey and the time 
is up. 

The writer sees little to hope in the division of this zone 
unless for purposes of administrative convenience. There is 
no reason for intei-vention in Armenia which does not hold in 
nearly equal degree of Anatolia. Both have a Turkish ma- 
jority and an oppressed non-Turkish minority. Both have 
crying need of capital, organization, and development along 
lines which presuppose such a government as the Turk can 
not give. In fact, this latter need is greater in Anatolia 
than in Armenia. Both must be made to supply or helped 
to supply that minimum requirement of decency and order 
which the world can not and will not forego. 

Yet the Turks are neither so few nor so weak that they can 
be taken in hand like savages and made wards of a civilized 
state. The Turk must be made the instrument of his own 
regeneration. An administration actually in Turkish hands 
but under the supervision and control of civilized powers, able 
and disposed to exact compliance with modern standards, is 
perhaps the feasible compromise. It is extremely doubtful 
whether any single state could assume this responsibility, con- 
sidering the size and strategic location of the country and the 
military training and capacity of its inhabitants. It is also 
much to be feared that no international combination formed 
for this or similar purposes could withstand the disintegrat- 
ing influences of intrigue and conflicting interests which 
would be used so assiduously for their undoing. But in 
some way the required supen' ision must be forthcoming. If 
the Allies are unable to provide this essential in their mo- 
ment of victory, then indeed is our boasted internationalism a 
fiction. The international commission which for a time con- 



268 THE GREAT PEACE 

trolled the finances of Egypt and again of Greece may perhaps 
furnish the precedent and the model, perhaps also it will sug- 
gest to some the ultimate failure and the inevitable next step. 
If a single nation can be found willing to undertake so 
heavy a responsibility under the mandate and guaranty of a 
group of friendly powers, the writer for one would look more 
hopefully upon the experiment. Britain, France, Italy, or 
America would do honest work there and make a garden 
where the Turk has made a desert, — yes, and make the Turk 
the gardener at that, — but the first three ought not to increase 
their responsibilities and the last would certainly be reluctant 
to do so. It is not without a shudder that the writer makes 
the suggestion. 

In this connection reference should be made to Italy's 
ambitions, already mentioned in an earlier chapter. Italy 
aspires to retain the Dodecanese, the twelve islands off the 
southwest corner of Asia Minor, and to acquire a foothold on 
the mainland on the southern coast. Doubt has already been 
expressed as to the wisdom of expensive colonial ventures for 
Italy under present conditions. We have here to consider the 
wisdom of such a move from the standpoint of the country 
itself. It will be noted that the proposed district is in Ana- 
tolia, not in the Arabian district. Such an annexation would 
therefore impair the unity of the Turkish domain. If the 
whole region is to be parceled out among the western powers, 
this is a legitimate beginning. If not, it is an annoying 
enclave thrust into a unit territory. The writer has a strong 
aversion against needless dismemberment of unit territories. 
All such divisions hinder the common object of our civiliza- 
tion. The unity of Anatolia-Armenia is based broadly on 
unity of geography, language, and religion. The proposed 
division would sin against all three of these unities. It is 
argued that such an arrangement would give Italy a stake 
in the Levant and insure her cooperation in maintaining the 



TURKEY 269 

status quo. It might just as easily work the other way. If 
it left Italy with no other thought than to protect what she 
had, such might be the result. But suppose it incited her 
to extend her holdings. Might she not conspire with an ag- 
gressor, — say with Germany, — to attain her ends, and with 
what advantage to the marauder who would thus find his 
base of operations prepared for him. Doubtless it will be 
hard to refuse Italy's request. It were much to be desired 
that she should avoid the necessity of a refusal. 

Note. Since these lines were written it is reported that a definite 
movement is on foot, sponsored by no less influential a personality 
than Viscount Bryce, to place America in charge of the rehabilitation 
of Turkey. Conversely, the plea comes from Turkish sources that the 
great powers should furnish Turkey with trained administrators. 
Neither of these proposals follows the lines above suggested. Both 
presuppose the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey and her restora- 
tion to independence. The writer believes that the present Turkish 
Empire is unnatural and doomed to failure. The Arabs and the Turks 
differ utterly in their race, character, their language, their civilization 
and their habitat. There is no likelihood of their forming a helpful 
imion. Meanwhile nothing but the most trustworthy of states can 
safely be trusted with the guardianship of these crossroads of the na- 
tions. With the divisions above suggested, divisions largely dictated 
by nature, an American receivership for Anatolia is perhaps a reason- 
able suggestion, — the more reasonable because unsought and unwel- 
come. 



CHAPTEK XVI 

CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 

The well known assertion of Napoleon that " Constanti- 
nople means the rule of the world " hardly exaggerates its 
importance.^ It is not only the most important strategic site 
in the world, but in certain respects it is quite unlike any 
other. Constantinople, or more exactly the waterway which 
it is convenient to call by that name, serves a larger territory 
than any other port. It is also more defensible, being per- 
haps the only impregnable passage in the world. In these 
respects it merely surpasses others in its class. But in other 
respects it is altogether unique, having no similar. It is 
completely inaccessible to attack from without, being situ- 
ated between two inland seas, yet is the most accessible of all 
harbors, being untrammeled by reef or bar. No other har- 
bor is so situated. It is unique above all in that it has no 
substitute. All other great harbors have competitors which 
could assume their task, were they closed or disabled. Con- 
stantinople has none. 

The value of Constantinople of course is very different to 
different powers, even to those in its vicinity. To Turkey it 
is merely a secure capital and a possession coveted by greater 
powers. It does not guarantee the Empire from attack, how- 
ever secure in itself. Especially as the Empire has now 
shrunken, it loses all large functional importance, having na 
considerable tributary in Turkish territory in Europe, while 
Asiatic Turkey necessarily makes use for the most part of 
other ports. The city itself has long ceased to be of any 

1 For a more complete statement of the -Bignificance of Constantinople 
see " The Things Men Fight For," by the author. 

270 



CONSTA]^TINOPLE A^D THE BALKANS 273 

importance, now that there is no occasion for transshipment 
en route and customs barriers and backsheesh have made the 
passers of the straits shun its quays. Its value to the Turk is 
primarily one of sentiment and prestige. 

But to a great power occupying the vast Black Sea basin 
it is not only a necessary ingress and egress, an indispensable 
condition of economic and commercial existence, but it is a 
weapon of tremendous power. Such a power, perfectly se- 
cure in the possession of the straits, could develop its vast 
resources quite at its ease and forge its thunderbolts undis- 
turbed, only to launch them from its secure retreat when 
they were ready. It is almost certain that Russia, such as 
she was and seems certain again to be, if once in secure pos- 
session of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, could ulti- 
mately dictate her will to other nations. In a very real sense, 
therefore, N^apoleon's assertion, addressed as it was to the 
Czar and with reference to Russian aspirations, represents the 
literal truth. The world has ever been unwilling to see the 
Dardanelles in Russian possession, for that would make the 
Black Sea a Russian lake and would extend her control to all 
its borders. If the Allies consented to this, as seems to 
have been the case, it was under duress and with misgivings. 
It is no small compensation for the disaster which the defec- 
tion of Russia entailed, that this unfortunate pledge was 
thereby abrogated. 

To Germany in her Mitteleuropa extension Constantinople 
would be hardly less valuable, though chiefly in a negative 
sense as enabling her to put Russia under lock and key and to 
menace British communications in the Mediterranean. It is 
diflScult to see what the outcome of this war would have been 
if Germany had been solidly established in Constanti- 
nople with the resources of the tributary territories thoroughly 
developed. The Mediterranean would have been sealed to the 
Allies with consequences that it is difficult to imagine. Con- 



274 THE GREAT PEACE 

versely, if the Allies had early acquired possession of Con- 
stantinople and been free to operate from that center in all 
ways, it can hardly be doubted that the war would long ago 
have been terminated in their favor. In short, though Con- 
stantinople is of less significance to other powers than to Rus- 
sia, it is hardly too much to say that any power that could 
retain it would thereby become the foremost if not the master 
of all. More definitely, if Constantinople falls into the hands 
of Germany or Russia, — the only two great powers that are 
seriously trying to get it, — that possession will assure the 
ascendancy of that power. 

This ascendancy is not to be admitted for a moment. 
Therefore neither of these nations must control Constanti- 
nople. No other power can reasonably aspire to such control. 
Some other disposition than that of ordinary national annexa- 
tion must therefore he made of this unique territory. 

Before suggesting what this disposition shall be, it is well 
to consider what we wish to accomplish by it. First, the pass- 
age should be kept open. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus 
must be public rather than private property. The Crimean 
War was fought to establish the principle that they were the 
private property of Turkey. It is now commonly asserted 
that the Crimean War was a mistake. That is not so clear. 
Situations change, and the necessities of the nations change 
with them. It is not clear that it would have been better for 
the world to have made the Dardanelles public property at 
that time. But be that as it may, that is the need now. It 
is customary to recognize the jurisdiction of a country over 
three miles of sea off from its coast. This principle would 
give Turkey jurisdiction over the Dardanelles and the Bos- 
phorus. But this is no ordinary case. Such jurisdiction 
would give her in effect a very considerable jurisdiction over 
the entire Black Sea to which these straits are the only access. 
But Turkey should have no such jurisdiction, and if possea- 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 275 

sion of the coast gives jurisdiction over the straits, then she 
must not have possession of the coasts. This indeed, as we 
shall see, is the inevitable conclusion. So much of the shores 
as command the straits must share the fate of the straits. 

It follows from the foregoing that Constantinople should 
be a free port. There should be no customs barriers, but 
ships should unload and reload freely, making it once more 
the busiest mart in Mediterranean Europe. Trifling dues of 
some sort would of course be necessary to defray the expenses 
of administration of the district, but the writer ventures to 
suggest that the charge should be for the use of the straits 
rather than for the use of the port as such, thus facilitating 
to the utmost the performance of its great function as the 
gathering and distributing point for the traflac that branches 
inimitably on either side. 

Finally, it is chiefly important to prevent the possibility 
of seizure and monopoly by any power. This is the most 
delicate matter of all. It implies on the one hand perfect 
competency and impartiality of administration, and on the 
other, the possession and exercise of a considerable force. It 
is needless to say that Constantinople itself, even with the 
limited territories that may be assigned to it, can not main- 
tain itself against the attack of a modern empire. That 
maintenance must be guaranteed by larger resources. But 
those larger resources can never be more than potential. 
They can not be ever mobilized and on the ground ready for 
action. If the district is entirely unprotected save by these 
unmobilized reserves, an unscrupulous power, even a little 
one, could seize the city and the straits by a surprise attack. 
It can not be too strongly urged that a serious power strongly 
intrenched in Constantinople and the Dardanelles could not 
easily be ousted. Does anyone doubt that if the Dardanelles 
had been no man's land and undefended at the beginning of 
this war, the Goehen and the Breslau would have rushed the 



276 THE GEEAT PEACE 

city and that with the aid of Bulgaria or some other venal 
ally, it could have been closed as it has been. Public prop- 
erty does not mean unguarded property, especially when it is 
property that all passers covet. Whatever the disposition of 
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, they must be powerfully 
fortified and strongly held so long as men use force and craft 
to accomplish their ends. 

There are several possible ways of attempting this settle- 
ment. It is conceivable that a great power might possess 
Constantinople in its own right, and yet voluntarily accept 
the limitations here proposed. This seems a hazardous guar- 
anty of so distinctive a world interest, yet it is one with which 
the world is well and favorably familiar. It is thus that 
Gibraltar is held, open for all to pass, yet completely under 
the control of a single power. Hong Kong in like manner, 
is a free port to all the world, a perfect treasure trove to the 
tariff harassed commerce of the east. It is not contended 
that such a custodianship is without its potential evils, but 
if we ask what in the actuality we would have different, it is 
difficult to suggest a change. In other words, Britain man- 
ages these vast trusts in exactly the way that we would wish 
some other custodian to manage them. It is difficult to be- 
lieve that the peaceably disposed nations of the world are 
very restive under her management. Probably Prance would 
manage such a trust in much the same way if its character 
were definitely recognized. Some will claim as much for 
America. Any of these nations would have the great advan- 
tage that they could supply the large potential backing of 
force which the situation requires as well as the police force 
constantly needed. Any of them would make of this neg- 
lected and bedraggled relic of a great past the very queen 
among the cities of the world. But such a custodianship 
would be in a sense irresponsible, however impartial and pub- 



COI^STANTIXOPLE AND THE BALKANS 277 

lie spirited. These powers would have only this advantage 
over Germany and Russia that they are not directely inter- 
ested in Constantinople, a very great advantage, but hardJy 
enough to silence the objections of those powers. 

Another way would be to give the trust to an insignificant 
power. Several such could be named who would administer 
the trust with ability, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway, perhaps Greece. The advantage of such an arrange- 
ment would be that the world would have little to fear from 
so small a power and one whose situation did not tempt her 
to turn the trust to her own advantage. Possibly, too, the 
police force could be provided. But such a nation could not 
furnish the larger backing of force required and must there- 
fore have a sponsor. That sponsor would inevitably be a 
great power, and perhaps a changing and even a clandestine 
one. The possibilities are disquieting. Better a known 
great power than an unknown one. Thus, Greece was before 
the war supposed to be a cat's-paw of Russia, Sweden of Ger- 
many, etc. It would be the most slippery of all guaranties. 
Incidentally, it may be noted that it is the arrangement that 
we have had for some centuries with the ascendancy of Ger- 
many as the result. 

Internationalization in some form would seem to be the 
only alternative. But internationalization, it must not be 
forgotten, is a concrete thing, not a mere talismanic ban. It 
implies agents, laws, force, and all that we know in the ordi- 
nary exercise of power. From whence is to come this force, 
this agent, these regulations? We will not embarrass our 
argument with questions of detail. But in principle these 
questions require an answer before the proposal can claim 
validity. It may be assumed that some concert of the nations, 
some form of international organization, perhaps the peace 
conference itself, will appoint some reliable person to act as 



278 THE GREAT PEACE 

its agent. ^ Some measure of citizen government could doubt- 
less be instituted, though it is clear that pure democracy and 
local self interest could not be relied upon to secure inter- 
national interests. Then a police force amounting to a large 
garrison would have to be provided. The suggestion of an 
international force, — equal numbers, let us say, from Brit- 
ain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, America, and other 
parties to the compact, — would be logical. But a cautious 
inquirer will by this time begin to have misgivings. What 
about the harmony of such a force ? Suppose the parties to 
the compact went to war with one another, would their sev- 
eral contingents be at peace in Constantinople ? Would they 
not manoeuvre to control it and deliver it to their nation? 
What a time their commander would have ! And even he 
would not be a man without a country. Where would his 
sympathies be ? And who would be the governor ? Would 
he hold for life or for a term of years ? And if the latter, — 
or even the former, — would not something like rotation be 
inevitable ? And when it came Germany's turn to take the 
lead, what of the possibilities with a German governor, a 
German consul, a German merchant community, and a body 
of German troops subject to his orders ? What would guar- 
antee us against German intrigue and the recrudescence of 
the Mitteleuropa dream under conditions so tempting? All 
this is imagined, it is true. Other arrangements might be 
made and unknown safeguards might develop. But mere 
possibilities are not enough. And then too it is equally pos- 
sible that unforeseen dangers might develop. We can not 
escape the conclusion that, in any such form as this, inter- 
nationalism would not he a safeguard against intrigue and 
aggression, hut an opportunity and an occasion for it. 

1 King Albert of Belgium has been suggested. He would at least have 
the advantage of experience in the management of internationalized 
territories. 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 279 

But that the solution of the problem rests with the associ- 
ated nations and not with any single nation is a foregone 
conclusion. No single nation as yet commands sufficiently 
the confidence of its fellow nations to be allowed to own Con- 
stantinople. Conceding that its administration would be per- 
fect and in the interest of all alike, the mere possession of 
such a site by one of the great powers of Europe would give 
that power an influence which, in wholly different connec- 
tions, might be overwhelming. The power that possessed 
Constantinople unchallenged, would speak with authority no 
matter upon what subject. 

Yet so far as efficiency and even impartiality of manage- 
ment is concerned, the chances are immeasurably in favor of 
administration by a single experienced and trustworthy 
power. Administration by an international committee or by 
any arrangement involving the actual cooperation of persons 
representing different systems and different national habits 
would be a guaranty of weakness and confusion. Let us 
take the most favorable supposition, that of the cooperation 
of English and Americans. Here no language barrier hin- 
ders cooperation. National systems have evolved largely in 
common, and national sympathies are for the present at least 
wholly favorable. Yet the writer prophesies for such a 
cooperation, certain confusion, friction, and inefficiency if 
not failure, A certain acquaintance with American admin- 
istration in the Philippines and with British administration 
in India and Egypt leaves him at a loss to know which to 
admire most. Yet the two are utterly diverse in method and 
even in their fundamental conception of the race problem. 
Either would be successful in Constantinople, but certainly 
not both at once, nor yet any composite or compromise of the 
two. They would simply emasculate and destroy each other. 
There would be clash in the methods as such, but there would 
be still more clash between the personnels of the two differ- 



280 THE GREAT PEACE 

ently evolved systems. Only the very biggest men at the top 
would be able to bridge the chasm with their broader sym- 
pathies. 

All this would be still more true as between other races 
where the barrier of language and a still greater divergence 
of methods would add to the complications. The net result 
of any scheme of internationalism which involved actual co- 
operation of dissimilar peoples and methods, would he to 
sacrifice efficiency to a purely fanciful equity. 

There is another and perhaps graver objection. We have 
been considering international interests. We are not wholly 
at liberty to ignore the interests of the local population. 
That population would be considerable. It has approached 
the million mark in Constantinople and in the district which 
would necessarily be included, it would be much more. There 
can be no doubt that making Constantinople a free port would 
largely increase this population. The interests of such a 
population, necessarily largely withdrawn from their own con- 
trol, must be a matter of grave concern to the international 
body. There can be no possible question that the influence 
of a single culture, consistent in itself and positive in charac- 
ter, would be far more salutary than that of a confused dis- 
cord in which each national element tacitly challenged the 
most cherished principles or habits of the rest. The cosmo- 
politan tendencies in such a place would be dangerously 
strong at best. They could have no better corrective than the 
presence of a positive, resolute race culture which would 
command respect as illustrating the value of consistent race 
ideals. 

We conclude that such an administration should be inter- 
national in its authority and ultimate sanctions but national 
in its actual exercise, a difficult combination, but not impos- 
sible, — perhaps, too, the least difficult of the permissible 
alternatives. This is not the place to suggest by exactly what 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 281 

means this may be accomplished. It is for practical states- 
men and experienced administrators to devise the necessary 
machinery. The essence of the suggestion is that a single 
trustworthy nation should administer Constantinople under 
the mandate of the associated powers. The chosen nation 
must needs be one of the great powers, one experienced in ad- 
ministration, and one not tempted by contiguity to make the 
trust a stepping stone to annexation and monopoly. These 
conditions would exclude Russia, Germany, and Austria, even 
were they not excluded by other considerations. There 
should be no hesitation whatever at such a juncture as this 
in declaring these nations disqualified. We have learned 
nothing from the war if we have not learned this. The list 
thus reduces to Britain, America, France, and Italy. The 
last could not wisely accept the trust. There is no serious 
reason to doubt the trustworthiness or the competency of the 
other three. 

The question naturally arises whether such an adminis- 
tration should be combined with the administration of Ana- 
tolia-Armenia suggested in the preceding chapter. The bal- 
ance of advantage would seem to be very much the other way. 
To combine them would come dangerously close to continuing 
the Turkish Empire under foreign administration. It would 
pretty effectually prevent the isolation of Constantinople and 
the Dardanelles and their administration purely as an inter- 
national trust, a facility of world commerce. The fiscal de- 
mands of impoverished Anatolia- Armenia would continually 
covet the possible revenues of the great waterway and impede 
its traffic with toll exactions. Political and religious inter- 
ests and prejudices, easily managed in cosmopolitan Constan- 
tinople, would acquire irresistible and dictatorial power with 
the backing of Turkish Anatolia. The two problems are not 
only diverse but wholly incompatible, if the plan of a truly 
open waterway and free port is to be adopted. 



282 THE GREAT PEACE 

Such a plan naturally raises the question how much is to 
be included in the internationalized area. Only military 
and administrative experts can answer this question. It is 
clear, however, that the inclusion should be based on mini- 
mum requirements for defense and administrative conven- 
ience. We do not wish to create another empire here. The 
Gallipoli Peninsula, marvellously set off by nature for its 
purpose, must obviously be included. Also the territory back 
of Constantinople at least as far as the Chatalja lines. 
Whether more than this is required, — possibly even territory 
linking Constantinople with Gallipoli, — the novice can not 
judge. It is even possible that the present slight territory 
of European Turkey may prove to be the workable unit, 
though it is to be hoped that a much more limited defensive 
program may prove practicable. Probably a certain inclu- 
sion on the Asiatic side will also prove to be necessary, though 
here again it would seem to simplify the problem if the Euro- 
pean shore proved sufficient. 

Little remains to be said regarding the Balkan Peninsula. 
The case of Serbia has been considered in connection with the 
problem of Austria, save possibly the problem of its southern 
and southeastern boundary as fixed by the treaty of 1912. 
There seems little doubt that this treaty gave to Serbia a 
certain amount of territory in which the population is pre- 
dominantly Bulgarian. This, however, must be understood 
in the light of the well known definition of nationality in 
this region. Language has little to do with it, and kinship 
still less. Church allegiance is the determining fact, and 
this allegiance, throughout all this Macedonian region, is a 
matter of comparatively recent propaganda. Under such cir- 
cumstances national boundaries need not take too careful note 
of present pseudo race alignments. ]\Ioreover these race ele- 
ments are relatively mobile and migrations following changes 
of frontier easily effect the necessary adjustments. The 



CONSTANTIN^OPLE AND THE BALKAN^S 283 

writer was a witness of these swarming migrations from re- 
gion to region following the second Balkan war. It may 
safely be assumed, therefore, that population has largely ad- 
justed itself to the lines as drawn in 1912, whether they were 
then drawn rightly or not. To correct a mistake made at that 
time, if such there were, would therefore necessitate renewed 
migrations and further readjustments. Under these circum- 
stances the thing to note is rather the topographical, commer- 
cial, and strategic factors than the elusive and artificial fac- 
tor of race. Whether these factors require rectification of 
the frontier is a question for the expert. It must be remem- 
bered that the Serbian and Bulgarian languages differ but 
slightly. 

The question of Bulgaria has been touched upon in speak- 
ing of Rumania. Considerations of race require the restora- 
tion of the earlier frontier between Bulgaria and Rumania in 
the region of the Dobrudja. The writer is unaware of any 
counter considerations. In case Constantinople is interna- 
tionalized and the present Thracian territories in the rear are 
regarded as unnecessary, their relinquishment to Bulgaria is 
seemingly inevitable. The aggrandizement of Bulgaria is 
about the last thing that the Allies are just now in a mood 
for, but it is to be hoped that present moods will not be al- 
lowed to stand in the way of plainly reasonable arrangements. 
The odium which Bulgaria has incurred in the second Balkan 
war and in the present struggle is largely to be charged to her 
unworthy monarch, and while her standards are not high, her 
shame and her disabilities may be allowed to disappear with 
him. Greece, of course, desires these territories, but to ex- 
tend the little kingdom to the gates of Constantinople would 
do her no good unless she is to have the city itself, while it 
would be both an affront and an injury to Bulgaria and a 
new source of trouble in this troubled region. 



CHAPTER XVII 

RUSSIA AND POLAND 

It is significant of the change that the war has already 
wrought that Eussia and Poland must now be mentioned sepa- 
rately. The greater no longer includes the less. Whether 
this prefigures a separate historical destiny from this time 
forth is not so clear, but it is the possibility and the pros- 
pect of the moment. The problem is distinctly the most com- 
plex with which we are confronted. The problems already 
discussed present grave difficulties, but for the most part we 
can see what we would like to accomplish. In the great 
Slavic East, it is difficult even to meet this preliminary re- 
quirement. 

The problem must be approached from two standpoints, the 
needs of these peoples themselves and the safety of the family 
of nations. These two interests may ultimately coincide, but 
it would be hazardous to assimae an immediate and complete 
coincidence. If all energies are devoted to the upbuilding of 
the Slavic peoples, the world should be the richer for their 
prosperity, but the world may be the sufferer from their 
aggression. Their ultimate power is almost limitless. On 
the other hand, the German policy of holding back the devel- 
opment of these peoples and keeping them divided and weak 
in the interest of outside nations is one so monstrous, when we 
consider the magnitude of the interests thus sacrificed, that 
we must regard it as both futile and perilous. It is ques- 
tionable whether a repressive policy toward any people is 
legitimate or safe, but certainly toward the largest and most 
virile of all peoples it is perilous in the extreme. Nothing 
could better assure the ultimate deluge than to keep the largest 

284 



EUSSIA ANB POLAND 285 

of the energetic races in perpetual barbarism. Underneath 
all policies that we consider must run this steady current of 
purpose, to promote the civilization of the Slavic peoples and 
to develop in them as rapidly as possible those inhibiting in- 
stincts which alone can protect civilization from their over- 
whelming power. 

The Slavs are by no means a homogeneous race, yet they are 
all obviously related and are conscious of and influenced by 
that kinship. Panslavism is the only one of the pan-isms 
which has a very substantial foundation. It seems to por- 
tend the ultimate union of all the Slavs whose habitats are 
territorially united into a natural unity. This means all of 
the former Russian Empire with the approximate addition of 
Austrian Galicia and Prussian Posen, a combination not quite 
equivalent to former Russia and historic Poland. The 
Czecho-Slovak area, though conterminous with the great 
Slavic domain, is not a natural part of that domain, and both 
history and nature interpose seemingly insuperable obstacles 
in the way of its inclusion. If it is ever to become a part of 
a larger whole, that whole must be the Teutonic rather than 
the Slavic unit, a result which is suggested by the steady 
German encroachment, industrial and cultural, upon this 
too far advanced outpost of the Slavic race. Present tenden- 
cies, to be sure, are checking this encroachment, and until 
the German learns better manners and better morals, we can 
but welcome the divisive influences. But it is perhaps le- 
gitimate to look forward to a very far future when the needs 
of commerce, industry, and defense, the chief things for which 
government legitimately stands, may be provided for a unit 
area rather than for fragments based on linguistic and historic 
accident. If the German people ever get over feeling that 
the other peoples are destined to be " hewers of wood and 
drawers of water for a dominant nation," they will have a 
very large field of opportunity open to them. 



286 THE GREAT PEACE 

Eeturning now to the normal Slavic domain, we have to 
note that it is both racially and naturally ill defined. In the 
extreme southwest it is separated from the plain of Hungary 
by the Carpathian Mountains, a very good natural boundary, 
but on most of the western frontier no such natural barrier 
exists. Vast marshes and lake systems make population 
sparse and intermittent, but tend rather to confuse than to 
delimit the racial frontiers. Such frontiers are seldom sharp 
but are rather of the nature of gradual transitions. Here 
they are even worse. In the early days of race mobility, the 
rivalry between Teuton and Slav took the form of establish- 
ing colonies or centers of population of each race against the 
other. These colonies slipped past each other far into each 
other's domain. Commercial organizations further compli- 
cated the situation, and the location of the Teutonic Knights 
as a patrician caste far to the east of the Teutonic domain, 
as the result of vicissitudes in the Mediterranean area, added 
another troublesome factor. There are Slavic settlements, — 
strong and self conscious, — within forty miles of Berlin. 
There are similar German communities not so very far from 
Petrograd. For many hundreds of miles the country is one, 
— not of mingled population, — but of mingled settlements, 
a far more tenacious and difficult problem. ISTor must we 
forget that there are other peoples like the Letts, mere racial 
fragments left in this great lateral moraine of the westward 
migrations, which own neither Slavic nor Teutonic allegiance 
and which yet can have no profitable future as distinct na- 
tionalities. We are therefore compelled to recognize at the 
outset of our inquiry that any line drawn between these two 
great areas will be arbitrary, — very arbitrary, — as compared 
with other race frontiers. A region of interlacing settle- 
ments can not be divided so as to throw all settlements of one 
race to one side and all those of the other race to the other. 

It must be plain, also, that such an area is peculiarly un- 



KUSSIA A:N^D POLAND 287 

suited to the principle of self determination. If race lines 
are followed, the result must necessarily be inconclusive. 
It is equally impossible for the people of such a district, un- 
less they are exceptionally developed, which these people cer- 
tainly are not, to forecast the result of the greater trans- 
formations which such a situation invites. Self determina- 
tion is a delusion and a snare where fair coherence and finality 
of national character has not been attained. 

In the absence of fairly clear racial or natural boundaries, 
the tendency is strong to follow historic boundaries. It is 
noteworthy that here as in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, there 
is an instinctive groping after historic boundaries which it 
is assumed have some presumptive justification. When the 
appeal to history is made to correct the wrongs of history, 
we are again in confusion. Thus, the restoration of Alsace- 
Lorraine is demanded on historic grounds, in oversight of 
the fact that history can be cited just as legitimately in favor 
of Germany's claim. Why is the history of the last fifty 
years less valid than the history of the preceding period? 
On general principles it should be rather more valid as 
representing present adjustments. In fact, history alone 
can not validate either claim. The indisputable claim of 
France rests on other grounds. 

Similarly, in our effort to escape from the confusion of 
the eastern situation, there is a noticeable groping after his- 
toric boundaries, a cry for the restoration of Poland. There 
is no apparent consciousness of what that historic Poland 
was, whether it was a constant or a variable, a fit or a mis- 
fit, a success or a failure. The assumption is that it better 
expressed the equities of the situation than the present (or 
recent) arrangement. The yoke galls now, — that is clear. 
It must be that the old one fitted better. So reasons the 
present victim, so reasons the sympathetic onlooker, each 
comparatively ignorant of that past which he invokes. 



288 THE GKEAT PEACE 

It is to be noted, first of all, that the historic past which 
is thus invoked is a much more remote past than that of 
Alsace-Lorraine. It more nearly corresponds to that remoter 
German past for the Rhine region which we have rejected as 
having been invalidated by later history. And to a large 
extent it has been thus invalidated by the happenings of the 
relatively long period since the partition of Poland. The 
tendency of political arrangements to validate themselves by 
effecting the necessary adjustments, has been quite as marked 
in this case as in any others. Unity of language and race 
has not been effected but it had not been effected in the his- 
toric Poland of pre-partition days which was largely Eussian 
and quite as unnatural a combination as any which has fol- 
lowed it. But adjustments of a very vital character have 
none the less been effected which the proposed reunion would 
disturb. Galicia, which is two thirds Eussian, is probably 
the most contented of all the subject races in the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. Though racially Slavic and outside the 
natural boundary of the Carpathians, it is united with Austria 
in religion which, — we find it hard to remember, — is the 
most important of political determinants in this part of the 
world. German Poland has been forcibly and harshly as- 
similated by Prussia, but not without effect. The German 
assertion that there is no German Poland is false, but it is 
not without a basis of truth. Germany is not Catholic like 
Austria, but its large Catholic population has successfully 
established its claim to complete liberty. The Poles have 
been an irreconcilable element in German government circles, 
but it is more than doubtful whether any considerable Polish 
territory in the German Empire would vote to enter a re- 
constituted Poland. 

Eussian Poland alone has remained distinctively Polish. 
Despite the official Eussification which has been so brutally 
enforced, the Poles have remained stubbornly unreconciled, 



EUSSIA AND POLAKD 289 

though it is noteworthy that no such wholesale betrayal of 
allegiance took place in Russian Poland as that which Austria 
suffered at the hands of the Czecho-Slovaks, and the efforts of 
Germany to rally to her cause an army of Poles after her 
conquest of Russian Poland seems to have met with failure. 
But while a century of Russian rule with its unmistakable 
harshness and tyranny, has not won the sympathy of the 
Poles, it has developed bonds that are none the less vital 
to Polish prosperity. A very large part of the industrial 
development within the Russian Empire is in Poland. Safe- 
guarded by the tariff barriers of the Empire, the immense 
Russian market has been theirs. But without this advantage 
these Polish industries could not compete for a moment with 
the much more developed industries of Germany and Eng- 
land. An independent Poland would not have this advan- 
tage but would be outside the Russian tariff barrier, com- 
pelled to find entrance on the same terms as these more ef- 
ficient nations. This she could not do. An independent 
Poland would be a ruined Poland, as far as manufacturing 
industries go. This Germany perfectly understands. The 
suggestion has been made that the independent Poland be in- 
cluded within a Russian customs union, but this, if it did 
not wholly imply Russian control, would almost inevitably 
lead to a reunion of the two countries, as Germany again is 
fully aware. By every means in her power, — not direct ap- 
peal, but clandestine propaganda, appeals to the theoretical 
democracy of the Poles and their sponsors, Germany will en- 
deavor to keep the Poles theoretically independent, trusting 
to the prejudices of the rural population and to the misdi- 
rected economics of modern nationalism to isolate Poland 
by tariff barriers which she will help to build and then in 
turn to make her, as a helpless purveyor of raw materials, 
dependent upon herself. There are more than military rea- 
sons for Germany's desire to erect Poland into an inde- 



290 THE GREAT PEACE 

pendent buffer state, — of course with a trustworthy German 
sovereign. With her industries ruined she would become 
a great producer of food for industrial Germany, who in 
turn would monopolize the privilege of providing her with 
the necessary manufactured articles. If this relation of 
dependent independence could be properly assured and sta- 
bilized, it is not clear that Germany would object to the re- 
union of Posen and perhaps of other parts of Prussian Po- 
land. It would rid the Eeichstag of a pestiferous and in- 
tractable element and would better delimit the hewers of 
wood and drawers of water froip the dominant nation. This 
economic dependence of which our western theoretic de- 
mocracy is utterly unconscious, is in fact the supreme factor 
in the problem of the Slavo-Teuton border. 

There are other embarrassments. Poland must have ac- 
cess to the sea if she is to have anything approaching real 
independence. This can come only through the historic 
harbor of Danzig. Unfortunately this harbor does not lie, 
as it properly should, between German and Russian terri- 
tories, but between two definitely German areas. To give 
Danzig to Poland with the neck of Polish territory which 
connects it with the Polish hinterland would cut Prussia in 
two. Such an arrangement is not inconceivable or without 
historic precedent, but it is pretty thoroughly discredited by 
history. Nor could East Prussia, thus severed from the 
main German body, be practicably given to Poland or any 
other power, containing, as it does, Konigsberg, the earlier 
Prussian capital and the center of Prussian tradition. 

Finally, we can not overlook the fact that the historic 
Poland to which we appeal was a signal failure. No gov- 
ernment in Europe during the last thousand years, has a 
record for more marked incompetency. Under the leader- 
ship of truly great sovereigns, the provincialism and local 
selfishness of the people proved obdurate to every appeal, 



KUSSIA AN^D POLAND 293 

even in the face of the most unmistakable national dangers. 
If ever a nation perished because it was unfit to live, that na- 
tion was Poland. This is not saying that the same would 
be true today, though the experiences of the last century or 
two have not been of a nature, seemingly, to develop the 
needed characteristics. Still less is this meant as an asper- 
sion upon individual Polish character, which has often 
enough given evidence of capacity and public spirit. But 
it means that Polish history offers an inadequate basis for 
faith in Polish future. 

The writer is predisposed, as he has already confessed, to 
the maintenance of unions among men, even when those 
unions are unideal and but imperfectly established. Such 
examination as he has been able to make of the irksome unions 
among peoples convinces him that the irksomeness usually 
inheres in something else than the formal union and remains 
after the union is dissolved. This predisposition should be 
discounted by the reader in the measure that he deems neces- 
sary. With this confession, he ventures to express his strong 
feeling that the ends sought by Poland can be better secured 
by autonomy and federation with Russia than by a nominal 
and unreal independence. N'or is he able to convince him- 
self that any form of international guaranty for a Polish 
state would be able to give that state real independence. Con- 
ceding that it might save the state from invasion and mili- 
tary subjugation (a very doubtful concession) this is not the 
danger that is most to be feared. With the present distribu- 
tion of mineral resources, Germany is predestined to become 
an industrial state, densely peopled and wealthy, while Po- 
land is as certain to become an agricultural state, with the 
moderate population and the moderate wealth which such 
occupation implies. With the geographical situation as it 
is, that means vassalage for Poland. To a large degree the 
same fate threatens all Slavdom, but the danger is infinitely 



294 THE GREAT PEACE 

greater to isolated fragments and most of all to fragments 
that lie next to Germany herself. Only the most strenuous 
effort, not alone on the part of the Slavs, but on the part 
of their friends as well, can avert this vassalage of the Slav 
to the Teuton, a vassalage which was distinctly prefigured by 
the commercial treaty of 1905 which was one of the prominent 
reasons for the war and which the treaty of JBrest-Litovsk 
re-imposes. Such a vassalage easily leads to military co- 
operation if not to political merger, as witness Bulgaria's 
statement on entering the war. It behooves the powers that 
are interested in restraining the military aggressions of 
Germany to resist by every means in their power that policy 
of disintegration by which Germany, invoking our cherished 
principle of self-determination, is pursuing her ends of Slav 
subjugation. 

It need hardly be said that the objections here urged against 
an independent Poland hold in even gTeater degree against 
the other fragments of Russia which it pleases Germany to 
erect into puppet kingdoms and decorate with her surplus 
princelings. They are smaller, weaker, and less historic than 
Poland. They have shown no evidence of national spirit or 
capacity. Their dependence upon Germany is not remote 
and potential but immediate and avowed. Their detachment 
and alleged independence would be tantamount to annexa- 
tion. 

This brings us to the all important conclusion. Russia 
must be reconstituted, reunited, and constructively devel- 
oped. Long dreaded by the western powers as the moving 
glacier whose irresistible advance threatened to overwhelm 
them, she now reveals herself as a necessary counterweight 
to a nearer and a deadlier enemy. If Russia could remain 
out of the game, perhaps all would draw a sigh of relief, 
but this is impossible. United and powerful, she is the 
inevitable check upon Germany whose leadership she resents 



RUSSIA AND POLAND 295 

as much as we do. Divided and weak, she inevitahly he- 
oomes a vast arsenal of resource for Germany's use. Ger- 
many entered this war to get Belgium and the Channel ports 
from which she could overpower Britain at her convenience, 
to overpower France and take her money and her navy, to 
get Constantinople and open the way from Berlin to Bag- 
dad. The day after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk she would 
have yielded Belgium and her hope of the Channel ports, 
she would have withdrawn from France, she would have 
retired from the Balkans and Constantinople, she would 
have restored Alsace-Lorraine, and would have renounced 
her dreams of Berlin to Bagdad, — all, if she could be 
left free in her new and undreamed-of prospect of Berlin 
to Vladivostok. That is what she is saying through her 
new prince-chancellor as these lines are written. Autonomy, 
justice, self-determination, leagues to enforce peace, with all 
these she is agreed. She will not let paper principles stand 
in the way of an agreement which says nothing about iron 
and coal and interposes nothing but verbal barriers between 
her and the richest prize that ever fell to the lot of a con- 
queror. 

The reconstitution of Eussia will encounter almost in- 
superable obstacles. The underlying unity of race is ob- 
scured by provincialism and negatived, — especially as re- 
gards Poland, — by the intensest religious prejudice. The 
country is inconceivably poor and wretched, and too ignorant 
to know the occasion of its misery. The wildest economic 
and political theories here find acceptance and work their 
terrible havoc. Schooled in the democracy of petty, local in- 
terests, no people is so utterly without knowledge of national 
interests or so unskilled in international problems. It is the 
land of the chimera and the will-o'-the-wisp. Yet if we are 
to escape the menace of a Germany that would extend from 
the Rhine to the Pacific, we must make a nation out of Russia. 



296 THE GREAT PEACE 

It will be the supreme test of our power to survive. !N'o 
paper guaranties and permessos will do the work. Close 
knit alliances, huge capital investments, constructive states- 
manship, and above all tolerance for political necessities un- 
like our own and for methods and mechanisms which would 
not serve our ends, will be needed in a measure surpassing 
our utmost imagination. If we don't do this, Germany will, 
— in her different way and for her different ends, — and will 
reap the benefit, all to Russia's hurt and ours. 

One exception to this general conclusion should perhaps 
be noted. Finland is not Russian, nor is there any reason 
for her becoming so except as a stepping stone to the absorp- 
tion of the Scandinavian countries by the great Slav power. 
This is obviously no longer contemplated, and is farthest from 
that ideal which now animates the Allied cause. Finland 
is essentially Scandinavian in her culture and in all her af- 
finities. She may well indulge in the novel pleasure of 
independence until the Scandinavian powers see the futility 
of their unnatural separation and find a way to reconcile 
their individuality with the necessities of modern larger 
organization. A customs union of Denmark, ISTorway, 
Sweden, and Finland with some form of federal union for 
the handling of their common interests, would seem a de- 
sirable thing to one who knows nothing of the petty jeal- 
ousies, the arbitrary differences of custom and dialect which 
have motived their recent centrifugal policy. Whether the 
war which has written its great lessons so large before their 
eyes, has prepared them for the desirable, the seemingly 
inevitable, step, remains to be seen. The issue is theirs, 
not ours, and should in no way influence the deliberations 
of the peace table except to dictate the expulsion of the Ger- 
man kinglet and leave Finland free to effect the desirable 
combination. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE REMOTER POWERS 

The war has gradually drawn into its vortex a number 
powers that are remote from the conflict both geographically 
and in their interests. With a single exception these are 
minor powers as measured by wealth, population, or military 
establishment. Their interests are unfamiliar and are easily 
forgotten. It may be assumed, however, that they are keenly 
alive to these interests and that they look forward to the 
peace conference as an opportunity for securing national ad- 
vantage. The world is familiar with the case of Italy in the 
Crimean War. The struggling little kingdom was but half 
formed as yet, and the issue of the war concerned her but 
remotely. Above all she was unprepared for war. But the 
far-seeing Cavour perceived that participation in the war 
meant participation in the peace conference and so recogni- 
tion by the powers. It meant farther an opportuuity to bring 
the cause of Italy before the powers of Europe in council as- 
sembled, an opportunity which he used with telling effect. 
]t is safe to say that these remoter countries have been much 
influenced by similar ulterior considerations, and that one 
of the most delicate tasks of the conference will be to de- 
termine what matters are relevant to the discussion. There 
will be the strongest pressure to make the peace conference 
a general committee pro bono publico, with the result that 
an impossible program will develop and a multitude of 
smouldering animosities will break into flame. Whether 
the world will find in Venizelos or some unknown Brazilian 
or Mongolian its new Cavour, we can only speculate. The 
situation has possibilities. 

297 



298 THE GEEAT PEACE 

The scope of the present work does not admit a study of 
these remoter national problems which may find in the great 
war an occasion for demanding our attention. Small though 
they may seem compared with the great issues that we have 
considered, they are numerous and involved, and require for 
their intelligent settlement a vast amount of patient research. 
To lay this burden upon the peace conference, to postpone its 
decisions and jeopardize its agreements by the animosities 
and heart burnings which these minor issues involve, would 
be fatal to its main purpose. It must not be forgotten that 
after five years of literal world war one of the imperative de- 
mands upon such a conference will be that it reach its de- 
cisions promptly and relieve the nations at the earliest pos- 
sible moment of their intolerable burdens. To reach a 
settlement that is just in its main lines but leave all details 
for more leisurely consideration under conditions of peace 
is the plain duty of the conference. Many a minor issue 
might better wait for justice than to have a suffering world 
wait for peace. 

The conclusion is that the irrelevant or feebly relevant is- 
sues affecting remoter nations, — and even the main con- 
testants, — should be rigorously excluded from the confer- 
ence. At the same time the war furnishes an occasion not 
to be missed for the settlement of these matters. The Hague 
Tribunal, less ambitious than the league of nations, and 
therefore more hopeful, has machinery ready and admirably 
suited for the work. The peace conference may, without 
undue delay, find time to refer such issues, properly defined, 
to the Hague Tribunal. The advantage of the occasion con- 
sists in this that the presentation of these issues to the council 
of the nations gives them an opportunity to recommend, and 
virtually to compel, the submission of issues to rational ad- 
judication, which otherwise would wait indefinitely for a 
suitable initiative. Kor will it be easy for one of these 



THE KEMOTER POWERS 299 

claimants to refuse the reference of its claim to such a 
tribunal when it has acquiesced in the reference of similar 
claims for some other nation. The peace conference may, 
therefore, become the occasion for an extensive world house- 
cleaning without itself delaying for the completion of the 
work. The question of the enforcement of these judgments 
may seem to offer difficulties, but it is doubtful if enforce- 
ment will be necessary. The mere reference of the matter 
to the tribunal by the council of the powers is in itself a pow- 
erful enforcement, and a quiet assumption of this fact with- 
out allusion to possible coercion would facilitate the refer- 
ence without seriously impairing the sanction. 

One of these remoter nations, however, stands in a class 
quite by itself. Japan is one of the great powers and this 
fact, together with her early entry into the war, quite pre- 
cludes the possibility of referring her claims to after settle- 
ment. Possibly some will demur that Japan has played but 
a secondary part in the war and that she is entitled to cor- 
respondingly less consideration. This criticism is without 
just foundation. Japan's part in the present war was de- 
termined in advance by treaty and by nature. That part 
was very considerable and has been admirably performed. 
It was primarily the policing of the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans against sea raiders, the protection of allied commerce 
in this vast area, and the expulsion of Germany from all her 
colonies and posts in the east. This last was done at the 
very outset and with the utmost thoroughness. The police 
duty has been performed throughout the war with perfect 
success. When we consider the extent of Allied commerce, 
let us say between Hong Kong and Aden and the heavy de- 
mand upon Britain's navy in the west, it is no small service 
to have made this largest commercial area in the world as 
safe in these four years of storm as in time of peace. But 
Japan has exceeded her pledge in this respect. When the 



300 THE GREAT PEACE 

submarine menace was at its height and the Mediterranean 
became almost impassable, Japan joined the Allies in the 
protection of this area, contributing materially to the practical 
reclamation of this vital line of communications from which 
the submarine menace long ago disappeared. This service 
has been both costly and valuable, but it has not been dra- 
matic. It easily permits the conclusion that no effort is be- 
ing made. The writer has repeatedly been asked the im- 
patient question during the last four years : " Why doesn't 
the British navy do something ? " The questioner seemed 
wholly unconscious of the fact that that navy was performing 
incessantly and with complete success the most titanic and 
exhausting task ever performed by any fighting force. The 
task of Japan, though less strenuous, is of the same exacting 
but unobtrusive character. 

It has been widely urged that Japan should have con- 
tributed to the struggle on land. This was physically im- 
possible. The eastern front was barred both by the long 
distance and poor communications, and by the feeling of 
the Russian people who would not have tolerated the pres- 
ence of their recent enemy in strength in their midst. The 
western front was twelve thousand miles away, accessible 
only by sea. At a time when no ships could be spared to 
bring wheat from Australia and too few were available to 
transport our own troops three thousand miles, the trans- 
portation of Japanese troops four times as far was obviously 
not to be considered. Japan has done what she could, and 
so far as can be seen, has done it cheerfully and whole- 
heartedly. The question has continually been raised whether 
Japan might not betray her allies and suddenly cast in her 
lot with Germany. There is nothing in the way of kinship 
or accumulated obligation to prevent it. Yet Japan has 
given no sign of defection. The writer is of the opinion that 
no government is more constrained by its plighted word than 



THE KEMOTEK POWEES 301 

this government,, so recently the inheritor of the incomparable 
Samurai tradition. In any case the promise has been kept, 
and Japan presents herself before the world in council as 
an extremely strong claimant for whatever she sees fit to 

claim. 

What will she claim? Formally she will perhaps ask 
nothing,— preferably so if she can avoid it. She will be 
happy if her claims are not mentioned in the conference, 
for to mention them will be to challenge them. Japan is 
the one great power that has realized substantial gains during 
the war and has succeeded in confirming herself in possession 
during the struggle. These gains are not primarily terri- 
torial, though the expulsion of Germany from her holdings 
in the east has left certain territories in her possession. 
Certain of these whose situation made their ownership a mat- 
ter of concern to Australia and Xew Zealand, have been re- 
linquished to their control. Others, and notably the famous 
Tsingtao, Germany's Gibraltar on the Shantung Peninsula, 
remain in Japanese possession. But these territorial prob- 
lems, even so strategic a one as the last mentioned, are of 
small moment compared with other advantages which Japan 
has been able to secure while Europe was too occupied to in- 
terfere. 

The capture of Tsingtao was the starting point for this 
very important advance of Japanese interests as also for a 
very significant and rapid evolution of policy on the part of 
the Japanese government and people. The announcement 
first made on the fall of Tsingtao was vaguely to the effect 
that Tsingtao had been recovered with a view to its restora- 
tion to the Chinese people, and lively expectations were at 
once aroused among the latter. These, however, were soon 
disappointed. A more explicit announcement soon followed 
to the effect that Tsingtao would be held by Japan during 
the continuance of the war after which the question of its 



302 THE GEEAT PEACE 

restitution -would be taken up. This seemed to promise the 
consideration of the problem at the peace table, a recognition 
of the fact that questions of international relation between 
China and Japan were subject to its jurisdiction, or at least 
a proper subject for its advice. 

But it could not fail to occur to the Japanese that this 
was a peculiarly favorable moment to escape from the tute- 
lage of the western powers who had seldom shown themselves 
disinterested arbiters of Oriental interests. For once the 
long enforced deference to their opinion and wish might 
safely be laid aside. Hence China was informed that Japan 
thought it desirable to reach a settlement of all the questions 
at issue between the two nations. These questions, — some 
of them hardly living issues until this time, — amounted to 
a remarkable series of demands made by Japan upon China, 
embracing, among other things, the extension and prolonga- 
tion of her hold upon Manchuria, the exclusion of foreign 
powers from specified parts of the Chinese coast, the transfer 
of control of the Chinese steel industry to Japanese hands, 
freedom of Japanese religious propaganda in China, and 
emplo}Tnent of Japanese experts in preference to those of 
other nations in all the constructive enterprises of the develop- 
ing Chinese government. The purpose of these remarkable 
demands was to check the economic and above all the military 
power of the western nations in the Orient and to secure that 
of Japan in their stead. Despite the passionate opposition of 
the Chinese, the effort was almost completely successful. 
China was helpless, and her friends, — more exactly Japan's 
rivals, — were powerless to interfere. All of the demands 
except the last were finally conceded.^ 

This diplomatic victory was not won without much com- 
motion in the world. Germany of course protested but in 

1 For a fuller statement of these demands and the reasons partly justi- 
fying them, see " The Things Men Fight For," pp. 312-319. 



THE REMOTER POWERS 303 

vain. Russia can hardly have been reconciled, but it was 
not the moment to protest. Britain found her own strong 
position rather strengthened than menaced by the aggressive 
policy of Japan, though the unspoken animus of the move- 
ment, the Orient for the Orientals, had its disquieting sug- 
gestions. But Britain was plainly debarred from opposing 
an ally upon whose assistance she was so vitally dependent. 
Japan probably consulted her ally and acted with her ap- 
proval, but that does not mean that the approval was will- 
ingly given. Decidedly Japan was in a strong position and 
she made the most of it. 

But Japanese sagacity was never better shown than in her 
prompt adoption of a conservative and conciliatory policy 
following her victory. Political conditions at home for- 
tunately enabled her to do this the more effectually. The 
retirement of the aged premier. Okuma, permitted the saga- 
cious elder statesmen to dictate the appointment of a con- 
ciliatory successor. The ambassador to China whose strong 
handed action had made him hated by the Chinese was con- 
veniently retired and Japan for three years has practiced to 
the full her incomparable art of ingratiation. The Chinese 
have short memories in matters that are remote from their 
daily thought, and there is little reason to doubt that the 
nation has learned to accommodate itself to the virtual su- 
zerainty of Japan. 

Most astonishing of all is the triumph of Japan in securing 
the recognition of outside powers and notably of ourselves.^ 
In the fullest sense, Japan has fortified herself for the later 
action of the powers. 

This, then, is Japan's stake in the settlement, the main- 
tenance of her position of paramountcy in the Far East and 
particularly in China. During the war she has converted 
that position from a theory into a fact and has confirmed 

iSee page 123. 



304 THE GKEAT PEACE 

it by her arts. The peace conference will he the first and 
presumably the last ordeal which that paramountcy will be 
called upon to pass. Best of all for her purpose would it be 
to have the matter unmentioned, thus tacitly accepting it as an 
accomplished fact like the other historic facts upon which 
the governments represented depend. This is the probable 
attitude which the conference will take. There will be living 
issues enough without resurrecting any dead ones. Japan 
is an ally and has done her part. China is not yet a going 
concern and rights wrested from Japan on her behalf are 
a doubtful service to the cause of civilization and peace. 
And after all there are excellent reasons for each of the con- 
cessions obtained, reasons which would have seemed com- 
pelling had we been in the place of Japan. Above all it is 
to be noted that the paramount position which China has 
been compelled and we have been persu aded to recognize, has 
long been a concrete fact. A highly organized military and 
industrial nation situated at the very door of China, inert, 
mediaeval, and effete, necessarily occupies a position to which 
neither her helpless neighbor nor her efficient rivals ten thou- 
sand miles away can lay any claim. There is not much use 
in blinking facts like that or legislating against them. 

But w^hile there can be, — and probably should be, — no re- 
view of these transactions by the peace conference, despite 
the cherished hope of China to the contrary, there are in- 
terests that are menaced by the arrangement between the two 
powers which may well be made the subject of consideration. 
The policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all na- 
tions in the trade of China and the development of her 
enormous resources, is a policy nominally in force since 
1900. To this policy Japan, along with other powers, has 
given her assent, and this assent is said to have been renewed 
on the occasion of our recent approval of her policy. In the 
interest of China, in the interest of their own commerce, and 



THE EEMOTER POWEES 305 

in the interest of the peace of the world, that policy should 
receive affirmation and, if possible, definition by the com- 
munity of nations at this time. It is not nearly so self- 
explanatory a policy as it might seem. It implies, of course, 
equal tariffs, equal privileges, etc., for all nations. But the 
easiest thing in the world is to evade the spirit of such an 
agreement. Thus, at a time when Russia had guaranteed 
to Japan equal commercial privileges in Manchuria, she is 
said to have evaded her agreement by making it impossible 
for Japanese consuls to find office or domicile. As there 
could be no consuls without domicile and no commerce with- 
out consuls, the guaranteed equality was thus effectually 
withheld, but in a way difficult to make the ground of diplo- 
matic protest. There is little likelihood that Japan will re- 
sort to such contemptible devices as this, but there are others. 
Particularly in the matter of concessions for railways, min- 
ing operations and the like, matters dependent upon special 
negotiations in each case, impartiality is not easy, nor is it 
guaranteed by a formula. The duty of the peace confer- 
ence, either directly or through some delegated procedure, 
is to set definite limits to Japanese suzerainty in China. 
Properly limited, that suzerainty is a safeguard, not a men- 
ace. It assures first of all the integrity of China against 
the rivalries and the possible domination of the powers whose 
peace might find there its menace. It insures also the de- 
velopment of China as a Japanese asset. On the other hand 
the permanent domination of China by Japan in a sense which 
might make China a military menace to the western nations 
is most improbable. The Chinese are neither few nor weak. 
Japan will be cautious about putting the sword into their 
hands. With the development of modern intelligence and 
modern methods in China, a certain sense of opposition is 
likely to be felt between the two powers sufficient to protect 
the world from them and to give Japan very good reason 



306 THE GREAT PEACE 

for checking militarism on China's part. In other words, 
the much heralded yellow peril is one against which Japan 
must be on her guard, for if she ever armed China to fight 
her battles, China would inevitably get out of hand. The 
world has reason to be complacent over the Japanese hege- 
mony of the Orient. 

On the other hand, we have little to fear from the hostility 
of Japan. Japan is and must be a naval power. No re- 
sources in her possession or within her natural sphere of in- 
fluence can ever give her world mastery of the seas. Her 
present allies hold that mastery and have every opportunity 
to retain it. If we can conceive of our own country ever 
having the folly to part company with its allied kin, a com- 
bination of Japan and Germany would be possible and per- 
haps fatal to either half and ultimately to both. But Japan 
will '' cast in her lot with the English speaking peoples '' if 
these peoples make common cause. If not, she will not and 
can not. 



CHAPTER XIX 

BEITAIN 

In the summer of 1915 the writer had opportunity for pro- 
longed conversations with an Englishman who was officially 
in touch with inner British circles. The relation became in- 
timate and confidential. There could be no doubt of the 
sincerity of the views thus expressed. In the course of one 
of the conversations on the war, after a discussion of the 
aims and prospects of the various powers, the question finally 
came up: "And what do you want?" "Not a thing. 
We are not going to annex a single square mile." " But you 
will have to. You siriplj can't let Mesopotamia and Pales- 
tine with their strategic situation go back to Turkey or to 
anybody else who is in line for them. You must link up 
India and Egypt." "Well, — yes, I see your point, but 
(after hesitation), no, we must avoid it. We didn't go 
into this war to get territory, and our moral position as fight- 
ing a purely defensive war will be so much stronger if we 
stick to that program, that I think we shall find some way 
to avoid it." 

Though speaking for himself, this man certainly reflected 
the opinion of high British circles at that time. There is 
no reason to assume that the preferences or judgments of 
these circles or of the British people have changed since that 
time. Yet we may take it as certain that this war will 
largely increase the responsibilities of the British Empire. 
The cynic will scoff and will find in this new discrepancy be- 
tween British profession and British deeds one more occa- 
sion for the oft alleged British hj^pocrisy. We can antici- 
pate the new diatribes of German critics about " perfidious 
Albion " and her conspiracy for the ruin of Germany and the 

307 



308 THE GREAT PEACE 

filching of her possessions. The Englishman was not in- 
sensible to the opportunity thus afforded. 

A people in the stage of development in which the German 
people now find themselves simply can not understand or 
credit the attitude of reluctance to assume the responsibilities 
of empire. With a crude acquisitiveness untempered by 
scruple or experience, and conceiving of subject peoples not 
as weaklings claiming their toilsome guidance and protec- 
tion, but as lower beings created for their service, empire 
for them means not burden but privilege. They do not ap- 
preciate that with the full acceptance of the principle of 
trusteeship the possibility of direct profit vanishes. Colonies 
to them mean prestige and profits, not burden and obligation. 
How can the people that conceives of the French and British 
as destined to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for 
themselves and that makes war upon a peaceable neighbor 
with the express purpose of appropriating the accumulated 
fruits of its industry and toil, — how can such a people regard 
the rule of negroes or Mongolians as entailing burdensome 
obligations? Colonies to them are assets and subject peo- 
ples are loot. Their colonies may be models of administra- 
tion and their peoples cared for like stock on a dairy farm 
(neither of which has thus far been true) but it will be from 
motives of sagacious exploitation, not of human obligation. 
They can not conceive of true reluctance to accept such per- 
quisites. 

Yet nothing is more certain than that this reluctance char- 
acterizes those who have truly mastered the secret of empire 
as a great human trust. There may be no hesitation, no lack 
of resoluteness in undertaking the necessary task, but the 
attitude in which new obligations are accepted by a people 
that has given hostages to humanity is as different from the 
crass selfishness of the eager novice as white is from black. 
Empire for such a people loses its glamour and presents itself 



BRITAIN 309 

in the sober gray of duty and poorly requited toil, a guise 
not without its attractions, but attractions incomprehensible 
to the uninitiated. 

There are still all kinds of people in the British Empire 
and all kinds of attitudes toward imperial obligations. There 
are those who feel the primitive impulse to acquire with little 
care for anything beyond. There are those who are com- 
placent with present gratifying achievments, too indolent to 
think beyond. There are those who shudder at the respon- 
sibilities that impend, and still others that would throw all 
over in disgust. But the British people have lost their crude 
eagerness to acquire. Their care is now to develop, to make 
self-sufficient, to lessen responsibilities, to emancipate, to com- 
plete rather than to extend the task of empire. 

Meanwhile this task remains an ever enlarging fact. The 
work of empire, the correlation of separated but kindred peo- 
ples, the guidance of backward peoples, the protection of the 
weak, this work remains to be done and calls aloud for those 
who can do it. This is no fiction. Not long since certain 
petty states in the Malay Peninsula petitioned King George 
that they might be allowed to become a part of the Federated 
Malay States whose prosperity and superb administration 
they envied. The unanimous preference of the Syrian 
Moslems for English administration in the event of a change 
in Turkey, has already been noted (page 257). Nothing 
succeeds like success, and British administration is a success, 
its enemies themselves being witnesses. 

But the immediate choice of the people is not the only nor 
the most compelling reason for the extension of these no longer 
alluring responsibilities. Little by little in all empires the 
fact reveals itself that the world refuses to divide satisfac- 
torily. Wherever the lines are drawn, there are weak points 
that can only be strengthened by extension of control. No 
responsible empire makes these extensions wantonly, but at- 



310 THE GKEAT PEACE 

tack or menace compels the unwelcome step. The imperial 
power is thus ever goaded on to further expansion. Such 
is the history of every healthy empire. Its growth is un- 
willed, reluctant, and at last coerced. The imperialism that 
is deliberate and avid is a disease. 

The present is one of those epochs of coerced advance of 
which the British Empire has recorded so many. This neces- 
sity rests on several facts. First, upon the clear necessity 
of liquidating the imperial operations of Germany. As an 
imperial trust she must go out of business. We have learned 
nothing from the war if we have not learned that. Mean- 
while her trust transactions call for a new trustee. Their 
location, if nothing else, prescribes Britain as the successor. 
The Caroline Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, and other 
scattered holdings in Oceanica are in the great British area. 
To assign them to any other power would be a forced and 
artificial arrangement which could have nothing but jeal- 
ousies or irrelevant interests to recommend it. These will 
not go to England, be it noted, but to Australia, the nearby 
civilized commonwealth that is vitally interested in their 
occupancy by a possible enemy. There is abundant guar- 
anty, however, that Australian administration will be guided 
by the invaluable British tradition. 

The great question, however, is the disposal of the exten- 
sive German colonies of Togo, Cameroon, Southwest Africa, 
and German East Africa. The first two are tropical colonies 
and so situated that they link up with French possessions 
more naturally than with those of any other nation. While 
Britain has not surrendered her colonies of earlier foundation 
in this part of Africa, there is an obvious assumption under- 
lying all Anglo-French relations since 1904 that this part of 
Africa is preeminently a French field of development. More- 
over a large part of the German colony of Cameroon was 
French until recently, having been ceded to Germany in 




OCEAN 



Capet] 

Cap* of Good Hope 



BKITAIN 313 

1911 under compulsion in lieu of the much coveted Morocco. 
It is fitting and probable, therefore, that these colonies should 
be assigned to France and united with the adjacent French 
territories in a unit development. 

German East Africa, also a tropical colony, adjoins Brit- 
ish, Belgian, and Portuguese territories. Of these three there 
can be no thought of its union with any but the British. 
Belgium already has in the Belgian Congo a territory visibly 
in excess of her ability to manage. It owes its existence to 
a misguided attempt at internationalization which resulted 
in bankruptcy, fearful exploitation of the natives, and finally 
in assumption by Belgium by the logic of accident. No 
national exploitation of Africa can begin to show the incom- 
petency and abuse which has characterized this great experi- 
ment in internationalism. The Portuguese colonies, on the 
other hand, have been conspicuous failures and their partition 
among other European powers was openly discussed and 
practically agreed upon before the war without protest from 
Portugal herself. She has long ago been weighed in the 
balances and found wanting. 

Turning to the remaining colony of Southwest Africa we 
have a wholly different problem, and one which is strangely 
misunderstood. Southwest Africa was for Germany a de- 
pendency, a possession, a source of materials for her in- 
dustries and of men for the armies which, as she boasted, 
were to keep British South Africa from aiding their associate 
dominions. It was. in short, the estate of an absentee land- 
lord. But Southwest Africa is by nature a part of the great 
South African Commonwealth, the white man's Africa, a 
white man's nation, free to determine its own destinies as is 
Australia or Canada or England herself. The question there- 
fore is not one of passing over a chattel from one power to 
another, but of emancipating white man's land and uniting it 
to its own. It is a question of Africa irredenta, of freedom 



314 THE GREAT PEACE 

and independence as contrasted with perpetual subjection, 
for Germany never contemplated the freeing of her colonies. 

But there is a larger question than this and one that has 
been surprisingly ignored. Despite all our striving and all 
our protestations we still continue to consider these questions 
rather from the standpoint of suzerain privilege than from 
that of colonial welfare. The plea is continually in our 
ears or in our thoughts as to whether Germany should not 
have *' her share " of colonies and the like, the good things 
of earth. Maddened by her inhuman acts we nerve our- 
selves to outlaw the great offender and to confiscate her col- 
onies, but we are still conscious of having deprived her of 
something normally hers, something which if decent she 
might rightfully claim. We divide up Africa as Jacob and 
Esau divided the herds. 

As regards tropical races and peoples destined to permanent 
or prolonged incapacity for self management, the right of 
the civilized world to impose the conditions of order can not 
reasonably be doubted, though it is a question whether even 
upon such races the civilized world has the right to impose its 
barriers and its feuds. But in a country like South Africa 
which is certain to be the home of white men and the seat of 
a great civilized independent state, this question becomes 
far more important. Europe is hopelessly divided in lan- 
guage and from this difference derive others which taken 
in the aggregate make political union impossible and even 
peace precarious. The present awful calamity which is said 
already to have cost the lives of eight million men is wholly 
due to diversities of race which in last analysis are matters 
of speech and custom. 

But awful as is this situation, in Europe it has its explana- 
tion, its reason. Europe itself is divided into sharply dif- 
ferentiated areas fit to engender race peculiarities but offer- 
ing advantages which compensate for them. The seas and 



BRITAm 315 

straits and gulfs that divide Europe are the most facile of 
highways, the channels through which move the stimulating 
and vivifying currents of life. Europe is the most quarrel- 
some but also the most dynamic, the most civilized, part of 
the world. Mature is responsible for both. 

But South Africa is not made that way. To transfer to 
that unit area the diversities and antipathies of Europe would 
give it perfectly gratuitous disadvantages with no possible 
compensation. These colonies are young yet. The German 
colony has virtually no German population and the schism 
is not yet born. But let it be German for a hundred years, 
and we would have there a German area permanently in- 
capable of union with the neighboring English speaking dis- 
trict which is, and forever must be, the dominant white ele- 
ment in South Africa. We should have gratuitously created 
a barrier for future generations to balk at, perhaps to drench 
with their blood. It requires a profound belief in the merits 
of German culture (a culture which the writer by no means 
despises) to make such a course as that seem worth while. 

It will of course be said in reply that a similar divergence 
exists between French and English. Yes, and regrettably so, 
but the cases are not even approximately parallel. The 
French and British colonies are sandwiched in together in 
some parts of Africa in a way that seems at this distance 
unfortunate, a thing perhaps to be remedied by exchanges. 
But these are tropical colonies, and tropical colonies will never 
become white man's land. The population will always be 
native and will for an indefinite period retain its native 
language. Whether these natives in addition acquire a smat- 
tering of French or English is irrelevant as regards their 
political or cultural future. But a land that is destined to 
fill up with white men should avoid the white men's dissen- 
sions, especially when the country itself speaks unreservedly 
for union. The problem of Southwest Africa is not a prob- 



316 THE GEEAT PEACE 

lem of the rights of Germany or of Britain. It is a problem 
of developing a united people in a united land. If German 
had the same dominating position in South Africa that Eng- 
lish now holds, the writer for one would unhesitatingly vote 
for a German unity. 

It is perhaps worth while to note that the dissensions thus 
forecast are by no means speculative. They have long ex- 
isted and Southwest Africa has long been a thorn in the flesh 
of the neighboring Commonwealth. It was no doubt in part 
due to this that the Commonwealth espoused the cause of 
Britain so wholeheartedly and devoted a hundred million 
dollars and a considerable army to the expulsion of " neigh- 
bor Hans " from his objectionable point of vantage. This 
hostility was not merely racial, but in this case had the arti- 
ficial virulence which William Hohenzollern has everywhere 
known how to give it. But artificial or not, its effect was 
not the less real. In German Southwest Africa had been 
planted the seeds of one of the world's great antagonisms 
which it is the good fortune of the present generation to pluck 
up ere it was grown. 

The case of the Portuguese colonies is not relevant to our 
discussion, yet intimately associated with our problem. 
Their fate has long been determined. Portugal does nothing, 
can do nothing, to develop them. It is due to them and 
to the world that some arrangement should be made to bring 
them under more favorable conditions. Britain's control 
of Portugal should make that possible. Indeed an arrange- 
ment was announced before the war dividing them between 
Britain and Gemaany. The eastern colony holds the same 
relation to the South African Commonwealth on the east that 
the German colony holds on the west, only the contact is 
much closer and more vital. It should be united to that 
great state now, before alien institutions and alien culture 



BRITAIN 317 

make the -union unnecessarily slow and difficult. The great 
western colony requires different treatment. 

The cases of Arabia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia have been 
sufficiently considered in the chapter on Turkey. These 
districts for many reasons will doubtless pose as independent 
states, but in varying degrees they must inevitably be British 
dependencies. Arabia will be an isolated shrine in which 
Britain will have no other function than to protect its isola- 
tion, — and insure its sanitation. Palestine will be a com- 
petently administered up-to-date artificial state, which will 
require nothing of Britain save protection from foreign ag- 
gression, and will repay that protection with perfect loyalty. 
Mesopotamia will require British capital and British ad- 
ministration and can hardly escape becoming an avowed 
British protectorate. As such it will again become the 
Garden of Eden. Perhaps Anatolia and Constantinople 
will claim the healing touch, but the claim may well be 
denied. 

The problem of problems in connection with the coming 
settlement is the control of the sea. That control Britain has 
maintained against all comers for two reasons that are pe- 
culiar to herself. The first is the insular position and dense 
industrial population of England. That population normally 
raises but thirty per cent, of its food. The rest is imported 
by sea. If the sea routes are closed, England starves. IS""© 
other country is so situated. If any other country loses the 
use of the sea, it suffers but it does not starve. England 
alone must have the freedom of the sea or her present popu- 
lation can not continue to live there, but must migrate and 
ruin her industries, her everything. 

To this unique necessity is added another, equally impera- 
tive and equally unique. England is but the European head- 
quarters of a vast aggregate a hundred times her area and 



318 THE GKEAT PEACE 

with ten times her population. This group of nations, falsely 
called an empire, constitutes the greatest power in the world, 
solely by virtue of its voluntary cooperation. But this co- 
operation is rendered possible only by the use of the sea. If 
this use were denied them, no amount of sympathy or desire 
to help one another would be of any avail. The great power 
would automatically crumble into a lot of scattered little 
powers helpless to achieve any worthy work for the world, 
helpless even to maintain their own existence- 
No more pertinent demand can therefore be made of a 
defeated Germany than the surrender of her navy. That 
navy was built solely to destroy the navy of Britain, that is, 
to destroy the British Empire. Even when Germany had 
colonies, her navy stood in no relation to their number or 
needs. With the loss of her colonies, she loses even the pre- 
text for the maintenance of a vast navy. That navy neces- 
sitated the expansion of every other naval program in the 
world. No other form of German militarism was so odious, 
so burdensome upon the entire world, so utterly gratuitous. 
No other form is so capable of suppression by international 
action. To propose the destruction of German militarism 
and yet leave Germany in possession of a monster navy which 
exists, not as the condition of her national union, nor yet for 
the protection of her commerce, but purely for the purpose 
of challenging the safety and the existence of other powers, 
is a proposal which would invalidate every argument by which 
the Allies have justified their action. 

A logical corollary of the surrender of the German navy 
would be the surrender of the Kiel Canal. It is true that 
this Canal serves commercial as well as naval purposes, though 
the latter were the real cause of its construction. Commer- 
cial purposes it would of course continue to serve in any case. 
But the Canal must in any case continue to exist, and so long 
as it exists it must potentially serve Germany's purpose. The 



BEITAIN 319 

idea of withholding it from her by internationalization in- 
volves the usual fallacy of assuming that such arrangements 
are self-enforcing. If the Canal would serve Germany's pur- 
pose in any future war, she would take it, and no interna- 
tional precautions would prevent it. 

Britain controls the sea that she may use the sea, for she 
must use the sea or perish. Her need and her right are such 
as no other nation knows. And now she is asked to surrender 
that control and to trust the freedom of the seas and with it 
her own existence and the lives of her people to an interna- 
tional league, a league having as yet only a theoretical exist- 
ence, a league of whose competence, of whose justice, of whose 
sympathy, even of whose existence, she has as yet had no 
experience. She will not do it. The ivorld can not afford 
to have her do it. The experiment must be tried with some 
lesser stake than the existence of the " great and sacred inter- 
national trust " which, more than any other power, holds the 
safety of the world in its keeping. British statesmen and the 
British people have too much feeling for reality to trifle thus 
with the heritage of a thousand years. 

And all for what ? What do we wish to accomplish by this 
new international agency that we summon from the limbo of 
the imagination to take over the task of this veteran of the 
seas ? To open the waterways to all honest folk ? To light 
the beacon on the savage's inhospitable shores? To rid the 
sea of the marauder? To remove the barriers and the toll- 
gates? To rescue the shipwrecked? To maintain by piti- 
less discipline the law of " women and children first " ? In 
which of these has Britain failed ? What sea has she closed ? 
What waterway has she barred? What harbor does she 
monopolize? Is there a reef that she has not charted, a 
coast that she has left unlighted, a pirate that she has not 
hunted? Is there a harbor under the control of her Parlia- 
ment that she does not open to the ships of her rivals on the 



320 THE GEEAT PEACE 

same terms as to her own ? Is there an abuse that she will- 
ingly tolerates, a possible forbearance that she does not 
show ? What is the world's grievance that impels it to dis- 
miss this most competent of unpaid servitors ? 

But Britain smites her enemies upon the sea, drives them 
to cover and shuts them in, all to the sore discomfort of those 
who were trafficking profitably with them. Precisely, just as 
land powers pursue their enemies upon the land with vastly 
greater disturbance and devastation. But what is there in 
recent British history to warrant the fear that her power will 
be used wantonly or tyrannously? It is fatuous to expect 
peace by the disarmament of the conservative and forbear- 
ing. The weapon in such hands is rather a guaranty of 
peace than its menace. We have read the story of the wars 
that the British navy has fought, but who knows the story of 
the wars it has prevented ? 

There has been just one intelligible protest against Brit- 
ain's control of the sea, that of the power that wishes to de- 
stroy her. That control is the condition of the existence of 
that fellowship of free nations which Germany abhors, and 
the very substance of its power. Withdraw the British navy 
from the seas and nothing will effectually hinder Germany's 
ruthless purpose. Eliminate that purpose, and Britain will 
withdraw her navy without a mandate. 

This protest against Britain's control of the sea is made in 
the name of internationalism, but in the interest (con- 
sciously or unconsciously) of the crudest and most illiberal 
nationalism. The seer of visions as usual plays into the 
hands of the seeker of gains. Meanwhile if the fondest of 
visions were realized, we should at the utmost be where we 
are now as regards the permanent interests of the safety and 
freedom of the seas. The thing we crave is as like the thing 
we have as tweedledum like tweedledee. And yet it is not the 
same, for the thing we have embodies the instincts and the 



BRITAIN 321 

traditions which the greatest of seafaring peoples has slowly 
developed during fifteen centuries. 

Note. For a more complete study of the problem of sea control see 
the author's earlier work, " The Things Men Fight For," Chapters VI 
and XIII. 

One of Germany's fiercest protagonists, Count Reventlow, has stated 
that as regards the use of the seas in time of peace Germany has no 
grievance. Only schemes of conquest are interfered with. 

It is perhaps a mistake to take seriously the newspaper speculation 
which rims riot at a time like this, but it is not always easy to ignore it. 
Our Secretary of the Navy recommends an enormous increase in our 
navy. So be it. We are a naval power with extensive coasts to pro- 
tect and interests exposed to the covetousness of all nations. But now 
comes the report that we are to go to the peace conference armed with 
the greatest navy in the world, — larger than that of Britain, — to de- 
mand the freedom of the seas. What does that mean ? From whom 
are we to demand it? From defeated Germany? From allied France? 
There can be but one answer. From Britain. It is diiSicult to say 
whether such a demand would be characterized most by foolhardiness or 
by criminality. Were it not that certain official pronouncements, in- 
cluding the famous fourteen points, have been disquietingly suggestive 
of an effort to coerce Britain to adopt measures which she regards as 
incompatible with her safety and her duty to the world, the suggestion 
might be dismissed as too preposterous for consideration. 



CHAPTER XX 

AMERICA 

Among the great powers that are actively engaged in the 
world struggle, the position of America seems to be unique. 
The interests involved did not at first seem to be our interests. 
In the territorial sense we were not attacked, nor was any 
attack contemplated, at least during the present conflict. In 
her tactless way, too, Germany made the most earnest eiforts 
to win our friendship, sacrificing what seemed to her substan- 
tial interests in order to do so. We accordingly essayed to 
be neutral, even in our inmost thoughts. When we finally 
entered the contest, it was still with no sense of serious danger. 
Even the submarine warfare which amply justified our course, 
did not seem to threaten our existence. There can be no 
doubt that so far as the popular consciousness is concerned, 
we entered the war for other than the compelling reasons of 
national safety which actuated our Allies. We quite natu- 
rally conclude that our action was on a higher plane and our 
motives more disinterested than those of other nations. Quite 
possibly this was the case. Our motives were naturally deter- 
mined by our appreciation of the situation, and the danger 
that we did not perceive did not influence our action. 

It is perhaps due to this fact that we have shown so marked 
a disposition to emphasize the theoretical and abstract aims 
of the war. The recognition of general principles merely as 
such, of forms of political organization and doctrines of popu- 
lar rights, have seemed the appropriate ends for a nation seek- 
ing no tangible interests to demand as the fruits of victory. 
It has not always occurred to us that the recognition thus de- 
manded might be a mere lip service, and that a nation so 

322 



AMEEICA 323 

skilled in dissembling as is our antagonist might purchase a 
dangerous immunity by conformity to these shibboleths. In 
short there has been an element of serious danger in this con- 
fident assumption that we were free from danger and at lib- 
erty to espouse ideals while others were compelled to think of 
groveling material interests. It has made us quixotic and 
unsympathetic toward the material interests of our Allies, 
careless even of our own. 

For the danger was there, quite as real and quite as seri- 
ous for us as for the others. The perception of this fact has 
become clearer as the war has progressed. The present war 
was not aimed at America, it is true. Its objectives were 
prudently limited to the defeat of Eussia, the appropriation 
of the colonies and capital of France, the incorporation of 
Belgium, and the dismemberment and plunder of the British 
Empire. But with Britain destroyed, France plundered and 
forced into alliance, and Eussia crippled and subject to Ger- 
man exploitation, the Kaiser's purpose to " stand no nonsense 
from America " was ready to reveal its true significance. 
Just what was to happen to us is not clear, nor is it certain 
that war was contemplated. It was probably assumed that 
our nonsense could be dealt with by less expensive means, not 
an unreasonable assumption. It matters little. The impor- 
tant thing is that the Kaiser was to be in a position to say 
what he would stand and what he would not stand. We were 
to recognize his authority. If the lesson of this war were not 
sufiicient, there would be other lessons as needed. 

There is still a tendency in certain quarters to refer to these 
designs with a certain levity. Such an attitude is not war- 
ranted either by the seriousness of German designs or by the 
American capacity for defense. If the Allies had been de- 
feated, — if even now they could be persuaded to accept an 
inconclusive peace, — these German designs would be realized 
with terrible literalness. When we see by how narrow a mar- 



324 THE GREAT PEACE 

gin that disaster has been averted, we can but shudder at the 
danger that we have escaped. 

Whatever our purposes, therefore, in entering the war, our 
purposes in closing it should be shaped by this fuller revela- 
tion. We know now why we ought to have entered the war, 
and that must determine our terms of peace. Kot merely as 
a knight errant generously espousing the cause of weaker 
nations, but as one that stands as our kinsmen stood " with 
our backs to the wall," fighting for the right to live, must we 
make peace with our enemy. 

First of all we must insist upon the exclusion from the 
Western Hemisphere of any power which might endanger our 
peace and our independence. More specifically, we must bar 
Germany from these shores. It has been suggested that this 
0,^ take the form of the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as a 
principle of international law. It would perhaps be better to 
avoid associating such a declaration with this historic doc- 
trine which is too intimately associated with our own country 
and too much motived by our national interests to command 
: the sympathy of the Latin American republics. It is these 
republics that are sure to be the first sufferers from German 
aggression. Brazil was hopelessly in the toils of German 
finance and marked for German appropriation before this war 
began. Erom such a country, — better still, from a group of 
such countries, — the plea for protection may appropriately 
come. It is for diplomacy to arrange these important mat- 
ters of detail, but for American vigilance to see that the neces- 
sary purpose is accomplished.-^ 

Kot that we are to imagine for a moment that such an 

international guaranty will make us safe against aggression. 

It can not be too strongly insisted that no international 

1 For the author's fuller discussion of the Latin American problem 
as related to the United States, and, particularly, to the problem of the 
Caribbean and the Canal, see " America Among the Nations," Chapters 

v-xn. 



AMERICA 325 

power exists or is likely to exist which can of itself and with- 
out national aid secure such ends. A coherent international- 
ism will be a partial internationalism with powerful enemies 
outside that do not own its law. An inclusive and all em- 
bracing internationalism would include the dissensions and 
the dangers against which it exists to defend the world. 
Our right arm must be our defense for a long, long time to 
come. But recognition is not without its value. It puts a 
quietus upon minor protests and at least insures local acquies- 
cence. And if the worst comes, it is easier to fight for a 
recognized right than for an unsupported claim. 

But more material interests may well claim our attention. 
There are disturbing ownerships in the Caribbean which 
menace our control of the Canal, the most vital of all our 
possessions. Holland owns her Dutch Guiana on the Carib- 
bean coast. We could have no more innocent or well disposed 
neighbor if Holland were independent. But Holland is not 
independent. During this war she has done all in her power 
to remain neutral, but Germany has compelled her to grant 
concessions which were a breach of neutrality. This rela- 
tion is always potentially present, a relation of dependence. 
The relation may slowly become one of virtual incorporation 
into the Germanic unity of which Holland is so natural a 
part. Had the Germans succeeded in retaining Belgium as 
they intended, the incorporation of Holland would virtually 
be an accomplished fact. With this incorporation would go 
the power to use Holland's colonies, including Guiana. It 
was precisely this danger which induced us to acquire the 
Virgin Isles from Denmark lest later forcible annexation of 
the little kingdom to Germany might give the latter control 
of a territory dangerous to our safety. The danger is hardly 
less in the case of Holland. 

France is similarly situated, her islands at the eastern end 
of the Caribbean being a close counterpart for the Virgin Isles 



326 THE GREAT PEACE 

and her Guiana similar to that of Holland. But France is 
stronger and seems to be little in danger of incorporation into 
a German Empire. The loss of such colonies as the result of 
an unsuccessful war, however, is not impossible. It would 
have resulted, as we have seen, from a French defeat in the 
present war. To this we may add the fact that these trifling 
possessions are isolated from the great French colonial terri- 
tories and are doubtless unprofitable, the maintenance of com- 
munications being expensive. France is at present heavily 
indebted to the United States for money loaned. In another 
sense the United States is more deeply indebted to France. 
Only with a blush could we accept payment of her debt to 
us, while unable to pay our debt to her. If the cancellation 
of our claim or some very generous portion of it against the 
cession of these scattered fragments of earlier empire could 
simplify the relation involved and lessen the burdens of 
France without a hurt to her sensibilities, it would perhaps 
be of general advantage. But France is not a menace, and if 
she prefers to continue to share with us the responsibilities of 
the Caribbean, we need not regret it. In this sense the case 
is not parallel to that of Denmark and Holland. 

More important than any adjustment of territory is the 
question of the control of the sea. Like Britain, we are a 
naval power. Economically we are less dependent upon sea 
communications than Britain. Isolation would not mean 
starvation, nor would it sever us from any vital part of our- 
selves. 'No nation is so well situated as we are for self- 
suflScient existence. Yet the blockade of our coasts would 
cause us almost inconceivable distress. We should be aston- 
ished to find how long is the list of the necessities for which 
we depend upon foreign lands. Many an industry would be 
brought to a standstill and widespread depression would re- 
sult. 

But the more vital fact is our problem of national defense. 



AMERICA 327 

1^0 great power can ever attack us otherwise than by sea, and 
if we fail to defend ourselves by sea, we shall not defend our- 
selves. Not that land defense is impossible, but it is certain 
to be the one for which we are least prepared, and if the 
stronger arm fails us, the weaker will not prevail. We are 
therefore interested hardly less than Britain in the problem 
of control of the sea. 

It is hardly necessary to repeat here what was said in the 
last chapter on this subject. Far from the noise of battle we 
have been free to indulge in idealistic speculations as our 
Allies have not. Remote realities become unrealities and 
are easily exchanged for the unrealities of speculation on even 
terms. Let us develop internationalism into a reality as 
rapidly as we may, but let there be no interregnum while 
nationalism is relaxed and internationalism is not yet effec- 
tive. We must still keep the seas. 

In framing the treaty of peace there are ends to be kept in 
view which are more vital than those nominated in the bond. 
Of these, none is so important to us or to the world as the 
unity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and this for two reasons. 
In the first place, they have essentially identical interests, 
material and ideal. All are industrial and commercial na- 
tions, dependent for their cooperation and for their contact 
with the world upon the freedom of the sea. That freedom 
is in their keeping, and with it the peace and prosperity of 
the world. United they can easily meet the requirements of 
their responsible position. Divided, they will exhaust them- 
selves with the superhuman task and eventually fail. The 
lessons of these days which have seen the two navies merged 
into a single force and the Union Jack, proudest of national 
emblems, floating from an American flagship, while the 
Stars and Stripes floated from the Parliament House in 
Westminster above the flag of Britain, should not be for- 
gotten. It is the symbol of what must henceforth be if we 
are not to squander our force and risk our existence. 



328 THE GREAT PEACE 

But far more vital is the union of our ideal interests. We 
are all free nations, and intent that the world shall be free. 
The power we hold is held subject to this, our common pur- 
pose. In no selfish particularism of race but as the begin- 
ning of human unity, we strengthen the bonds of common 
ideals and common purpose which make us one. The world 
J will not be united as a motley assemblage of discordant wills, 
^ divergent cultures, and differing developments, all by the 
V^, magic of an agreement and a mechanized procedure. The 
union will come by gradual crystallization around a congenial 
center. Ours is the privilege and ours the responsibility as 
a race, of furnishing that nucleus of crystallization. At the 
center is England, mother of free peoples and free institu- 
tions. Around this center is the larger circle born from her 
or drawn to her, the circle that we call Britain. All Britain 
is British in some very real sense, though only the center is 
English. 

Earther reaching is the larger circle in which we find our 
place. It is not English; it is not British. It is Anglo- 
Saxon. Nearer by far to England than much that is British, 
this outer circle after all owns a different allegiance, uses a 
different symbol, and enjoys a more obvious independence. 
Less clear is the bond of unity, but not less vital. 

Again the circle enlarges and peoples feel the mystic bond 
who are neither English nor British nor Anglo-Saxon, 
France speaks another language, owns a different origin, and 
boasts a different culture. But France is free, and this is 
our talisman. With her accession the widening circle be- 
comes the circle of the free peoples. 

Build about this center the league of the nations. Enlarge 
the circle of the free peoples. Strengthen their hand for the 
defense of the world's liberties. Exchange not the substance 
of things realized for the shadow of things imagined. Wel- 
come the humblest accession of the free in spirit, but bar the 



AMERICA 329 

proudest of the unregenerate. Compel no lip service. Trust 
no deathbed repentances. For neither by clever contrivance 
nor by outward profession of faith, but by unobtrusive growth 
and transformation of spirit will mankind attain the goal 
of unity and peace without the sacrifice of liberty. 



INDEX 



Adriatic, 198 

Africa, 69; German oolonies, 310; 

South Africa, 152, 255, 312 flf. 
Albania, 202, 240, 243, 251 
Aleppo, 259 
Alexandretta, 262 
Algeria, 79 
Alsace-Lorraine, 42, 61, 66, 175 flf., 

287 
America, 82-84, 153, 268, 279, 281, 

302, (Ch. XX) 322 flf. 
Anatolia, 251 ff., 265, 281 
Anglo-Saxons, 149 ff., 262 
Arab, Arabia, 76, 250, 255 ff., 317 
Ararat, 252 



control, 319-321 ; trusteeship, 
79-81; unity, 40 ff. 
Bulgaria, 3, 251, 283 

Cartels, 20 

Catholic; see Vatican 
Cattaro, 199 
Cavour, 297 
Central Powers, 1 
China, 123 ff., 301 ff. 
Chios, 251, 265 
Cilician gates, 256 
Class struggle, 16-19 
Clemenceau, 143 
Coal, 58 ff., 180 ff. 



Armenia, Armenians, 76, 242, 247, Colonies, 94, 105; German, 155, 

251-252, 255 ff., 263 ff., 281 310; Italian, 205; Portuguese, 

Australia, 19, 251 316 

Austria, 113, 131, 192 ff., 207 ff., Constantinople, 107, 249, 251, 

301 (Ch. XVI) 270, 295 

Autocracy, 15, 147, 154, 245 Cordova, 248 

Avlona, 199, 202 Corfu, 199; pact of, 233 

Courland, 147 

Baalbek, 262, 295 Crete, 251 

Bagdad, 248, 259 ;— Railway, 137 Crimean War, 250, 274, 297 

Belgium, 56, 111, 147, (Ch. XI) Croats, 208, 227, 240 



161 ff., 173, 277 
Bessarabia, 220, 227 
Beyrout, 262 
Bismarck, 131 
Bohemia, Bohemian, 46, 48-50, 

208, 215, 234, 241 
Bolshevik, 138, 201 
Bosnia, Bosnian, 208, 227, 232, 

243, 251 
Bosphorus, 104 
Brailsford, 266 
Brazil, 94 
Brest-Litovsk, 295 
Britain, British Empire, 56, 85, 

113, 122, 151, 161, 257-258, 268, 



Cromer, 80 

Cyprus, 251 

Cyrillic alphabet, 233 

Czech, Czechoslovak, see Bohemia 

Dalmatia, Dalmatian, 201-202, 

208, 227 
Danzig, 290 
Dardanelles, 32, 84, 104, 111, 114- 

115, 249, 273 
Democracy, 7 ff., 126, 152, 236 
Denmark, 111, 113-115. 277, 325 
Diplomacy, 7, 127 ff., 137, 302 
Dobrudja, 225 
Duma, 77 



281, 303, (Ch. XIX) 307 ff., 327- 
328; population, 183, 279; sea Egypt, 81, 85, 152, 251, 255, 259 

331 



332 



INDEX 



England, English; see Britain, etc. 
Euphrates, 252 

Finland, 296 

Flume, 204 

France, 78-79, 86, 113, 123, 147, 

161, (Ch. XII) 175 ff., 262, 268, 

276, 281, 312, 325-326 
Fryatt, Captain, 101 

Galicia, 208, 241, 285, 288 

Gallipoli, 282 

German, Germany, 19, 51, 57, 61, 
67, 86, 131, (Ch. X) 143 fiF., 
208 ff., 233, 273, 277, 285 ff., 318, 
323; barbarities, 155, 161 ff.; 
colonies, 155, 301, 310; indem- 
nity from France, 89 ff., 102, 
115; industries, 64, 168; league 
of nations, 117; population, 183; 
potash, 65 

Gibraltar, 104, 111 

Greece, Greek, 56, 65, 76, 256, 265, 
277 

Grey, 131 

Guaranties, 219 

Hague Tribunal, 237, 298 
Hapsburgs, 235 ff., 241 
Hedjaz, 256 

Herzegovina, 208, 227, 251 
Holland, 86, 159, 277, 325 
Hong Kong, 276, 298 
Himgary, 207 ff. 

Imperialism, 47 ; British, 307 ff. 
Indemnities, 87 ff., 96, 171 ff., 175 
India, 69, 152, 259 
International guaranties; see 

guaranties 
Internationalism, 27 ff., 51-53, 84, 

103 ff. 
Iron, 58 ff., 180 ff. 
Isonzo, 197 
Istria, 203-204 
Italy, 39, 44-45, 59, 64, (Ch. 

XIII) 191 ff., 205, 251, 268, 281, 

297 

Japan, 15, 83, 123 ff., 299 ff. 



Jehad, 250 
Jews, 256, 260 flf. 
Jugo-Slavs, 227, 235, 240 

Kiel Canal, 104, 111, 114, 318 
Konigsberg, 290 

Language, 16, 33, 197 ff. 

League of Nations, 109 ff., 328- 

329 
Lichnowsky, 137 
Lloyd George, 155 
Lusitania, 101, 145 

Macedonia, 242, 251, 266 
Magyars, 208, 212, 225 
Malay Peninsula, 70-71 
Manchuria, 305 
Mecca, 250, 255 
Medina, 255 

Mesopotamia, 252, 255, 258 
Militarism, 245 

Mohammedans, 79, 231, 243 ff. 
Monroe Doctrine, 324 
Montenegro, 199, 227 
Moravia, 20 

Nationalism, 15 ff. 
Natural resources, 55 ff. 
New Zealand, 19, 151, 301 
Norway, 277 

Oman, 257 

Palestine, 256 ff. 

Panama Canal, 104, 111, 325 

Panslavism, 285 

Peace, preparation for, 2; pur- 
poses, 3 

Persian Gulf, 252 

Philippines, 82, 153, 279 

Poland, 48, 147, 177, 179, 219 (Ch. 
XVII) 284 ff. 

Population, 183-184, 201 

Portugal, 55, 75-76; colonies, 316 

Posen. 2.S5, 290 

President of the United States, 
108, 128. 137 

Prussia, 42, 113, 161, 290 



INDEX 



333 



Race, 31 ff. 

Religion, 228 ff., 243 ff. 

Restitution, 168 ff.; in kind, 171- 

174; see also Indemnities 
Rhine Province, 187 ff. 
Rhodes, 251 
Roman Empire, 40 ff. 
Roosevelt, 121 
Rumania, Rumanian, 76, 208, 

220 ff., 235, 251 
Russia, Russian, 52, 77, 93, 113, 

131, 212, 215, 223, 273, 277, (Ch. 

XVII) 284 ff., 303, 305 
Ruthenians, 212 

Samas, 251, 265 

Schleswig-Holstein, 113 

Sea, access to, 234; freedom of, 

103-104, 107, 317-319, 326-327 
Self determination, 10 
Serbia, Serbian, 48, 200 ff., 227, 

240, 251, 282 
Sidon, 262 

Slavonia, 208, 227, 240 
Slavs, 203, 212, 232, 285 ff. 
Slovaks, see Bohemians 
Slovenes, 208, 227 
Smyrna, 256 
Spain, 55, 75-76, 84 
Suez Canal, 104, HI, 261 
Sweden, 151, 277 
Switzerland, 405 
Syria, 256 ff. 



Taurus Mountains, 256, 263 

Territory, (Ch. IV) 44 ff. 

Thasos, 251 

Thirty Years' War, 215 

Thrace, 251 

Tigris, 252 

Transportation, 47 

Transylvania, 212, 223, 225 

Treaties, 127 ff.; secret, 201 

Trentino, 194 ff. 

Trieste, 4, 199, 202 ff. 

Triple Alliance, 45 

Tripoli, 205, 251 

Tropics, 68 

Trusteeship, (Ch. VI), 67 ff., 206 

Tsingtao, 301 

Tunis, 79, 251 

Turkey, 76, 94, 205, (Ch. XV) 

242 ff. 
Tyre, 262 

United States of America, see 

America 
Ukraine, 39 

Vatican, 192 ff., 232 
Vladivostok, 295 

War between nations, 20 
Wilson, see President of the 
United States 

Zemstvos, 77 



PRINTED IN THB UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



T 



HE following pages contain advertisements of books 
by the same author or on kindred subjects 



H. H. POWERS' NEW WORK 

America and Britain 

The Story of the Relations Between Twc Peoples 

By H. H. powers 

This new work of Mr. Powers, though but a little 
book of some eighty pages, sets forth in vigorous style 
the story of our relationship with Great Britain from 
the struggle for independence to this day ; that people 
with whom we have had more to do, — and must seem- 
ingly continue to have more to do, — than with any 
other in the world. The fact that we are British in 
origin, in culture, institutions, laws and language is 
seen to have influenced us in the many crises that have 
arisen in the years of our history as a nation. Dr. 
Powers* work is nice in its balance, and sane and trust- 
worthy in its judgments. The book rings true to these 
times and in every patriotic school the classes in 
American history should read it as supplementary to 
their regular textbook. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Ayenue New York 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



America Among the Nations 

By H. H. powers, Ph.D. 

$1.50 

"For an understanding of this new crisis that we are facing in 
1918 we know of no book more useful or more searching or clearer 
or more readable than H. H. Powers' 'America among the 
Nations.' It is really a biography, or rather, a biographical study. 
Its hero, however, is not a man but an imperial people." 

— Outlook, New York. 

"Mr. Powers takes unusually broad views and they are en- 
forced by a historical knowledge and a logical development of 
ideas that carry conviction. ... An excellent book." 

— Philadelphia Public Ledger. 

"All the great problems that here confront us are discussed 
from the standpoint of an international observer free from cant, 
and the result is refreshing. This is particularly true of his 
treatment of Pan-Americanism." — Argonaut, San Francisco. 

"Thoughtful, interesting, unsentimental and stimulating." 

— New Republic. 

"Nowhere is our position in relation to other nations discussed 
with greater clearness and ability." — N. Y. Herald. 

"Remarkable acumen and insight . . . clear, straightforward 
comment on some of the most momentous questions of our 
times." — Chicago Daily News. 

"As honest as the day and as fascinating as a mystery novel . . . 
a finely informative treatise." — Chicago Herald. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 

The Things Men Fight For 

By H. H. powers 



$1.50 



'An able, unprejudiced and illuminating treatment of a 
burning question." — Philadelphia North American. 

" Probably no other book dealing with the war and its 
sources has made so dispassionate and unbiased a study of 
conditions and causes as does this volume." — New York 
Times. 

" Out of the unusual knowledge born of wide observation 
and experience came this unusual book. We may not alto- 
gether agree with its conclusions, but we must admire the 
breadth of it, and feel better informed when we have perused 
it. The liberal spirit of it cannot fail to impress the careful 
reader." — Literary Digest. 

" Dr. Powers' volume is one of the most arresting, stimu- 
lating, and original discussions dealing with the fundamental 
causes of war thus far published." — Philadelphia Press. 

" The author's style, vivacious and often eloquent, lends 
added distinction to one of the most significant and able of 
recent treatments of the world problem of to-day." 

— Baltimore American. 

" Without doubt it is one of the best books of the year rela- 
tive to the great European war, because it calmly gives all 
sides of the question and is critically analytic. If one can 
enjoy reading a war book this is the one." — Boston Globe. 

" One of the few books dealing with the controversial as- 
pects of the Great War that every one, no matter how much 
in disagreement with its opinions, must be glad has been 
written." — The Independent 



THE MACMTLLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue Kew York 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



The Art of Florence : An Interpretation 

By H. H. powers 

With Illiistrations , Cloth, %2.oo 

This book was previously published under the title, Mornings 
with Masters of Art. It has been reprinted with slight correc- 
tions in the text. 

"Mr. Powers deals with the evolution of art from Constantine 
to the death of Michael Angelo. He virtually covers the history 
of Christian art. ... He has produced one of the most stimu- 
lating books that have been written on this important subject. 
His style is lucid, and his thought is free and individual." 

— Philadelphia Public Ledger. 

"It is very refreshing to come across a work of this independent 
and personal quality in which the author has drawn all his in- 
spirations directly from the original sources." — Boston Transcript. 

"The result of his daily contact with the greatest works of 
modem artists is to give his book a certain freshness and original- 
ity that is not found in the work of those who deliberately prepare 
for the writing of a book. The author takes up all the great 
Italian pamters, but his discussions of Botticelli, Donatello, 
Leonardo, Raphael, and Michael Angelo are especially full and 
satisfying. He is one of those who can see little in 'The Last 
Judgment,' although his appreciation of the work on the vaulted 
ceiling of the Sistine Chapel is the best that we have ever seen. 
The book is elaborately illustrated from photographs, many of 
which are not common." — San Francisco Chronicle, 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



League of Nations. Vols. I and II 

By THEODORE MARBURG 

Each $.60 

" This little book is a history of the movement in the 
United States to secure action by the United States and 
other nations, after this great world war, looking to the 
establishment of a League to Enforce Peace. Mr. 
Marburg, the author, is a student of international law, 
a publicist, and a diplomat of marked ability and learn- 
ing. . . . Mr. Marburg, with Mr. Holt of the Inde- 
pendent, was the first to move for the formation of a 
League to Enforce Peace, and has been most diligent 
and effective in promoting the League ever since. . . . 
I hope that Mr. Marburg's little book will be widely 
read." — Hon. William Howard Taft, in Preface. 

The End of the War 

By WALTER E. WEYL 

Author of " American World Policies," " The New 
Democracy," etc. 

$2.00 
" The most courageous book on politics published in 
America since the war began." — The Dial. 

" An absorbingly interesting book . . . the clearest 
statement yet presented of a most difficult problem," — 
Philadelphia Ledger. 

" Mr. Weyl says sobering and important things. . . . 
His plea is strong and clear for America to begin to 
establish her leadership of the democratic forces of the 
world ... to insure that the settlement of the war is 
made on lines that will produce international amity 
everywhere." — N. Y. Times. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



H^i^s P 



Q ^ 












•ft' *.^^ * ^ 














•8- <? 



A <. ♦-TV.' .0^ -^b -.,.' A ^ ♦-^T; 






69*. 



• •♦ 
















V^^'\/ 





%.** 




►'^'.'^^V .0^.*:.^.% /.».^:^V . 












^• ^^^% \1 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 



Treatment Date: ^^ 



m\ 



^fff*' 0^ "^^ *'••»-' A <. *' PreservationTechnologies 

rt^ •»•'•♦ *V> 4 V" B • " • « *<^ A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PBESERVATIOM 

C **i«/?5fe,* v5 J** 'j^^^tV.^* *C» 111 Thomson Park Drive 

C> « *^J^ni^>3>* *4» -V ^J^^URka Vf Cranberry Township, PA 16066 

Afx* . iHlrBSo/Ti * ^ v^ rfl^te^lGI. ' (72417792111 







• "- ./.-^iX <'°-:^^'> *^*.'^-*^ 






-^^d^ 
.<?^ 



r^o^ 

























HECKMAN 
BINDERY INC. |e 

>^^ JUN 89 

N. MANCHESTER, 
INDIANA 46962 








rti^ii^' 



''bv^ 



-^^d^ 



